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# Problems of Australian Foreign Policy

June 1956-June 1957

By GEOFFREY SAWER

This survey is mainly concerned with January-June 1957; the more extended title merely indicates that some issues are introduced from the latter half of 1956, because Professor Macmahon Ball's survey in the last number was concerned exclusively with the Middle East crises.

The general atmosphere in which Australian foreign policy has operated during this period remained much the same as in the previous year. The Suez and Hungarian crises worsened Great Power relations, but they also weakened the position of both the American and the Russian blocs, for different reasons; the internal American demand for budget economy and reduction of external commitments matched Russian domestic political developments which, in spite of the Hungarian panic, continued in general to produce a more conciliatory attitude towards the non-Communist world. But jockeying for power and for the control of oil resources in the Middle East offset these ameliorating influences, and the world continued to be an armed camp, in which small nations had the awkward choice of being camp followers or of trying to preserve a precarious neutrality which neither of the main blocs might respect.

From February to June of 1957, there seemed some possibility of the Special Sub-Committee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission making progress; the Russians showed interest in a combination of aerial inspection and ground control plans, to meet the Western emphasis on supervision as essential to the restriction of nuclear weapons. But by the end of June, most of these hopes had evaporated and instead the Great Powers had embarked upon a competition in boasting about their progress with intercontinental ballistic missiles. Hence the Australian Government has been left to face substantially the same problems as in 1955-6; it must maintain satisfactory relations with a power group capable of defending the country, and yet encourage, so far as possible, the development of a peaceful and stable world order.

## The Suez

This writer agrees substantially with the study of the Suez problem by Professor Ball in the previous issue. The Eleventh Assembly of the United Nations remained in special session until 8 March 1957 in order to supervise the Israeli withdrawal. At the end of 1956, Israeli forces still occupied various parts of Egyptian territory, and Israel attempted to bargain for better boundaries or better guarantees from the Great Powers or from the U.N., before withdrawing. Meanwhile, the General Assembly on 19 January and 2 February 1957 passed resolutions condemning the Israelis for their failure to withdraw, but the second resolution also (to the disgust of the Arab and Communist bloc) emphasised the necessity for scrupulous observance of the 1949 general armistice by both Israel and Egypt, and for placing



the United Nations Emergency Force on the demarcation line. The Australian delegate, Sir Percy Spender, voted for these resolutions, and in accompanying speeches emphasised the provocation under which the Israelis had acted, the illegalities of which the Egyptians had been guilty, and the necessity for achieving a stable peace in the area and an end of Arab determination to destroy Israel. However, he did not go so far as to propose specific safeguards for Israel.

The Australian delegation also raised the question of the authority of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), which the Secretary-General had stressed was present on Egyptian soil solely by Egyptian consent and could operate only within the limits permitted by Egypt. Sir Percy Spender suggested that UNEF should have an authority independent of Egyptian consent. The Secretary-General convincingly replied that the force was not there pursuant to any Security Council resolution—which might conceivably give it coercive authority—but solely under Assembly resolutions. The Charter plainly gave the Assembly no independent authority for such action, and accordingly Egyptian consent (and as to Israel territory, Israeli consent) was the only possible legal basis for these operations. It is surprising and regrettable that much more study and publicity have not been given to the performance of UNEF in this episode. Korea was a somewhat fictional example of the U.N. obtaining “teeth”, whereas in Egypt the U.N. forces were genuinely international, and built up in difficult circumstances a body of military and political experience which could be of the utmost value in the development of the organisation. One would have expected a middle power like Australia to have given every assistance in this process. Instead, it is to be feared that the discussion initiated by Sir Percy Spender on 1 February 1957 was designed less for the strengthening of U.N. authority than for scoring off the Egyptians. The Soviet bloc naturally enough regarded the discussion as showing a desire to do through a U.N. force what the United Kingdom and France had failed to do the previous November.

The Canal was opened for shipping on 29 March, thanks to salvage operations whose cost Australia helped to defray, and on the same day the Egyptian Government announced terms in accordance with which the Canal would be operated. These were elaborated on 24 April, in a document which Egypt lodged with the Secretary-General of U.N. and declared to be an “international instrument”. This declaration announced that Egypt would observe the terms of the 1888 Convention, would devote specified proportions of dues (which must be paid direct to Egypt) to Canal operations, to improvement programmes, and to royalties, would not vary tolls beyond one per cent. in a year without consultation, and would continue to operate the Canal through the government agency created in July 1956. On 26 April, the Security Council, at the instance of the U.S.A., discussed this document. The U.S. delegate indicated briefly that his Government was not satisfied with the Egyptian statement, but considered that the subsequent behaviour of the Egyptians in the matter would be more important than the document, and accordingly without abandoning any claims his Government was prepared to authorise American use of the Canal under the system indicated by the Egyptian statement. The Australian representative (Dr. Walker) made a caustic attack on the Egyptian declaration, objecting to almost every feature of it and asserting that it did not amount to a



carrying out of the Security Council's "Six Point" resolution of 13 October 1956. Only the Soviet bloc accepted the Egyptian declaration without demur. The United Kingdom criticised it along lines similar to the Australian attack, but the Australians were the most outspoken critics.<sup>1</sup> It was inevitable that the Western group should criticise this document, but it is doubtful whether the Australian Government showed wisdom in refusing to concede any merits at all to the attitude displayed by the Egyptian declaration. In some respects, Australia was cutting off its nose to spite its face. For example, Dr. Walker (like the U.K. representative) said that although the Egyptian declaration had been promulgated as an international instrument, it remained simply a unilateral declaration which the Egyptians could modify or withdraw at will. It might have been better tactics to accept the document as a binding promise on which Australia and like-minded nations proposed to act, so as to create at least the possibility of establishing a multilateral obligation incapable of change without agreement. (The Swedish delegation adopted such an attitude.) This need not have prejudiced criticism of details in the instrument and the expression of a resolve—however academic—to continue negotiations with President Nasser. Neither the Great Powers nor the U.N. were willing or able at this stage to put any further pressure on the Egyptians, and it was a case for making the best of the situation rather than for continuing the peevish attitude of a bad loser.<sup>2</sup> In another part of his speech, Dr. Walker gave a good illustration of what could usefully be said by drawing the attention of Egypt to the many measures open to the great seafaring nations, if the Egyptians did not observe a reasonable and conciliatory policy in their management of the Canal.

On 2 April, the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Casey, tabled a statement on international affairs in the Commonwealth House of Representatives and Senate, which was then extensively debated and provided *inter alia* a post-mortem on Suez. Neither Mr. Casey nor any other Government speakers were prepared to find reassurance in the Egyptian statement of 29 March, adumbrating the declaration of 24 April. Ministers and Government supporters continued to justify the Anglo-French action of the previous November and the part which Mr. Menzies had played in those events, and to seek comfort from the theory that this intervention had prevented Russian domination of the area. Many Government speakers trenchantly criticised the U.S.A. for the role which it had played in the whole affair, and some regretted that the U.K. and France had not carried their military intervention to completion. The Labor Party maintained the attitude of hostility towards the Anglo-French policy which it had displayed from the beginning, and was able both in principle and with much detail to say "we told you so". The Labor Party was prepared to give Egyptian management of the Canal a fair trial; the Government had in fact no option but to do the same.

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<sup>1</sup>Dr. Walker even repeated the fatuous criticism that the Egyptians had had no military reason for blocking the Canal. Actually there was obviously some military justification, and it was ridiculous to expect that the Egyptians would act with complete calm, and with saintly self-abnegation, when attacked by three Powers.

<sup>2</sup>Similarly, Mr. Casey grudgingly acknowledged Egypt's acceptance of International Court of Justice compulsory jurisdiction; 24 July 1957.



## Hungary

The Soviet repression of Hungarian moves towards genuine self-government in October 1956 provided the Western bloc with a golden opportunity for discrediting Communist régimes, and the Australian Government took full advantage of that opportunity. Australian spokesmen were well to the fore in the series of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions in the United Nations from 28 October onwards.<sup>3</sup> While the emotional relation of these actions to the Suez business was clear enough, Australian actions also had an independent basis in every feature of the Menzies Government's foreign policy; it was action following a joint U.S.-United Kingdom lead, it was damaging to the prestige and influence of the Soviet Union and of Communism generally, and it was brought formally within the framework of the United Nations. Australia played more than a supporting role. Mr. Keith Shann, a permanent officer of the Australian Department of External Affairs and Australian Ambassador at Manila, was appointed Rapporteur of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary established by the General Assembly on 10 January 1957. The other delegations were all from small powers, and included neutralist Ceylon and Arab-bloc Tunisia. It was largely due to the intellectual brilliance and the conciliatory personality of Mr. Shann that this Committee unanimously produced a report<sup>4</sup> which is a sober narrative of the Hungarian affair, and an indictment of Russian actions. It is likely that the Report under-emphasises the part played in the Hungarian history by the course of American propaganda and secret service activities; the Committee disposed convincingly of Communist suggestions that the Hungarian plot was specifically and directly "organised" by imperialist counter-revolutionaries, but it does not dispose of the suggestion that American counter-revolutionary propaganda had created an over-optimistic attitude among some of the Hungarian freedom fighters, and had encouraged Hungarian reactionaries to try to climb on the band-waggon. The Report also fails to dispose of the suggestion that the contemporary events in the Middle East contributed to Russian policy. The Australian Government also authorised Mr. Eugene Gorman, Q.C., to question Hungarian refugees in Australia. Mr. Gorman produced a careful narrative, but his work is open to the criticism that operating almost single-handed, he could not cross-examine and check the statements of his necessarily anonymous witnesses in the manner which would be required by a genuinely judicial examination, and his witnesses had had time for mutual discussion, producing a "theory of the case". The Shann Committee, with greater resources, was able to do much more in the way of cross-checking, and some of its chief witnesses were examined in public. The Australian Government was also prompt to offer refuge to some 2,000 (later raised to 15,000) of the 190,000 Hungarians fleeing from the Communist counter-terror.

### Some Issues in the United Nations

#### (i) *Organisation*

In November 1956, the Latin-American states raised in the Assembly the

<sup>3</sup>Mr. Casey advocated expulsion of the Kadar Government representatives at U.N.; *Current Notes*, Vol. 27, No. 12, Dec. 1956, p. 843.

<sup>4</sup>Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary.



question of expanding the size of the Security Council, with a consequent change in its voting procedure, so as to provide a larger and more certain representation for the Latins and the Afro-Asian bloc. The issue was discussed from time to time in plenary session in November and December, but no agreement was secured and the item is now on the agenda for the Twelfth Session. Australia supported the U.S.-U.K. policy, favouring an increase of two in Security Council non-permanent membership, and a consequential modification of the "gentlemen's agreement" of 1946 on regional distribution, so that one additional seat would be allocated to the Afro-Asian bloc and one to the Latins. Between the U.S.S.R., which objects to any change until Communist China is seated, and some Afro-Asians and Latins who want a much bigger expansion, the U.S.-U.K.-Australian proposal is a sensible compromise. The Security Council should remain a relatively small executive body, but the present weighting of world bloc representation is unjust, particularly to the Asian and Soviet groups. An expansion of two is perhaps not quite sufficient to overcome the injustice—three might be necessary, but any further increase would make the Security Council even less effective than it now is.

The U.S.A. again raised in the Assembly the question of admitting South Korea and South Vietnam to U.N. membership. As usual the U.S.S.R. (which had previously vetoed similar applications in the Security Council) counter-proposed the admission of North Korea and North Vietnam as well, and also Outer Mongolia, while various Afro-Asian-Latin combinations proposed further study, so as to avoid committing themselves to either of the propaganda gestures—they were little more—which the Great Power resolutions represented. Australia supported the U.S. proposals and opposed the Soviet ones. On 28 February, the plenary session carried resolutions for the admission of South Korea and South Vietnam, with the Soviet bloc opposing and the Afro-Asians abstaining; at writing, this resolution had not been considered by the Council. This was an insoluble problem under existing circumstances. The Soviet bloc could not permit South Vietnam and South Korea to be treated as if they alone had the legitimate governments for the whole of their respective areas, and equally the U.S.A. could not abandon its South Korean and South Vietnamese allies. Perhaps admission of all four Governments would facilitate eventual unification, as the Indian delegation hopefully suggested, but this is speculative. It was consistent with the general policy of the Australian Government that it should support the U.S.A. on the matter, though it could with equal propriety have taken the attitude that the situation being incapable of solution until Korea and Vietnam have been unified, the whole discussion was pointless.

In October 1956, the United Kingdom brought before the Fifth Committee a proposal to put an absolute limit to the total overall budget of the United Nations. This was in accordance with Australian policy, which favours pruning of U.N. activities. But New Zealand led a group favouring the more constructive policy of establishing priorities in U.N. work, and the upshot of the discussion was a recommendation to the Secretary to submit proposals along these lines to the Twelfth Assembly. The United Kingdom and the New Zealand suggestions both had obvious merits. It is, however, surprising that Commonwealth nations—especially such like-minded Governments as New Zealand, Australia and the U.K.—had not reached a common policy on a matter of this sort beforehand.



As a result of the Anglo-Australian indignation with U.N. actions in relation to Suez, Mr. Menzies, like some U.K. statesmen, has suggested in general terms that U.N. debating and voting procedures should be altered.<sup>5</sup> However, no formal proposals to this effect have been put forward by the Australian Government, and it is difficult to see how any such proposals could be framed, leave alone carried. No doubt Mr. Menzies was moved by his general feeling that the U.N. ought to express the responsible views of powerful and conservatively-minded nations. During the House of Representatives debate in April, many Government speakers criticised the U.N. along similar lines, pointing out that the Afro-Asians and Latin blocs tend to vote because of bargains made between delegations, in which support is traded on various issues and irresponsible majority decisions emerge. This sort of thing does go on at New York, sometimes on an even larger scale and in an even more cynical fashion than occurs in national parliaments with a multi-party or multi-group political system such as France or the U.S.A. itself. But it is a gross misrepresentation of the position to suggest that any such thing happened in relation to the Suez issue; the majorities against the U.K., France and Israel there were voting on a genuine conviction both as to the legality and as to the wisdom of the actions they condemned. If the Assembly is to be anything like a legislative body in a democratic system, then the voting must give some approach to equality between the member states. The small nations can hardly be expected to accept a position which would amount virtually to one party rule. Like many other features of the present Australian Government's attitude towards U.N., proposals of this kind reflect temporary passions or irritations over specific issues, not a considered coherent theory about the long-term function and development of the organisation.

## (ii) *Colonial Issues*

As usual the Australian delegations were frequently to be found voting with the "colonial" powers against resolutions supported by the Soviet, Afro-Asians and (though nowadays much less reliably) the Latin-Americans.<sup>6</sup> Amongst the matters under this head were Algeria, Cyprus, the treatment of Indians in South Africa, race conflict in South Africa, questions relating to the Mandated Territory of South-West Africa, and West New Guinea. In every case, the Australian delegation adopted the most rigid possible interpretation of the "domestic jurisdiction" clause in the Charter—2 (7)—and voted against inscription or consideration of relevant items or (when overruled at that stage) either voted against subsequent resolutions or abstained from voting as seemed desirable in order to indicate a sustained opposition to the sort of "domestic interferences" which these questions invite. Thus on Algeria, Australia indicated that it would be prepared to vote for a "goodwill" resolution, in fact voted *against* the motion—little more than a goodwill one—which the First Committee finally adopted, but in the end supported the compromise

<sup>5</sup>Speech at Australia Club, London, 8 July 1957. He raised the matter at the Commonwealth Conference on 1 July; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 July 1957. The Conference Communiqué (5 July) mentioned briefly the desirability of improving U.N., with no indication of the kind of improvement intended.

<sup>6</sup>In the Eleventh Assembly, the Latin-Americans proved very important for voting purposes, to some extent confirming the view of Dr. Evatt in 1945 that Australia would do well to cultivate their friendship.



"goodwill" resolution, worked out in consultation with the Arabs and France, which was carried unanimously in plenary session on 15 February 1957.

The Cyprus question took a new turn, because in addition to the usual Greek and Turkish initiatives, the U.K. raised a complaint about Greek incitements to Cypriot revolt, and this in the Australian view<sup>7</sup> was a matter properly within U.N. jurisdiction. Since the Greek complaints about the suppression of self-determination in Cyprus<sup>8</sup> were not by way of defence or counter-claim, it was perhaps logical enough for the Australian delegation to maintain its objection to the consideration of those matters, notwithstanding its support for hearing the U.K. complaint. In the end, an Indian compromise "goodwill" resolution was carried by a large vote, Australia supporting.

On the South African questions, Australia has always taken a view antagonistic to the annual effort of the Afro-Asians to procure resolutions condemning "apartheid" in general and the treatment of Indian minorities in particular; the Australian view depends partly on "domestic jurisdiction" objections, strong here because the issue comes close to the original "White Australia" reasons for tightening up Article 2 (7), and partly on a feeling that such problems are better settled through Commonwealth channels than through the U.N. But it is not so easy to justify the Australian attitude on the question of South-West Africa. South Africa has refused to bring that former Mandate under the U.N. Trusteeship system, but the International Court of Justice advised in 1950 that the area remained a Mandate, with the General Assembly succeeding to the rights and responsibilities of the Council of the League of Nations. One might have expected a "rule of law" country and middle power like Australia to encourage respect for I.C.J. decisions as an end in itself, superior to such doubtful advantages as we might obtain from cultivating the goodwill of the South African racialists. Instead, Australian delegations have each year questioned the correctness of the I.C.J. decision of 1950, and have tried to restrict the attempts of the Assembly's South-West Africa Committee (set up to give effect to the 1950 decision) to discharge its functions. This attitude was carried to extremes when Australia voted against granting a hearing to the Rev. Michael Scott at the Fourth Committee consideration of the Report of the Committee on South-West Africa, on 7 December 1956.<sup>9</sup> There seems no good reason why Australia should continue to attract to itself some of the odium which South Africa has earned for itself in Asia, and particularly in India, whose goodwill would seem of more importance to this country.

The West New Guinea question came before the General Committee on 14 November 1956, and as usual Australia sought and obtained a hearing to oppose inscription of the item, but not expressly on the "domestic jurisdiction" objection. Mr. Casey, speaking for Australia, based his objections on the substantive ground that Indonesia had no case, and that debate on the item could only worsen relations between the relevant powers. The item was put on the agenda 47-18-14, and both among the opposition and among the abstentions there figured a considerable

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<sup>7</sup>Mr. R. G. Casey himself handled the matter.

<sup>8</sup>Raised also in 1954 and 1955.

<sup>9</sup>Mr. Scott was heard. South Africa absented itself from all these discussions.



number of Latin-Americans. In February 1957, the First Committee proceeded to debate a resolution requesting the General Assembly to appoint a Good Offices Commission to assist in negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. Sir Percy Spender represented Australia on this occasion and on 25 February subjected the Indonesian case to a minute examination. He showed that Indonesia's legal grounds were weak, and that so far as colonialism was concerned, the handing over of West New Guinea would subject its Papuans to permanent separation from their brother-Papuans and to the rule of another alien race, without any Trusteeship safeguards. Thus far, Sir Percy Spender's observations were sensible and appropriate, but he got on to rather dangerous ground when asserting that Australia had special interests in the Territory which must also be considered. This left it open to the Indian delegate (Mr. Menon) to enquire what the interest could be, but an imperialist and strategic one. Sir Percy weakly replied that the special interest was the wellbeing of the West New Guinea natives. The resolution failed to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority in plenary session (27 February 1957). There is ample evidence that Dutch retention of West New Guinea is strongly favoured by majority Australian opinion, and any Australian government would be bound to express this view in U.N. Perhaps our delegations are a little over-eager to speak on the issue; perhaps, however, their excessive zeal is partly excused by the unintelligent attitude which the Indians, with equal and opposite zeal, so assiduously display on behalf of the Indonesians.<sup>10</sup>

### (iii) *Human Rights*

In December 1956, the Third Committee resumed its long drawn out task of drafting the proposed Convention on Human Rights in the economic, social and cultural fields. The Committee adopted Articles 6 (right to work), 7 (right to just and favourable conditions of work), 8 (trade union rights), 9 (right to social security), 10 (protection to family life, pregnant mothers and young children), 11-12 (right to adequate standard of living), and 13 (right to physical and mental health). Australia abstained from the final vote on 6-12 inclusive, but voted in favour of 13. (The U.K. and the U.S.A. abstained on all these clauses. New Zealand abstained on 6, but voted for the rest.) The average Australian might be both shocked and surprised at this; shocked because he might think his Government is indifferent to such matters, and surprised because he might think Australia's standards on such matters are in any event as high as any achieved in other countries.

The Australian Government's attitude on human rights derives from many considerations. Article I of the Convention (adopted in 1955) provides for the "right" of dependent peoples to self-determination. This provision, reflecting the disingenuous attitudes of Soviet, Afro-Asian and Latin-American countries which engage in unlimited internal colonialism, but are filled with solicitude for external "colonies", constitutes a formidable obstacle to any of the "trustee" countries ever ratifying the Convention as a whole; they are not willing to subject themselves to the sort of ill-informed criticism and pressure which might result if they recognise

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<sup>10</sup>Note Mr. Casey's statement of 11 Feb. 1957, welcoming a statement by the Indonesian Ambassador to Australia to the effect that Indonesia would not use force in relation to West New Guinea; *Current Notes*, Vol. 28, No. 2, Feb. 1957, p. 147.



a "right to self-determination".<sup>11</sup> "Territory" difficulties also arise under other Articles. Secondly, there is the federal difficulty; most of the social claims under consideration fall within the competence of the Australian States, or under joint regulation of Commonwealth and States. Although in this writer's opinion it would be within the constitutional power of the Commonwealth to give effect to such conventions, once adopted, by its own legislation and administration, it might in many cases be unwise, politically inexpedient or administratively inconvenient to follow such a course; hence the views of the States must be considered.<sup>12</sup> Thirdly, the politico-legal setting in which the exercise is being carried out produces an attitude towards the concept of "rights" conflicting with the traditional notions of Anglo-American legal science. As can be seen from those listed above, we are dealing not with "rights" in any precise legal sense of the term, but with broad political and social claims or purposes, which might well be set out as the preferred *values* of a civilised modern state. Expressed as "rights" they are either unintelligible or misleading; they also put too much emphasis on what the individual thinks he can demand from government, and make no reference to the duties and responsibilities which he should also be accepting. Fourthly, there is a touch of the grotesque about the enterprise when one considers the sort of countries and governments which have busied themselves so much with procuring this convention; for example, to have the U.S.S.R. pressing for self-determination, Hungary for freedom of trade unions, Saudi Arabia for women's rights, and India for the right to work, and these not simply as desirable objectives but as immediately binding obligations, is offensive to anyone with a sense of what an international obligation ought to mean. Australian governments decline to ratify such instruments because of quite minor divergences between convention and domestic law. Fifthly, the drafting of individual clauses is bad, as must be expected from the work of a committee of eighty-odd nations, most of whom actively participate in the task. Sixthly, individual difficulties arise with particular clauses; for example, the Commonwealth might find itself compelled to dictate the policy of industrial arbitration tribunals (*e.g.* on equal pay for the sexes), which for reasons of constitutional law<sup>13</sup> and of politics might be difficult or inadvisable.

Running through the Australian attitudes and voting at U.N., on all issues, one can see many excellent features. There is the intellectual rectitude which avoids dishonest statements, the moral rectitude which avoids dishonest promises, and the good taste which avoids flatulence and boasting. It is also inevitable that on issues directly related to Australian domestic politics, the policy should be conservative, extremely anti-Communist and over-sensitive about Australian State rights. However, the policy also produces an impression of doctrinaire adherence to the sort of qualities indicated above, to the extent of giving the country an overall reputation for a somewhat bone-headed conservatism, a conservatism become in its total effect reactionary. This could be avoided if more opportunities were

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<sup>11</sup>For example, no Australian government could accept a commitment which ignored the interests of the non-Papuan population in New Guinea.

<sup>12</sup>The U.S.A. and Canada have similar difficulties.

<sup>13</sup>In this writer's opinion, there is actually no constitutional obstacle.

sought for going along with the majority on colonialism, economic assistance, human rights and similar issues, occasionally taking a small legal risk rather than forever negating or abstaining. It is a great advantage that the country's policy should have an overall reputation for integrity, but it would not be in the long-term interests of Australia to acquire (as can easily happen) a corresponding reputation for cold-heartedness and priggishness. Australia's generous activities, such as Colombo Plan, cannot be brought into these other debates in a sufficiently convincing way, and in any event appear very marginal to most of the recipients.

### **South-East Asia Treaty Organisation**

The Council of Ministers of SEATO met in Canberra from 11 to 13 March. Mr. Menzies opened the meeting and Mr. Casey was Australia's chief representative. New Zealand was also represented by its Minister for External Affairs. France, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom did not send representatives of corresponding seniority, but the U.S.A. more than made up by sending its Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles. The important discussions concerned action against Communist activities, and defence, and were held in strict secrecy.

A public report on the activities of the previous year said that while the danger of war had receded in South-East Asia—a development said to be due partly to the existence of SEATO itself—the Communists had increased their efforts at peaceful “subversion”, and SEATO had correspondingly increased its “peaceful” counter-measures. During the year, there had been four conferences of military advisers and one of anti-subversion experts, as well as a number of military exercises. A permanent headquarters had been established in Bangkok, and the full-time staff comprised 51 persons.

At the end of the meeting, a communiqué was issued indicating the following developments for 1957-8. First, continuation of military planning and exercises, including the establishment of a permanent Military Planning Office in Bangkok.<sup>14</sup> Secondly, continuation of the anti-subversion programme, with emphasis on “exposure” of Communist infiltration and propaganda techniques. Thirdly, greater stress on economic and social collaboration, including a conference to discuss Asian civilisations and cultures, the establishment of “SEATO Fellowships” to encourage study and research “in fields of special interest to SEATO”, and educational co-operation within the Treaty area. Fourthly, strengthening of the permanent organisation in Bangkok by appointing a Secretary-General and Deputy. The Australian Government, which had much to do with the establishment of SEATO in 1954, played a vigorous part in these negotiations; it promised to provide £A2 million in economic aid for the special SEATO programme and has provided the Deputy Secretary-General. (The first Secretary-General was a Thai, Mr. Pote Sarasin, since resigned on his appointment as Thai Premier.)

SEATO has now reached a high level of organisational and technical complexity, and the Council meeting provided Canberra residents, including the writer, with the opportunity of seeing how serious an enterprise it has become. Nevertheless,

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<sup>14</sup>An Australian military officer has since been appointed Secretary.



one must entertain a number of reservations about the organisation. There can be no question of the value and importance of Australian defence collaboration with New Zealand and the U.S.A. as exemplified by ANZUS,<sup>15</sup> and measures to support non-Communist governments in Asia which need and desire external guarantees are likewise justified. But the American pattern of bilateral pacts may turn out to be a better system than the attempt at creating a South-East Asian NATO. The basic difficulty with SEATO from this point of view is its unsatisfactory Asian membership, and the unlikelihood of this situation improving. Pakistan can provide little effective security contribution in the threatened area. Thailand is an unstable military oligarchy, how unstable having again been demonstrated by the *coup d'état* of September 1957 in which Marshal Pibul Songgram was displaced—and Thailand, of all places, is SEATO'S headquarters! The Philippines is a most untypical Asian power. In its present form, SEATO appears an association of threatened non-Asian powers seeking to provide themselves with some Asian allies in order to conceal their fundamental nature and interests. It is a mere parody of a U.N. regional agreement. Hence while there may be short-term advantages in SEATO military arrangements, it is difficult to support the development of the organisation beyond the military field, or to place undue reliance on it even as a purely defence measure. Hence also, in this writer's view, the decision to expand SEATO'S economic, social and cultural activities was a mistake. Colombo Plan and United Nations programmes adequately cover the economic field, and have the advantage of offering aid which is not and cannot be resented because of strategic accompaniments. UNESCO, ECAFE, and the South Pacific Commission in various ways and areas cover fields of cultural contact, in a much richer fashion than can possibly be achieved by SEATO.

The "subversion" motif in SEATO must also be regarded with suspicion, because it is carried on in almost complete secrecy and is likely to cover more than Communist attempts at subverting governments by conspiratorial methods. What a Thai Field Marshal or even an Australian security officer of the Menzies-Fadden régime would regard as subversion might well be regarded as legitimate political activity by most Asians—and by a lot of Australians and Americans as well. This matters little in Australia, where parliamentary process will promptly disclose abuse, but one dislikes the situation where a security organisation, with resources and prestige contributed to by Australia, is available to prop up régimes already illiberal or in danger of becoming so.

## China

Although the question of Australian relations with Communist China did not arise during this period in any official form, unofficial contacts between the two countries have increased. There were several visits of university teachers, trade union leaders, Labor Party Federal members and ministers of religion, and one by an Australian Government trade representative in Hong Kong. On 20 May 1957, in the Commonwealth House of Representatives, Mr. R. G. Casey stated the

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<sup>15</sup>An ANZUS Council meeting was held in the U.S.A. in November 1956; the extremely scanty communiqué (*Current Notes*, Vol. 27, No. 11, Nov. 1956, p. 777) was in marked contrast with the ballyhoo attending Canberra's SEATO.

Government's attitude to visits of this kind; he said that the Government was neutral, and would neither encourage nor discourage them. He had been under pressure from the more fanatical anti-Communists in the Government parties to prevent or discourage such trips, and was addressing them and the like-minded press outside when asserting a belief that Australian visitors to China would make objective assessments of what they saw and would not be converted into Communist propagandists. However, there was one curious passage in his statement; he said he did not believe that visitors had on their return talked "tolerantly, or even sympathetically, about what they saw in China"—as if it would necessarily be a bad thing if they did so.

Since it is Labor Party policy to recognise Communist China, that course was urged by Labor speakers during the April debate on foreign affairs, while the policy of non-recognition was defended by many of the Government speakers. Evidently the growth of a "recognition" sentiment in Australia has caused some concern in the U.S. State Department, because during his visit for the SEATO Conference in March, Mr. Dulles went out of his way to circulate a strongly worded statement advocating his country's non-recognition policy and attacking the arguments for recognition; the statement was out of place, since it was embarrassing to the United Kingdom and Pakistan delegations, coming from countries which recognised the Communist régime, and was an intrusion into an active current issue of Australian party politics.<sup>16</sup> It seems that Australian public opinion would accept, without enthusiasm, a policy of recognising Communist China, but there is no strong pressure to achieve such a result and the more vehemently anti-Communist groups (especially the Roman Catholics) would be strongly opposed.<sup>17</sup>

On the trade issue, however, there was evidence of a fairly considerable public opinion in favour of expansion, and in some trade circles there was criticism of the Government because it gives no specific lead in that direction.<sup>18</sup> The Minister for Trade, Mr. McEwen, made a short statement on 22 July, expressing something of the same policy of neutrality as that which Mr. Casey had expressed on the question of cultural contacts. Mr. McEwen said that except as to the goods of strategic importance on which Australia, in common with all Western powers, imposed restrictions, China was free to trade with Australia on the same terms as other non-British countries, and Australian business concerns were free to seek markets in China. He also reported that after a period when trade with China had been encouraged, Australian exports were now running at over £5 million per annum, and there was a likelihood of a Chinese trade delegation visiting Australia in the near future.

<sup>16</sup>A somewhat similar situation arose in August, when the new U.S. Ambassador in Australia, Mr. W. E. Sebald, made a speech to the Australia-America Association in Sydney, widely reported in the press, similarly advocating the non-recognition policy. Telegrams of protest were sent to Mr. Sebald by Dr. Evatt's secretary, and by a senior Labor member, Mr. L. Haylen. The making of the speech and the making of the protests both raise some important questions, but since the episode lies beyond the period of this paper they are not further discussed here.

<sup>17</sup>*West Australian*, 2 July 1957, editorial; cf. *Melbourne Advocate*, 25 July.

<sup>18</sup>Editorials in *Hobart Mercury*, 4 June, *Melbourne Age*, 21 June, and see Gallup Poll in *Melbourne Herald*, 20 June.



## Defence

On 4 April 1957, Mr. Menzies tabled in the Commonwealth House of Representatives a statement on defence; the debate on this overlapped with the debate on Mr. Casey's statement on foreign affairs tabled two days earlier. Mr. Menzies announced an important change in Australian defence policy, involving the abolition of compulsory citizen defence training in the Navy and the Air Force, and the restriction of such training for the Army to 12,000 trainees (chosen by lot) from the more than 30,000 persons eligible for service. The purpose of this change is to concentrate both the available money (about £A200 million per annum) and the permanent personnel of the fighting forces on the provision of small, highly trained, very mobile forces equipped with the latest available conventional weapons and transport facilities. The re-equipment programme also involved establishing standardisation with the U.S. forces, and reliance on the U.S.A. rather than the U.K. for supplies.

This development follows logically on the Menzies-Casey conception of probable perils to Australia. They think that the nuclear deterrent has made major world wars unlikely, but that the Communist powers will continue their attempts at expansion by "subversion" and by limited wars, particularly in South-East Asia. The policy is designed to enable Australia to play the most effective part as an ally of the U.S.A. and U.K. in the SEATO, ANZUS and ANZAM military blocs, so as to repel this sort of danger.

Mr. Menzies made it clear that Australia would continue to provide facilities for the development of "non-conventional" weapons, at Woomera Rocket Range and the Monte Bello nuclear testing sites, and would participate in such experiments, but he did not expect Australia to become itself a "nuclear power". It was not clear from his statement whether he regarded defence measures against nuclear attacks—even conceding their unlikelihood—as impossible, or merely as so expensive that they could not be undertaken without a gross distortion of the economy.

Labor Party speakers did not seriously question the basic principles of the new policy; they wished compulsory citizen training to be abandoned altogether, advocated more concentration on submarines for naval defence, queried the ability of the Government or of its Service advisers to carry out a rapid and satisfactory re-equipment programme, having regard to the irresolution of the past and the formidable rate of technical change at the present, and criticised the absence of even decentralisation safeguards against atomic attack. But more generally, Labor speakers considered that the Government should place less emphasis on military force in present-day affairs, should be more prepared to accept the inevitability of co-existence with Communism and its implications, and should use its influence to promote world disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. The chief Labor speaker, Mr. L. Haylen,<sup>19</sup> also suggested that Australia should proclaim its military forces to be at the disposal, not of SEATO and such organisations, but of the United Nations for policing a world peace system.

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<sup>19</sup>2 May 1957.

**The Foreign Affairs Debate April-May 1957**

This debate began in the House of Representatives and Senate on 2 April and was continued at various intervals in the Representatives until 11 April and in the Senate until 2 May. In the Representatives, 47 out of the 123 members took part. As indicated above, much of the debate was devoted to a post-mortem on Suez, with incidental discussions of the Middle East situation generally and of U.N. voting procedures. However, in his opening statement Mr. Casey briefly surveyed recent happenings in the countries of South-East Asia, emphasising the extent of Australia's aid contributions in that area through the Colombo Plan, and concluded: "We have tried to be good neighbours, without seeking advantages in return—except good neighbourliness from others." Dr. Evatt began by crediting Mr. Casey with being "a man of good will . . . doing his utmost in a difficult situation. . . . What I complain about is that in the crucial matters that confront Australia and the world he really says very little and makes no positive proposals." A number of Labor speakers suggested that if Mr. Casey had his own way, he would pursue a less militaristic and conservative policy than his Cabinet colleagues desired; in particular, they insinuated that Mr. Casey had personally disliked the course taken by Britain and France over Suez. Perhaps such left-handed compliments embarrassed Mr. Casey, and caused him to end the debate with an ungenerous attack on Dr. Evatt, in which, beginning by accusing him of being a neutralist, he finished by saying: "One could call it by uglier names than neutralism, but I do not propose to do that." Insinuations and sneers of this kind from both sides disfigured a good deal of the debate, which went on for too long and became very repetitious. Among characteristic contributions on the Government side, particular attention should be paid to the speeches of Messrs. Menzies, Downer and Kent Hughes in the House of Representatives, and Messrs. McCallum and Pearson in the Senate. On the Labor side, Left-wing views were ably put by Messrs. Clyde Cameron and Cairns, and the Right-wing views by Messrs. K. Beazley and L. Daley in the House of Representatives; see also Senators McKenna and Toohey, and the Democratic Labor Party views put by Senator McManus. Apart from points covered previously, the following issues were extensively discussed.

Labor speakers strongly advocated nuclear disarmament, with as a first step the suspension of A. and H. Bomb tests. They criticised the decision of the U.K. Government to hold its then forthcoming first H. Bomb test at Christmas Island in the Pacific. Government speakers did not deny the necessity for nuclear disarmament, but sought to infer from the Labor speeches that Labor was more ready to criticise the U.K. and the U.S.A. than it was Russia, and would even advocate unilateral nuclear disarmament so as to avoid the possibility of an atomic war. It was not a fair construction of the Labor speeches to interpret them as desiring anything but simultaneous universal nuclear disarmament, but many of them could and should have expressed their views on this matter more clearly so as not to lay themselves open to misconstruction. It was in particular quite unreasonable to expect the United Kingdom, after all the misfortunes and humiliations of the past decade, to give up what might well have been its last opportunity for qualifying as a nuclear power. It is certainly very much in the interests of the middle powers



like Australia that the implacable confrontation of the U.S.-Russian giants should be modified by having "the bomb" in the possession of a potential intermediary power such as the U.K. The speech of Mr. G. Whitlam (Labor) on this point was sensibly phrased; he made the positive suggestion that the Western powers could well afford to announce unilateral suspension of nuclear bomb tests for six months, resuming the tests if at the end of that time there had been no suitable reaction from the Communist side. It was probably inevitable that given the political atmosphere, the debates should produce over-dogmatic statements from Government speakers to the effect that the risk to human life and health caused by test explosions was small and equally over-dogmatic statements in the opposite direction from Labor speakers, but the issue is too important for handling by such polemics. Since Australia is directly exposed to whatever effects might result from the tests, and since Australia's Asian neighbours are hypersensitive on the subject, it would have been more useful for the Government to initiate joint action by a truly regional group in the South and South-West Pacific to have fall-out dangers soberly assessed by a representative body of experts, with special regard to the governing climatic conditions of the region.<sup>20</sup>

The discussion of SEATO raised an important subsidiary issue. At the Conference of the Australian Labor Party in Brisbane on 11-14 March 1957, criticism of SEATO had included the assertion that Australia should not be tied up with a reactionary government like that of Thailand. Mr. Casey has several times gone out of his way to object to such criticism of Thailand, and when Dr. Evatt proceeded<sup>21</sup> to make similar references to the Thai Government during this debate, Mr. Casey endeavoured on a point of order to prevent him from proceeding. The point of order was not upheld and in the course of the debate Labor speakers continued to criticise Thailand, and Government speakers continued to criticise such discussions of a "friendly foreign power". Perhaps Mr. Casey had been under diplomatic pressure to defend his Thai ally from such criticisms, but he should have confined himself to defence—though it was difficult to put up any convincing defence of the Thai Government of Pibul Songgram, in power as Mr. Casey spoke: that Government had come to power by subversion and military *coup* combined, had a wartime and pre-war history of advocating a Fascist system (in the strict sense of that word)<sup>22</sup> and deserved no credit for the social stability and "natural democracy" which fortunately characterise the rural life of Thailand. Even while Mr. Casey was speaking, Pibul Songgram was under heavy pressure from his fellow oligarchs to abandon the steps towards democracy which he had recently made (mainly under American pressure).

It is impossible to consider foreign policy in an intelligent and intelligible fashion unless some regard is paid, *inter alia*, to the character and domestic politics of the countries with which we are allied. No doubt Australia cannot afford to be too fussy about its allies, and no doubt gratuitously offensive parliamentary attacks

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<sup>20</sup>On 7 July, the Government announced the formation of an Australian National Radiation Advisory Committee which will study the possible effects both of atomic fall-out and of other sources of radiation.

<sup>21</sup>2 April.

<sup>22</sup>Field Marshal Pibul Songgram admired Mussolini.

on foreign countries—and not only on allied ones—unrelated to an issue under debate ought to be avoided as a matter of convention and courtesy. But in this debate, the character and record of every country in the world, and certainly of South-East Asia, was potentially relevant. The character of countries in the SEATO Pact was particularly relevant because, as indicated above, the SEATO agreement involves us not only in military arrangements, but also in the business of “anti-subversion”, in which Australian resources may be used to identify as “Communist” any opposition which a reactionary oligarchy may find inconvenient. However, while saying this, the present writer does not subscribe to the view expressed by Dr. Evatt and some Labor speakers that the Government could and should be looking for Fascist governments to overthrow, with the implication in several cases that Thailand could fairly be regarded as Fascist. Fascism is not currently a real issue. It may become so, but the overwhelming issue today is Communism. The kind of oligarchies that one now finds in countries like Thailand are and always have been of the pre-Fascist authoritarian kind, likely to ape Fascism when it is powerful and fashionable, but equally likely to ape democracy under suitable inducements. Hence it would seem that instead of decrying Australian relations with Thailand—a quite separate issue from the justification for SEATO as a whole—it would be better to urge on the Australian Government the policy of using its influence to ensure that Thailand progresses towards democracy, and to ensure that our assistance in security matters is exercised so as to prevent peaceful political opposition from being misrepresented by the Bangkok warlords as Communist plots.

Echoes of the March Labor Party Conference also appeared in frequent references to the place of “democratic socialism”<sup>23</sup> in the current world. It was a general Labor thesis that only democratic socialism could provide an effective social answer to Communism, in a way facilitating stable coexistence between Communist and non-Communist powers. Much of the Government case was taken up with showing that the Communists had shown no respect for social democratic régimes, were probably better able to infiltrate and subvert such régimes than those which depended primarily on “rugged private enterprise”, and that only adequate military defences could hold the Communists within their present boundaries. Here again, the atmosphere of political partisanship was unsuitable for an adequate and scientific analysis of the issues in question. It is improbable that social democracy can provide a universal panacea against Communism; on the other hand, the virtues of private enterprise, even aided by the nuclear deterrent, are unlikely to provide a stable world unless reinforced by the virtues of the welfare state. In the context of Australian politics, “democratic socialism” is a specific and local policy, which generates in its opponents a particular set of emotions; it is absurd for them to transfer these same emotions to a consideration of the kind of social-democratic policies which might, for example, prevent India from “going Communist”.

Finally, a frequent theme on both sides was the proper Australian attitude towards the United Nations. Labor speakers accused the Government of being at best lukewarm concerning the U.N., of failing to rely sufficiently on the U.N. forum

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<sup>23</sup>Adopted as the general title of A.L.P. policy at that Conference.



for the discussion and solution of international problems, in particular of failing to propose or support conciliatory procedures so as to settle international disputes. Government speakers said that in general it was no substitute for a foreign policy to "support the United Nations". Even if U.N. is regarded as a "real" government, with a parliamentary system of its own, the member nations provide its policy and, like the individuals in a democratic state, can do so only through formulating proposals, creating parties to support these proposals, and seeing that the proposals if adopted are carried into effect. It is accordingly no derogation from "support for U.N." when the Australian Government follows the lead of the U.S.A. or the U.K. on such matters as South-East Asian defence or Middle East stability. There is much force in the Government case on this matter. Labor speakers are so much concerned with using the *procedure* of U.N. that they devote insufficient attention to the special political conditions under which U.N. works, and the formidable difficulty of carrying into the international sphere the sort of substantive proposals which divide parties in domestic politics. They tend to assume that Australia can be an effective "party leader" in U.N. politics, when in a particular situation we may be more effective as a backbencher. However, the Government case also has its disingenuous side, and the Government attitude towards U.N. was probably better indicated by a spontaneous interjection which Mr. Casey made in the course of Dr. Evatt's speech.<sup>24</sup> Dr. Evatt: "This Government is guilty of a lack of persistent and continuous faith in the United Nations." Mr. Casey: "Nobody takes any notice of it." The truth is that the Government, like most of the older Western powers, is unwilling to depart from the power politics of military and economic groupings, conducted on the lines of the old diplomacy, in order to take whatever risks are involved by relying on action solely or even chiefly within U.N. It would be quite possible for Australia to abandon all its military alliances, which the Government reconciles with the Charter by a fiction of interpretation, build up a purely local system of defences, and hope that aggression against this country would bring into action through U.N. the kind of intervention by which South Korea and Egypt were defended. Has the Labor Party studied seriously, with regard to all the political and technical questions involved, the possible consequences of doing this? On the other hand, has the Government avoided such a policy mainly because of a reasoned conviction that it would be unsuccessful? Or is it mainly that the parties of the Right have an emotional preference for the secret diplomacy and tight military alliances by which the British (and other) imperialists built and maintained their systems?

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<sup>242</sup> April.

# The Third Earl Grey and Federalism, 1846-1852

By JOHN M. WARD

The third Earl Grey<sup>1</sup> is not often regarded with much sympathy.<sup>2</sup> His great abilities and strength of character are almost universally acknowledged, but he is remembered less for his excellences than for his failings. His acidulous criticisms of his contemporaries, which made him an impossible colleague, are better known than is his colonial policy. Some remember him only as the obstinate and opinionated individual whose dislike of Palmerston hindered the formation of a Russell Government at the end of 1845 and whose mistakes or misfortunes as Secretary of State for the Colonies contributed to the downfall of Russell's ministry in 1852.<sup>3</sup> Most historians concede that he was an exceptionally well-informed and conscientious Secretary of State, who brought intellectual distinction to his office and possessed rare firmness of political principle. He was and still is regarded as an unusually forceful and clear minded administrator. But his were not the sort of good qualities to win him popular approval in his own day or ready admiration in ours. As Secretary of State he incurred a most crushing burden of unpopularity both in Britain and the colonies. Unable and unwilling to conciliate others, he writhed under this hostility, for he was a highly sensitive man and honest enough to recognise that his failure to win public favour handicapped his work as Secretary of State.<sup>4</sup>

Grey combined great gifts of head and heart with other, less happy attributes that cut short his political career. For the last 42 years of his life, he held no Cabinet office. A son of Earl Grey of the Reform Bill, he had all the privileges that family eminence and power could bestow. There was scarcely a door that could not have been opened to him, had he found it easy to work with other men and had he possessed a sufficient share of the commoner sort of political ambition. Politics attracted him by a sort of family inheritance of public duty, but high political office did not prove congenial. From his first entry into public life he

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Note: This article is based on a paper read at the sixth Anglo-American conference of historians held in London in July 1957. I should like to acknowledge here my debt to Dr. J. Conway Davies, Reader in Palaeography and Diplomatic in the University of Durham, who greatly facilitated my use of the Grey of Howick Papers, now permanently deposited with the University.

<sup>1</sup>(Sir) Henry George Grey, Viscount Howick and later third Earl Grey, K.G., b. 1802, o.s.p. 1894; Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, 1846-52.

<sup>2</sup>Grey's reputation is discussed in the author's forthcoming book, *Earl Grey and the Australian Colonies, 1846-57*, to be published by Melbourne University Press.

<sup>3</sup>Grey's version of both incidents may be learned from his Journal in the Grey of Howick Papers at Durham. He did not intend his opposition to Palmerston to prevent the formation of a Russell Government and believed that Russell must have had other reasons for declining to form an administration; Grey's Journal (C3/12), 15 to 31 Dec. 1845 and 5 Jan. 1846, Grey of Howick Papers (Durham). In 1852 Grey believed that colonial affairs had very little to do with the fall of the Government, laying most of the blame on the mismanagement of Russell; Grey's Journal (C3/15-16), 6 to 13 March 1852, Grey of Howick Papers (Durham). Hereinafter Grey's Journal is referred to as Journal, with volume number and dates.

<sup>4</sup>e.g. Grey to Russell, 22 Sept. 1849; Russell Papers, Public Record Office, London. Hereinafter these papers are cited as Russell Papers.



showed a strong preference for the role of independent critic of the government and in all the offices he held was much given to thoughts of resignation.<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps it was no great disappointment to him that he was never in a ministry after 1852. He had once thought of the prime ministership,<sup>6</sup> but only when the idea had been suggested to him by his friends. After the major victories of free trade had been won, his compulsive sense of duty to desert the rural peace of the family seat at Howick for the turmoil of office in London was largely relieved. He was content to go up to town for the parliamentary sessions and, from his seat in the Lords, pass judgment on the efforts of others. By 1852 he had thoroughly lost confidence in Lord John Russell, the most obvious leader of the liberals, and was determined not to serve under him again.<sup>7</sup> So many of the old rallying causes of the Whigs had disappeared that Grey found himself more and more in sympathy with conservatives like Derby. But he would not join Derby in trying to form an administration in 1858, when most cordially invited to do so. His objections were characteristically personal; he disliked Derby's followers in the Commons, especially Disraeli, and he had no wish to appear disloyal to his own former associates.<sup>8</sup>

His failure to hold office again was not, however, entirely his own choice. His nagging criticisms of his Cabinet colleagues had put him out of favour with his political allies and they showed little inclination to share power with him again.<sup>9</sup> In 1855 he had some discussion of these matters with a frank and friendly informant, who

told me that, while I was reckoned very able, I was considered so difficult and so disagreeable to act with in the cabinet that there is a general indisposition to take me into the Government. I am not surprised at this; it is partly to be accounted for by the fact that I have strong opinions, which I never can consent to sacrifice for the sake of office.<sup>10</sup>

To this it needs to be added that his unpopularity in the House of Commons made him appear something of a liability at a time when the confused state of the parties gave personal attachments great importance.<sup>11</sup> Grey was not even widely reckoned a successful Colonial Secretary. His brother-in-law, Charles Wood, might write that "they never had and never will have again so good a colonial minister",<sup>12</sup> but most of his contemporaries counted his record an unfortunate one, even while they acknowledged his abilities. His administration was a time of troubles, over convict transportation, over the transition to free trade, over the interminable problems of New Zealand. The Kaffir Wars were the culminating point of Grey's embarrassments and neither press nor Parliament spared him hostile notice.

<sup>5</sup>The Journal contains many references to threats to resign and offers of his resignation, both in the 1830's and the 1840's. He resigned as Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office in 1833 and as Secretary at War in 1839.

<sup>6</sup>Journal (C3/12), 3 June 1846.

<sup>7</sup>Grey to Russell, 23 Dec. 1852, Russell Papers; Russell to Grey, 21 Dec. 1852, and Grey to C. Wood, 7 Nov., 20, 25 and 27 Dec. 1852, Grey of Howick Papers (Durham); Journal (C3/17), 31 Dec. 1852.

<sup>8</sup>Grey entered his correspondence with Derby in his Journal (C3/20), 21 Feb. 1858.

<sup>9</sup>See correspondence cited in n. 8. Also Journal (C3/16), 22 March and 31 Dec. 1852.

<sup>10</sup>Journal (C3/18), 15 Feb. 1852. The informant was Lady Waldegrave.

<sup>11</sup>See Ward, *op. cit.*, Ch. VII.

<sup>12</sup>Wood to Grey, 2 Nov. 1852, Grey of Howick Papers.

One of his less serious misfortunes as a policy maker turned out to be his advocacy of federation for British North America, for Australia, for New Zealand and for South Africa. In the cases of Australia and New Zealand, his prescient statesmanship, as some might call it, or his vain predilection for constitution-mongering, as his less kindly contemporaries did call it, ended in political frustration. In North America and South Africa he did not translate his advocacy into firm attempts at federation, but only because he was restrained from doing so by the advice of the men on the spot, the objections of his advisers in the Colonial Office and the opposition of Russell himself.

Grey's desire to federate<sup>13</sup> the colonies was the offspring of a union between his faith in free trade and his doctrine of imperial responsibility. He was a convinced and ardent free trader, who believed that Britain ought not lightly to give up control of the tariff policies of the whole Empire:

When Parliament, after a protracted discussion of many years, finally determined upon abandoning the former policy of endeavouring to promote the commerce of the Empire by an artificial system of restrictions, and upon adopting in its place the policy of Free Trade, it did not abdicate the duty and the power of regulating the commercial policy, not only of the United Kingdom, but of the British Empire. The common interest of all those parts of that extended Empire required that its commercial policy should be the same throughout its numerous dependencies.<sup>14</sup>

If political and financial conditions in the colonies made absolute free trade impossible for them, at least the Crown should do all in its power to promote the flow of trade by opposing discriminatory and prohibitive duties.<sup>15</sup> Fervour in his free trade mission explained a large part of Grey's interest in promoting the federation of colonies. Within a federal union, he thought, there would have to be freedom of trade.

Grey was not one of those who believed that the fall of the old colonial system would be followed by the disintegration of the Empire.<sup>16</sup> As Colonial Secretary he saw that a new idea of empire was needed because the coming of free trade had swept away the old sort of commercial imperialism. He rebutted those who argued that the Empire was no longer worth maintaining by invoking a doctrine of imperial responsibility: "I conceive that, by the acquisition of its Colonial dominions, the Nation has incurred a responsibility of the highest kind, which it is not at liberty to throw off."<sup>17</sup> In his eyes the colonies remained a trust until they had acquired the strength to manage their own affairs. Britain, which drew wealth, power and prestige from the Empire, had heavy responsibilities towards every part of it. A special duty was laid on the Colonial Office in respect of such great questions of policy as free trade and constitutional reform on which it was not to be expected

<sup>13</sup>The word is used very loosely throughout this article. Grey's own rather unsystematic thinking on the various forms of federal government is mentioned later.

<sup>14</sup>Earl Grey, *The Colonial Policy of Lord John Russell's Administration*, 2nd ed., London, 1853, Vol. I, p. 281.

<sup>15</sup>W. P. Morrell, *British Colonial Policy in the Age of Peel and Russell*, Oxford, 1930, p. 219. R. L. Schuyler, *The Fall of the Old Colonial System*, New York, 1945, pp. 235, ff.

<sup>16</sup>Grey, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 11, ff.

<sup>17</sup>*ibid.*, p. 13.



that colonial legislatures would have either the experience or the richness of talent to do well for themselves.<sup>18</sup>

To establish federal unions in the colonies for the sake of freedom of trade seemed to Grey to be a natural consequence of his own fiscal principles and of his sense of imperial responsibility. Free trade he held to be a principle so obviously just and beneficial that it was a moral duty to uphold it as far as could be. Federations within the Empire he thought of as conducive to freedom of trade and as an imperial contribution to the harmonious management of affairs that belonged in common to groups of self-governing colonies.

His partner in promoting the federation of the colonies was for a time the famous Under-Secretary, James Stephen.<sup>19</sup> The two men had become closely associated when Grey, then Lord Howick, had been Parliamentary Under-Secretary for the Colonies in his father's administration and Stephen had been Permanent Counsel to the Colonial Department and the Board of Trade. Although there was no friendship between them, each respected the other and they had discussed imperial matters together for many years after their official connection ceased in 1833. During the 1830's they had some common experience of federation projects in the colonies. They were both involved at one stage or another in the attempts to revive the federation of the Leewards.<sup>20</sup> They were both convinced quite early that federation would be an essential part of any good solution to the political problems of British North America.<sup>21</sup> Howick was prominent among those who were firmly in favour of the federation of the Canadas when Lord Durham was sent out in 1838.<sup>22</sup> The fact that Durham's report recommended the complete union and not the federation of the Canadas caused Howick surprise. He wrote to his brother-in-law praising the general tenor of the report and claiming that the political and economic bases for a union of the Canadas simply did not exist.<sup>23</sup> Borrowing an idea from Stephen (although it had already been rejected by the Cabinet), he suggested that the colonists should hold a convention in Montreal, and choose for themselves between a federal union and a legislative union.

At this stage Howick's power to influence British policy towards North America was already waning fast. He had practically been a lone voice in the Cabinet where British North America was concerned from 1836. He resigned as Secretary for War in September 1839, partly because of disagreements over colonial policy, and did not hold office again until 1846, when he became Secretary of State for War and the Colonies in Lord John Russell's first administration.

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<sup>18</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 13, 17 ff., 33 ff., 281.

<sup>19</sup>There is an extensive correspondence between Grey and Stephen in the Grey of Howick Papers.

<sup>20</sup>C. S. S. Higham, "The General Assembly of the Leeward Islands", *English Historical Review*, Vol. XLI, 1926, pp. 333, ff.

<sup>21</sup>Minute of 20 Dec. 1836 and heads of a bill, 1837, C.O. 537/137. Stephen to Howick, 28 Dec. 1837, Grey of Howick Papers; Journal (C3/3), 1 and 29 Dec. 1837; Howick to Russell, 2 Jan. 1838, Russell Papers.

<sup>22</sup>Journal (C3/3), 2, 3, 5, 6 Jan. 1838. C. Buller, *Sketch of Lord Durham's Mission to Canada in 1838* (1840), reprinted in C. P. Lucas (ed.), *Lord Durham's Report on the Affairs of British North America*, Oxford, 1912, Vol. III, pp. 362, ff.

<sup>23</sup>Howick to Durham, 7 Feb. 1839, Grey of Howick Papers.

By the time that he returned to office, Grey's free trade beliefs had hardened to a dogma. He agreed to enter the Russell administration only after receiving explicit assurances that a free trade policy would be followed with real determination.<sup>24</sup> Almost immediately after taking office, he began to advocate the federation of colonies, largely for the sake of freedom of trade among them.

The first opportunity was provided by New Zealand. Up to 1846 this colony had not been given any representative institutions. Stephen had been in favour of granting them from as early as 1843<sup>25</sup> and had drawn up an elaborate constitution for New Zealand, providing for a pyramid of institutions, which rose from municipal corporations at the bottom to provincial legislatures and a federal assembly at the top.<sup>26</sup> The scheme was complicated by a system of indirect election, designed to ensure that the three classes of legislature did not come into conflict with one another. Stanley, who was Secretary of State when the constitution was drawn up, declined to have anything to do with it, disliking the whole notion of giving self-government to New Zealand at so early a stage and having little admiration for Stephen. Gladstone, on succeeding Stanley, adopted the whole of Stephen's plan except the federal system, but was not long enough in power to have it enacted.<sup>27</sup> Grey was thoroughly willing to grant representative government to New Zealand and greatly admired Stephen's judgment and legal skill. He took over the plans that Gladstone had sanctioned and restored the federal system to them. Acting with some impetuosity, he had the new constitution embodied in an Act of Parliament and charter before the end of his first year in office.<sup>28</sup>

The constitution so suddenly thrust on the Antipodes represented an able lawyer's answer to the problem of making representative government work in a large colony, where the white population was sparse and communications were bad. Grey was sufficiently a believer in colonial self-government to see the full force of the political arguments in favour of setting up at one stroke municipal, provincial and federal institutions and of relating them closely to one another. But he justified the federal clauses to Russell on other grounds, by telling him that, if they were not enacted, "the different legislatures would . . . have been making different arrangements about customs duties, etc., leading to great confusion".<sup>29</sup> When he wrote privately to Governor George Grey in New Zealand to tell him about the new constitution, he took the opportunity of laying down the principle that customs duties should never be used for any purposes other than raising revenue and that they should always be moderate.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>24</sup>Grey to Russell, 16 and 19 Dec. 1845, Russell to Grey, 18 Dec. 1845, *ibid.* Journal (C3/12), 2 July 1846.

<sup>25</sup>Stephen's minute on No. 97 (Treasury), 28 Jan. 1843, C.O. 209/25.

<sup>26</sup>Stephen's minute of 10 July 1846 on G. Grey to Stanley, 27 Jan. 1846, C.O. 209/42. Grey to Russell [n.d.] 1846, Russell Papers. Morrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 119, ff. A. C. V. Melbourne, *Early Constitutional Development in Australia*, Oxford, 1934, p. 342, especially n. 4.

<sup>27</sup>Grey to Russell [n.d.] 1846, Russell Papers. Gladstone was probably influenced against the federal system by the advice of Wakefield, that New Zealand did not need a general government; Wakefield to Gladstone, 21 Jan. 1846, C.O. 209/50.

<sup>28</sup>9 and 10 Vic., c. 103. The charter was enclosed in Grey to G. Grey, No. 23, 23 Dec. 1846, C.O. 406/6.

<sup>29</sup>Grey to Russell [n.d.] 1846, Russell Papers.

<sup>30</sup>Grey to G. Grey (private), 27 Nov. 1846, Grey of Howick Papers.



About the same time Grey wrote officially to Lord Elgin, who had just been appointed Governor-General in Canada, declaring that all the provinces of British North America should adopt free trade principles without delay and suggesting that they might establish a customs union or even enter into some form of federation.<sup>31</sup> Elgin, before he left England, had seen much of Grey, had married that statesman's niece (Lord Durham's daughter) and had been quite prepared to work for the federation of British North America.<sup>32</sup> When he wrote to Grey from Montreal, however, it was to say that a federal union would be politically and economically impracticable for a long time to come.<sup>33</sup> He boldly asserted that he could find no evidence of inconvenience resulting from the conflicting tariffs of the provinces and suggested that all proposals for federating Canada should be postponed until railway construction had done something to reduce the problems of distance.

At that stage relations between Grey and Elgin were excellent. Grey liked and respected Elgin sufficiently<sup>34</sup> to accept his judgment that federation was out of the question in British North America for the time being, although he insisted that it would ultimately become necessary in a country of such vast extent divided into self-governing provinces.<sup>35</sup>

Meanwhile, the southern hemisphere had presented yet another opportunity for federalism.<sup>36</sup> In 1847 there were four colonies in Australia: New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land (or Tasmania), South Australia and Western Australia. The southern portion of New South Wales, known as the Port Phillip District, was demanding separation from the parent colony and the Governor of New South Wales had reported that separation ought to be granted. Grey was perfectly willing to grant it. Of the four existing colonies, only New South Wales enjoyed representative government. South Australia and Van Diemen's Land were both asking for it and so was the Port Phillip District. Grey was fully prepared to concede it to all three of them. Thus he was faced with the prospect of having five colonies in Australia, four of them self-governing and as near neighbours as was likely in so vast a territory. Would there be freedom of trade in such circumstances? Grey had sound reasons for believing that there would be nothing of the kind. New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land had already involved themselves in a discreditable tariff squabble that they had taken to Downing Street itself for final judgment. From Grey's point of view the position was perfectly clear. Australia needed James Stephen's ideal constitution, which would make representative government work in large territories with small, scattered populations and which, through its federal elements, would ensure free trade among the colonies. In July 1847 he sent a long despatch to the Governor of New South Wales, announcing his intention

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<sup>31</sup>Grey to Elgin, 31 Dec. 1846, C.O. 43/148.

<sup>32</sup>See Grey to Elgin, 8 Aug. 1849, A. G. Doughty (ed.), *Elgin-Grey Papers*, 1846-52, Ottawa, 1937, Vol. I, pp. 437, ff.

<sup>33</sup>Elgin to Grey, 7 May 1847, *ibid.*, pp. 34, ff.

<sup>34</sup>The liking and respect began at their first meeting; Journal (C3/12), 21 July 1846. The Elgin-Grey correspondence, cited in n. 33, is famous.

<sup>35</sup>Grey to Elgin, 2 June 1847, *Elgin-Grey Papers*, *cit. sup.*, pp. 37, ff.

<sup>36</sup>On all these developments see Ward, *op. cit.*, Ch. II.

of separating the Port Phillip District and going on to sketch, rather obscurely, the form of the New Zealand constitution that he proposed to bestow on Australia.

Then Grey received one of the worst shocks of his political life. Governor George Grey of New Zealand wrote to him complaining that the new constitution was unsuited to local conditions.<sup>37</sup> Its elaborate provisions could not be made to work in such sparsely populated and scattered settlements. The franchise provisions would offend the Maoris so much that there would be danger of rebellion in the northern part of the colony, if they were put into force. The Governor agreed that New Zealand needed a central legislature, as well as provincial legislatures, but he could find no reason for believing that Stephen's pyramid of institutions would work successfully. He declined to put the new constitution into force in the northern part of the colony and was reluctant to apply it in the southern.

Lord Grey recognised at once that a bad mistake had been made. The reputation of Governor Grey and the risk of a native war were sufficient to persuade him. He had Parliament pass an Act<sup>38</sup> suspending the new constitution for five years in both parts of New Zealand. The Governor was given a very wide discretion as to how and when representative institutions should be introduced. As a mark of confidence he received a knighthood and was honoured with private letters from Grey<sup>39</sup> explaining what had happened and outlining the Government's intentions for the future. Altogether Lord Grey behaved as well as any man could in the circumstances, blaming no one but himself and making the amplest amends in his power. He did not believe that the constitution he had sent out to New Zealand was wrong in principle, but he was forced to conclude that New Zealand was not yet ready for it.

The debacle over New Zealand caused him much concern about his Australian policy. He was still convinced that a central authority would be needed there, but became doubtful of the wisdom of proceeding to enact James Stephen's ideal constitution. Partly on the advice of Stephen, who had retired from the Colonial Office in October 1847, Grey decided to refer the whole problem of constitutional reform in Australia to the Privy Council Committee for Trade and Foreign Plantations, thus reviving one of the older functions of the Board of Trade and providing a means by which Stephen might be officially connected with whatever decisions were made. The advisability of taking time to reconsider the whole matter was certainly confirmed by what Grey heard from Australian colonists in London and from the news of Australian reactions to his despatch of July 1847. The colonists objected particularly to the proposed municipal corporations, a form of which already existed in New South Wales, and to the system of indirect election to the colonial assemblies. Federation they found boring or incomprehensible; it was quite remote from their interests.

The Privy Council Committee was presided over by Grey himself and its report was drafted by Stephen. The other members of the Committee felt bound to acquiesce in the views of two men so much more knowledgeable in colonial affairs

<sup>37</sup>See correspondence cited in Morrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 322, ff.

<sup>38</sup>11 and 12 Vic., c. 5.

<sup>39</sup>Grey to G. Grey, 26 Feb. and 18 March 1848, Grey of Howick Papers.



than they were themselves.<sup>40</sup> Discussion confirmed Grey and Stephen very much in their original opinions, except that the municipal corporations were abandoned. Otherwise, the original plans were largely preserved. The Port Phillip District was to be separated; representative government was to be granted to the new colony so formed and also to Van Diemen's Land and South Australia. For the sake of freedom of trade there was to be a general tariff for the whole of the Australian colonies, enacted in the first instance by the Imperial Parliament. To control this tariff a central legislature was obviously necessary and the report proposed a federal assembly to legislate on a fairly considerable list of matters that concerned the colonies in common.

During 1849 and 1850 Grey and Russell made repeated attempts to pass through Parliament a bill embodying the recommendations of the Committee.<sup>41</sup> They were severely handicapped by the great political weakness of the Government. The Opposition, though divided and not over-willing to take office, was quite ready to embarrass and defeat the Government whenever public opinion made it safe to do so. Grey and Russell had to modify their measures repeatedly in response to criticisms within Parliament and from the colonies. The general tariff had to go. Finally the federation clauses, after suffering many vicissitudes, were also dropped. They passed the Commons and then in the Lords came very near defeat. So many convincing objections had been raised to them that Grey himself was persuaded that they were seriously imperfect. He was always an open-minded man except where free trade was concerned. Rather than endanger the whole of the bill for the sake of these imperfect clauses, Grey voluntarily withdrew them. His decision to do so may have been helped on by several hints from Russell that federation could wait, for it was much less urgent than many of the other matters dealt with in the bill. Lack of support for the clauses from the colonists induced the Opposition to be specially hostile in scrutinising them and they were condemned on a variety of grounds, ranging from assertions that they were bad imperial policy to accusations that they were inconsistent with colonial self-government and unwanted in Australia. The Australian Colonies Government Act (1850) became law without any provision for the federation of the colonies.

Grey continued to believe that Australia would soon need some central authority, but he gave up as inexpedient all intention of imposing a federal union by Act of Parliament before the colonists had requested it. In 1851 he appointed the Governor of New South Wales to be also Governor-General of Australia, with special responsibility for fostering any tendencies towards federalism that might develop in the colonies and for watching over legislation in the various colonial parliaments that might affect the interests of other parts of Australia or of the Empire at large. The governor-generalship turned out to be nearly always useless for the purposes that Grey had intended it and was allowed to expire within a decade.<sup>42</sup> The coming of responsible government made the idea of policy-making Governors an anachronism.

While the Australian bills were still before Parliament, Grey conceived the idea that federation might provide an answer to some of the constitutional problems

<sup>40</sup>Russell to Grey, 22 Sept. 1849, *ibid.*

<sup>42</sup>*ibid.*, Chs. IX and X.

<sup>41</sup>Ward, *op. cit.*, Chs. V and VII.

of South Africa. The Eastern Province of the Cape Colony had displayed separatist leanings from 1823 and the obvious difficulties of ruling it from Cape Town and of protecting its frontiers with troops controlled from Cape Town had led to various experiments in the way of a local executive.<sup>43</sup> None of them assuaged Eastern discontent. The perils of the Kaffir Wars, resentment at real and imagined neglect by the Government in Cape Town, administrative inconvenience and, perhaps, some hostility between English and Dutch, all kept separatism very much alive. The probability that representative government would soon be granted at the Cape increased Eastern discontent: how could the Eastern Province be represented by its own people in a legislature sitting hundreds of miles away in Cape Town?

In 1849 one of the many petitions from Eastern Province colonists asking the Queen for separation prayed that the federal constitution designed for New Zealand should be given to South Africa also.<sup>44</sup> The colonists had read about the New Zealand constitution in the newspapers and believed that its federal provisions would work well in South Africa, where there were some problems common to all the British territories and other problems peculiar to each. The petitioners suggested that a federation be formed of themselves, the rest of Cape Colony, Natal and the Orange River Sovereignty.

There was no easy answer to the Eastern Province's desire for separation in the way that there had been with the Port Phillip District in Australia.<sup>45</sup> To begin with, the Eastern colonists were not even united in asking for separation; some of them preferred, or would have been content with, the removal of the capital from Cape Town in the west to Grahamstown in the east. The federation proposal had no decisive backing. Federation had been thought of before as a desirable sequel to separation, but a very serious objection had been found to it. "If you have separation", wrote the masterful Attorney-General at the Cape, Porter, "you must have a General Assembly. Where should it meet?" Presumably it would have met at Cape Town in the west and there considered all the matters that were most vital to the Eastern Province: defence and war, frontier problems and relations with the natives.<sup>46</sup> The Eastern Province petition that asked for the New Zealand constitution had no effective answer to this difficulty.

Moreover, the petition bore all the marks of having been made with little comprehension of other difficulties involved. To have established in South Africa a federation on the New Zealand model, Britain would have had to take first a series of decisions of fundamental importance. Separation would have had to be agreed to. Representative government would have had to be given to both the Cape provinces. It would also have had to be granted to Natal, which had only

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<sup>43</sup>H. J. Mandelbrote, "Constitutional Development, 1834-58", *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. VIII, Cambridge, 1936, Ch. XV, pp. 380, ff. G. E. Cory, *The Rise of South Africa*, London, 1930, Vol. V, pp. 59 ff., 167, 234 ff., 243 ff., 270 ff. G. W. Eybers (ed.), *Select Constitutional Documents illustrating South African History, 1795-1910*, London, 1918, pp. xxxiv, ff.

<sup>44</sup>Enclosed in Smith to Grey, 9 July 1849, C.O. 48/297.

<sup>45</sup>See C. W. de Kiewiet, *British Colony Policy and the South African Republics, 1848-72*, London, 1929, pp. 32, ff.

<sup>46</sup>Mandelbrote, *op. cit.*, p. 380.



just acquired a nominated Legislative Council, and to the Orange River Sovereignty, whose annexation by Governor Sir Harry Smith had been approved by Grey in 1848.<sup>47</sup>

In 1849 the Colonial Office was groping both for the facts in the South African situation and for the fundamentals of a policy towards them. Grey's decision to ratify Smith's action in the Orange River Territory had been opposed by the two Under-Secretaries, Hawes and Merivale, who had dreaded the prospect of still further extensions of British responsibility in South Africa. Grey had acted on assurances from Smith that the annexation was desired by the inhabitants and that the Territory would be financially self-supporting. But he was far from sure that he had acted correctly. All such doubts aside, there remained the problems of establishing representative government at the Cape, settling the fate of the Eastern Province and finding suitable forms of government for the Orange River Sovereignty and British Kaffraria.<sup>48</sup> Grey very much doubted whether the Cape was fit for representative government and was sure that self-governing institutions would not be satisfactory to the Eastern Province unless separation were granted.<sup>49</sup> Matters were complicated by his own ill-advised attempts to force convicts on the Cape, which disturbed political conditions there and enveloped the Cape question in a blaze of unwelcome publicity in England.<sup>50</sup> Grey found it very hard to settle on any policy and resolved to refer the constitutional problems of South Africa to the Privy Council Committee for Trade and Foreign Plantations.<sup>51</sup>

As an interim measure, he felt bound by the political situation at the Cape to assure Governor Smith that he had been convinced by his arguments (and those of the able officials at the Cape) on three major questions of policy:

The balance of convenience is in favour of an Elective Legislature, common to the whole Colony. For any attempt to divide it must either end in the absolute splitting of the Colony into two or more independent communities, to the great detriment of their power and importance; or in attempts to establish some common bond between two distinct legislatures, which, it seems to be the general opinion, could scarcely lead to practical results; or would be exposed to the same objection of distance and want of communication.<sup>52</sup>

Grey thus deferred rather doubtfully to colonial opinion on representative government, separation and the practicability of a general legislature for the two Cape

<sup>47</sup>Grey to Smith, 11 March 1848, and Grey's Minute of 2 May 1848, C.O. 48/284.

<sup>48</sup>An outstanding question with respect to the Sovereignty was whether the annexation had been founded on conquest, in which case the Crown could provide for the government of the territory, or on settlement, in which case the intervention of Parliament would be needed to establish a constitution. British Kaffraria was originally the Queen Adelaide Province which D'Urban annexed after the sixth Kaffir War. Glenelg ordered its relinquishment in 1835. After the War of the Axe Smith made it a separate imperial dependency under the name of British Kaffraria and the Privy Council Committee for Trade and Foreign Plantations, when consulted by Grey, recommended that it and also the Orange River Territory should be retained as distinct colonies. *Great Britain Parliamentary Papers*, 1851, Vol. XXXVII (Cmd. 1160), pp. 431, ff.

<sup>49</sup>Grey's minutes of 4 Nov. 1848 and 6 Jan. 1849, C.O. 48/289.

<sup>50</sup>Morrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 290, 403 ff.

<sup>51</sup>Grey to Lord President of the Council, 29 Jan. 1849, C.O. 48/289.

<sup>52</sup>Grey to Smith, 12 Feb. 1849, *Gt. Brit. P.P.*, 1850, Vol. XXXVIII (Cmd. 1137), pp. 98, ff.

colonies. He pointed out that the form of the constitution would need prolonged consideration.

The Privy Council Committee sat on this question without the powerful aid of Stephen. Grey himself drew up the report on the Cape constitution.<sup>53</sup> The Committee recommended early in 1850 that representative government should be granted to the Cape Colony according to principles that were laid down. The Committee did not recommend the separation of the Eastern Province. The report made lengthy reference to the precedent of the Port Phillip District, but did not follow it because the best official opinion at the Cape had been unanimously opposed to such a step.

Grey's private preference was still for separation, if that should be possible. Continued complaints from the Eastern Province probably decided him to give events a push in the desired direction. In December 1850 and January 1851 he was at work on a despatch to Governor Smith, outlining a scheme of federation for the two Cape provinces, Natal, British Kaffraria and the Orange River Sovereignty.<sup>54</sup> As in the case of Australia, he was moved partly by concern at the increase in the numbers of the colonies and partly by fear that their trade with one another might be hindered with retaliatory tariffs and vexatious restrictions.

This despatch was never sent. On 20 January 1851 Grey wrote on it, "This draft may be cancelled". The Permanent Under-Secretary, Merivale, had told him that he was giving too much importance to the tariff problem and also, apparently, that the federation proposal was untimely.<sup>55</sup> Russell had objected to a reference to responsible government in the draft and had not been prepared to support any steps towards the federation of British South Africa.<sup>56</sup> He had suffered enough from Grey's attempts to provide large and comprehensive solutions to the constitutional problems of the colonies and from the bitter attacks that had been made on the Government's failure to control the political and military situation in South Africa. Federation, he thought, might very well be left to wait.

The despatch that Grey sent out in March 1851 merely suggested that the capital of the colony should be transferred from Cape Town to Grahamstown.<sup>57</sup> This, as we have seen, was quite an old idea. Grey and Russell were merely taking the simpler of two alternative courses that colonial opinion had already marked out for them.

Progress towards establishing at the Cape the sort of constitution that the Privy Council Committee had recommended was slow. There was much division of opinion in the colony, which was complicated by the troubles resulting from Grey's transportation policy and by the Kaffir War that broke out in 1850.<sup>58</sup> At

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<sup>53</sup>The report was enclosed in Grey to Smith, 31 Jan. 1850, C.O. 48/289. Its authorship is referred to in Grey to Russell, 14 Dec. 1849, Russell Papers, and Stephen to Grey, 7 Nov. 1849 and 5 Jan. 1850, Grey of Howick Papers.

<sup>54</sup>Cancelled draft, Grey to Smith, Jan. 1851, C.O. 48/308.

<sup>55</sup>Minutes, Grey to Merivale, 18 Dec. 1850, Merivale to Grey, 26 Dec. 1850, C.O. 48/308.

<sup>56</sup>De Kiewiet, *op. cit.*, p. 34. Russell to Grey, 12 Jan. 1851, Grey of Howick Papers.

<sup>57</sup>Grey to Smith, 5 March 1851, C.O. 49/41. Grey to Smith (private), 16 Feb. 1851, Grey of Howick Papers.

<sup>58</sup>Morrell, *op. cit.*, pp. 289, ff.



one stage Grey was driven to contemplate an extensive change of the constitutional plans that had been announced. Russell warned him that what he was meditating would be regarded in the colony as a breach of faith.<sup>59</sup> Grey had been thinking of something very like a return to the policy of the cancelled despatch:

I am much inclined to think that it may be expedient to break up the territory into several distinct governments, one for the Eastern division, one for the western, of the Cape proper; another for Caffraria and a fourth for the sovereignty; the first two only being of a representative character; and there being some common authority to regulate customs duties and other matters of joint concern.<sup>60</sup>

Russell conceded that the separation of the Eastern Province might be necessary, but he would not contemplate any form of federation. The only central authority that would be needed, he thought, would be a Governor-General of the two Cape colonies, residing at Cape Town or Grahamstown according to his option.

Grey's opportunity of federating British South Africa, if it ever had existed, was already past and gone. The separation of the Eastern Province had always been the starting point of his project. By the middle of 1851 he was no longer in a position to take this initial step. As he wrote to Governor Smith in August, Britain could not with propriety separate the Eastern Province on the eve of granting the new constitution. "If the separation is to be effected, it must be by the authority, or at least with the concurrence, of the Parliament which is to be established."<sup>61</sup> Early in the following year, Grey resolved that a question which so sorely divided both the colonists and the Cape Government should not be decided at all while the war continued.<sup>62</sup> Less than a month afterwards the Russell Government fell from power.

Although Russell rejected Grey's proposals for the federation of British South Africa, he had only a short time before been quite prepared to consider establishing federal unions in New Zealand and in Australia. In the case of British North America, he had gone farther, for he had himself proposed a federation of the provinces. This was in August 1849, when he wrote to Grey suggesting that the federal constitution then being considered for Australia should be granted to Canada also.<sup>63</sup> He thought that federation would lift Canadian politics above "the miserable party struggles" that had so long been their rule. He also thought that a federated British North America, whether it continued as a colony or grew up to independence, would be in a strong position to withstand political and economic pressure towards absorption in the United States. Grey promptly reminded Russell<sup>64</sup> that he himself had been thinking along somewhat the same lines a few years before when he had asked Lord Elgin to work for the federation of Canada. He also reminded Russell of Elgin's judgment, that federation would not be practicable until the provinces were linked by railways. If Russell wanted to federate British North America, he

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<sup>59</sup>Russell to Grey, 3 June 1851, Grey of Howick Papers.

<sup>60</sup>Grey to Russell, 1 June 1851, Russell Papers.

<sup>61</sup>Grey to Smith (private), 14 Aug. 1851, Grey of Howick Papers.

<sup>62</sup>Morrell, *op. cit.*, p. 296.

<sup>63</sup>Russell to Grey, 6 Aug. 1849, Grey of Howick Papers.

<sup>64</sup>Grey to Russell, 8 Aug. 1849, Russell Papers.

ought to provide funds for railway building, a project on which Grey was always keen. In his delight at the interest shown by Russell in federation, Grey wrote to Elgin telling him about the Prime Minister's proposal.<sup>65</sup> The answer that he received on this occasion was much the same as that given in 1847, with an additional observation, that federation would not answer in Canada because the only powers that the provinces would concede to a federal assembly would be those that really belonged to the Imperial Parliament.<sup>66</sup> Lord Durham had made a similar remark in his report<sup>67</sup> and Grey was rather impressed at the time by what Elgin had to say on the subject.<sup>68</sup>

Grey and Russell were not alone in thinking that the provinces of British North America ought to be federated because of their proximity to the United States and their internal political troubles. Opinions of that kind were common enough among the colonists themselves. In 1851 Sir Edmund Head, the Lieutenant-Governor of New Brunswick, was moved to sum up one version of this kind of case for federal union and prepared a long memorandum on the subject that he sent privately to Grey.<sup>69</sup> Head thought that the provinces would have to be united to save them from annexation to the United States. He was convinced that, if they were federated under the British Crown and given the largest possible degree of self-government, they would prosper and maintain the imperial connection for a long time to come. He would have begun by joining in a federal union the two Canadas, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island.

Grey had already told Head<sup>70</sup> that he favoured the federation of British North America, although believing that it would have to wait on better communications among the provinces. He sent a mere acknowledgment<sup>71</sup> of Head's memorandum. Whether he took any action on it is not at present known. The correspondence with Head was the last occasion on which Grey was concerned as Secretary of State with plans for the federation of colonies.

Grey had no successes with his federation policy. It is true that in later years his failures were occasionally regretted by the colonists and that some of them came to admire him for statesmanlike foresight. In one sense, Grey was obviously right when he insisted that the colonies in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada would feel the need of some form of union before many years had passed. But there was an enormous difference between his notion of a federal

<sup>65</sup>Grey to Elgin, 8 Aug. 1849, *Elgin-Grey Papers*, cit. sup., p. 437.

<sup>66</sup>Elgin to Grey, 3 Sept. 1849, *ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 465, ff.

<sup>67</sup>Lord Durham's *Report on the Affairs of British North America*, cit. sup., Vol. II, p. 304.

<sup>68</sup>Grey to Elgin, 22 Sept. 1849, *Elgin-Grey Papers*, cit. sup., Vol. II, p. 471.

<sup>69</sup>See Chester Martin, "Sir Edmund Head's first project of federation, 1851", *Canadian Historical Association Report*, Ottawa, 1928, pp. 14, ff. The article reprints Head's memorandum from his own draft now in the Head Papers, Public Archives, Ottawa. The original was probably sent to Grey under cover of a letter of 4 Sept. 1851, but neither this letter nor the memorandum is to be found in the Grey or Howick Papers at Durham, nor in the official papers in the Public Record Office. For an assessment of Head's work for the federation of Canada, see Chester Martin, *Foundations of Canadian Nationhood*, Toronto, 1955, pp. 219, ff. See also D. G. G. Kerr, *Sir Edmund Head*, Toronto, 1954, pp. 83, ff., for a lengthy discussion of the contents of the memorandum and its background in Canada.

<sup>70</sup>Grey to Head, 19 Aug. 1851, Grey of Howick Papers. This letter may be regarded as a request to Head to forward the memorandum, but it may not have been so.

<sup>71</sup>Grey to Head, 17 Oct. 1851, *ibid.* Again, this letter may be an acknowledgment of the memorandum, but this is not certain.



system imposed by the imperial authority for the sake of freedom of trade and efficient government and the reality of the various forms of union entered into by Canada, Australia and South Africa, and legislated for by the Imperial Parliament at the request of the colonies. The New Zealand constitution of 1852-3,<sup>72</sup> which had been partly drawn up by Grey before leaving office, came nearest to what he had intended. This was a provincial rather than a federal constitution, but the difference would not have interested Grey. What was important to him was the principle that groups of neighbouring colonies, that enjoyed self-government, should have some general authority to deal with the matters that concerned them in common, especially their trade policies. The authority might or might not be a federation; Grey wrote variously of general assemblies, congresses, central authorities and so on without troubling in most cases to settle constitutional niceties.

While the Australian bills were before Parliament in 1849 and 1850, Grey was often accused of constitution-mongering, of finding some esoteric satisfaction in thinking up far-fetched forms of government for colonies that really needed nothing more than the simplest form of self-rule. His critics were not quite accurate in their choice of target. That other favoured object of their abuse, James Stephen, was the true author of Grey's federal schemes in their more elaborate constitutional aspects. Stephen the lawyer fashioned the instruments of government that Russell and Grey usually had somewhere in mind when they thought of establishing federal unions within the Empire.

In their own different ways Grey, Russell and Stephen all believed in self-government for colonies. Apparently none of them felt between 1846 and 1852 that the use of the imperial power to federate colonies that had never asked to be united might amount to a violation of colonial self-government. Grey was probably saved from suspecting any inconsistency in his own policies by his strong belief in imperial responsibility. He was quite willing to play the paternal role of bestowing federal systems on colonies that, in his opinion, would eventually need them, even if the colonists themselves had not yet recognised their need. The Colonial Office, he tended to believe,<sup>73</sup> was well able to call on the experience of the whole Empire and, by judicious acts of authority, to make it available to every colony. Such autocratic benevolence came easily to a conscientious Whig peer, steeped in a tradition of public service, and firmly convinced that the imperial power ought to play an active part in the development of every part of the Empire.

But the trend of events was away from Grey's carefully qualified notions of colonial self-government. Russell himself had to remind him that, "Probably you and Hawes and Taylor and Gairdner may govern better than Trinidad and Guiana

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<sup>72</sup>The Suspension Act of 1848, 11 and 12 Vic., c. 5, suspended the new constitution enacted in 1846 and revived the old form of government. By the Act of 1852 (15 and 16 Vic., c. 72) a new constitution came into force in 1853. This set up six provinces, which elected councils for local purposes, and a general assembly of two chambers, which was to legislate for the whole country. An Act of 1875 abolished the provincial councils and with them the federal element in the constitution.

<sup>73</sup>After he became Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, Grey became more and more critical of the inability of the Colonial Office to take time and counsel in considering weighty questions of policy.

and Van Diemen's Land would govern themselves—so says Nicholas of Russia and so said Metternich—but Whig practice is the other way”.<sup>74</sup> In 1853 Grey wrote that:

This Country has no interest whatever in exercising any greater influence in the internal affairs of the Colonies, than is indispensable either for the purpose of preventing any one Colony from adopting measures injurious to another, or to the Empire at large; or else for the promotion of the internal good government of the Colonies, by assisting the inhabitants to govern themselves when sufficiently civilised to do so with advantage, and by providing a just and impartial administration for those of which the population is too ignorant and unenlightened to manage its own affairs.<sup>75</sup>

Only in New Zealand, and there but for a short time, was it possible to establish some form of federation of colonies according to these principles. Especially in the eyes of a free trader, federation might seem “indispensable . . . for the purpose of preventing . . . one Colony from adopting measures injurious to another, or to the Empire at large” and necessary, also, “for the promotion of the internal good government of the Colonies”; but, until the colonists themselves found solid reasons for thinking so, federation was politically impracticable.

The triumph of free trade was contemporaneous with the emergence of responsible government. What Grey did not see was that the policy, which he based on his free trade principles and tried to associate with the extension of self-government according to his notions, was itself running counter to the movement by which the colonists gained power to decide such questions for themselves. They settled the federation question, not by some distillation of the experience of the whole Empire, but according to necessities and ambitions that they themselves began to feel.

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<sup>74</sup>Russell to Grey, 21 Nov. 1848, Grey of Howick Papers.

<sup>75</sup>Grey, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 17-18.



# Australia, the United States and Asia

By MICHAEL LINDSAY

At the outset it may be worth placing Australia in an approximate perspective in relation to Asia.

First, one has to be careful not to overdo the idea of Asian "neighbours". Darwin to Timor is not far, but Darwin or Perth to Djakarta is roughly the same distance as from London to Istanbul; and England and Turkey do not usually consider themselves as neighbours. Darwin to Calcutta is roughly the same distance as from London to Washington. If one starts from the densely populated areas of Australia the distances are still bigger. Delhi is nearer to London than it is to Canberra and Peking is slightly nearer to London than to Brisbane.

For America the distances are even bigger. Sydney to San Francisco is further than Perth to Alexandria and San Francisco to Shanghai is further than Sydney to Bombay and a good deal further than Canberra to Peking.

These are all great-circle distances measured on a globe. They are slightly misleading for two reasons. Sea transport from Europe to Asia has to go a long way round even *via* Suez. Furthermore, international air routes cannot at present go over the Soviet Union or its satellites. Even so Australia's neighbours are neighbours on the scale of the outback rather than on the scale of a suburb.

Secondly, if Australia is compared with Asian countries in terms of population it is far down on the list. The leaders are two giants, China with 600 million and India with over 350. Then come Japan, Indonesia and Pakistan with populations between 90 and 75 million. Then come a group of countries with populations between 25 and 15 million—Thailand, the Philippines and Burma with Korea and Vietnam (if one counts the two parts together). Australia comes in the next group, a little smaller than South Vietnam and a little larger than Formosa, Ceylon or Nepal. Then come Malaya with nearly five million, Cambodia with about four, Hong Kong with two and a half down to Mongolia with one million and Bhutan with about 600,000.

Thus, if one looks at Australia in terms of population it is a small power on the Asian scene, but the picture is very different if one looks at national income. Here Australia comes fourth on the list instead of eleventh and is outranked only by China, India and Japan. And Japan with nearly ten times the Australian population has less than twice the Australian national income. India with forty times the population of Australia has a national income only two and a half times as large. Ceylon with a slightly smaller population has only one-ninth of the Australian national income.

This means that, for economic power, and to some extent even for military power, Australia has a strength quite out of proportion to its population. Even in purely military terms a country with a large population very near the subsistence level may not be very strong; any large diversion of resources for military purposes

can only be made at the expense of severe suffering for the civilian population. For such things as economic aid in peace-time what matters is not the total national income but the surplus available after essential requirements at home have been met.

Of course Australia's power on the international scene is potential rather than actual. In a state of full employment any resources used for international objectives would have to be diverted from home use. But with strong enough motives a good deal could be diverted for international use without any really serious sacrifices at home. And though Australia does not have much unemployment it does have a good deal of inefficiency. If a desire to act in the international field provided a motive for raising standards of efficiency in Australia a great deal could be done abroad without making any sacrifices at home.

Obviously Australia is not in the very small category of world powers which can, if necessary, pursue a completely independent policy, but it is one of the strongest powers in this part of the world and in a position of great strategic importance. This strength and strategic position give Australia an important degree of potential independence in foreign policy. Australia is not an ally which a great power could write off as comparatively unimportant but one important enough to be worth conciliating and entitled to demand that some account should be taken of Australian views.

It is only since the last war that Australia has really started to develop an independent policy towards Asia. Before the war relations with Asia were handled through the U.K. Now there are fifteen Australian diplomatic posts in Asia. And this technical change is only a symptom of a new independence in foreign policy. Before the war it was reasonable to talk in terms of a British policy towards Asia from which Australian policy might sometimes diverge. Now it is most reasonable to talk of an Australian policy which retains a good deal of co-ordination with U.K. policy and which has developed an increasing co-ordination with American policy.

The U.S.A. is one of the great world powers. Its population is larger than any Asian state except China and India and its national income is by far the largest in the world, about 25 times that of Australia. However, American involvement in Asia is also a fairly recent development.

Before the war the United States was directly concerned with the Philippines and was a major naval power potentially in conflict with Japan for control of the Pacific. Apart from this American interests in Asia were comparatively small, if one defines interest in economic or strategic terms. There was, however, the strong sentimental interest in China which cannot really be explained in terms of economic interest or power politics. Of course America had economic interests in China. There was a fair amount of trade which some American groups wanted to expand. American banks had at one time participated in Chinese loans, there were American troops in Shanghai, Tientsin and Peking forming part of the general system of extraterritoriality, and American insurance, banking and air transport were important. But American economic interests and American involvement in the partial foreign control of China were much less than British. In pre-war China it was always the British who were considered the main "imperialists". While American policy towards China was certainly not entirely altruistic it was greatly



influenced by a strong popular feeling which did not have a basis in economic interests or power politics. China was the main field of American missionary activity. Almost every American community would have heard talks about China, if only as part of an appeal for mission funds, and returned missionaries and their families were an influential pro-China pressure group. This missionary interest was reinforced by increasing cultural contacts. A high proportion of the Chinese who studied abroad went to America. Americans felt proud of the number of American university graduates having important positions in China. Chinese universities were organised on the American model and American influence in them was strong.

One cannot really understand American feelings about China unless one takes into account this emotional involvement. Large numbers of Americans feel that, whatever the faults of American government policy, their interest in China has been really altruistic. In the case of returned missionaries and teachers they feel that they have devoted a good part of their lives to the service of China. They feel, and with some reason, that before the rise of Communist power, the American feelings of friendship for China were reciprocated. All this has made the violent anti-Americanism of the Chinese Communists far more of an emotional shock than the anti-Americanism of the Russian Communists. American hostility towards Chinese Communism is reinforced by feelings of resentment against an old friend who has turned into an enemy which do not apply to Russian Communism.

This resentment was reinforced by the Korean war. It is fairly easy to be magnanimous to a beaten enemy and the emotional shock of Pearl Harbour has been compensated by the American occupation of Japan. It is much harder to be magnanimous to an enemy whom one has not beaten, especially when one believes that a victory would have been possible if the fight had not been stopped.

To understand the basis of American feeling about China and to make allowance for it does not imply agreement with it. On the contrary, one has to recognise that this emotional resentment which has strong popular support makes it hard for any American government to base its policy towards China on purely rational grounds. American opinion often seems reluctant to accept what to most other people seem to be the obvious facts of the situation. Though Australia still recognises the Kuomintang Government on Formosa, when Australians talk about China they almost always mean the mainland and its Government. For many Americans the natural meaning of China is Formosa and its Government, while the mainland régime is thought of as an unfortunate aberration, and is carefully termed "Communist China" or "mainland China".

This emotional involvement with China has been a constant factor in America but in other respects the American position has completely changed. In the 1930's America was only a naval power. For most of the inter-war period the American army was only a little over 100,000, the size to which the German army was limited by the Treaty of Versailles. Now the American armed forces are about two and a half million and America has become one of the two great military powers in the world. In the 1930's isolationism was a very powerful force in America whereas now America has clearly accepted the international responsibilities of a world power.

Because of its overwhelming superiority in resources America has largely taken over the position previously held by the U.K.

The motives and objectives behind American policy in Asia are obviously very complex. The motives by which Marxian theory explains American policy are almost certainly one component. There are business interests who want to extend their markets and to obtain more control over sources of raw materials and which are looking for profitable fields for investment. Equally there is almost certainly a genuinely altruistic component. There is a feeling that America's fortunate economic situation carries with it a responsibility for trying to help countries that are less fortunate, and there is a strong tradition of sympathy for countries which, like the United States, have obtained independence from colonial rule.

A more important component than either of these is almost certainly the desire for security. The traditional balance of power system has now narrowed down to two really great world powers of which America is one. And one can predict on theoretical grounds that a balance of power system is likely to become increasingly unstable as the number of powers in it becomes smaller. For America to precipitate the final step and end the balance of power system altogether by trying to obtain world hegemony would be a break with the whole American tradition and, though some groups in America might like to do this, it is unlikely that they will exert much influence on American policy in the foreseeable future. (Henry Luce's notorious editorial on "The American Century" produced little response.) However, there is a strong fear that the other world power has such ambitions and this provides an extremely powerful motive for keeping up military preparations and extending American influence abroad in order to make sure that America is strong enough to discourage attempts to bring the world under Soviet hegemony. It is generally believed that the world Communist leadership has ambitions of world domination and that an extension of Communist power would threaten the values most highly prized by American culture. Given this belief, which is very strongly held by most Americans, it is obviously in the American national interest to devote considerable resources to resisting the spread of Communism and to assisting the development of prosperous and stable non-Communist states in Asia.

In Asia the changes of the last twenty years have been greatest of all. (In what follows Asia is used in a restricted sense to cover the area from Pakistan to Japan, excluding the Middle East and Central Asia.) Before the war there were only three independent countries in the area, Japan, China and Thailand; and of these only Japan was strong enough to play an active part in world politics. All the rest was under colonial rule.

Now colonialism has practically disappeared. The only remaining areas of any size still ruled by non-Asians are British Borneo and New Guinea, areas at a very primitive level of economic and social development where some sort of rule from outside is practically unavoidable. For the rest colonialism only remains in a few odd places which are only spots on any large-scale map. (The position is, of course, very different in Central Asia which is one of the biggest remaining colonial areas of the world.) K. M. Panikkar is certainly right in taking these developments as



the end of an epoch in world history, an epoch during which European power was temporarily dominant.

This European dominance had lasted for two or three centuries. In the Middle Ages most of Russia had been part of the Mongol Empire and only internal developments prevented the Mongols from conquering a good deal of the rest of Europe. As late as the reign of Charles II in England the Turks were besieging Vienna. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century a good deal of Asia was ahead of Europe in material civilisation. Indian textiles were superior to the European product and Chinese silks and ceramics found a big sale in Europe. The Europeans who visited China were impressed by what they saw and found that Chinese administration was ahead of that of most European states.

European powers were dominant from the eighteenth century because modern science and technology had started in Europe and remained until recently very largely a monopoly of the Western powers. This development can be related to special features of European society but this is a large and speculative subject. What is relevant here is that a change started in Europe which may, in the long run, alter human society as much as the discovery of agriculture several thousand years before. And people are still inclined to underestimate the break in cultural tradition which it has produced. An educated European of the seventeenth century would probably have felt fairly at home in the Roman Empire and an educated Chinese of last century fairly at home in Han dynasty China. They would feel completely bewildered in present-day London or Shanghai and, in the company of scientists or technologists, they would find themselves dealing with people whose way of thought was largely unintelligible to them.

By being the first to start the change, the Western powers obtained a big temporary advantage over the rest of the world, which was not simply a matter of having better weapons or better equipment of other kinds. (A great deal of Asia was conquered by the West in the eighteenth century when the difference in weapons was not very great.) It was at least as much a superiority in the techniques of organisation and management. The Asian countries which thought that they could resist Western pressure simply by taking over Western equipment soon found that this did not work. If they wanted to compete with the West they had also to take over a great deal of Western organisation and to train people in Western habits of thought.

Many Westerners have been inclined to explain this temporary superiority in terms of some inherent racial superiority. An extreme example occurs in a book by a foreigner in the Chinese Customs Service who wrote:

It has been calculated that the nervous energy of an educated Chinese is 0.24 that of the white man, and that of a labourer 0.18. In an office it thus takes four Chinese to do the work of one foreigner, and in manual work five men.<sup>1</sup>

There was a time when Westerners were able to get away with this sort of claim, but the Japanese disproved it more than fifty years ago and no reasonable person

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<sup>1</sup>Putnam Weale, *Why China Sees Red*, London, 1926, p. 268.

would now accept it. It used, for example, to be considered that a railway system was the kind of large-scale organisation which could only be efficient under Western management, but both Japan and China are well ahead of Australia in this.

What the assertion of racial superiority has done has been to leave behind in Asia a legacy of bad feeling and a reluctance to admit the real importance of using people with tradition and training who cannot easily be produced at short notice in societies which are just beginning to change to modern organisation.

In all the countries of Asia, many of them only recently independent, the ruling élite is trying to put through a process of social and economic change. They are trying to take over and adopt to their societies the ideas and methods which have given Western societies a power and prosperity previously unknown. This is an exciting and inspiring development but there is a danger of being sentimental about it. One must respect and admire the enthusiasm of many Asian leaders but one must also ask, "What is the most likely outcome of their policies?" In particular it seems quite misguided to have an uncritical enthusiasm for the development of nationalism.

It is natural that countries which have recently attained their independence should have strong nationalist feelings. Where nationalism is simply a pride in one's country, a desire that it should be strong and prosperous, and that it should produce a culture of its own, then nationalism is a motivation likely to produce good results. But nationalism is a motivation which easily becomes perverted into xenophobia, which often hinders economic development, and which is often a serious danger to peace.

In Europe nationalism was specially strong in those countries which had attained their independence from the Turkish or Habsburg empires, but these countries were notorious for the violence of their quarrels, the instability of their governments and their refusal to co-operate to their mutual economic advantage. If Asia develops the kind of extreme nationalism which was found in parts of Europe the chances of peaceful development and economic prosperity will be greatly reduced.

The countries of Asia face very difficult tasks. On the purely technical level the development of modernized economic systems demands large-scale investment, including the training of technicians, but they have only a small surplus available for investment. This is a point at which countries like Australia with a potential economic surplus can give very real help. A good deal is already being done through the Colombo Plan and a great deal more may need to be done.

Many of the countries of Asia have already a serious population problem and it seems likely that their economic problems will be insoluble unless they manage to stabilize their populations. This is a large subject which can only be mentioned here.

There are even more serious problems at the less technical level. A society which wishes to use modern technology has to co-ordinate human activity to a much greater degree than more primitive societies and this needs not only large numbers of trained administrators but also the development of certain traditions. For efficient organisation one needs what Mary Parker Follett called "the de-personalization of authority". Loyalty to a personal leader needs to be replaced



by loyalty to the organisation. Instead of simply obeying orders people must learn to do what is necessary to further their common objectives. Again, efficient political organisation is only possible when most people have some loyalty to society as a whole which transcends sectional loyalties. All these traditions are very difficult to develop in societies where they have previously been weak. All this again is an interesting subject which can only be touched on here.

Twenty years ago Australia hardly needed to have a policy towards Asia because no Asian country except Japan was strong enough to be any threat to Australian security. In the future the power of Asian countries is certain to grow and long-run Australian security can only depend on establishing good relationships with them. There are obvious mutual advantages in Australian co-operation with stable and prosperous Asian countries and no obvious conflicts of interest. Australian security would be threatened if the Asian countries fail to solve their political, social and economic problems. If the development of extreme nationalism causes wars in Asia Australia might find it hard to stay out. There is a lot of empirical evidence to suggest that a ruling group may be inclined to favour adventures abroad to distract attention from social conflicts at home. (To put it like this is an extreme simplification of a complex and largely unconscious process.) This means that, if any major Asian country fails to develop a system of government which can rely on support from an informed public opinion, there would be a danger of imperialist adventures which might threaten Australia. Again, the failure to solve economic difficulties would incline people to desperate remedies, and the prospect of economic relief by the conquest of Australia, however illusory, might seem attractive.

Such considerations show the importance of doing everything possible to help the peaceful development of Asian countries. In providing resources for the necessary investment programmes anything that Australia can do must be on a far smaller scale than America but Australia is in an exceptionally favourable position for offering technical training and advice.

It is very difficult for the Americans to avoid suspicion that anything they do in an Asian country may be a means of trying to get some control over it, simply because America is a major world power. The U.K. is also suspect because, until recently, it was a major imperial power in the area. But no one seriously suspects Australia of imperialist ambitions in Asia. This means that any assistance or advice offered from Australia has a much better chance of being accepted on its merits. There is no need to pretend that offers of assistance are entirely altruistic. There is less chance of suspicion if it is made clear that it is in Australia's interest to help the development of stable and prosperous countries in Asia.

All this is rather general and long-term. At the more immediate level is the military co-operation involved in SEATO, which is a more controversial topic. There are a number of countries which might well be in SEATO—India, Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia—which are actually not in it and whose leaders say that they dislike it and consider it to be a factor which hinders rather than helps the prospects for peace in the area. It is important to recognise that they hold such opinions and to try to find out the exact reasons behind them, but there is no reason to suppose that the opinions of these Asian leaders are necessarily correct.

The value of the military side of SEATO depends on whether or not there is a real military threat to the security of the area against which it is necessary to take precautions. It would be logical for someone to say that the military side of SEATO is simply provocative if he goes on to say, "because there would be no danger of military aggression from the Communist powers even if the non-Communist powers of the area took no precautions against it". It is simply evasive to attack SEATO without stating clearly this assumption on which the attack depends. And the assumption is certainly not self-evident. In Europe, Communist military power has certainly been used to expand Communist control; and the North Korean attack in June 1950 was a clear attempt to expand Communist power in Asia by military force. The present position in Asia is not so clear and Chinese policy in particular admits of differing interpretations. There is no clear proof that the Chinese Government would use military force to expand its power, or to impose Communist régimes on other countries, if it thought it could get away with it. But there is also no clear evidence for believing that such action would be impossible or even extremely unlikely. Since it is reasonable to take precautions against a possible attack and not merely against a certain attack, the onus of proof that military aggression from the Communist powers is impossible must rest on those who attack the military side of SEATO. And so far they have not produced any satisfactory evidence to support their case.

Equally there is no reason to suppose that Mr. Dulles' views about SEATO are necessarily correct. The statements he made in March 1957 during his visit to Australia reflect the view which is widely held in America, that Communism has unalterable ambitions of world domination which it is prepared to pursue by any means, including military aggression when this might be successful and not too expensive. This general view of Communism is almost certainly too dogmatic. It takes no account of the possibility that some Communist aggressiveness may be the result of persecution mania, a belief in the Marx-Leninist theories which predict that the Capitalist powers are determined to destroy the Communist powers. It assumes that "Communism" is an unchanging entity which will always be aggressive and takes no account of the possibility that Communism might change from an aggressive Stalinist form into a more peacefully inclined form with which genuine peaceful coexistence would be possible.

This dogmatic view of Communism gives American policy an inflexibility from which Australia could well dissociate itself. This does not mean going to the other extreme and accepting the view, which seems implicit in some of Mr. Nehru's statements, that there is nothing to be feared from the Communist powers as an external threat provided one treats them nicely. What can be said is that the American view generalises with more certainty than is justified by the present evidence. This implies that it would be worth trying to get more evidence, which might confirm the American view, but which, quite possibly, might show that the risk of Communist aggression could largely disappear without the Communist powers ceasing to be in some sense Communist.

It is possible that the dogmatism with which the American view is presented may be one of the reasons which make some important Asian leaders unwilling to



accept its practical applications, such as SEATO. If a more moderate Australian view could be worked out presenting the threat of Communist aggression, not as a certainty, but as a possible danger which, on present evidence, could not be dismissed, and if this view could be presented in Asia, it might do something to create conditions under which SEATO could be expanded into a wider and more effective organisation.

The American view of Communism also leads to a belief that Communism is always imposed on a country, either by attack from outside or else through subversion by a small minority. There is, however, a good deal of evidence to suggest that, under certain social conditions, Communism may have a real attraction especially for the educated minority which is the determining force in many Asian countries. And these conditions may be produced if support is given to an anti-Communist régime which is not making the necessary social reforms. To support such régimes may be an effective short-run policy, but a policy of backing groups favouring social reforms is likely to be a more effective long-run policy even though it involves more immediate risk.

American policy towards China is another point on which Australia could take a more independent line. It was suggested above that American policy is considerably influenced by emotional considerations. If one looks at the statement which Mr. Dulles made at Canberra on 12 March 1957, it states a case but a rather one-sided one. It may be true that recognition of the Peking régime would discourage the opponents of Communism among the overseas Chinese. But the refusal of recognition and the U.N. seat seems, not only to many Chinese but also to large sections of non-Chinese Asian opinion, to be a serious injustice to the Peking régime. This creates not only sympathy for Peking but also feeling against Washington; and this second effect may well outweigh the first. Again, there might have been a good case for confining U.N. membership to countries whose governments met certain standards. In fact, the U.N. has accepted the principle of inclusive membership and has admitted members whose conduct has not been any better than that of the Peking régime. Yet again, Mr. Dulles assumed that no possible gains could come from closer contact with China. But the possibility of contacts exerting some influence in China though it may be small is not negligible. The possibility of China becoming less hostile to the West through some change within the Communist régime is a great deal more likely than the possibility of a new revolution restoring the Kuomintang. The continued hostility implied by non-recognition only encourages the more extreme and doctrinaire forces within Chinese Communism and it is not sensible to lessen the chances of a more likely favourable development in order to increase the chances of an extremely unlikely one.

Here again, Australian policy need not go to the other extreme. It would be quite reasonable to ask for assurances that recognition of the Peking régime would be followed by the establishment of normal diplomatic relations and not by the long period of rather humiliating stalemate which followed U.K. recognition. It would also be quite reasonable to continue to recognise the government of Formosa, as the Government of Formosa. The principle of self-determination, which the Peking régime claims to support, clearly implies that the future of an area which

would be viable as an independent state should be decided by the wishes of the inhabitants. When the Communist leaders claim Formosa simply because it has been historically "part of China", they are taking the same line as the die-hard British conservatives in 1914 who opposed Irish Home Rule simply because Ireland had historically been "part of the U.K."

This sort of independent action by Australia need not weaken the American alliance which is obviously needed. It was pointed out above that Australia has a position which gives some real scope for independence in policy. And there is a real possibility of influencing American policy. American policy is influenced a great deal by a process of more or less public discussion. There is a very close relationship between policy making organisations and all sorts of academic research organisations whose opinions in the long run have very considerable influence. If a reasoned and well supported case can be presented for holding that some aspect of American policy is mistaken and unlikely to produce its intended results, it will be listened to by a lot of Americans who have considerable influence on policy.

This and previous sections point to the conclusion that Australia needs to devote more resources to research related to foreign policy. To influence American policy by influencing the research workers who advise it Australia needs to produce research work of its own of really high quality. Also, not nearly enough is known about Asian societies—their economic, social and political problems, the assumptions on which their leaders base their thinking, and so on. And such things need to be known to produce an effective policy towards Asia. Again, in a rapidly changing world situation there is need for continual rethinking of the concepts and theories in terms of which foreign policy is considered. No doubt research is being done in the Departments of External Affairs and Defence but the influence of research done by official organisations is limited because it cannot be published. Furthermore, people in these Departments admit that they are normally too busy with day-to-day problems to spare enough time for fundamental thinking.

In America research on international relations problems is carried on on a very large scale, mostly by academic or semi-academic institutions which publish a large part of their work. In Australia the proportion of the national income spent on such research is certainly not more than one-tenth and perhaps less than one-twentieth of the American figure. Some research on international relations is done in Departments of History or Politics at the State universities, the Australian Institute of International Affairs cannot afford a research staff of its own and can do little more than give some assistance to the publication of work done in the universities or by private individuals, the only organisation concentrating on research is the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University. This is also a small organisation and its future has been in a continued state of uncertainty for the past three years. People in the Department have argued that its task should be to do research with some relevance to the problems of Australian foreign policy with a geographical concentration on the area of special interest to Australia. However, the majority of those in the University responsible for deciding the future of the Department seem to have preferred a concentration on much more purely academic work with only a remote or indirect relevance to any current problems in international affairs.



If the Australian Government realises the need for more research on current problems in international relations it will not only have to provide more finance but also to insist that the allocation of this money shall be in the hands of people who want to do the right type of work and not in the hands of people who seem inclined to believe either that it is impossible to apply scientific method to the study of current international problems or else that this type of work is academically disreputable.

This digression on research started from a discussion of SEATO and American policies. The non-military side of SEATO is now developing some research on the technical problem of countering subversion and propaganda and on the problems of economic development and is also starting work in the important field of developing cultural contacts in its area. This is alright as far as it goes but, as a rather speculative conclusion, it is suggested that something more is needed, an investigation of why Communism is attractive to some Asian societies and how to provide something more attractive.

It was pointed out that the ruling élites in Asian countries are engaged in a very difficult task of modernising their societies to enable them to use the developments which started a few centuries ago in Western countries. On the purely technical side the problems are fairly straightforward though often very difficult. Science and technology are international. There is no problem of choice between proletarian or non-proletarian chemistry or between Aryan and non-Aryan engineering. (This might not have been strictly true before the fall of Lysenko. The Japanese Communist Party at one time was trying to spread its influence in the countryside by doing propaganda for Michurin agriculture.)

On social and political systems there is a bewildering problem of choice. Western societies have made at least a partial adjustment to the social changes required by the development of science and technology, but none of them has made a completely satisfactory adjustment. The Asian leaders trying to modernize their countries know that they have to take over some elements of Western political and social organisation, but it is very hard to choose the right ones. At one time the tendency was to take over everything, including perfectly futile things like top hats and frock coats for official functions. Many countries tried to transplant constitutions which were simply copies of the then dominant Western parliamentary democracy. And these constitutions seldom worked, though they may work in India because of a long period of British political tutelage. Now Asian leaders realise that they must choose those elements which are essential and adapt them to the conditions of their countries, but they now have the choice between two very different types of Western political and social organisation.

The attraction of the Communist type is that it promises to answer the pressing problems of society more directly than the Western type. Russian Communism faced a similar task of modernizing a backward country. It showed that it was possible to deal ruthlessly with vested interests which opposed social change, and most Asian societies have such vested interests. It worked through power concentrated in the hands of a small minority, and most Asian countries have only small minorities with enough education and experience to play an effective political role.

By contrast the democratic countries do not offer any ready-made solution. Their institutions have developed to run countries with an educated and politically conscious population and a tradition of respect for law which have taken a century or so to develop. Asian leaders might well say: "These systems depend for their working on conditions which do not exist in our countries. And the Western countries do not offer any suggestions for a quick way of creating these conditions where they do not exist."

It can and should be pointed out that Communism promises a good deal more than it performs even in the short run. The long-run disadvantage is even more serious; the natural development of at least the Stalinist type of Communism is towards what Marx called "Oriental society", a society in which the power of the ruling group depends, not on property, but on control of the apparatus of government. This makes it in some ways easier for Asian societies to adopt but the restoration of a modernized version of Marx's "Oriental society" is certainly not what the leaders of Asia are aiming at. Even the Chinese Communist leaders do not really want to create a society something like the old Chinese empire with the mere substitution of Marxism for Confucianism as the official orthodoxy. In the long run a reversion to "Oriental society" would mean the failure of everything the leaders of both Communist and non-Communist Asia are working for. Such societies tend to become static and, if they developed in Asia while the West retained its free organisation, Asia would again fall behind the West and might experience a new period of Western dominance.

This is not to say that Western societies face no dangers. Perhaps the most serious one for the democratic powers is the development of what one might call the "vested interest" society. Democratic institutions enable particular interests to secure what is most important to them at any moment but the total of particular interests does not add up to the general interest. This type of society is described very convincingly in Herbert Lüthy's *The State of France*<sup>2</sup> and one can see a good deal of it in Australia.

If the democratic countries want to offer Asia an alternative which is obviously more attractive than Communism they will have to do two things. First, to present a plan for development which will work in Asian countries. On the economic side people are trying to do this but comparatively few political theorists have got down to considering the questions: "What sort of institutions can work in a country without the general education and political consciousness, the traditions of respect for law and readiness to compromise and so on, on which the effective working of Western democracy depends? And what sort of institutions which would work in a country of this type are likely to develop towards a genuine democracy?"

Secondly, the Western countries need to show that their institutions can obviously give better results than Communist institutions. At present an Asian student in Australia can learn a lot of technical knowledge and even a lot about administrative techniques but he might well say: "Australia can only afford her political institutions because she has such a high ratio of resources to population.

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<sup>2</sup>London, 1955.



In my country we need to get a lot done quickly and simply could not afford this type of vested interest society with its bottle-necks of vested inefficiency and continual wrangling before anything gets done."

Even as it is Australia is quite impressive. The high standard of living is so obvious that visitors cannot fail to be impressed. But to exert a real long-term influence in Asia a great deal more is needed, namely, a situation in which any Asian visitor will say: "This country has a really efficient political and economic system which my country should aim at."

Of course Communists would argue that this is impossible, that only Communism can provide a political and economic system under which any society can make efficient use of its resources for the general good. This is the issue which will become increasingly important if the international situation develops towards "competitive coexistence". In the long run the rational response to the danger of Communist subversion is not simply to take defensive measures against it but to destroy the whole basis of the Communist challenge by showing that a non-totalitarian society can offer not only greater freedom but also greater efficiency.

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# Social Darwinism

By P. D. MARCHANT

In two years' time there will occur the centenary of the publication of Charles Darwin's famous book, *The Origin of Species*, on 24 November 1859. From that date until the outbreak of the first world war, "Darwinism", in one form or another, was a central question in biological science, in social theory, and in a good deal of practical politics. First appearing as the rankest heresy, both religious and scientific, Darwinism soon became established orthodoxy, was next subjected to its Reformation and schism, and finally, in the inter-war period, had become another anonymous ingredient in the compost heap of the twentieth century's intellectual heritage.

Up to 1914 approximately, there was a great flood of literature on Darwin and Darwinism; between the wars the flow subsided, as if the subject of violence, with which Darwinism had largely become identified and which culminated in the cataclysm of the first world war and in the Russian Revolution, had become an improper subject of investigation.<sup>1</sup> But the renewed dedication to the philosophy of violence in the totalitarian powers in the 'thirties, and the second cataclysm of war, were sufficient to show that violence was by no means discredited. The revived attention to Darwinism in recent years may be regarded, along with such other investigations as the enquiry into the nature of totalitarianism, as part of a general attempt to assess the role of what are often called ideological factors in politics. Recent study of the subject is centred on two main questions, of which the second is of interest here. They are, first, the question of Darwin's contribution to science viewed in the light of scientific advances in the last hundred years;<sup>2</sup> and second, the question of Social Darwinism as an intellectual and social phenomenon of the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries which is seen to have a contemporary relevance as well as being of historical interest.<sup>3</sup> Without going into this contemporary relevance it may be noted that Social Darwinism bears striking resemblances in its theoretical structure to certain modern politico-ideological movements, notably Nazism and Communism. It could be argued<sup>4</sup> that the success of these movements, as of Social Darwinism, their acceptance and their

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<sup>1</sup>In this period, there were a number of biographies of Darwin of which the best is Geoffrey West, *Charles Darwin, A Portrait*, Yale, 1938, which contains, *inter alia*, an exhaustive bibliography of Darwiniana up to that time. J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, London, 1924, and Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1937, both have useful historical and theoretical material.

<sup>2</sup>e.g. Sir Arthur Keith, *Darwin Revalued*, London, 1955 (this is also biographical, but very poor as against West); William Irvine, *Apes, Angels and Victorians*, London, 1955, a joint biography of Darwin and Huxley; Maurice Mandelbaum, "Scientific Background of Evolutionary Theory in Biology", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 18, No. 3, June 1957.

<sup>3</sup>e.g. Jacques Martin Barzun, *Darwin, Marx, Wagner—Critique of a Heritage*, London, 1942; Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860-1915*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945; Stow Persons (ed.), *Evolutionary Thought in America*, Yale, 1950; R. G. McCloskey, *American Conservatism in the Age of Enterprise*, Harvard, 1951. There are also important references in V. L. Parrington, *The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America*, Vol. III of his *Main Currents in American Thought*, New York, 1927, 1930; R. H. Gabriel, *American Democratic Thought*, New York, 1940; Morton G. White, *Social Thought in America, the Revolt Against Formalism*, New York, 1949; H. S. Commager, *The American Mind*, Yale, 1950.

<sup>4</sup>See my article, "Determinist Theories and International Relations", *International Relations* Oct. 1956.



role as guides to or justifications of policy, owes something at least to certain common theoretical characteristics, namely, their determinist elements, which, by identifying certain individuals or classes or nations as being especially favoured by the inevitable trend of history, make such theories particularly palatable to these individuals or groups. One index of the prevalence of such theories might lie in the extent to which they *fail* to arouse searching criticism. Now, Social Darwinism flourished best in pre-1914 America and there was certainly a marked absence of serious examination of it in that country. Another significant indication of its strength in the U.S.A. is that the movement, besides being criticized mainly by *foreign* contemporaries, was most clearly identified and *named* by European thinkers, who worked in societies where Social Darwinism, though an important intellectual movement, by no means had the field to itself. Parsons<sup>5</sup> credits Pareto with coining the name "Social Darwinism", but it is already in common use in Continental sociological writing by the 1890's.<sup>6</sup>

In these two connexions, it is notable that, as the works listed indicate, the revival of interest in Social Darwinism has been almost confined to the United States and that Americans do not seem to have identified the movement except in retrospect. This raises the question why the critical examination of Social Darwinism in the country in which it enjoyed its greatest vogue should have been delayed at least a generation after the movement declined.

Part of the answer would lie in the fact that Social Darwinism was so ideally convenient an explanation and justification of the conduct of the American ruling class, in politics, in business and in education, that one would hardly expect to find a thorough and critical examination of the doctrine making great headway.<sup>7</sup> Social Darwinism suited the America of the post-Civil War years, and especially of the expansionist decade of the 1890's, as "a philosophy", and as "a philosophy" it was never seriously examined in its heyday by its own advocates. Just as the theory itself was originally an importation, though one to which Americans added a good deal, so were the attempts to reform it theoretically initiated in Europe. Herbert Spencer, the greatest Social Darwinist, was never so lionized as when he crossed the Atlantic; though he was not without honour in his own country, he made far less impression in an England in which the social struggle for survival had already been very much more tamed than it had been in America. The sort of criticism to which D. G. Ritchie subjected the doctrine seems to have become possible for Americans only from the perspective of the last two or three decades. Hofstadter can write<sup>8</sup> that Spencer "was telling the guardians of American society what they wanted to hear". But it is nearly seventy years since Ritchie said<sup>9</sup> that "the idea of struggle for existence . . . makes a very comfortable doctrine indeed for

<sup>5</sup>Parsons, *op. cit.*, pp. 114, 220, n. 2. Pareto's *Traité de sociologie générale*, from which Parsons is quoting, first appeared, in Italian, in 1916. Unless he coined the phrase much earlier than that, it is not his.

<sup>6</sup>See e.g. *Revue internationale de sociologie* in that period and especially the essays of Jacques Novicow and Achille Loria.

<sup>7</sup>Not, of course that there were *no* critics of Darwinian theory in America. The leading one was Lester Ward, especially in his *Dynamic Sociology*, but it was many years before he gained a hearing.

<sup>8</sup>Hofstadter, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

<sup>9</sup>D. G. Ritchie, *Darwinism and Politics*, London, 1889, p. 3.

all those who are quite satisfied with things as they are". The leaders of American society at the time when Ritchie wrote this in England were satisfied, and few of them questioned their right to such satisfaction. Apart from Ward, who had little of the wealth of the Gilded Age, the important theoretical critics of Social Darwinism were not Americans, but English and Continental writers.<sup>10</sup> This is not to deny, of course, that there was strong opposition in America to the sort of society which Social Darwinism was invoked to justify—by such satisfied people as Andrew Carnegie, for example. Opposition both to the system and to its philosophy came from Henry George, Edward Bellamy, Upton Sinclair and others. But such opposition remained rather political than theoretical, and Social Darwinism in America recovered from domestic assaults in the 1890's to flourish with new vigour as the *rationale* of expansionism in the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations.

What I want to suggest is that Social Darwinism, like other determinist theories which were used to justify certain policies, escaped serious examination as long as it could fulfil this function. In fact, because of this utility, it achieved a fame<sup>11</sup> much wider and at a more popular, uncritical level than other contemporary doctrines in America—socialism and idealism, for example. While there were certain writers<sup>12</sup> before the first war who gave non-Darwinian interpretations of social and international processes, it was not till after the disillusionment of that war that the Darwinian explanation fell into disrepute in America. The first assault on Social Darwinism was, so to speak, a practical one, an attack on the kind of society, both domestic and international, which it was taken as justifying. It is only the grandchildren of the Gilded Age and the era of Manifest Destiny who can bear to examine the philosophy of that generation at all closely.

One thing that does emerge from the modern re-appraisals of Social Darwinism is that, like many general intellectual movements (Marxism, for example) it is difficult to identify, much less define it, with any precision. It has been frequently observed that the Darwinian theory of evolution went through many evolutionary stages itself, and this is true of both the biological and sociological applications of the doctrine. To answer the question, "What was Social Darwinism?" one must have in mind that it was a *movement*, and one cannot avoid giving an historical account of this movement, although I do not want to maintain that such an account is a substitute for a theoretical analysis of the issues involved. It is possible, however, to see certain characteristic features which persist throughout its history and which give it that continuity which enables us to recognize Social Darwinism as an intellectual movement.

First of all, one must emphasize the enormous prestige, popularity and influence which Darwinism in its many forms enjoyed in the second half of the nineteenth

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<sup>10</sup>Especially, Peter Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid—A Factor of Evolution*, London, 1902; Benjamin Kidd, numerous books including *Social Evolution*, London, 1894, which sold one-quarter of a million copies; Jacques Novicow, *La Critique du Darwinisme social*, Paris, 1910; Ritchie, *op. cit.*; and many other writers.

<sup>11</sup>See the references in Parrington, Commager and Gabriel to the place of Social Darwinism in the literature of the day, especially the work of the realists, London, Dreiser, etc.

<sup>12</sup>Notably Charles A. Beard, who, following J. B. Hobson, takes a straight Marxian, economic line at this time. See his *Contemporary American History, 1877-1913*, New York, 1914.



century, notably in America, and the speed with which it gained prominence after the publication of *The Origin of Species* in 1859. At least since the early 1840's, or even earlier, when the possibility of the mutability of species first occurred to him, Darwin had been aware, and steadily grew more acutely and sometimes painfully aware, of the implications of his theory over a vast field. But he was primarily a naturalist who preferred to leave the issues which his work stirred up to those who relished a fight more than he did, notably to his champion, T. H. Huxley. The *Origin* was a treatise in biology which set out the theory that Natural Selection accounted for "The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life", as the sub-title put it. The races in question were plants and animals, and Darwin skirted the question of the origins of man by the one cautious observation that by "my theory"—it was not called the evolutionary theory until the fourth (1866) edition<sup>13</sup>—"much light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history". According to West, even this was included reluctantly and only to forestall the criticism that Darwin was blinking the consequences of his position. And, while he always felt that he must turn to this great question sooner or later, Darwin postponed publication till 1871, when he brought out *The Descent of Man*. Even then, two-thirds of the volume were devoted to sexual selection, treated in a general way, without particular reference to man. Although the *Descent* was a much firmer statement of what he had only suggested formerly, namely, that all species, including man, were the descendants of a few, or even one, form, its overall position was not new. It was the logical application to man of Darwin's evolutionary principle of Natural Selection, which had been laid down in the *Origin*. Partly because it was a corollary of the *Origin*, the *Descent* caused much less of a stir than the earlier book. But the relative quiet of its reception is also to be explained by the fact that the movement of Social Darwinism had already got under way in the intervening years. It had done so, moreover, without Darwin's direct aid, or even his connivance, for he was much less of a Darwinist than many of his self-appointed disciples, and, like his contemporary Marx, Darwin had to devote a good deal of effort to repudiating things said by others in his name and to "correcting" various "interpretations" of his position. The successive editions of the *Origin*, the sixth and last of which came out in 1872, as well as his letters, bear witness to this.

I have already said that Darwinism enjoyed a tremendous following after 1859. I do not mean that the following was entirely friendly. Opposition to the *Origin*, both scientific and clerical, was strong and well-entrenched, and even some of Darwin's intimate friends and supporters did not fully agree with him; for example, Wallace and Lyell could not follow him in applying Natural Selection to man. But, whether his work was met with praise or vituperation, its reception was instant, widespread and animated. Darwin was always a little puzzled, though pleased, by his success. He did not accept the explanation "that the subject was in the air" because, as he naïvely remarks in his autobiography:<sup>14</sup> "I occasionally sounded not a few naturalists, and never happened to come across a single one who seemed to doubt about the permanence of species." This is rather an indication

<sup>13</sup>In which he also borrowed from Spencer the phrase "survival of the fittest".

<sup>14</sup>Ch. 2 of Francis Darwin (ed.), *Life and Letters of Chas. Darwin*, 2nd ed., London, 1887, p. 87 of Vol. I.

of the comparative isolation of his life at Downe than a description of the "intellectual climate" of the time, for the idea of evolution in some form or other had been actively canvassed for well over half a century. In biology, Darwin's grandfather Erasmus, Buffon, Goethe, Lamarck and Saint-Hilaire had done pioneering work in observation and theorizing; in geology, Hutton and more especially Lyell, in his *Principles of Geology* (1830-33), had established the "uniformitarian" theory as against the "catastrophists"—a move paralleling the acceptance of gradual and continuous modification rather than creation in biology, and a fact of crucial weight with Darwin. Chambers' book *Vestiges of Creation*<sup>15</sup> had highlighted the question of man's place in nature; in physics, Helmholtz had formulated the theory of conservation of energy mathematically in 1847, a hard fact for creationists to gainsay; and in philosophy, Herbert Spencer, much impressed by the geologists, Helmholtz, and the work of the biologists Wolff, Goethe and von Baer,<sup>16</sup> had been developing an evolutionary system since the early 'fifties. The subject was, then, very much "in the air". As background to the whole movement was the growing faith in the idea of progress, an idea with which nearly all evolutionary thought was irresistibly, though not quite logically, combined, and which was immensely strengthened in the mid-Victorian era by the very tangible progress which the application of science was bestowing on mankind—white mankind anyway.

This intellectual preparation helps to explain two things. One is the instant impact of the *Origin*, and the other, as I have already mentioned, is the fact that Social Darwinism, even without Darwin's aid, was able to make so early a start. But on the first point it is not sufficient to say, though this is important, that the *Origin* was well-timed. Other reasons must also be sought for its impact.

It is instructive here to compare the work of Spencer and Darwin in certain respects. Spencer's work was always far more systematic than Darwin's and more consistent. Spencer was much more *obviously* a proponent of evolutionism than Darwin—like Huxley, he was always actively and enthusiastically promoting the doctrine, while Darwin, largely because of the seclusion which his bad health imposed on him, remained aloof from the direct struggle, assuming almost a mythical stature in his obscure retreat at Downe. Finally, it was Spencer who coined the phrase "survival of the fittest" which, even more than Darwin's own "Natural Selection", became the slogan of Social Darwinism. Yet the movement was named after the scientist, not the philosopher.

This seems to me to suggest one of the crucial points in the appreciation of Darwin's impact on nineteenth century thought, the point that Darwin spoke as the very model of a Victorian scientist. Cautious and reticent to the point of exasperation; meticulous in the observation and recording of phenomena; persistent and painstaking in the verification of his facts; fearful of the besetting danger of

<sup>15</sup>Published anonymously in 1843. Some attributed it (falsely) to Darwin.

<sup>16</sup>See his early essays, e.g. "The Development Hypothesis", in the *Leader*, March 1852; "A Theory of Population", the *Westminster Review*, 1852; and especially "Progress: Its Law and Cause", *ibid.*, 1857. He had also written *Social Statics* (1850) and *The Principles of Psychology* (1858) before the *Origin* appeared. These and other essays of Spencer's are reprinted in his *Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative*, London, 1891, whence this and other references are drawn.



unwarranted extrapolation; on the other hand, acutely aware that the explanation and not just the amassing of facts was the scientist's task; alive to the importance of the interrelations of phenomena in a number of fields—botany, zoology, geology, ecology; seeking to confirm a simple hypothesis with wide explanatory range; careful not to multiply concepts and to keep a tight rein on speculation. These were the standards by which Darwin worked. His position had just enough of the architectonic in it to satisfy an age in which system-building was still accepted and in which the riddle of the universe was still thought to be soluble. But Darwin's work was on a thoroughgoing scientific foundation, much more solid than any of his predecessors', none of whom, moreover, had quite combined the grand simplicity of such a concept as Natural Selection with so formidable a body of data to support it. It was this scientific grounding, too, that gave his work so much more prestige than that of either of his two contemporaries, Spencer and Marx. In fact, while Spencer steadily maintained that he owed little or nothing to Darwin, and while Marx admitted only that Darwin gave weight to his view of class struggle, it has been argued that Darwinism overshadowed both of them insofar as it was the source of scientific endorsement for all variants on the theme of progressive, deterministic change. Thus Barzun says<sup>17</sup> that "the Marxists became simply a sect in the larger church", and Bury argues<sup>18</sup> that Darwin's work helped to establish the idea of progress, however conceived, because it "elevated to the rank of a scientific hypothesis . . . what might be set aside before as a brilliant guess".

If it is granted, as it must be, that Darwin's writings, and above all the *Origin*, enjoyed pre-eminent standing because they were impeccable models of scientific work as well as being a contribution to biology comparable, in Wallace's view at least, to Newton's in physics, it should not be surprising to find attempts on all sides to invoke their authority in support of the most varied theories and causes. Biology does not lend itself to the exact formulations of physics, and Darwin was not the most consistent or systematic of thinkers. Moreover, his published works run into very many volumes, none of them slim, and many editions. Bearing these points in mind, it is understandable that his work had something of a Biblical character about it, sufficiently imprecise and ambiguous to provide texts for all occasions and to furnish support for orthodoxy and heresy alike.

In successive issues of the *Origin*, Darwin changed his ground a good deal. What was new in the book was the theory of Natural Selection, but its author did not adhere to it with utter tenacity, admitting the Lamarckian explanation of modification, in terms of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, to be of more importance than he had first conceded.<sup>19</sup> This was an important concession because, in the notion of *acquired* characteristics, some room was left for conscious striving, a concept which found no place at all in the theory of Natural Selection, which worked only on chance variations. Briefly stated, the theory ran thus: Far more members of any species are born than can survive on the available resources. Among them, there are innumerable slight random variations. In the struggle for

<sup>17</sup>Barzun, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

<sup>18</sup>Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 334.

<sup>19</sup>Spencer, incidentally, was a Lamarckian before the *Origin* appeared, and he remained one all his life.

existence, for the limited resources, certain of these variations will benefit their owners, who will thus reach maturity and produce offspring who are likely to inherit the favourable variation. Thus certain variations from the original forms are selected and perpetuated. The process is repeated, over an immense number of generations and at a geological tempo, until the variations are so marked as to be new species. This process of Natural Selection is not conceived teleologically; it is true that Darwin often personified Nature, but he did not want to maintain that this implied God's hand at work or that the modifications which were preserved implied that species progressed, as Lamarck, for example, had argued. It is clear, I think, that Darwin wanted to exclude purpose and will as a factor in modification. But he did waver on the point and he did provide—whether inadvertently or as grudging concessions to orthodoxy—ammunition for those who would see conscious purpose in evolution as well as for those who saw only a blind determinism.

Another point on which Darwin vacillated and gave ground was the question of the continuity of the process of modification. As he became more and more disturbed by the incompleteness of the geological record, he tended to modify his original insistence that nature does not make leaps to the much weaker view that the leaps are not great or sudden. This opened the door, however little, to the possibility of divine intervention, on the one hand, and, on the other, it gave plausibility, however slight, to demands for far-reaching social reforms.

So far, I have referred to several factors which help to explain why Darwin's theory about the biological origin of species created such a stir in the intellectual world of the mid-nineteenth century. I have referred to the superb *timing* of the *Origin* against the background of half a century's speculation on the subject; to the prestige which the book enjoyed as a *scientific* work; and to the variety of *interpretations* to which it was open and the number of views to which it seemed to lend colour.

These points also help us to understand how the movement later identified as Social Darwinism had made a successful start even before the *Origin* appeared, and how it gained tremendous momentum after 1859. Spencer was writing in the evolutionary style before that date. In the following decade, a number of books developing the evolutionary position appeared. They all owed something to Darwin. In some cases the debt was direct, a straight-out borrowing of the notions of competition for survival, struggle for existence, ruthless elimination of the unfit. But even where such ideas were not adapted to sociological or historical explanations, authors benefitted from the sure foundation on which the *Origin* had at last set the idea of evolution; for, from this time onward, there was an increasing tendency to identify Natural Selection with evolution, so that even evolutionary theorists who rejected Darwin's account of the evolutionary process benefitted because he was regarded as having established the theory as such.

Under the capacious Darwinian blanket, then, a great number of strange and diverse bedfellows contrived to find cover. The interesting point is to see what common characteristics make it plausible to regard them as varieties of the same species of social theory. I can look only in the briefest way at a few of these views. But in the first place, among them all Spencer must be allowed a special position,



both as an independent theorist and as a link between Darwinism and other views, notably religious ones, which without Spencer would probably never have become associated with the main stream. Spencer's adherence to the Lamarckian view supported his opposition to social legislation, on the ground that the habits, as he would have called them, of intemperance, shiftlessness and unemployment among the poor are hereditary, and that the only way to get rid of such undesirable species is to let the law of the survival of the fittest have full and free play.<sup>20</sup>

Again, Spencer explicitly accommodated the supernatural in his scheme. He distinguished<sup>21</sup> between the Knowable and the Unknowable, and by preserving the belief in an Absolute "that transcends not only human knowledge but human conception", Spencer made his views acceptable to theists; indeed, his first disciple in America, John Fiske, was able to retain his Christian beliefs unimpaired and it was possible to argue that evolution and even Natural Selection were the subtle ways by which God achieved his ends. It should be noted, on the other hand, that W. G. Sumner, who was the leading exponent of Social Darwinism in America for thirty odd years, began life, as Darwin did, by training for the ministry, and like Darwin found that his religious convictions had painlessly evaporated after some years of neglect.

Spencer's position had more of what John Plamenatz calls "fundamentalism" in it than Darwin's. Plamenatz describes<sup>22</sup> Marxism as fundamentalist in that it singles out one factor as *the* determinant of all other social activity and history. He could add that the nineteenth century scientific quest for one single, all-embracing law of nature was as fundamentalist as any philosophy of history or society. Evolutionary theory, especially in its Spencerian form, was more fundamentalist than either Marxism or strict Darwinism. For whereas Darwin had shown a single principle at work in natural history and Marx had displayed the driving force in social history, Spencer exhibited the one universal law in both these realms and in mind as well. But at this level of generality, the universal law of change, namely the development from undifferentiated homogeneity to differentiated heterogeneity, became so elusive that it was easy to argue that any proposal or policy at all conformed with it. In just the same way, Darwin's own theory of the natural selection of fit species, which made survival the only criterion of fitness, was remarkably accommodating—for, until the final test of survival was made, anybody's guess was as good as another's as to the ultimate fitness of a plant, or animal, or man, or society, or nation, or race.

We can say of Spencer, then, that he is in important ways the prototype of the Social Darwinist. He was a fundamentalist, and he was anxious to ally himself with natural science, to maintain that any *real* explanation of social processes must be of the same sort, or even simply the same, as explanations of physical phenomena. He wanted to *quantify* social phenomena in order to make them commensurable with physical facts. This approach led Spencer into what Hayek<sup>23</sup> would call the

<sup>20</sup>See e.g. the chapter "The Coming Slavery" in *The Man v. the State*, London, 1885.

<sup>21</sup>*First Principles*. The quotation is from Preface of the 1st ed. (1862) reprinted in 1910 ed., London.

<sup>22</sup>John Plamenatz, *German Marxism & Russian Communism*, London, 1954, Ch. 5.

<sup>23</sup>F. A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science*, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952, pp. 20, ff.

fallacy of "scientism", the approach of "methodological collectivism" which manifested itself in the treatment of society as an *organism*,<sup>24</sup> in a quite literal and not merely analogical sense. What I would argue is that these are the three characteristic features of Social Darwinism in its many guises, namely: fundamentalism, the search for a single law; scientism, the belief that the search for such a law and the law itself are of the same kind as physical laws; and organicism, the view that social processes must be explained functionally in relation to a particular social unit or organism—man, class, nation, race. There were violent disagreements over the nature of the law, on the point of whether or not, like some other physical laws, it gave man any control of social phenomena, and on the question of which organism, or unit, was paramount. But they were disagreements within a recognizable framework.

There is one other point to be noted about Spencer, that his view was not only the prototype of Social Darwinism but also the orthodox statement of that creed. In relation to the three distinctive features of the doctrine referred to above, the orthodox view was this. First, that the fundamental law was the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest in that struggle, which was chiefly characterized by ruthless competition. Secondly, that this struggle was, like other laws of nature, an inevitable fact about which nothing could be done—it had simply to be recognized and accepted but could not be controlled or eliminated. Thirdly, that the social organism developed and progressed to the extent that its members, individual people, were unimpeded in their prosecution of the struggle and in their efforts to survive and survive well. There is no need to emphasize the affinities between this view and contemporary Utilitarianism, Liberalism and *laissez-faire* economics.

Perhaps the chief exponent of this orthodox line, next to Spencer himself, was W. G. Sumner, who championed Social Darwinism in the America of the Gilded Age. In a steady stream of essays in the last three decades of the century, Sumner warned against the danger and futility of any attempts to interfere with the inexorable laws which governed society. "The socialist enterprise of reorganizing society in order to change what is harsh and sad in it at present is therefore as impossible from the outset as a plan for changing the physical order", he said,<sup>25</sup> and his essay on "The Absurd Effort to Make the World Over" has, especially in the title, the ring of a seventeenth century religious tract. Distinguishing the struggle for existence from the competition between men for greater command of resources, Sumner defended private property and the inequalities in its distribution as being part of "the system of nature". Any attempt to secure equality would be unnatural and would "favour the survival of the unfittest, and we shall accomplish this by destroying liberty".<sup>26</sup> Sumner was not, however, a thoroughgoing determinist. He did admit the power of education and that "we puny men" can, however slightly, modify "the tendencies of some of the forces at work".<sup>27</sup> But

<sup>24</sup>See especially Spencer's essay "The Social Organism", *Westminster Review*, Jan. 1860.

<sup>25</sup>W. G. Sumner, *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, ed. by A. G. Keller, Yale, 1914, p. 38.

<sup>26</sup>*ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>27</sup>"The Absurd Effort" (1894), reprinted in A. G. Keller (ed.), *War and Other Essays*, Yale, 1911, p. 205.



this was a very limited concession, and Sumner repeatedly emphasized the impossibility of knowing all the consequences of a policy. On this ground he ridiculed proposals for radical transformations of society, and, during the imperialist fever at the end of the 1890's, he inveighed mightily against America's acquiring overseas territories. It is a striking testimony to the versatility of Social Darwinism that its leading apostle in America should find himself so much at odds with nationalists like Theodore Roosevelt and racialists like Josiah Strong, when all shared the same intellectual legacy.

On two of the characteristic features of Social Darwinism, Sumner and his imperialist opponents were in agreement. They shared the beliefs that struggle and competition were the fundamental social laws, and that these laws were as intractable as physical laws. Where they differed was on the question of the units among which the competition occurred. For Sumner, the answer was individuals; for the others, nations or races. Putting this difference another way—for Sumner, the organism was a particular society; for his opponents, it was the world or mankind.

It is clear, then, that by altering one or other of the three factors in the Darwinian equation, a great number of different answers can be read off. At least as early as 1865, Walter Bagehot was arguing<sup>28</sup> that the fundamental factor was co-operation rather than competition, and that the unit of study was the society rather than the individual. That there was a discoverable law of social development he did not doubt. "Everyone now admits", he wrote,<sup>29</sup> "that human history is guided by certain laws." One of these is the growth of the military power of one tribe, nation or civilization over another, and the power was increased as the group succeeded in developing "the legal fibre" or the "faculty of coherence" in "cementing a cake of custom". "The slightest indication of a military bond is . . . enough to turn the scale. The compact tribes win. . . ." Although he had begun the movement of revolt against orthodox Social Darwinism, Bagehot felt able to sum up, as he says, in "Spencer's phrase, that progress is an increase of adaptation of man to his environment, that is, of his internal powers and wishes to his external lot and life".<sup>30</sup> But he saw the adaptation being made by co-operation, not competition.

Bagehot thus initiated a heterodox view which soon pointed in just the opposite direction from Spencerianism. There was still common ground—the organicist theory of society, the existence of a fundamental law of development, and the similarity of such a law to the physical laws of nature. But there was less stress on the individual than on the group, the law was not individual struggle but group co-operation, and, most important of all, the law resembled those of physics which man can use to his own advantage. In short, evolutionary theory, it was argued, supported the demand for social reform against *laissez-faire* liberalism.

Spencer's opponents accepted the view that development was a question of fitting into the environment. They argued, however, that in the first place co-operation could succeed as well as competition, and secondly that the environ-

<sup>28</sup>Walter Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, London, new ed., 1918.  
<sup>29</sup>*ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>30</sup>*ibid.*, p. 209.

ment could be changed without killing off the unfit. Just as industry and technology turned natural laws to man's advantage, so man could progress by turning the laws of society to account. The evolutionary process could be controlled, and so the evolutionary theory was diverted to the support of social reform. Lester Ward, for example, took this view in advocating<sup>31</sup> what he called "meliorism". "Now, just because nature is a domain of rigid law, and just because man can comprehend that law, his destiny is in his own hands." He goes on to reject, on the one hand, Utopianism and Micawberism, the optimistic view that something will "turn up" unaided, and, on the other hand, the pessimism of *laissez-faire*. "The optimist says: Do nothing, because there is nothing to do. The pessimist says: Do nothing, because nothing can be done. The Meliorist says: Do something, because there is much to do and it can be done."

There were even some who wanted to argue that there was no need to insist on the sharp distinction which Ward drew between the blind evolutionary struggle in nature and the purposive, directed evolution. Kropotkin<sup>32</sup> was able to produce from natural history the same sort of evidence as Darwin had put forward, but to show that competition among animals did *not* produce new and improved species. In his youth, he was struck by the co-operation he observed among the animals of Eastern Siberia and Northern Manchuria where he "failed to find . . . that bitter struggle for existence, *among animals belonging to the same species*, which was considered by most Darwinists . . . as . . . the main factor of evolution". Kropotkin was also inspired by the Russian naturalist Kessler's lecture in 1880 in which he argued that there is in nature a law of mutual aid, as well as a law of mutual struggle. Kropotkin was able to lend strong support to the socialist movement by this argument that mutual aid was as *natural* as competition.

The exponents of co-operation and reform had more tangible support from biology in the work of Weismann and de Vries on Mendel's laws and the theory of mutations. One of the major objections of the orthodox Social Darwinists against reform was that evolution, in nature and society, is slow and gradual. Any reforms would be against these fundamental natural laws because they would be attempts to bring in sudden changes, and nature does not make leaps. But the theory of mutations showed that gradual, imperceptible change was not, after all, the invariable rule of nature. The corollary for social reformers was that a sudden and sweeping change in society by legislation or revolution was not unnatural, was not a violation of natural laws fraught with calamitous possibilities. The biologists had a further disappointment for the followers of Spencer in the form of those researches of Weismann's which told effectively against the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Now Social Darwinism would have to become more strictly Darwinist; progress could no longer be looked for from education, the improvement of the habits of the unfit in society; it would have to come from strict natural selection—or, as we shall presently see, from strict human selection.

<sup>31</sup>This was a theme of his *Dynamic Sociology, Glimpses of the Cosmos*, and other works. The quotations are from his article, "Contributions to Social Philosophy—II—Sociology and Cosmology", *American Journal of Sociology*, Sept. 1895.

<sup>32</sup>Kropotkin, *op. cit.* The quotation is from the Introduction. The book first appeared in serial form in the *Nineteenth Century* between 1890 and 1896.



The Social Darwinists were never able to reform their ranks effectively in line with the new biology. Disarmed by this virtual treachery from those very scientists on whom the movement had most relied, and in face of the rising tide of social reform, Social Darwinism began to lose its force as a viable philosophy, certainly as a defence of rugged individualism. Until the disillusion of the 1914 war, at any rate, evolutionary progress had to be seen in terms of successful groups, nations or races rather than of successful businessmen or politicians.

But the movement still had plenty of resilience and pliability, and it made a spectacular last stand as the justification of new tendencies. The first of these, the eugenics movement, is notable not because of its importance as a social or intellectual movement in its own right, but as an illustration of the power of Darwinism to muster a following for almost anything; and because of its connexions with the second of the new tendencies, the very much more important doctrine of racial superiority and the domestic and international consequences of this doctrine.

The pioneer of eugenics was Sir Francis Galton, Darwin's cousin, and it was another scientist, the statistician Karl Pearson, who led the movement in its heyday when he became Galton Professor of Eugenics at London University and director of the Galton Laboratory for National Eugenics. Another leader was Darwin's fourth son Leonard, who, having been trained as a soldier rather than a scientist, had in mind the military virtues of "sound stock". Pearson defined his science thus: "National eugenics is the study of those agencies under social control which may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally."<sup>33</sup> Eugenics, he argued, offered a solution to the dilemma posed by medical science which, by its ability to save the unfit, cut across the Darwinian selection of the fit in an unrelieved struggle for existence, and could thus positively promote the degeneration of the race. Taking it for granted that it was the *race* as a whole that was the important unit and that selection could be controlled, the eugenists' solution was

that the right to live does not connote the right of each man to reproduce his kind. . . . As we lessen the stringency of natural selection, and more and more of the weaklings and the unfit survive, we must increase the standard, mental and physical, of parentage.<sup>34</sup>

The eugenists' brave new world was to be state-controlled, and the success of the movement in America was reflected in the passage of sterilization laws in twelve States by 1915.

One point which must be stressed, and which comes out with particular clarity in connexion with eugenics and racialist theories, is the support which unregenerate, determinist Social Darwinism gave to notions of the élite in society or among the nations. There was, of course, a whole body of evolutionary ethics in which the slide was very easily made from that which was fittest for the environment to that which was best absolutely; what was selected by nature was naturally the best. In Social Darwinism, success—in business, politics, war—membership of the fortunate

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<sup>33</sup>Karl Pearson, *Darwinism, Medical Progress, and Eugenics*, Cambridge, 1912, p. 2.

<sup>34</sup>*ibid.*, p. 26.

élite, was the very hallmark of fitness. In fact, there is a close parallel in the work of Sumner and in the thinking of Carnegie, for example, between the Darwinian notion of natural selection and the Calvinist doctrine of divine election.<sup>35</sup> The argument that the race must be kept pure was, like the Sumnerian argument against restricting competition by state interference with social legislation, an argument in defence of the *status quo*, of those who were already the "favoured races" of the *Origin*. As Hofstadter puts it, in America what the eugenists called the "fit" were "native, well-to-do, college-trained citizens".<sup>36</sup>

The eugenics movement was a return to primitive Darwinism, with one modification. This was the substitution of human for natural selection. The fundamental law of evolution, the survival of the fittest, being now understood, man could make evolution work even more efficiently. He could speed up the process of improving men by eliminating the slow and wasteful mechanism of blind trial and error on which nature had to rely, and substituting for it purposive human planning. In this blueprint for Utopia, the race—the organism whose development was to be promoted—was to be improved from within.

In the parallel doctrine of race superiority, the natural process was not to be interfered with nor was the amelioration of the race to be planned from within. On the contrary, the fittest nations and races, like the fittest men, must be naturally selected in the struggle for survival. This was the tumultuous reassertion of the old cry of rugged individualism in the age of imperialism. Now the individuals were not men but nations, the arena of struggle was not society but the whole world, and the final arbiter of fitness was war. In this last stand of Social Darwinism, recruits came to its defence from all quarters. The artist Ruskin pictured war as "the foundation of all the high virtues and faculties of men",<sup>37</sup> and soldiers—Moltke,<sup>38</sup> Bernhardt, Lea, Admiral Mahan,<sup>39</sup> scholars—Renan,<sup>40</sup> Ratzenhofer,<sup>41</sup> H. S. Chamberlain,<sup>42</sup> statesmen—Roosevelt,<sup>43</sup> Rhodes, Joseph Chamberlain, Rosebery,<sup>44</sup> and even clergymen like Strong<sup>45</sup>—all found justification for social dominance, empire building, the spread of civilization, and the warlike defence of these benefits, in Social Darwinism. The ideas of "nature red in tooth and claw", of an unrelieved struggle to the death, of the virtues of the struggle itself and of survival—in short, the elevation of international violence to the rank of a cult;

<sup>35</sup>See e.g. McCloskey, *op. cit.*, pp. 138, ff.      <sup>36</sup>Hofstadter, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

<sup>37</sup>John Ruskin, *The Crown of Wild Olive*, Orpington, 1886, p. 122.

<sup>38</sup>"La guerre est un élément de l'ordre du monde établi par Dieu. Les plus nobles vertus de l'homme s'y développent . . ." quoted by Novicow, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>39</sup>Bernhardt develops the theme of the duty of making war in his *Germany and the Next War*, 1911, see Ch. 13. Homer Lea, *The Day of the Saxon*, New York, 1912, showed America's obligation to make war, and Mahan, in e.g. *The Interest of America in Sea Power*, London, 1897, and other books, stressed the importance of naval strength.

<sup>40</sup>E. Renan, *La Réforme intellectuelle et morale*, Paris, 1871.

<sup>41</sup>See references in Novicow, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>42</sup>H. S. Chamberlain, *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, London and New York, 1912 (German ed. 1900), *passim*, but especially pp. 254 to end of Vol. I.

<sup>43</sup>See e.g. Theodore Roosevelt, *An Autobiography*, New York, 1913, Ch. VII.

<sup>44</sup>See William L. Langer, *The Diplomacy of Imperialism*, 1890-1902, New York, 1951 (1st ed. 1935), Pt. I, Ch. III, pp. 80, ff.

<sup>45</sup>Josiah Strong, *Our Country*, New York, for the American Home Missionary Society, 1st ed. 1885, revised 1891.



this was the culmination of Social Darwinism. It is no wonder that the doctrine fell into final disrepute after 1914, for nothing could justify that struggle.

From this historical sketch of the movement or group of ideas that developed under the general name of Social Darwinism common elements can, I think, be discerned. First, there was the notion of development in accordance with inevitable, natural, and discoverable law. Second, the view that what developed was an organism—man, class, nation, or race—some entity which was alleged to have an organic unity. These two notions were common to all evolutionary theories. What distinguished Darwinism was the third point, that the developmental law was the natural selection of chance variations better adapted to the environment. The difficulties and looseness in this concept led to the different interpretations of Darwinism as a social theory. Could not man, as part of nature, but distinguished by will and purpose, do the selecting? Could not the adaptations be made by altering the environment rather than the species? Did the notion of the fittest mean more than fitting into the environment? What organism was it that survived—the individual, the class, the race, or what? Was survival the only value in the cosmic or social process? It was in attempting to answer these questions which Darwin and, we must add, Spencer had raised, that the several varieties of Social Darwinism grew up. As Bury wryly observes, the evolutionary doctrine left the door open for its own undoing, for, in the end, it turned out to be a doctrine that was itself unfit to survive.

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# The Idea of the Ministerial Department: Bentham, Mill and Bagehot

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## I

There were three major inventions in British governmental machinery in the nineteenth century. One was the classified civil service recruited by open, academic, competitive examination. The second was the elected, multi-purpose local authority. The third was the ministerial department. None of these was a sudden or independent invention, but their importance cannot be questioned. They have received unequal study. The history of the ministerial department has received least attention of all. The outlines are therefore unfamiliar and its peculiarity unappreciated. The purpose of this article is to summarise one aspect of the history of the ministerial department: the debate about notions of responsibility and organisation from Bentham to Bagehot which went along with actual developments in central government practice.

The ministerial department came to have certain specific features. It was to be headed by a single political person, at once exclusively responsible, the most powerful and yet the most temporary element in the organisation. Underneath the Minister would be certain senior officers reporting directly to the Permanent Head and appointed, like him, in consultation with the Prime Minister and the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury. The Minister would be responsible for these appointments. The Permanent Head would be at once the chief adviser to the Minister and the general manager of the department. As the general manager he would also be the accounting officer. Thence downwards there would be a continuing hierarchy. The patterning of departmental top organisation on the grading of the civil service administrative class would create a type of organisation characterised by filtering and therefore by strain. What would appear at the top was what Sir John Henry Woods called a super-bottleneck. This sort of organisation was quite different in its shape and methods from what can be called the norm of executive organisation. A comparison of the organisation of the Treasury with that of the Board of Inland Revenue would show the distinction clearly. At the head of the pyramid would be a single person, the Minister. The Parliamentary Secretary would be an assistant not in any sense a deputy or jointly responsible person. The organisation of this "normal" department would reflect civil service classification and a distinction between administrative and other work and its dominance over such other work. The top of the pyramid would tend to consist only of the top grades of the administrative class.<sup>1</sup>

This was an organisation of a peculiar type, dependent on parliamentary scrutiny and financial control, a reformed civil service and a restriction of departmental

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<sup>1</sup>cf. Sir J. H. Woods, *Public Administration*, Vol. 26, 1948, pp. 85-91. J. R. Simpson, "Organising the Larger Units", *British Management Review* reprint, July 1949.



functions. If the organisation was peculiar, it was still more peculiar that it should be held to be the best, and even the only, form of organisation for central government. The nineteenth century invention was precisely the belief that ministerial responsibility demanded departmental organisation of this and only of this type, and that ministerial responsibility and departmental organisation should be applied throughout central government.<sup>2</sup> One side of this was the actual development of the preconditions, for example the reform of public finance beginning with Graham's work at the Admiralty in the 1830's. This was gradual not sudden. So until the 1850's, that is for a generation after the Reform Bill, central government still freely used organisations other than ministerial departments and new non-ministerial organisations were set up. Thereafter this ceased to be true. Irresponsible and variegated eighteenth century and earlier forms were abolished or absorbed by ministerial departments. Nineteenth century experiments in non-ministerial organisation were replaced. No new non-ministerial organisations were created. New and major ministerial departments—for agriculture and for education, for example—appeared. This was a striking tendency. It continued until in this century a further transition occurred.

These developments have recently been discussed elsewhere.<sup>3</sup> Some aspects (like the failure of the first Poor Law Board) are familiar; others (debates about the Office of Woods and Works, for example) are less so. But the ideological side has scarcely been discussed at all. When it has, the assumption has been that Bentham was the first to enunciate the idea of a responsible ministerial department; that at the height of its acceptance, the doctrine was reiterated by Mill; and that there you have the main outlines. This is misleading about Bentham and Mill and indeed represents an inadequate statement of the whole development. Today, when there are anxious questions about the future of the ministerial department and about the whole problem of providing for responsibility in government organisation, it may be worthwhile to re-examine the matter.

## II

What had Bentham to say about responsibility? For Bentham responsibility was a matter of being open to punishment. It was a liability rather for things done than for a failure to do anything. Public offices were places where such misdeeds were especially likely to occur. Some types of office made this the more likely. Bentham's contribution therefore began as an attack on one particular existing system. He was attacking the remnants of eighteenth century administration in what he saw: the non-ministerial organisation of the system before 1832. The ministerial offices of the years before 1832 were themselves specifically free from some of the later conditions of the ministerial norm: Lord Palmerston, for example, regarded a permanent civil service as a danger to, not a condition of, ministerial responsibility.<sup>4</sup> The fifty years of economical reform before 1832 did

<sup>2</sup>*cf.* J. Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, London, 1908 ed., Vol. II, pp. 51-4, for the Ayrton case, when ministerial responsibility received a precise exposition and a supreme tribute.

<sup>3</sup>F. M. G. Willson, *Public Administration*, Vol. 33, 1955, pp. 43-58. S. E. Finer, *ibid.*, Vol. 30, 1952, pp. 329-60.

<sup>4</sup>A. C. Benson and Viscount Esher (eds.), *Letters of Queen Victoria 1837-1861*, London, 1908, Vol. I, pp. 106-8, letter of 25 Feb. 1838.

not blunt Bentham's attack. He was concerned with the actual corruption and influence that seemed to him to be consciously hidden by abstract nonsense about independence.

The country justices are all gentlemen; their mess, like the member of parliament's, is all sweet without bitter, all power without obligation. What they vouchsafe to do, the country is to think itself obliged to them for: they do just as much as they like, and as they like it, and when they like it.<sup>5</sup>

What was wanted, Bentham thought, was officials in precisely the opposite position to that of the country justices: officials who would do as much as the country liked as and when the country liked it, and do it as their obligation. This was the object of concern, not abstract qualities like independence.<sup>6</sup>

The second thing about Bentham, however, was that the solution he recommended was not the responsible Minister of nineteenth century Parliaments and Cabinets at all, but something much more like the American version. He was all in favour of "single-seated functionaries" and dependence on the "public opinion tribunal" as a way of securing "appropriate moral aptitude". The Minister was the person in a position of highly concentrated and public accountability. His reputation was the result of his own actions. This included an undertaking of responsibility for his subordinates lest they do evil on his behalf.<sup>7</sup> But Bentham did not want Ministers elected to or voting in the Parliament, though they would have certain rights of speaking and initiative there: thus would their influence be honest not dishonest. He acknowledged the similarity to American government.<sup>8</sup> The beliefs that led him against boards led him against parliamentary Ministers.

Certainly Bentham's views of the society around him did lead to an attack on boards, commissions and trusts, to some sort of design for pyramidal departments and to a number of interestingly specific prescriptions. The gravamen of his case was that answerability for results was weakened by the aggregation of positions constituting a board. A board was a screen behind which power could be abused and punishment miscarry. A multiplicity of members meant greater influence, greater protection and greater indifference to shame. The fellowship of the board would provide applause for a member or compensation elsewhere for disgrace. Closed methods failed to apportion public disgrace according to desert or public approval according to merit. Emulation or exertion were submerged under lassitude and neglect.

The evil went beyond the members of a board. The more deeply you penetrated subordinate levels the worse the abuses and the less the performance.

A Board, my Lord, is a screen. The lustre of good desert is obscured by it—ill desert, shrinking behind, eludes the eye of

<sup>5</sup>J. Bowring (ed.), *The Works of Jeremy Bentham*, Edinburgh, 1843, Vol. IV, p. 376.

<sup>6</sup>*ibid.*, p. 316.

<sup>7</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. IX, Constitutional Code, Book II, Ch. IX, S. III, Arts. 3 and 7 and S. XXV, Art. 26. For a very different view see W. Blackstone, *Commentaries*, London, 1803, Vol. II, p. 36, or L. V. Harcourt (ed.), *Diaries and Correspondence of the Rt. Hon. George Rose*, London, 1860, *passim*.

<sup>8</sup>*Works of Bentham*, Vol. III, Plan of Parliamentary Reform, Catechism, S. IV; and Vol. IX, Constitutional Code, Book II, Ch. VIII, Arts. 3-6 and 10 and at p. 206.



censure—wrong is covered by it with a presumption of right, stronger and stronger in proportion to the number of folds: and each member having his own circle of friends, wrong, in proportion again to the number, multiplies its protectors.<sup>9</sup>

This was so, as he said elsewhere in a less familiar passage,

not so much on the part of the members of the board itself, which by the prominence of its situation engages in some measure the public eye, as on the part of the subordinate functionaries; whose functions while they have little to attract the eye of the public have much to repel it, and who are the less looked after by the public in proportion as they are supposed to be well looked after by their superiors at the board.<sup>10</sup>

Here Bentham is indeed concentrating on the effects of the board on subordinates and is almost prepared to weaken his attack on board members to do this.

From his limited views of the motivation of conduct and of the functions of government Bentham devised a picture of the sort of organisation he wanted. It would be one in which the "exclusion of delay, vexation and expense" would be achieved with the appropriate "aptitudes" at various levels. The necessary conditions were responsibility, the "responsible location principle" and the fear of consequences. These conditions, which should replace independence, differed. Responsibility, indeed, depended partly on fear. It would be created by "subordinateness" and "accountableness". Subordinateness was a result of certain powers—of direction, "suspension", "dislocation", "suppletion" and punishment. So, if there was to be responsibility, the subordinate must be frightened of his "superordinate" because of these suspensive and other powers. He must also be subject to directions. The directive power itself was insufficient. Further, it was only efficacious when the subordinate was accountable. By accountability was meant the necessity to report on the performance of operations undertaken "in consequence of, and compliance with", the superordinate's directions. All these conditions of responsibility were to be distinguished. Subordinateness and accountability were the main conditions, though not the same thing: other departments were accountable but not subordinate to the Finance Department.<sup>11</sup>

Responsibility meant subordination and accounting for results. Fear was the ultimate sanction. This took Bentham to certain conclusions about pay, tenure and promotion. "The military functionary is paid for being shot at. The civil functionary is paid for being spoken and written at." Thus he argued that confusion about responsibility, reward and punishment had maximised official expense in English government. Officials ought to be rewarded for taking on their obligations; but they would carry them out for fear of punishment. This precept, accepted generally, was not applied in the English administration, in which functionaries professed responsibility in proportion to their rewards, present or expected. "Note that only by the expectation of eventual evil (punishment included) can responsibility be established: neither by expectation of eventual good or by possession of

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<sup>9</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. V, Letters on Scotch Reform, Letter II.

<sup>10</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 558.

<sup>11</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. IX, Constitutional Code, Book II, Ch. IX, S. III, Art. 6; S. XXI, Art. 6; Ch. II, Art. 17; Ch. IX, S. V.

good (reward included) can it be established."<sup>12</sup> Bentham's most significant conclusion was about organisational structure: the need for a pyramidal hierarchy with one individual at the top. Here he recommended a departmental form and anticipated something of the Northcote-Trevelyan principles for civil service classification; the association of the two things was important. He wrote that a division between levels of control on the one hand and lower levels of information on the other hand would provide a better distribution of work than would many-membered boards. He discussed the allocation of functions at the top and bottom of "the official climax". He distinguished between situations as they demanded talent, simple trust or trust and talent.<sup>13</sup>

His general recommendations contained specific criticisms and further recommendations. For example, he said that people were confused about arbitrariness.

That which in the exercise of official functions constitutes arbitrary power is—not the unity of the functionary but his exemption from control, including the obligation, contemporary or eventual, of assigning reasons for his acts.

A second example was his argument that the practice of staggering appointments and limiting conditions of eligibility tended to make boards self-perpetuating: retiring members would be reappointed and would later do the same for their beneficent colleagues; the board would degenerate into "imbecility, corruption or ineptitude". He instanced the Bank of England and the East India Company. The solution was "the here-proposed all-comprehensive temporary non-relocability system". Of all those enjoying independence, trustees were the worst, and of all trustees, unpaid ones were the worst. "The more confidence a man is likely to meet with the less he is likely to deserve. Jealousy is the life and soul of government." Individual and if possible contractual management was the answer: this was how Panopticon was to be managed. He observed that the branches of service most essential to the comfort and luxury of the monarch were not put into the hands of boards. Here a necessary exception was made to the normal use of boards in a corrupt government,

for were it in the hands of a board, each member in reality, as well as in name and pretence, becoming a part in the business, what is sufficiently understood is—that there never would be a house fit for service.

What was required for the monarch's house was also required for Bentham's ideal penal house, Panopticon. Boards would be as unsuitable for that as they were—Russian experience, he said, had shown this throughout the eighteenth century—for effecting great schemes of codification or improvement.<sup>14</sup>

Bentham did approach the general design and some of the details of the normal, ministerial, civil service department. But he was attracted to the American model. He ignored the reforms that had already taken place. Furthermore, despite his

<sup>12</sup>*ibid.*, Ch. IX, Ss. XVIII and XIX; Ch. V, S. VI, Art. 3; Ch. II, Art. 16, Rule II, p. 151.

<sup>13</sup>*ibid.*, Ch. IX, S. III, Arts. 15 and 30; S. XVI, Arts. 11-14.

<sup>14</sup>*ibid.*, Book I, Ch. VI, p. 29; Book II, Ch. VI, S. XXV, Arts. 8 and 20; Vol. IV, Judicial Establishment, Ch. V, Tit. III, Obs., Ss. I and IV; Vol. IV, Panopticon, Postscript, Pt. I, 1791, S. II; Vol. IV, Papers Relative to Codification, etc., 1817, Pt. I, No. 12 and Letter II to the Emperor, July 1815, p. 524.



general attitude to boards and to departments, his inventive genius and his honest and ample parentheses provided a good deal of possible assistance to those who favoured non-ministerial organisation itself. To take one instance: he suggested the use of annual and other reports as a link between the legislature and organisations otherwise limited in responsibility. His doctrine about annual reports was reflected in some of Chadwick's opposition to ministerial control and, in particular, in the Kennedy case in the 1850's. Kennedy, who at the time was one of the official Commissioners of Woods, objected to the Treasury's exerting any control over him and specifically over his annual report: this was to be a full and independent preparation linking his administration directly to Parliament and, if possible, to a special parliamentary committee.<sup>15</sup> Bentham saw the ways in which a board's decision could be fortified against outside opinion. There were suggestions about the use of powers of direction, "dislocation" and inspection as controls over less responsible organisations. His distinctions between subordinateness, accountability and responsibility elucidate the variety of relations that may exist between one official and another. If one applies his argument to relations between one organisation and another (as Bentham did with his example of the Finance Department) one can see that they may be linked by certain degrees of responsibility and subordination without being united. Here is an approach to an understanding and a classification of relations between a ministerial department and a non-ministerial organisation.<sup>16</sup>

In the main stream of his argument, Bentham himself assumed "a form of government of which corruption is the main instrument"<sup>17</sup> swarming with boards that were merely screens for abuse, multipliers of office and defences against punishment. But his footnotes did allow for boards in certain cases. At one point he said so quite clearly and gave a list which suggested<sup>18</sup> that they could be used for very routine or very open work. He also implied that board members could be useful watches on each other. This tallied, not with what he himself had said elsewhere, but with an argument sometimes used later in the nineteenth century. "It would be an error if . . . a conclusion were formed that there exists not any case in which government by bodies corporate or boards can be conducive to the legitimate ends of government." His possible examples included, "where neither extraordinary talent nor extraordinary exertion is necessary, . . . giving out money by others' direction, . . . where misapplication would be manifest or easily detected, . . . and insofar as division of power is necessary to good government".<sup>19</sup> In his *Principles of Penal Law* he said that plurality in administrative councils might be some form of precaution against abuse of authority, though unity was *prima facie* desirable for responsibility. He thought that the advantages of plurality and unity might be combined if there were a single head and a subordinate council of associates and voting were avoided.<sup>20</sup> This bore an interesting resemblance to the

<sup>15</sup>Great Britain Parliamentary Papers, 1854, Vol. X, Select Committee on Crown Forests, Question 882, etc.

<sup>16</sup>Works of Bentham, Vol. IX, Constitutional Code, Book II, Ch. VI, S. XXVII, Art. 56; Ch. IX, S. XX, Art. 10; Book I, Ch. VIII; etc.

<sup>17</sup>ibid., Book I, Ch. V, S. XIX, Art. 39.

<sup>18</sup>ibid., Vol. VI, p. 558 n.

<sup>18</sup>cf. ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 516-28.

<sup>20</sup>ibid., Vol. I, p. 571.

top organisation of the East India Company of which Bentham was thinking as well as to later arrangements for Indian government and other later institutions like Sir Horace Plunkett's Irish Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction.

Altogether Bentham's list is an interesting contrast and sometimes a parallel with later non-ministerial forms. One would say that he was nearer to ideas of "hiving off executive work"—as in the old German departments—than to such of our own contemporary uses as are the opposite of that. Indeed, some of his statements now provide a starting point for that understanding of the difference between administrative and executive posts that is of importance to any appreciation of the significance of non-ministerial organisation. He said that precedent was of limited use as a basis for action. He provided a careful analysis of "executive power". His words about high and low level posts are enlightening:

... At the top and at the bottom of the official climax the greatest scope for the union of functions exists: at the top because there the functions are chiefly of the directive kind: and to the directive function, exercise may, in minute proportions of time, be given to the operations of functionaries, in indefinite number; at the bottom, because for the performance of the functions, though of the executive kind, the demand for performance will generally be so infrequent.<sup>21</sup>

Bentham did at times admit that the normal conditions of responsibility would not always be sufficient for enforcing "appropriate aptitude" in officials and organisations. The public opinion tribunal could secure moral aptitude by its enforcement of responsibility through the single-seated functionary as Minister. But certain situations required more than moral aptitude. The normal conditions would not necessarily be sufficient where intellectual and active abilities were required. Here additional powers—administrative ones, for example—would be needed. And there would be a problem of finding evidence in case of official transgression.<sup>22</sup>

He saw that there were problems and indeed limitations in ministerial responsibility and organisation. He was prepared to admit that the Minister's responsibility was limited by the possible extent of his vigilance, and that his responsibility depended on directive and dislocative powers which could not usefully apply to subordinates so distant that an "exercise" was effected before it could be "excluded". These may have appeared marginal admissions to Bentham; however illegitimate it may be, it is impossible for us now to read him without feeling that these admissions go almost too far.<sup>23</sup>

### III

Bentham contributed a very great deal to the theory of the normal ministerial department of the later nineteenth century. He did not have that precisely in his mind, and he did not only say that. If one adds later experience to what he said one could sometimes almost get an explanation of the amount of deviation

<sup>21</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 198-9. cf. H. A. Clegg, *Industrial Democracy and Nationalisation*, Oxford, 1951, pp. 107-8.

<sup>22</sup>*Works of Bentham*, Vol. IX, Constitutional Code, Book II, Ch. IX, S. XXV, Arts. 20, 22, 24; Book I, Ch. VIII.

<sup>23</sup>*ibid.*, Book II, Ch. IX, S. XXV, Arts. 26, 27, 32, 35.

from the normal department to be found in the present machinery of government. Chadwick was his disciple. Nor was the discussion of responsibility and organisation in central government after Bentham simply a matter of a swelling chorus of philosophical radical praise for the ministerial department. If Bentham had mainly been concerned to criticise the boards and trusts of eighteenth century administration and its aftermath, there were those who were prepared to criticise Bentham. Thus in *The Statesman*, 1836, Sir Henry Taylor's statement that boards and commissions were in fact useful and no longer irresponsible was put in words which so clearly echo Bentham's that they read as a conscious refutation.

Formerly it might be objected to boards that the sense of responsibility was weakened by division. But in these days responsibility is brought to bear with an excessive and intimidating force, and in many cases the plural is the preferable responsibility.

Taylor approved of commissions as a means by which the statesman could get his work done out of doors. He certainly preferred commissions to parliamentary committees for their greater degree of permanence and suggested that they should decide and draft necessary bills and instructions: they should see the business through. He also gave some characteristic advice on their organisation.<sup>24</sup>

His corrective is sharper than his defence of boards and commissions. It is instructive to read his account of a Minister's office. The office was not yet a department and responsibility in such an office was not at all the problem with which we are faced. Even within those terms, Taylor thought that there were inevitable limits on political responsibility and control. "The far greater proportion of duties which are performed in the office of a Minister are and must be performed under no effective responsibility." That was, where no question of politics, party or individual injustice was involved. There was an echo here of Palmerston's view in the 1830's that responsibility existed as long as you did not have, or allow too much to, permanent officials. Taylor added that the statesman had no time for the "inventive and suggestive" portions of his functions. It was the job of the executive agents to work towards legislation on the topics whose execution was provided for by legislature: the chain of functionaries should be suggestive as well as executive. Parliamentary interposition in administrative business should be restricted to certain types of case and certain conditions.<sup>25</sup> Taylor developed this later. In a letter to Earl Grey in 1855 and in another letter of 1852<sup>26</sup> he suggested the type of speaking but non-voting Minister which Bentham had suggested and O'Higgins was later to suggest in Ireland as a compromise with the full ministerial type. Perhaps the most suggestive of Taylor's points were the emphasis on the ability to work through others, the dangers of popularity and accessibility and the need "in high and important spheres of action" for a frequent setting aside of general administrative rules.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>24</sup>Sir H. Taylor, *Works*, London, 1883 (1st ed. 1836), Vol. IV, pp. 352-5.

<sup>25</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 321, 324, 327, 330 n., 355-8. cf. Graham Wallas, *Men and Ideas*, London, 1940, pp. 115-20.

<sup>26</sup>Taylor, *op. cit.*, App. p. 403, letter dated 23 Nov. 1855. E. Dowden (ed.), *Correspondence of Sir Henry Taylor*, London, 1888, p. 196, letter dated 1 May 1852.

<sup>27</sup>Sir H. Taylor, *The Statesman*, London, 1836, Chs. III and XIII and pp. 254, 279.



Taylor wrote when the flow of reform which had in fact begun in Bentham's day was fuller and more obvious. His concern was practical not constitutional. Hence his specific marginalia in the thesis of ministerial government picked out, for example, the uses of commissions and the translation of them into something more than bodies of enquiry only.

Then there is the position of Chadwick to be taken into account. Chadwick was a major Benthamite of the second generation. He was also a major propagator of boards and commissions. It is possible to explain away his support for non-ministerial organisation. He soon enough ceased to be happy with his boards and commissions at the phase of enquiry. He had grasped the case against administration by commissions of technical experts: expert officials were another matter. He was much happier in the General Board of Health under Lord Morpeth than he had been in the first Poor Law Board.<sup>28</sup> Sympathetic Ministers and civil service status might have provided a better screen for the independence he was searching for than did the relatively public position of a board. But the fact is that Chadwick never understood that. A faithful disciple of Bentham, he was, like his master, never able to appreciate the advantages that would flow from an amateur, responsible, parliamentary Minister in charge of an official permanent machine. Nor could he distinguish clearly between the two. The contemporary ministerial office described by Taylor or by Palmerston did not encourage any assumption that it was with such vehicles that the Benthamite objectives would be reached.

In any case opposition to boards and non-ministerial organisations was not at all confined to philosophical radicals. It included angry Tories like Praed and perturbed Whigs like Sydney Smith.<sup>29</sup> The line of thought that has been called Gothic constitutionalism—the application of the spirit of early Victorian Gothic revivalism, of neo-romanticism in the field of government—was, like Taylor's, very different from the Benthamite. But it was sometimes, as in local government, indirectly sympathetic to some part of the Benthamite programme. The major figure in this line was Toulmin Smith.

It was, not surprisingly, Taylor's commissions which especially angered Toulmin Smith. He was indeed a spokesman of a widespread reaction in the 1830's and 1840's against radical commissions of enquiry, as in his *Government by Commission Illegal and Pernicious*, published in 1849. His case was that administration by Crown-appointed commissions, as well as the use of commissions of enquiry, was part of a contemporary centralisation. He saw in this a threat to the natural rights expressed in the constitution according to Coke, in its principles of taxation and in its principles of local self-government. His first thesis was that particular legislation and, still more, administrative action or extra-parliamentary legislation were, irrespective of their content, things which lessened confidence in the existence of fundamental law. His second thesis was that the use of commissions was something which made encroachment particularly easy. Here he was attacking radical—generally Benthamite—experiments “of which the beginning is always a Commission

<sup>28</sup>cf. S. E. Finer, *Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick*, London, 1952, pp. 159-60.

<sup>29</sup>cf. G. O. Trevelyan, *Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay*, London, 1890 ed., Ch. VIII, pp. 380-1.

of Inquiry and the end a General Board of paid Commissioners". In theory the use of commissioners was inevitably bad. In practice government nomination led to a packed commission of enquiry whose interest it would be to recommend the creation of a permanent body.<sup>30</sup> He referred back for support to Sydney Smith who, though a radical of a sort, had in the 1830's indulged his gift of irony at the expense of the commissioners of that decade. Toulmin Smith was right to see that some of the legislation of his time would make new demands on administrative organisation. The ultimate outcome was often to be a ministerial department; but the immediate outcome then was often a non-ministerial board.

Furthermore, it was precisely the Benthamite first Poor Law Board itself that was particularly influential in the formulation of the nineteenth century case against non-ministerial organisation. It was nicely put in 1847 by Sir George Grey, as Home Secretary, in moving a bill to amend the Act of 1834.<sup>31</sup> He (unlike Toulmin Smith) was not against central supervision or even against delegated legislation. He was pleading against imperfect and indirect responsibility, against the lack of a check and the lack of opportunity for self-defence, against the position in which the House, the Minister and the commissioners were all placed. Grey perceived two features of responsibility. As with Bentham, there was a desire for culpability, or at least for a check. This would be secured by the competence, the power in the Minister: the one feature depended on the other. Grey also assumed that ministerial competence demanded departmental organisation. Such departments would need Ministers who would in the end take the blame because they did possess the power to set things aright. In the growth of this sort of attitude a role was played by the debates in the 1850's on the reform of Indian government and especially on the arrangements for transferring responsibility from the Company and the Board of Control to Ministers. Evidence of the influence of those debates on this matter is found in Mill, Bagehot and Helps. Indeed, Bagehot said that the new India Office was the only case in which "the real constitution of a permanent office to be ruled by a permanent chief"—the form of the normal, homogeneous, ministerial department—was discussed. He implied that James Wilson, his predecessor at the *Economist* and a former Financial Secretary, was the only protagonist who then had understood the matter.<sup>32</sup>

By the 1860's there was not merely an opposition to the use of boards; there was a separate emphasis on the use of responsible Ministers at the head of homogeneous departments. Such Ministers were to be answerable, accountable or culpable, and in positions of what Bentham would have called competent superordination. But this could be expressed for reasons completely independent of Bentham's. One can think by then of such textbook writers as Alpheus Todd or

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<sup>30</sup>J. Toulmin Smith, *Government by Commission Illegal and Pernicious*, London, 1849; see especially Book I, Chs. I-III, Book II, Chs. III-IV, and pp. 16, 17, 23-8.

<sup>31</sup>*Great Britain Parliamentary Debates*, Third Series, Vol. XVII, p. 340, 4 May 1847. See contributions by Hume, Banks and Henley as well as those of Grey and Russell; *n.b.* the signs of opposition to the use of the word "board" itself.

<sup>32</sup>W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, World's Classics ed., 1928, pp. 191-2. E. A. Helps (ed.), *Correspondence of Sir Arthur Helps*, London, 1859, p. 204.

Earl Grey.<sup>33</sup> Todd gave in 1866 a remarkably explicit formulation of the relationship of direct and universal ministerial responsibility to the established constitutional doctrines of the Cabinet and collective responsibility. He had, apparently, started his book before Erskine May's work was first available in 1854.<sup>34</sup> Secondly, Todd quoted Earl Grey on this matter of direct and universal responsibility.

It is no arbitrary rule which requires that all holders of permanent offices must be subordinate to some Minister responsible to Parliament, since it is obvious that without it, the first principles of our system of government—the control of all branches of the administration by Parliament—would be abandoned.

The one meaning of responsibility (he thought of it as parliamentary control of Ministers) demanded the other. He assumed departmental organisation.

Todd's treatment of some details is interesting: for example his discussion of such a tool of responsibility as parliamentary questions, whose origin he dated to Pitt but whose formal recognition to May's work of 1854.<sup>35</sup> Commissions—"Royal, statutory and departmental"—he restricted to enquiry. They were permissible only because of ministerial responsibility and only so long as they were not issued

with a view to evade the responsibility of Ministers in any matter; or to do the work of existing departments of state, which possess all needful facilities for obtaining information upon questions of detail, and which are directly responsible to Parliament.<sup>36</sup>

Parliament, Ministers and departments made irresponsible bodies intolerable. They made them unnecessary, too: this was not quite what Bentham had been saying. For Todd and Grey the abolition of sinecures had led to the clear division between supreme and political offices on the one hand and subordinate non-political offices on the other hand.<sup>37</sup> For them responsibility existed not merely to provide punishment but as a part of the architecture of the constitution and therefore as an accepted end in itself. It was expressed in a combination of parliamentary Ministers, departments and permanent civil service with the royal prerogative. Bentham had not exactly foreseen this and might not have particularly liked it. The completion of financial and service reforms in 1866 and 1870 was to strengthen this arrangement of responsibility.

#### IV

By the 1860's there was a wide acceptance of responsibility and the ministerial department. This was not at all an exclusively Benthamite creation. The results had not been what Bentham had had in mind. One usually thinks of Mill and Bagehot as the main exponents in the 1860's of responsible organisation for central government. But were they, was Mill even, merely reiterating in 1861 just what

<sup>33</sup>A. Todd, *Parliamentary Government in England*, London, 1867-9. Third Earl Grey, *Representative Government*, London, 1858. cf. also H. Coxe, *The British Commonwealth*, London, 1854. W. E. Hearn, *The Government of England*, London, 1867.

<sup>34</sup>Todd, *op. cit.*, 1892 ed., preface by Spencer Walpole, p. iv.

<sup>35</sup>It was the Irish M's.P. who were to make parliamentary questions take several steps forward in importance. It is surprising how far departmental organisation went irrespective of the parliamentary question.

<sup>36</sup>Todd, *op. cit.*, Book VII, p. 62; Book III, Ch. I; Book IV, Ch. III, S. 5, pp. 85-92, p. 95. cf. A. Helps, *Thoughts upon Government*, London, 1872, p. 169.

<sup>37</sup>Todd, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-6.



Bentham had said? Did Mill, more or less than Bentham, fully state a conception of the ministerial department itself? Was not Bagehot a better exponent than either of those two? When one comes to Bagehot one doubts whether he at any rate thought that ministerial responsibility and the ministerial department were generally accepted.

Mill had, long before the 1860's, edited, augmented and completed Bentham's *Rationale of Judicial Evidence*. Some of the strongest of Bentham's argument lay there. It was necessarily of more importance for the development of contemporary opinion than was, say, the *Constitutional Code*.<sup>38</sup> However, like Bentham, Mill was prepared to accept boards in certain practical instances. He had supported Chadwick and the early administration of the Poor Law Board. He later supported the idea of using a government commission to supervise London's water supply. Here was a specific instance where the development of local government would make the use of non-ministerial organisation less necessary, for Mill thought that such a commission should exist only until London had its own single Council. Similarly one finds him like others of his time forced to contemplate some deviation from the normal ministerial situation in Irish and Indian government. In the 1860's he mooted for Ireland a body something like the Land Commission which was later to be created.<sup>39</sup>

The Indian situation was the more important. Bentham had seen certain possibilities in a translation of the East India Company into some sort of advisory council. Mill went further. Indeed, he devoted much more space in the relevant section of his *Considerations on Representative Government* to the case for using such conciliar forms in departmental organisation than he did to the attack on boards. Naturally, he had defended the East India Company, his employers, but this was much more than a matter of defence. He thought he saw something generally useful in such a form. If there were to be political Ministers, should they not have boards of advisers like the Court of Directors associated with them and appointed by the government? This was relevant not merely to India but also to naval and military affairs and indeed wherever "it is not sufficient that the Minister should consult some one competent person".<sup>40</sup> This was an admission into which as into many of Bentham's one can read a great deal. It certainly suggested that Mill did not think that pyramidal departments always necessarily provided ministerial competence. Elsewhere he explained how the necessity for special experience for handling affairs intelligently demanded a council to check the Minister, to whom the Minister should present all important measures and by whose suggestions he would have to be affected. The council that had been provided in the 1858 Act did not, he thought, go far enough at all. Such councils should be strong. They would be alternatives to the purely pyramidal department.

<sup>38</sup>J. Bentham, *Rationale of Judicial Evidence*, London, 1827 ed., preface, pp. v-xvi. cf. M. St. J. Packe, *Life of John Stuart Mill*, London, 1954, pp. 72-3.

<sup>39</sup>See various articles by Mill, e.g. in the *Examiner*, 27 Oct. 1833, pp. 675-6; the *Sun*, 12 May 1834, p. 2; the *Morning Chronicle*, 2 Aug. 1834, p. 2; the *Globe*, 8 Sept. 1835, p. 4; the *Morning Chronicle*, 31 Oct. 1846, p. 4 (for a later opinion on the Poor Law Board); *Public Agency v. Trading Companies*, London, 1851, pp. 19-23; *England and Ireland*, London, 1868.

<sup>40</sup>J. S. Mill, *Considerations on Representative Government*, World's Classics ed., p. 347.

The utility of such special and, in a sense, responsible councils—able, experienced, professional and consultative (but by no means merely ciphers)—was something in which Mill obviously and deeply believed as one of the good results and lessons of Company rule. It was not at all something which he merely expressed as an official. Nor was it an idea which he would have restricted to Indian government. It was something he thought that ministerial government would require.<sup>41</sup> This is an outstanding example of the influence of the Indian debates of the 1850's on the formation of opinion on responsibility and departmental organisation.

Mill's main thesis was concerned with a rational democracy, the paradox of representative and responsible government. This required a distinction between the legislature and the Minister and between the Minister and the official. A chain of responsibility would run from the official to the legislature through the Minister. Boards would prevent this. His opposition to bureaucracy was unambiguous. He did not equivocate about the need for responsibility. Much of this he had expressed as early as 1835.<sup>42</sup> It was more fully put in 1861 in his *Considerations on Representative Government*. However much of Bentham Mill may by then have discarded, it is true that in this matter he came at times near to repeating what Bentham had already said. Bentham is duly quoted. With an individual head—with a council if necessary—there was complete responsibility; with a concurrence of more than one functionary in a decision responsibility did exist but penalties were diminished by being shared; with a board and secret decisions by majorities there was no responsibility. Mill's opening paragraph on this topic in *Representative Government* states a belief very similar to what was to be stated in the Haldane Report nearly eighty years later: that responsibility is best provided and the work best done if all functions of similar subject be allocated to single departments.

It is, however, just as true that here (as elsewhere) Mill saw a vital defect in the Benthamite inheritance: how, for example, to provide for competence as well as liability: as so often he saw both sides but could not make them meet. Further, as one can read significance into Bentham's exceptions, so one can into Mill's. He wrote that "boards . . . are only admissible in [executive government] when, for other reasons, to give full discretionary power to a single Minister would be worse". No examples are given to elucidate this tautology. Some exception to Bentham was presumably intended there, as when Mill added that if a spirit existed which made the individual member identify himself with the board, the suffering and so the responsibility of the board would be his also. Mill did not admit that this very non-Benthamite situation ever occurred; but the admission was there. We may find extra meaning in his discussion of conciliar forms. In his distinction

<sup>41</sup>See references in *Representative Government*; and various articles and reports, e.g. on the India Bill of 1853 in the *Morning Chronicle*, 5 and 7 July, p. 5 on each occasion; *Contention for Continuation of the East India Company: Report of the Debates at the East India House Relative to the Proposed Change in the Government of India*, London, 1858, pp. 6-8; *Review of Improvements Under the East India Company*, London, 1857-8, pp. 1-38; various pamphlets on the India Bills and Resolutions of 1858: *A Constitutional View of the India Question*, *Practical Observations on the First Two of the Proposed Resolutions on the Government of India*, *A President in Council the Best Government for India*, *The Moral of the India Debate*. This last pamphlet is especially interesting.

<sup>42</sup>*London Review*, July and Oct. 1835 (reprinted as Appendix in J. S. Mill, *Dissertations and Discussions*, London, Routledge, 1859-70). cf. *Representative Government*, Ch. VI.

between legislative, ministerial and official phases and in his attitudes to decentralisation, to knowledge and power in public administration, to public administration as a skilled business, to the limitations which are therefore necessary to parliamentary interference in detail—in all these things we may detect starting points. From them would much later emerge such a belief in the division between phases of the governmental process as would in fact justify non-ministerial organisation itself. This was to occur when the responsibility of a Minister for officials in a vast department became a problem and when other forms of responsibility seemed necessary.<sup>43</sup>

One does not always see the same things in Mill as in Bentham. Mill drew different conclusions than Bentham from the two sides of responsibility. His distinction between politics and administration was different from Bentham's distinction between high-level and lower or executive official functions. Mill was not merely concerned to abolish boards as apt devices for corruption: he was concerned to design a lofty structure for government and society. Too much had happened and been changed and discussed between Bentham's day and 1861 for Mill merely to repeat Bentham. Mill was much more interested in the differences between Ministers and officials and much more concerned with the problem of supplying Ministers with expert assistance. Bentham, it has been stressed, did not envisage departments like those that were the later Victorian norm however much he contributed to some points of the theory on which the departments were based. Though Mill's concern did enable him to stress some things with which Bentham had not been so concerned—notably the difference between Ministers and officials—he did not always get nearer than Bentham did to the actual type of responsible ministerial pyramidal department. And in some ways Bentham is nearer to us. At least Bentham and we ourselves look out on an untidy machinery of government. Mill's contemporary machinery was much nearer his ideal and it was effectively no nearer to ours than was Bentham's in the vital matter of scale.

If Mill was the first, Bagehot was the second of the two main exponents. There are two things to be noted about his position in this matter: he was a more definite proponent of the ministerial department than Mill (or Bentham); and he wrote as though on the defensive. In 1867—six years after Mill's *Considerations* and a year after Todd's *Parliamentary Government*—Bagehot published *The English Constitution*. He began with a quotation from Mill. Though he was analysing rather than prescribing, what he had to say about non-ministerial organisation was broadly what had been said by Mill and the others before. Certain differences were important. For example, Bentham and Mill had been attracted to conciliar forms in departmental organisation but Bagehot was specifically opposed to them. Mill thought that the Indian Government Acts had not gone far enough in providing them for the Indian Office. Bagehot specifically said they had gone all too far.<sup>44</sup>

Bagehot emphasised two main points which had not been so emphasised before. The first and more familiar was the need for any department in its own interest to be represented by a party political Cabinet Minister in the House. The point

<sup>43</sup>*Representative Government*, pp. 344-6; *n.b.* the significance of his words about "the fluctuations of a modern official career".

<sup>44</sup>W. Bagehot, *The English Constitution*, World's Classics ed., pp. 191-2.



had begun to emerge from, for example, the first Poor Law Board and had been implied by Sir George Grey. It was Bagehot who elucidated the party aspect. The second—and this was new and very important if at first difficult to see—was the peculiar advantages such an essentially temporary Minister brought to the internal office organisation of the department. It was, for instance, only the amateur Minister—the “extrinsic” chief—who could bring “the rubbish of office to the burning glass of common sense”.<sup>45</sup> The first point dominated his superb chapter “On Changes of Ministry”. Having stated all the disadvantages of a situation in which all the heads of government are likely to be swept away together, he went on to justify it. He specifically dealt with the weakness of the alternative to which Bentham had been attracted—a defender who was the more expert in the affairs of the department because he was not a member of the House though he could attend and speak. He too drew on the experience with the old Poor Law Board in this matter of political defence.<sup>46</sup>

Bagehot’s parliamentary argument was quite unequivocal. In some ways his second point was the more important because it was the more original. From them both he drew a picture that was much more than Bentham’s or Mill’s the normal, ministerial, civil service, pyramidal department. This picture included a place for the permanent, official head. Further, Bagehot would have allowed no exception at all. Not merely did he not want boards and so forth, he did explicitly want all departments to have this and precisely this one form. This emphasis was a new and a very important part of the theory of the ministerial department. Here Bagehot had gone beyond analysis to prescription and here his statement was more rigid and more complete than that of Mill, Bentham or anyone else. One might add that Bagehot’s view would seem to have been based on an assumption of relatively small offices and relatively similar functions in each of them.<sup>47</sup>

The second thing to be said about Bagehot is that if here he went beyond analysis it was because he did not see anything like a general acceptance of the complete norm in the contemporary machinery of government. His words are evidence of the discussion of this norm in the 1860’s. But they suggest both that it was not yet necessarily established and that to Bagehot at least agreement about it did not look at all inevitable. He wrote, in this matter, as one on the defensive. Thirty years before Bagehot wrote Palmerston had thought of a civil service based on political patronage as a defence against bureaucracy. Todd and others had explained that on the contrary, it was the existence of a permanent civil service and the division between it and politics that was an essential part of the responsible system. Now Bagehot saw a threat to that system and in particular to the sort of departmental organisation which should complete it, coming from a contemporary “seizure of partiality” towards bureaucracy.<sup>48</sup>

## V

Was there any evidence in the contemporary machinery of government or in the development of opinion in and after 1867 to suggest that Bagehot was right

<sup>45</sup>*ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>47</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 170, 174, 180-1, 190-3.

<sup>46</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 162, 164, 167-8.

<sup>48</sup>*ibid.*, p. 170.

to be on the defensive? Insofar as the influence of German thought and the administration of the Prussian state was then becoming fashionable he did have cause for concern. Among other things one may recall that it was German administration that specifically developed non-ministerial organisation and hived off executive work as an alternative to the use of comprehensive ministerial departments. The contemporary writing of, for example, Arthur Helps, Fitzjames Stephen and others showed such a partiality in highly relevant matters as, two decades later, did the early Fabians.<sup>49</sup> In practice, however tidy the central machinery of government of that time may look to us, it did still contain a good deal of deviation in non-ministerial organisation and within departmental organisation. In particular we should note that Bagehot's idea of the departmental virtues of the amateur Minister were not all widely understood then or for some time. An outstanding example of this can be found in the contemporary discussions about the creation of a ministry of education. The Select Committee on Education of 1883-4 was bogged down in a discussion of the wholly irrelevant and hypothetical question of whether the sort of person appointed to a Lord Presidency or a Vice Presidency, a separate ministry or a parliamentary commissionership and so forth would have the more knowledge of education, museums, etc.<sup>50</sup> Early and mid-Victorian government was rich with experiment in political posts that were not simply for departmental Ministers.

But Helps and the others were not prepared to go very far with their criticisms. This is the more striking when one considers who these critics were. Helps, for example, was a distinguished civil servant very much after the model of Sir Henry Taylor in his literary ambitions and writings, in his attitude to his subject and in other ways. His general approach came from a belief in paternalism and governmental patronage. He thought this more not less necessary as civilisation advanced. A serene confidence breathes through the work: the British people were easy to govern under a constitutional monarchy; there were no grounds for fearing a bureaucracy since officials were too lazy to be ambitious for power. Indeed he thought that the limits of interference, which included ridicule as one of the most potent, meant that the danger was too little not too much government. Now this was a very forward-looking attitude in some ways and doubtless different from Bagehot's, but it did not take him to a defence of non-ministerial organisation. There his approach was not unlike that of Mill. The legislative and administrative functions were distinct and done by different bodies. The legislature should interfere as little as possible in administration. "Trust your agents" should be the note in public as well as in private business. But, at the same time, "fear of responsibility was the great fear of modern times". He had an idea for having "councillors" attached to a department, who would be neither permanent civil servants, nor permanent commissioners, nor the same as members of advisory bodies or legislative

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<sup>49</sup>A. Helps, *op. cit.*, Chs. II-IV and App. E. A. Helps, *op. cit.*, Intro. p. 9 and pp. 204, 209, 213. A. Helps, *Friends in Council*, London, 1859, Series II, Vol. II, On Government, pp. 181-2, and Series I, Vol. II (new ed. 1869), Ch. V, Government. For Fitzjames Stephen see Leslie Stephen, *Life of Fitzjames Stephen*, London, 1895, pp. 350-1. Duke of Somerset, *Monarchy and Democracy*, London, 1880, Ch. XV, pp. 159, ff. The Duke was Chadwick's old enemy Seymour of the Board of Health.

<sup>50</sup>*Gl. Brit. P.P.*, 1883, Vol. XIII and 1884, Vol. XIII.

committees, but he had not approved of the conciliar idea that had been discussed in the 1850's for the India Department, or of the Board of Health of that time.<sup>51</sup> Nor would Fitzjames Stephen—a Utilitarian still more concerned with doubts about democratic implications than J. S. Mill and a vigorous controversialist if ever there was one—state a stronger attack than did Helps.<sup>52</sup> Such was the state of opinion in the 1870's.

The fact was that by the mid-Victorian period one would not have found any important general statement, as against particular exceptions,<sup>53</sup> opposed to ministerial responsibility and the emerging department. There was the long history of a demand for a ministry of health. In 1852 Kay-Shuttleworth was prepared to propose the administration of charities with education under the same Ministers.<sup>54</sup> Early in the Crimean campaign *The Times* was calling for the unification of all army departments under a Secretary of State for War no longer responsible for the Colonies.<sup>55</sup> That did not mean that there was a clear understanding of the ministerial department in the 1850's—Kay-Shuttleworth and *The Times* were, apparently, speaking of ministerial boards. But it did mean a movement to responsibility and single political heads. By the 1880's even such a work as the Duke of Somerset's *Monarchy and Democracy* was concerned to deprecate the effects of party solidarity and the Cabinet on ministerial responsibility and not to belittle the latter. What a writer like Helps wanted (and the same would be true for Chadwick) was not non-ministerial organisation at all. It was a recognition of public administration, of the role of the permanent, efficient and in that sense independent officials. And by the 1870's most realised that all this depended on having, not on avoiding, a ministerial system: these were not (as Bentham might have thought of boards and responsibility) alternatives; they were conditions of each other. This was a great step forward in theoretical understanding. One may, perhaps, now believe that non-ministerial organisation itself can depend on and assist the ministerial system: but that was another step still and at that time had not been taken and was not, generally, needed in the processes and scale of work then being done.

There may still have been some preference for the ministerial board. There was still much confusion about what the Minister himself would do. The word Minister was itself avoided except by radicals: but reformers tended to think always in terms of ministerial departments. Would it be an over-simplification to say that while radicals of, say, the 1930's and 1940's were excited by the idea of public corporations, radicals of the 1870's were equally excited by the idea of ministries—for health, education, agriculture and so on? Critics like Stephen, Maine or Lecky were not prepared to say what would be said elsewhere and later by Faguet or

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<sup>51</sup>*Thoughts Upon Government*, Chs. II-IV and App., especially pp. 6, 23, 27, 28, 38, 233, ff. *Friends in Council*, Series II, Vol. II, pp. 181-2. E. A. Helps, *op. cit.*, pp. 204, 213.

<sup>52</sup>*cf.* Stephen, *loc. cit.*

<sup>53</sup>*cf.* Sir C. Rivers Wilson, *My Official Life*, London, 1916, p. 63.

<sup>54</sup>F. Smith, *Sir James Kay-Shuttleworth*, London, 1923, p. 301.

<sup>55</sup>*The Times*, 8 Ap. 1854.



Mosca.<sup>56</sup> There was no reflection of the reaction that in Canada or Australia, for example, was already leading to a demand for official independence from Ministers.<sup>57</sup>

In general nothing came to disturb the acceptance of the ministerial department until after the turn of the century. Popular descriptions and accepted textbooks almost entirely neglected non-ministerial organisations. For Traill the central executive so completely meant responsible ministerial departments that he could hardly think of the first Poor Law Board as a branch of the central executive at all. Nor did he find any non-ministerial organisations of his own time worth mentioning. Similarly all the departments that Porritt dealt with were "represented by a Minister in Parliament". Courtney did devote a short chapter to commissions like that for statute law revision. He even devoted a somewhat larger chapter to what he called "Parliamentary Commissions"; but these, with one or two exceptions, were also either investigating or judicial bodies and he stressed Parliament's jealousy of such forms. The fate of the Poor Law Board he thought to have been inevitable. But his exceptions—Ecclesiastical and Charity Commissions, and the Light Railway Commission—were not, we can see now, without significance.<sup>58</sup> Anson mentioned "departments which may be described as non-political" and said that these were "the outlying departments of the Treasury, the Ecclesiastical Commission and the Charity Commission". This was not, in fact, a full and certainly not a helpful indication of what existed or of the characteristics of non-ministerial organisation. What it did do was to indicate the way in which the Treasury was thought of as a convenient cloak for such inconvenient creatures. Dicey did not recognise the field at all. His discussion of the Minister was limited to a reiteration of the contrast between his position of legal responsibility and *droit administratif*.<sup>59</sup>

If the general attitude was one of acceptance, it had been Bagehot who had supplied the fullest statement. The distinction between Minister and official, the uses of the political Minister in the House and the amateur Minister in the department, the need for homogeneity in the machinery of government and the exclusion of all exceptions—in all these ways Bagehot thoroughly expounded the ministerial department and thoroughly opposed non-ministerial organisation. Bagehot's understanding of the Minister was echoed in, for example, Trollope's contemporary Palliser novels. There was a popularisation of the idea of a Minister. There was now to be no exception. Bentham's preference for a presidential system could be forgotten. Critics were not prepared to engage in a direct attack. The paradox of the ministerial department—the accountable, potent but temporary Minister and the permanent but obedient official—was to be universally applied in central government. Where it was apparent non-ministerial organisation would be opposed.

<sup>56</sup>cf. E. Faguet, *The Cult of Incompetence*, English ed., 1911, p. 37, Ch. III etc. G. Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, English ed., 1939, Ch. 10, S. 8.

<sup>57</sup>cf. G. McG. Dawson, *The Principle of Official Independence*, London, 1922, pp. 23, ff. F. E. Eggleston, *State Socialism in Victoria*, London, 1932, Ch. III.

<sup>58</sup>H. D. Traill, *Central Government*, London, 1887, pp. 133-4. Edward Porritt, *The Englishman at Home*, London, 1893, Ch. VIII, pp. 227-8. Leonard Courtney (Lord Courtney of Penwith), *The Working Constitution of the United Kingdom*, London, 1905, pp. 152-5, 208, 210-18.

<sup>59</sup>W. R. Anson, *Law and Custom of the Constitution*, London, 1892, Pt. II, The Crown. A. V. Dicey, *Law of the Constitution*, London (1st ed. 1885), Intro. to 8th ed. (1915) and Ch. XI. But cf. Sir Frederick Pollock, *Law Quarterly Review*, Vol. 25, 1909, p. 53, for a more interesting view.

Broadly speaking it was either not to be recognised or not to be understood if it made an appearance. This was after all a thoroughly good mid-Victorian attitude to the exotic, the inconvenient or the deviant. Smiles were permissible. "You are a Lord now—and you will be a President soon and then perhaps a Secretary. The order of promotion seems odd but I am told that it is very pleasant."<sup>60</sup> You could afford a decorative cloak of odd titles as long as the basis was a solid homogeneous conformity. You could assume that the machinery of government was what it ought to be: a group of essentially similar responsible departments, no more and no less; the rest was mere delightful trappings. Like other contemporary compromises this hid large exceptions and tremendous strains. These have since triumphed. We can only look back from the present chaos with envy and admiration at the splendour of the Victorian attempt to establish such an exclusive invention for central government organisation.

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<sup>60</sup>A. Trollope, *Phineas Finn*, World's Classics ed., Pt. II, p. 66.

# Central Supervision and Local Government in Indonesia

By J. D. LEGGE

## I

In August 1950 the United States of Indonesia, the federal republic to which the Dutch had transferred sovereignty in 1949, was transformed into the unitary Republic of Indonesia. This constitutional change, effected partly through the merging of individual states and partly through the decision of the federal Parliament itself, realised an important nationalist aspiration. During the struggle for independence Holland had insisted that the variety of regional differences to be found within the archipelago and the concentration of over half of its population in the island of Java made a federal system a necessity. To the *de facto* republic which had proclaimed its independence from Holland in 1945, however, such an argument appeared as an unconvincing disguise for a determination on the part of the Dutch to divide and rule—either to split the nationalist movement by appealing to elements in the Outer Provinces who feared Javanese domination or republican ideals, or, failing that, to retain as much influence as possible in a federal structure. The Republic, claiming to represent the authentic voice of Indonesia, therefore opposed a federal republic “made in Holland”, and after the transfer of sovereignty its replacement by a unitary state was quickly achieved. At the same time the new Republic, recognising that the regional feelings which the Dutch had sought to manipulate were genuine enough, professed its intention to concede a large measure of autonomy to regions within the unitary state.

The federal proposals and the nationalist reaction to them have given a particular slant to all subsequent consideration of the problem of regionalism, which is perhaps unfortunate. In the first place, to frame the problem merely in terms of alternative constitutional solutions is to assume that it is essentially capable of solution by these methods—that it is concerned solely or principally with desires for greater local initiative arising from local pride or consciousness of ethnic distinctiveness and from fears of Javanese predominance. These elements are certainly present and there has been a growing dissatisfaction with the slowness of the central government in preparing and implementing its plans for regional autonomy. At the same time it may be doubted whether the provincial separatism of December 1956 and February-March 1957 can be explained solely in these terms or whether the regional grievances expressed in those movements would be satisfied by the concession of greater powers of local autonomy. At least part of the resistance to Djakarta sprang from dissatisfaction with central government policy in fields (*e.g.* economic policy and especially currency control) which are clearly of national concern and which, in a federal state, would certainly fall within the province of the federal government rather than that of state governments. Secondly, insofar as constitutional arrangements are relevant to the problem, there is the fact that many aspects of local government planning fall quite outside the federal state-unitary state controversy. Either a federal or a decentralised unitary structure



must be based upon units of reasonable size and competence which could serve as constituent states or as autonomous provinces. In Indonesia such units must necessarily be artificial. While there are broad differences from area to area in terms of language, social organisation, religious belief and material culture, it is also the case that, outside the cities, the effective political and social units, based on traditional groupings, are usually very small in area and population, extending barely beyond the village or complex of villages. The gulf between the village on the one hand and Djakarta on the other is a wide one, and the problem of administering these lower units would not be touched either by the creation of a federation or the surrender of wide powers of autonomy to provinces. In either case it would still be necessary to meet more immediate local needs below the state or the province.

It may be argued, in extreme form, that a major task facing any central government of Indonesia today is that of extending its authority to the base of society—of securing “government in general” in a situation where immediate local consciousness is much stronger than any feeling of national identity. The planning of a local government system reflects the difficulty. Attempts have been made to combine the surrender of powers to local authorities with the retention of a considerable measure of central supervision and guidance, and to integrate a local government system into a centralised administrative system, at least until such time as local governments themselves may become instruments which can assist in the maintenance of central authority. This may prove a contradictory task. In any case the Republic’s plans for local autonomy have, in consequence, something of a colonial flavour about them. This is true not merely in form—the system of units and organisation used at the local level today stems from, and bears many detailed resemblances to, programmes of administrative and political decentralisation in Indonesia before the war—but also in essence. Even though Indonesia is now an independent sovereign state its task at the local level is not altogether different from that of an alien government attempting to establish and preserve its authority in the “subject” society, at least regarding those matters which touch its own interests. And this affects the form in which local self-government may be developed.

This view, stated somewhat uncompromisingly here, may be tested by reference to one issue which has proved to be a major one in the drafting of a local government law—the question of central government supervision over local governments. The drafting of a comprehensive law has been a slow business. A provisional local government system was established in Java and parts of Sumatra and Borneo on the basis of a law passed in 1948 by the original, pre-federation Republic (R.I. Law 22 of 1948), and in the remainder of the archipelago on the basis of a 1950 law of the State of East Indonesia, the largest of the constituent states established by the Dutch (N.I.T. Law 44 of 1950). In the meantime attempts were made to prepare new legislation to serve as the basis for a permanent system of local government throughout the whole archipelago. It was not until January 1957, however, that, after a series of earlier drafts had failed to secure parliamentary approval, a new law was proclaimed (Law 1 of 1957). The experience of the provisional period, and the proposals for the maintenance of some degree of administrative supervision

of local bodies which were included in the successive draft laws, may indicate the character of the problem as it has been felt to exist by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

## II

In approaching the question of local self-government in Indonesia it is possible and helpful to make a preliminary distinction between two broad types of situation to be found in the archipelago. On the one hand there are the areas such as Java, Madura, and, to a lesser extent, Sumatra and Borneo, where the central government, both in colonial times and at present, has maintained its own centralised administrative system reaching right down to the basic territorial unit—the village. Secondly, there are the areas such as the greater part of Celebes, the Moluccas and the Lesser Sundas, where agreements between the Indies Government and local rulers (Long or Short Contracts) granted a degree of recognition to self-governing states (*swapradja*) within the colonial framework, and where the lower administrative structure was thus more independent of the centre. In the first type of situation, immediately above the *desa*, *negeri*, or other basic unit of village organisation, stood the central government or at least its lower administrative reaches. In the second type of situation the meeting place between the government and the governed was not the village but the self-governing state. Above the *swapradja* stood the Government. Below it lay its own administrative organisation, maintaining contact with the village. The ruler of a self-governing state possessed some little measure of independence but he was required to enforce decisions of the Indies Government. Both geographically and politically this distinction can only be maintained in very broad terms. In the western part of the archipelago there were self-governing states—the four states of Java, for instance—and in the eastern part there were areas under direct rule. Further, there were wide differences in size and competence and organisation between one self-governing state and another, just as there were innumerable forms of social organisation for the directly ruled communities. But, in spite of exceptions, an awareness of the broad distinction between the two types of situation, and of the fact that the two were, on the whole, geographically separate also, is important for an understanding of post-war experiments in local government. It has proved difficult for the independent Republic of Indonesia to prepare a uniform system which can be applied to the whole country. The fact that, in the eastern islands, the State of East Indonesia (*Negara Indonesia Timur*) created by the Dutch during the revolutionary period had already prepared its own local government system before the formation of the unitary state in 1950, added further complications. Though this system continued to operate in the three eastern provinces, it is proposed here to give attention rather to the provisional system established in the western part of the archipelago under the local government law of the original Republic of Indonesia, as that law provided the model for the drafting of the new basic law for the whole country.

The provisional system of local government established in western Indonesia takes as its point of departure the extremely centralised administrative system which the Republic carried over in its essentials from the pre-war Dutch system as it had existed in Java. Now, as then, administration is conducted through a highly

developed chain of command centralised in the Ministry of Internal Affairs and passed down through a descending scale of territorial officers to the base of society: through Provinces, Residences, *Kabupatens* (Regencies), Districts and Sub-Districts to the *Desa* or village complex. The officers administering this pyramid of territorial divisions form a distinct administrative service of the central government—the *pamong pradja*.<sup>1</sup> It is an important feature of the post-revolutionary situation that the service, in becoming completely Indonesian, has inherited something of the paternal traditions of the European colonial administrator.

Under the Local Government Law of 1948 three of the levels in this administrative hierarchy were to be transformed into levels of local self-government—the provincial level, the *kabupaten* level and the *desa* level. The territorial divisions at each of these levels were to become self-governing areas with regard to matters of local concern.<sup>2</sup> In each was to be established an elected legislative council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah*) which would, in turn, appoint from its own members an executive council (*Dewan Pemerintah Daerah*). Provision was also made for the creation of municipal governments possessing similar institutions. Municipalities were to be of two grades—large towns were to be equivalent in status to a *kabupaten* and small towns to a *desa*. There was provision too for the formation of Special Districts (*Daerah Istimewa*) composed of units or groups of units which did not lend themselves to the ordinary classification, and which could be equivalent to a province or *kabupaten* as circumstances dictated. The so-called “self-governing States” (*swapradja*) were expected to lend themselves to treatment as special regions.

In each region there was to be a Head of the Region (*Kepala Daerah*) who was to be the chairman of the executive council as well as general supervisor of the local government in question. This office was not to be entirely elective. It was to be filled by appointment made by a specified authority representing the central government, but such appointments were to be made in each case from a list of at least two and not more than four candidates submitted by the legislative council of the region concerned. Thus the *kepala daerah* of a province was to be appointed by the President from the list of candidates nominated by the legislative council of the province. The *kepala daerah* of a *kabupaten* or a large town was to be

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<sup>1</sup>In colonial times the Regent, formerly a hereditary office, was the highest level of the service in Java to be staffed by Indonesians. Above that level administrative officials—Governors and Residents—were Dutch. The pattern varied outside Java. In Sumatra, for instance, the European service penetrated one stage lower. Sumatra was a “Government” divided into residencies. Beneath the residents, assistant residents administered a territorial division approximating roughly to a Javanese regency. Beneath that division in turn a European controller administered a lower sub-division, below which came districts and sub-districts under native officials. In areas where local rulers were recognised by the Indies Government, European officers advised and guided the internal administration of the principality.

<sup>2</sup>Powers which were to be transformed to the autonomous bodies were, at least on paper, fairly extensive. They included such things as irrigation, waterways, maintenance of roads and public buildings, development of agricultural programmes, development of fisheries, maintenance of health and veterinary services, and supervision of marketing and distribution. Powers were not enumerated in detail in the basic law, but were listed in the separate legislation which was required actually to establish each local government. Under Law 22 of 1948 it appeared that a local government was to possess only those powers specifically surrendered to it. Later establishing legislation made it clear, however, that a local government might deal with matters of local concern beyond those specifically surrendered, provided these fields were not already being handled by a higher local authority, or by the central government itself.



appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs from a similar list proposed by the legislative council concerned. And the *kepala daerah* of a *desa* or a small town was to be appointed in similar fashion by the *kepala daerah* of the province in which it was situated. (In the case of the Special Regions the *Kepala Daerah* was to be chosen from the ruling family of the region. In fact this was the essential difference between an ordinary and a "special" local government. In the latter the position of existing rulers was to be recognised, and they were to serve as regional heads, though the two councils were now to be associated with them.)

While some measure of autonomy was to be conceded to local governments under this law the central government was anxious to retain a measure of supervision over the activities of these governments. In the first place the Regional Head, in addition to his chairmanship of the executive council, was to exercise certain specific powers of control on behalf of the central government. His signature was necessary for ordinances of the legislative council. And he was empowered to delay the operations of decisions of either council if they appeared to him to conflict with higher legislation or to be contrary to the general interest. In the event of the imposition of such a delaying veto, the matter was to be reported to the President in the case of provinces, and to the executive council of the next highest level in the case of lower local governments. Secondly, the three levels of autonomy, like the six levels of administration, were hierarchically arranged. Provinces, while concerned with the fields of activity specifically assigned to them, possessed also a supervisory power over *kabupatens* and large municipalities within their boundaries, and so on down the scale. In particular the executive councils at each level had what was termed a power of "preventive supervision" over certain matters, primarily financial, which were specified in the law (remuneration of council members, regulations concerning the local civil service, the raising of loans, the annual budget, etc.). Regulations governing these subjects were not to go into effect until they had been approved by the executive council of the next highest level of local government, or by the President in the case of provinces. Executive councils had the further power to repeal decisions made by lower executive or legislative councils if they conflicted with the general interest or with higher legislation. This was termed "repressive supervision". And, where a regional head had exercised his power of delaying a council decision, the executive council of the next highest level had power to resolve the issue.

The intentions of this local government system were twofold. The institution of a measure of self-government at the provincial level was intended to satisfy the feelings of regional and cultural identity existing amongst various ethnic groups within the archipelago and to cater for the facts of broad regional suspicion of the centre, and of fears of Javanese predominance within the unitary state. Autonomous provinces constituted an alternative to the creation of constituent states in a federal system. Secondly, there was the need to provide "government in general"—to fashion new instruments of government at all levels for a society in transition. The proposed creation of the second and third level local governments in *kabupatens* and in villages was directed towards that end, and it was at these levels that the supervisory machinery provided under the Act was regarded as particularly

important. From the Government's point of view the vital link in the supervisory system was the position of *kepala daerah* or regional head, and here it is relevant to compare the post-war plan with the pre-war local government system.

In some respects the system of regional units and authorities outlined in Law 22 followed the pattern set, somewhat half-heartedly, by Dutch experiments in political decentralisation. Provinces, regencies and municipalities had been established during the 'twenties and 'thirties, with councils able to exercise a measure of responsibility over local matters. There are obvious differences, of course. Election of councils on the basis of universal suffrage and the disappearance of the European members of councils were natural changes. A more crucial feature of the new plan concerned the proposed change in the relationship between the central government's administrative service and the local government system. In the pre-war experiments the head of the local government system at each level was the central government's chief executive officer in the region. The Governor of a province was also chairman of the provincial executive council. In a *kabupaten* the Regent (now *bupati*), also essentially a central official, possessed a similar dual function. Thus a close connection was preserved between the central administrative hierarchy and the system of local autonomy. Law 22 proposed, in theory though not, as it turned out, in practice, to dispense with that tie, and it was round this point that the whole issue of central supervision has centred. Under the Law the office of *kepala daerah* and chairman of the executive council was still to be combined with that of chief administrative officer of the region. But an elective element was introduced in that appointment was to be made, as has been noticed, from a list of nominees chosen by the representative council. Thus the chief executives of regions would no longer be members of an official service though they would still combine two types of activity. In theory the full flourishing of the new local government system was expected to eliminate the need for a separate administrative service of the central government.<sup>3</sup> The local governments themselves were expected to take over, on behalf of the centre, the responsibility for the administration of lower units within their territory (e.g. *kewedanaan*—districts—and *ketjamatan*—sub-districts—within a *kabupaten*) if such administration continued to be required. Though Law 22 is not clear in defining his position and duties it would seem that the *kepala daerah* was intended to co-ordinate local and central activities. The explanatory appendix to the Law, in fact, described him as a representative of the central government, with reference to such administrative duties,<sup>4</sup> though the same document described him elsewhere as an organ of the regional government.<sup>5</sup> His power to delay decisions of the executive council and the legislative council were to be exercised, of course, on behalf of the centre.

Briefly, according to Law 22 the *kepala daerah* was intended to exercise a dual function. As chairman of the executive council he was to be head of the local government with some responsibility to the legislative council. Secondly, he was

<sup>3</sup>The Law provided that administrative divisions would continue to exist until they were abolished. The appended explanation to the Law makes it clear that such abolition involved also the abolition of the *pamong pradja*. In particular the office of resident was expected to become obsolete in the very near future.

<sup>4</sup>Law 22, explanatory appendix, para. 35.      <sup>5</sup>*ibid.*, para. 22.

entrusted with the supervisory powers over his councils which have already been mentioned. But, in addition to these two specific functions, there were further duties to be performed on behalf of the centre, though these were not defined in the Law. As head of the region the *kepala daerah* was to be the representative of the central government in the area, supervising the execution of governmental tasks which did not fall within the competence of the local government, and exercising the same type of co-ordinating function as had formerly fallen to the lot of the appropriate officer of the *pamong pradja*, or central administrative service, *i.e.* the Governor in the case of a province, the *bupati* in the case of a *kabupaten*, and the mayor (*wali kota*) in the case of a town. It might be said that the new proposal reversed the pre-war arrangement. Formerly a central administrative official was appointed as head of the region. Now the incumbent of the office of regional head was also to perform some of the duties formerly belonging to a central administrative official.

Obviously the concept of the dual role of the *kepala daerah* had its theoretical difficulties. The fact that he was an organ of the local government, bearing a responsibility together with his colleagues on the executive council to the representative body on the one hand, and with responsibility on the other to the higher levels of administration, left open the possibility of a conflict of interest between the two capacities—a conflict which was particularly likely to occur in view of his specific power to delay measures of the local councils which appeared to him to be contrary to the general interest or to run counter to the measures of higher governments. The exercise of this temporary veto was not intended always to be left as a matter of discretion. Since the *kepala daerah* did owe a duty to the central government it could be assumed (and has been assumed) that he could be instructed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs to delay any matter which was known to be pending, and in which the Ministry felt itself to have a contrary interest to that of the elected authorities of the region. If used in this way the veto power could become the central element in the system of supervision which the centre felt it necessary to maintain over local bodies. Obviously the position of *kepala daerah*, as provided in the law, called for great qualities of skill and tact if a clash of interest was to be avoided.

In actual practice, as will be seen more fully below, the role of *kepala daerah* has been rather different from that envisaged in the basic law, since the normal procedure laid down in the law for the appointment of these officers was not followed. Law 22 contained an emergency clause which enabled appointments to be made for the time being directly by the central government without any reference to the wishes of the representative councils in the regions concerned. The Government availed itself of this escape clause during the provisional period.

### III

Under the provisions of Law 22 of 1948 temporary councils were gradually established in Java, Sumatra and Borneo. In three respects the provisional system did not follow the details of the plan laid down in the law. For the time being councils, with one exception (the Special District of Jogjakarta) were not elected.



They were appointed according to a procedure laid down in a Government Regulation, and designed to give a representation of all major political parties and groups roughly in accordance with their estimated strengths. Secondly, no attempt was made for the time being to create institutions for local government in the village. The only "third level" local governments to be established were small municipalities. The third difference was the direct appointment of regional heads under the escape clause of the Act. Of major importance was the fact that, in exercising its power of direct appointment, the Government simply appointed the appropriate members of its own administrative service, the *pamong pradja*. Governors became *kepala daerah* of provinces, *bupatis* became *kepala daerah* of *kabupatens*, and mayors became the *kepala daerah* of municipalities.

This practice had broad implications for the total plan for it reversed the intention of the Law, and, in effect, constituted a return to the pre-war method. Though Law 22 referred to a dual function for the *kepala daerah*, in reality, as has been suggested, it would have been more accurate to distinguish three functions rather than two:

1. The chairmanship of the executive council;
2. Supervision of executive council and legislative council, and
3. Administration to be performed for the central government by an official of that government.

Law 22 placed the first two of these in the hands of the *kepala daerah* (his dual function) and assumed that the third function would gradually become superfluous or, alternatively, become the duty of the local government. In practice, with the appointment of officials as *kepala daerah*, all three functions were retained and were concentrated in the hands of a single person in each area. Strictly speaking, however, the distinction remained between the duties of governors, *bupatis* and mayors as *pamong pradja* on the one hand, and the dual functions of the *kepala daerah* on the other. For example, the general co-ordinating and administrative duties of the *pamong pradja* did not pass to the local government whose field of activity was to that extent restricted. Provinces, *kabupatens* and municipalities remained administrative divisions for those central government purposes falling outside the scope of autonomy, and Governors, *bupatis* and mayors continued to be the officers to whom the lower administrative ranks were responsible. But in another respect the distinction was blurred. While, according to Law 22, the supervisory function was to be exercised as part of the responsibility of the *kepala daerah*, not as part of that of the *pamong pradja*, the appointment of *pamong pradja* to that office tended to confuse the separate roles, and undoubtedly strengthened the element of supervision.

These consequences were deliberate. The decision to appoint directly to the office, rather than from a list of nominees submitted by the legislative council, and the accompanying practice of appointing existing officials, was due partly, no doubt, to the fact that if the position had been given the semi-responsible character envisaged in the Law the Government would have been faced with the necessity of making immediate readjustments in its administrative system in order to cope with

the considerable body of unemployed officials which would have been created. The plan was to allow the *pamong pradja* to become superfluous gradually, not at one stroke. But there was also present the conviction that close official control and supervision of autonomous governments was a necessity for the time being. While in theory a *kepala daerah* appointed from a list of nominees according to the normal procedure laid down in Law 22 was intended to owe loyalty to the centre as well as to the elected council, and was intended to exercise supervision over the local government on behalf of the centre, the officials who were actually appointed owed loyalty to the centre *by virtue of the structure and traditions of the administrative service itself*, and they were thus far more independent of the pressures of local politics. Indeed, with the training and traditions of official service behind him a member of the *pamong pradja* would naturally be expected to be a different type of person from a *kepala daerah* appointed by the prescribed procedure, and to interpret in a different way the obligation to balance the desires of his regional council against more general considerations of national interest. Any *kepala daerah* appointed from a list submitted by a legislative council would surely be extremely reluctant to impose any check upon the resolutions of either his executive or his legislative councils which would be composed of his political colleagues, presumably of like mind with himself. In such circumstances it would be natural for the national interest to be interpreted in such a way as to make it consistent with local demands.

As it is, the reverse has been the case. The Ministry has been able to rely with certainty upon the obedience of its servants to subordinate local wishes to its own interpretation of the national interest. The supervisory machinery established under Law 22 was so much the more effective when the Ministry was in a position simply to instruct its officials to impose a veto with regard to any controversial matter which was known to be pending. It could then ensure that the matter was raised by stages through the hierarchy of local governments until it was eventually brought officially to its own notice. For example, a *kabupaten* decision vetoed by the *kepala daerah* would be referred to the executive council of the province, as required in Law 22. If the executive council of the province approved the original decision of the *kabupaten* legislative council or executive council, that approval would constitute a decision of the provincial executive council which might then be the subject of a similar delaying veto by the *kepala daerah* of the province, and the matter would then pass for decision to the Minister acting in the name of the President. The watch-dog function of the *pamong pradja*, of course, was intended to produce the same effect where the central government had no prior warning and had issued no prior instruction.

In general, then, the exercise of the duties of *kepala daerah* by the person who was at the same time the central government's chief executive in the region concerned meant that the role of these officers as central government servants has been more apparent than their role as leaders of the local government, and that the prestige of the local government has been overshadowed by that of the centre even where local matters were concerned. The character of the system as it has operated in practice is reflected most clearly, perhaps, in the accepted titles of regional heads. It is worth noting that, though in strict terminology the term

*kepala daerah* is supposed to denote a different function or area of activity from that of a Governor, or *bupati*, or mayor, and though the official designation of these officers is "*Gubernur/Kepala Daerah, Bupati/Kepala Daerah, Wali Kota/Kepala Daerah*", in practice the *pamong pradja* rank is invariably used by itself—Governor, *Bupati, Wali Kota*. And this practice is more consistent with the facts as they have been up to the present.

Objections were raised in principle against the combination of the two positions in the same hands, on the grounds that it was no more than a device for disguising the continuance of central control. At the same time it must be admitted that, in practice, the system has worked surprisingly well. Certainly there have been cases where Governors and *bupatis* have found themselves at odds with their councils. But these have been exceptional. For the most part regional heads have managed to establish a good working understanding with their councils. While party representatives in Parliament have directed their fire at the retention of a veto power in the hands of central officers, these attacks do not seem to have awakened strong echoes in the regions themselves, where the issue of central supervision appears to have been of much less moment in practice than one would expect in theory. In fact the power of veto has rarely been used. The credit for that fact must lie partly with the political skill of Governors and *bupatis* who have been able, by personal contact with council members, to resolve potential differences between councils and centre before they became issues on the councils. In exercising this skill a Governor or a *bupati* was, of course, aided by the mere fact that he was in a position to impose a veto if it did come to the point. But, in addition to this legal power, there has been a more intangible factor present also—the fact that he was a person of authority. The *mystique* of authority still counts for much in political relations in Indonesia. A Governor or a *bupati* or a mayor is the more easily able to reach a good understanding with the members of his council, considered as individuals rather than as party representatives, because of the mere fact that he embodies in his person the authority of the central government in the region. This applies particularly to the *kabupaten* level where the *bupati* is regarded in his area less as the head of an autonomous government than as the symbol of a higher power. It is a paternal authority which he represents. He is the father of his people and it would be unwise for the student of political relations in Indonesia to ignore the special flavour expressed, for instance, on the occasions when a *bupati*—or for that matter one of his subordinates, a *wedana* or *tjamat*—speaks paternally to the *lurahs* of his region. Even at the more sophisticated level of *kabupaten* or provincial political activity something of the same relationship survives, and there is room for careful study of informal as well as formal methods of decision-making by regional representative and executive councils.

Naturally this attitude to authority may be expected to change. There are already signs that the chairman of the legislative council, a person chosen by the council itself, is coming to be an important focal point in local affairs, and this in itself must weaken the traditional position of the *bupati* or the Governor. Again, the tendency of members of the *pamong pradja* to acquire a party affiliation is bound to blur the present distinction between official neutrality and the conflict



of political pressures, especially when some members of the administrative service have sought political office. It is argued by some that the *pamong pradja* as a service should stand aside from politics. But this is a difficult ideal to achieve, since, in recent years, many higher appointments in the service have been made partly, at least, for political reasons. An ambitious regional officer can hardly be blamed for attempting to safeguard his future advancement by acquiring political connections.

But these are long-term elements of change. In the present situation, though the political affiliations of the administrative official have laid him open to the charge of using his influence in matters of national politics, as in the elections of 1955, his neutrality in local government politics seems not to have been seriously impaired, and so far his prestige has been such as to overshadow that of popular representatives. In these circumstances his special position within the system of autonomy has not, except in a few difficult cases, constituted the source of friction which one might have expected from a study of the formal machinery of local government, or from a consideration of parliamentary criticisms of the system.

#### IV

Against this background of practice during the provisional period the drafting of a new basic local government law tended to develop into a tug of war between the Department of Internal Affairs, which was well satisfied by the working of the provisional supervisory machinery, and political leaders in Parliament and the regions who were anxious to remove any suggestion of paternal control. The role of officials and the degree to which they should continue to exercise powers of control over local authorities emerged as the major point at issue between successive governments and Parliament. It was the intention of each government which concerned itself with the problem to retain a greater measure of supervision than had been envisaged in the old Law 22 (this intention reflected closely the departmental view) and it was the aim of party leaders in Parliament to resist such a plan.

Briefly, the Government's case for withholding full autonomy has rested on several considerations. There was a paternal fear that inexperienced local councils would prove inadequate to the tasks confronting them. Though the Government regarded full autonomy as a desirable goal it found it difficult to believe that the regions were ready to receive full responsibility immediately. Naturally it is never difficult to find evidence to support an assumption of that kind. Nor was it simply inexperience which was feared. There was also the fear of positive irresponsibility, and certainly there have been cases enough to lend substance to such a fear.<sup>6</sup> But perhaps more important than either of these arguments is the fact that, though provinces and *kabupatens* may be given certain powers of self-government, there still remains the problem of administering the basic unit—the *desa*, or *negeri*, or

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<sup>6</sup>As one instance there may be quoted the situation in West Java where local councils increased the remuneration of members for attendance at meetings beyond the prescribed scale. In such cases as this the Ministry is unable to rely on obedience to instructions which it may legitimately issue to councils. Of similar character is the action of many councils with a strong Moslem majority in refusing to seat a Communist member on the executive council when that party was entitled to a seat.

*marga*, or whatever other form its organisation may take. Pending the establishment of a third level of autonomy the central government needs to retain control over the administration of the affairs of the village, at least in those areas where it has done so in the past. It is not clear how far this point entered consciously into the thinking of the Department. It was not frequently stressed in conversations of the present writer with officials concerned with planning. It is, nonetheless, an important element in the problem. When a third level of local government, based on villages or collections of villages, is established, the need for a central administrative service should disappear as envisaged in Law 22, or at least be greatly reduced, and changed in character. At that point the lower regional administration, if it was still considered to be necessary, could become the responsibility of the autonomous *kabupaten*, with *wedanas* and *tjamats* acting as the servants of the *kabupaten* executive council. In the meantime there remains the fact that *kabupaten* councils are not really representative of the agriculturalist, and their activities do not directly reflect village needs. The greatest single occupational group to be found on councils is composed of civil servants, a fact which is reminiscent of the local councils established during the colonial period and which is reflective of the character of the social élite catered for by the council system.<sup>7</sup> Other groups are small tradesmen, religious leaders, teachers, labour leaders and industrial workers. Only isolated exceptions are drawn from the agricultural population. Even if fuller autonomy were to be conceded to the *kabupaten* level (in the sense of restricting the veto of the *kepala daerah*) the central government cannot really surrender full responsibility for the care and control of the village to councils which do not adequately represent the village population. In the "special regions"—*swapradja* or federations of *swapradja*—the situation is rather different. There local governments, as a matter of history, have already been responsible for the administration of lower territorial subdivisions. But for the remainder of the archipelago, where the local administration of the central government has always been more detailed and more thorough, the Government considers it necessary, for the time being, *either* to retain this channel of communication in its own hands *or* to institute a very close supervision by appointed officials over the administration of lower districts by legislative and executive councils.

At first the latter alternative was preferred. When the new legislation for local government was under consideration between 1954 and 1956 two alternative solutions to the problem, quite opposite in character but each designed to establish a firm supervisory system, were put forward in succession. The draft bill of 1954 suggested a simple and direct solution, namely that the existing provisional method of direct appointment of an official as the *kepala daerah* be made permanent. The *kepala daerah* of provinces would be appointed by the President, of *kabupatens* and large municipalities by the Minister, and of lower units by the *kepala daerah* of the province concerned. Naturally it was intended that, in making these appointments, the Government would continue its practice of appointing members of the *pamong*

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<sup>7</sup>This group formed from one-third to one-half of the membership of eight second- and third-level councils studied by the writer in East Java, and of four in Central Sumatra. In the legislative council of the province of East Java, appointed in October 1956, 23 of the sixty members were civil servants.

*pradja*.<sup>8</sup> Emphasis was laid in the bill not on the dual character of the *kepala daerah* but rather on his character simply as an official of the central government. "The *Kepala Daerah* is a national civil servant" (Article 23). And the general explanation attached to the bill was more explicit: "In a unitary state the *Kepala Daerah* has the role of supervising all the measures of the regional government in the interests of the State as a whole. Because of this it is provided that the *Kepala Daerah* shall be an official who is appointed and dismissed by the central Government." In this way it was hoped to continue the practice of balancing the power of autonomous local governments by placing at their centre the same individual who was also responsible for the administration and co-ordination of central government activities in the region concerned. With his power of veto over the decisions of both local councils he could exercise an effective supervision over their actions and policies.

It was, perhaps, not surprising that this feature of the bill should arouse strong and successful opposition, and a new draft, prepared in 1956, tried to secure something of the same object but by different means. In the new draft the *kepala daerah*, so far from being an official, was to be simply a political figure, appointed by the legislative council itself in the case of provinces and *kabupatens*, and directly elected by the people in the case of lower levels. (The selection had still to await confirmation from above, but this was seen as an emergency safeguard only.) At the same time the character of the office was also to be changed. There was no longer any question of the regional head having a dual role. The accompanying explanation to the draft law described him as being simply "an organ of the regional government". The supervisory powers which had been entrusted to the *kepala daerah* in 1948 and again in the 1954 draft were now to be vested in the hands of a new officer at the provincial level—the *komisaris*—who was to stand outside the local government system and who was empowered, on behalf of the President, to delay decisions of provincial, *kabupaten* and municipal councils where they conflicted with the national interest, and to delay or revoke those of third-level councils. Though the draft bill was silent on the details, it was intended that the *pamong pradja* would be retained, though as a distinct and separate service, and that the position of *komisaris* would, in fact, be occupied by the Governors of provinces. Below them *bupatis* and mayors, though no longer themselves empowered to interfere directly in the workings of local councils in their area, were intended to keep a quiet eye upon council deliberations and to serve as a spy system on behalf of the centre.

The new proposals clearly offered a much watered-down system of central control as compared with the proposals of two years earlier. Even so, the new draft did not go far enough to meet parliamentary opinion. Debates on the new bill in November 1956 were marked by sharp criticism of the institution of the office of *komisaris*, and the Minister of Internal Affairs was unable, in a conference with party leaders, to convert them to his view. The outcome was the passage

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<sup>8</sup>Though this has been the general rule up to the present there have been exceptions in the case of higher appointments. Not all Governors have been appointed from within the service.



of a severely amended version which became the new basic law for local government—Law 1 of 1957.

In the amended version the *kepala daerah* remains a political figure as in the earlier draft. He is to be chosen according to a procedure still to be determined by law, but pending such further legislative provision he is to be chosen by the legislative council. From the point of view of supervision the main feature of the new law is the dropping of the proposed supervisory official, the *komisaris*, and, therefore, by implication the complete separation of the administrative service from the local government system. The only remaining provisions for higher control over local government are that decisions of legislative and executive councils which run counter to the national interest may still be repealed by the next highest executive council in the hierarchy (by the Minister in the case of provinces), that decisions in certain specified fields must still await the approval of the next highest executive, and that the Ministry itself is to have a power of direct intervention in a manner to be determined by Government Regulation. (The Minister also has the power to delay or revoke decisions of second- and third-level councils if the appropriate authority—the next highest executive—neglects its duty. The Minister apparently has the right to decide when a neglect of duty has taken place.) But in spite of these provisions it is clear that the new law leaves the central government in a much weaker position with regard to the daily running of local governments than would have been the case if the local government system had been closely integrated with the administrative system, as proposed in 1954, or if the former had, at least, been indirectly supervised by the latter, as proposed in 1956. The *pamong pradja* will, no doubt, still be able to observe unobtrusively the work of councils and to report to the Ministry upon the workings of autonomous governments at various levels, but this must be an informal role since the law confers no such power upon the service.

Because of this retreat it is now more than ever necessary, in the official view, that the administrative service should not be allowed to wither away or be transferred to the control of local governments. The service is not mentioned in the new Act but it is intended that it shall be retained for central administration. It will be necessary to make a sharper distinction between central tasks and local government tasks than existed in practice during the provisional period, and members of the administrative service will still be placed in each region as chief executive officers of the central government with responsibility for the co-ordination and supervision of central matters. In particular the administration of the village, in areas where this has previously been the task of the central government, and where a third level of autonomy has still not been established, is intended to remain within the field of central responsibility, not that of autonomy. The *pamong pradja* will continue to serve as the Government's channel of communication to the basis of society. Having failed to secure the close control of autonomy that it desired, the Government has been forced to accept the other alternative—that of keeping this channel in its own hands.

The new law does not really meet the demands of either party to this prolonged controversy. The Government, or rather its advisers in the Ministry of Internal

Affairs, in fighting a rearguard action for the maintenance of an effective supervisory system were undoubtedly moved by the desire for good government. The close connection proposed between the autonomous system and the administrative hierarchy appeared a neat and simple way of securing the best of all worlds. That method called, of course, for a spirit of compromise between elected councils on the one hand and the Ministry, represented by its appointed officials, on the other. Given a willingness to compromise, the combined functions of the *kepala daerah* far from being a potential source of conflict could have been an advantage, since the arrangement would have enabled guidance and intervention to take an unobtrusive form. Against this it could be argued that the Ministry was being too paternal and too cautious, and that, in the interests of good government, it had been too distrustful of local bodies and too reluctant to allow them a reasonable scope for experiment and error. Be that as it may, the system as it was established during the transitional period did reflect a consistent point of view, albeit an authoritarian one. The new law represents, by contrast, an uneasy compromise between political pressures demanding fuller autonomy and the official approach based on the view that autonomy must, for the time being, serve the purposes of general government. Its implications have yet to be worked out in practice and, at the time of writing, it is as yet not clear what exact relations will develop between the autonomous side and the central administrative side in the future. For instance, one apparently minor question, but basically an important one, has yet to be settled. Who will live in the official residence at present occupied by the combined official/*kepala daerah*? With the splitting of the office into its component parts, will this building become the residence of the elected *kepala daerah* or of the administrative officer of the region concerned? In Java the standard architectural arrangement is for the open hall used for *kabupaten* legislative and executive council meetings to stand immediately in front of the *bupati's* house, reflecting the connection that has existed hitherto between the *bupati's* two functions. Apart from that, the *bupati's* house has been a symbol of government authority. Whoever lives there in future will have that much advantage in the silent and informal competition for prestige which must inevitably determine which of the two is the principal figure of the district.<sup>9</sup>

## V

The political crisis of early 1957 has delayed the operation of the provisions of the new Act insofar as they relate to the appointment of the *kepala daerah*, and it is possible that the whole question may be reopened. But whether an attempt

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<sup>9</sup>This issue will not be acute in eastern Indonesia where for the most part former self-governing states or groupings of former self-governing states are intended to become Special Districts, with a *kepala daerah* selected from a ruling family. In these areas the responsibility for lower administration is already in the hands of the local authority. A similar situation prevails in certain other regions, for example in the Minahasa region, in which, though it is not a former *swapradja*, the local executive council has already become responsible for lower administration. The Minahasa example may indeed provide a pattern for future development in other areas formerly under direct rule. There the competition between appointed official and autonomous local government has been quickly and decisively determined in favour of the latter. In Manado there is an office of the Resident-co-ordinator for four *daerahs* of north Sulawesi. But it has been overshadowed in prestige by the office of the local government.



is made to revert once more to the situation in which the central government was able to place its officials at the centre of local governments, or whether the ideal of enabling those governments to select and control their chief executives in the manner prescribed in the new Law is retained, the future of the *pamong pradja* as a distinct service must depend upon what arrangements are eventually made for the lowest level of local government. The difficulty of creating third-level governments below the *kabupaten* and based on the village or group of villages became obvious during the provisional period and no such governments were in fact established, as has been seen. As a result the optimism of the old provisional Law 22 which assumed that such governments could be quickly created has now been replaced by a more cautious approach in the new Law. Whereas Law 22 stated categorically that there were to be three levels of local government, Law 1 of 1957 provides merely for two levels except where it is convenient to establish a third level: where, that is to say, there already existed in traditional organisation units of suitable size and coherence to be adapted to the tasks of modern local government. Where traditional organisation provides no such unit, as in most of Java, only the two higher levels are to be established. Below that the existing system of village government and administration will continue to function, but outside the provisions of the local government law, and subject, as at present, to the control exercised by the central government through the chain of authority extending down from the Ministry of Internal Affairs through the administrative hierarchy to the Districts and Sub-Districts immediately above the village.

One of the difficulties arises from the fact that the formation of third-level local governments, with democratic councils on a modern pattern, would presuppose a fairly "open" society. Social change is proceeding rapidly enough in Indonesia, but each of the various forms of village organisation, because of the strength of customary obligations and procedures, is still to a great extent a closed society of its own. (This is, of course, a matter of degree. Some villages have already been brought within the orbit of a wider economy and society and have been the subjects of a greater breakdown in traditional patterns than is the case with others.) It is hoped that the third level may be grounded, as far as possible, in customary organisation, but that would be an extremely difficult goal to achieve, particularly upon a uniform basis. Again, even if it were easy to transform customary procedures in the desired fashion, the village unit, which represents the core of social organisation in Indonesia, is considered by the Department to be, for the most part, too small to serve as an effective unit of local government. The intention to organise such governments by combining several customary units is an ambitious plan since it, too, would involve nothing less than a substantial modification of customary organisation. One suggestion is that representative councils might be established at the level of the sub-district (*ketjamatan*), either by the process of amalgamating *desas* or on the basis of a federal association of *desas*. In either case it is likely that such a council, in its decision making, would still have to recognise the existence of a separate, vigorous, and prior process of decision making in the individual *desas* themselves. The actual execution of *ketjamatan* council decisions, for instance, might well be forced to depend upon the consent and co-operation of traditional *desa* leaders, whether the status of those leaders was still formally recognised or not.



Particularly would this be likely to be the case where the individuals elected to the central council were different from the traditional authorities as constituted before the amalgamation or federation. For reasons such as these the Government, though it does desire to use, as its basic level of autonomy, the *ketjamatan* or something like it in area and population, also recognises that, at least in Java, the strength of the customary unit is such as to make such a transition a remote possibility for the moment. Outside Java the prospect is brighter, though the variety of types of organisation makes it dangerous to generalise. The *negeri* of western Sumatra, though it is approximately equal in size of population to the *desa*, covers a more extensive area, and it has had some experience in the operation of a local council during the colonial period. It might well prove to be a suitable subject for experiment as an autonomous unit of the third level. Again, some of the smaller *swapradja* in eastern Indonesia might be similarly adapted. But in these and other cases the creation of a third level of local government must be a matter for trial and error, and for the adaptation of modern procedures to the character of the society in question.

In general the core of the problem lies in the difficulty of determining which units in Indonesia have genuine substance. In Java the *desa* has substance in a way that higher units do not. The autonomous *kabupaten* is in effect a product of social change. It serves the interests of the élite, which has never belonged to, or has escaped from, the *desa*, and does not represent the rural population. So long as effective social organisation of that population continues to be based on the small unit, the higher levels of local government must be, to some extent, divorced from the mass of the population. And it is the existence of the gap between government and the great mass of the governed which imposes a limitation upon the powers which may be enjoyed by regional authorities and which gives local administration something of a colonial character still.

*University of Western Australia*

# Australian Political Chronicle

## January-June 1957

### THE COMMONWEALTH

Apart from defence, the main decisions taken by Federal Cabinet gave the Liberal and Country Parties a chance to demonstrate their attachment to the principles of free competitive business enterprise. Airlines, banking, and the disposal of government-owned concerns were involved. At the same time, the Government found itself somewhat embarrassed by the private enterprise of its backbenchers in both Houses of Parliament—in connection with divorce in one case, and in the other by a move in the Senate to have the import licensing regulations disallowed.

#### *Airlines Policy*

A protracted series of negotiations about the future of Australian National Airways came to a close after a Cabinet meeting at the end of June. Some hint that A.N.A. might again be seeking government assistance in the face of financial difficulties had been in the minds of one or two alert newspapermen since airline fares were increased early this year. As the other major operator, Trans-Australia Airlines, had shown a substantial profit, the decision could only be prompted by the needs of A.N.A.; under the 1952 "rationalization" agreement, however, both operators were obliged to raise their fares concurrently. The death of Sir Ivan Holyman, one of the founders of A.N.A., probably influenced the directors, who came predominantly from the shipping firms with major holdings in A.N.A. and were presumably considering whether to cut their losses at a time when heavy expenditure on re-equipment had to be contemplated.

A.N.A.'s original proposal, for some form of merger with T.A.A., was not acceptable to the Government, and was opposed by T.A.A., as hinted by its Chairman, Mr. McDonald, on 1 June. The A.N.A. directors then revived the scheme for a holding company which had been presented to the Government during the negotiations in 1952. This plan was for the assets of all the major domestic airline operators to be owned by a holding company in which the Commonwealth would have a 49 per cent. interest. The operating companies would retain their identity and continue to function under their own boards of directors. Ansett Airways announced their opposition to any such scheme, and after a further Cabinet meeting in Brisbane the Minister for Civil Aviation, Senator Paltridge, stated on 25 June that the holding company proposal was unacceptable to the Government because it would inevitably result in a monopoly.

Senator Paltridge's statement reflected the unwillingness of a majority of Cabinet to swallow a scheme which would have involved a perpetual subsidy to an unprofitable private concern. Some Ministers are known to have been impressed by the paradox of "private" enterprise existing only on the basis of governmental featherbedding. Despite this, a section of Cabinet, believed to comprise mainly N.S.W. Liberal members, was in favour of further assistance to A.N.A.

The Minister's statement hinted that the Government would be sympathetic to any private deal for the taking over of A.N.A., and negotiations continued during July with Mr. R. M. Ansett, Managing Director of Ansett Airways. Finally, on 2 August, the Chairman of A.N.A., Mr. Haddy (who is General Manager of the Adelaide Steamship Company and Chairman of the Australian Steamship Owners' Federation) announced that the directors of A.N.A. would recommend to shareholders that they accept the offer of £3.3 million from Ansett Airways. The conclusion of these negotiations was welcomed by the Government, which made it clear that it would do all it could to enable the new owners of A.N.A. to continue to benefit from the 1952 agreement.

International as well as domestic airlines made the news during this period. In June, the General Manager of Qantas Empire Airways and the Director-General of Civil Aviation returned

after negotiating an agreement with the United States Government by which Qantas was given rights of passage across the United States, thus enabling it to operate a direct route from Sydney to London *via* San Francisco, New York and intermediate points. In return, the Australian Government has conceded similar rights to any American airline which desires to operate international services by way of Australia. With the ratification of this agreement, into which the U. S. Government entered despite opposition from American domestic airlines, Australia becomes one of the world's major air transport operators.

### **Banking**

After some strenuous sessions, Cabinet finally decided on 19 April to throw a sop—or rather a couple—to the private banks. In a preliminary announcement, the Treasurer, Sir Arthur Fadden, foreshadowed legislation which would separate the trading bank and the central banking functions of the Commonwealth Bank, as well as modifying the special accounts procedure. The drafting of the necessary amendments to the Banking Act was to be commenced as soon as details had been settled. The new legislation will be brought down following the passage of the Budget in September.

### **Disposal of Government Enterprises**

Cabinet was able to show its devotion to private enterprise in three instances during the period under review. In April, a decision was taken to sell the assets of the Commonwealth Handling Equipment Pool, set up during the war to stimulate the improvement of materials handling methods on the waterfront; on 7 June, it was announced that the Joint Coal Board would dispose of three coal mines and a coal washing plant in N.S.W.; and on 25 June, the sale of government shares in the Commonwealth Engineering Co. Ltd., a firm manufacturing heavy motor bodies, was announced.

### **Divorce**

On 11 April, Mr. P. E. Joske, Q.C., one of Australia's leading authorities on divorce law and Liberal M.H.R. for Balaclava, introduced a private member's bill to establish a uniform divorce law throughout Australia. The bill provides for the supersession of existing State divorce legislation, makes provision for domicile and similar technicalities, and lays down eight grounds on which divorce may be obtained.

It may be worth digressing for a moment to note that uniformity in divorce laws began to disappear in Australia very soon after the introduction of responsible government. The instructions issued by the British Crown to colonial Governors contained (and still contain) a provision that laws concerning divorce must be reserved for the assent of the monarch. The object of this instruction was to retain uniformity in divorce laws throughout the Empire, but although some attempts were made to do so by disallowing colonial Acts, these were soon abandoned and diversity became the rule. Placita (XXI) and (XXII) of Section 51 of the Constitution, giving the Commonwealth power over marriage, divorce and matrimonial causes, seem to have been included almost as an afterthought, and certainly no Commonwealth government has yet had the hardihood to exploit these powers. The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1945 dealt almost entirely with anomalies concerning domicile, as did Mr. Joske's amendment to it in 1955.

Comment on the bill was guarded at first, although it might have been expected that the Churches would oppose any measure calculated to make divorce easier or simpler. The main attack came, however, from members of the N.S.W. Bar while the second reading was being debated in May. Although the real grounds for opposition appear to lie in the fact that by imposing a minimum period of three years desertion before a suit may be brought for restitution, the bill would destroy the much more liberal provision now in force in N.S.W., a number of other arguments were publicly aired, including an outcry about the "filching" of States' rights. Matrimonial causes are a particularly lucrative branch of legal practice in N.S.W., and the N.S.W. Bar is in any case by far the largest of its kind in Australia, so that this opposition has serious significance. Mr. Beale, Q.C., the Minister for Supply, himself a member of the N.S.W. Bar, declared his opposition to a number of provisions in the bill during the second reading debate. The Leader of the Opposition, Dr. Evatt, criticized some aspects of the bill



as being less satisfactory than the draft bill which was prepared during his term as Attorney-General by a committee of divorce lawyers. (Mr. Joske's bill is largely modelled on this draft.) Other Labor members indicated they would seek amendments in committee.

The bill passed its second reading on 26 May, and remains on the notice paper for discussion in committee. Its passage may well be rendered difficult by the absence of firm Government support.

### **Defence**

On 4 April, Mr. Menzies made two important statements concerning the review of defence policies. The national service scheme was to be reduced to an annual intake of 12,000, and the Minister for Defence, Sir Philip McBride, was to head a mission to Washington for talks with the U. S. Government. Mr. Menzies foreshadowed the purchase of a new fighter and a new transport plane, generally presumed to refer to the Lockheed company's F. 104 (Star-fighter) and C. 130 transport. Sir Philip McBride left Australia in May, and on 11 June announced in Washington that an American technical mission would visit Australia to discuss the re-equipment of the Australian forces.

On 1 May, a new system of selecting national service trainees by "birthday ballot" was announced, and the first ballot was drawn on 27 May. This system has aroused considerable criticism and seems likely to arouse still more.

### **The D.L.P. Conference**

Leaving government affairs, two important conferences were held in March which may affect the future of the Labor movement. These were the foundation Conference of the Democratic Labor Party, which was timed to precede the biennial Conference of the Australian Labor Party by a short margin, and the A.L.P. biennial Conference which opened in Brisbane on 15 March.

The D.L.P. Conference produced few surprises. The already familiar attacks on the leadership and the methods of the official Labor movement were made. The more interesting point was the emergence of a national organisation, with a set of rules which have one important divergence from the structure of the A.L.P., namely, the representation of State branches according to numerical strength and not on an equal basis, as in the A.L.P. itself. As the centre of gravity of the D.L.P. is in Victoria and N.S.W., this was only to be expected; however, similar proposals made at A.L.P. conferences in the 'twenties and 'thirties were always rejected.

### **The A.L.P. Conference**

The interest of the Conference lay in the restatement of the A.L.P. objective. For the first time since 1921, the sacrosanct socialisation objective was reworded to advocate "the democratic socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange—to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation and other anti-social features in those fields". This is clearly an attempt to combine the original socialisation plank with the "Blackburn declaration" formula and some of the later additions like the lengthy preamble produced by Mr. Kim Beazley in 1953. Tacked on to this objective is an official interpretation which for the first time commits the A.L.P. unequivocally to a programme of civil rights. The interpretation contains clauses concerning freedom of expression and association, the rule of law and free elections.

The discussion on this new objective was marked by the usual counterpoint—the Federal President, Mr. Chamberlain, made a fighting speech advocating democratic socialism, while both Dr. Evatt and Mr. Calwell reiterated the Blackburn principle that only those monopolies were to be socialised that were inimical to the public interest.

Other interesting reversals by the Conference were the opposition to compulsory unionism and the insertion instead of a clause advocating preferences for unionists; the opposition to any form of government aid to denominational schools, a statement which reverses the steady drift of A.L.P. policy for a number of years previous to the split in 1954; and the opposition to court-controlled union ballots. All of these mark the re-emergence of a strong union influence

on A.L.P. political objectives, and the excision of the points advocated by the industrial group movement since 1945. Mr. Chamberlain himself clearly represents the Leftward trend among Australian transport workers, and another important influence has been the swing to the Left in the Australian Workers' Union.

It may, of course, be true that in the near future the A.L.P. biennial Conferences will reflect the historic pattern of a progressive decrease in Left-wing militancy as their *locale* moves south. The tradition that the most radical policies were formulated in Brisbane has now reappeared after a long eclipse; it remains to be seen whether the watering down process will also be repeated in the traditional way.

S.E.

## NEW SOUTH WALES

### *The Parliamentary Session*

The last days of the second session of the thirty-eighth Parliament, which sat from 26 February to 19 June, were particularly dull ones, enlivened only by a brush between the State and Federal Governments on the housing situation. Only three bills of importance received the royal assent and only on housing and the registration of foreign doctors was there any worthwhile debate.

The housing controversy began in mid-February, when the Minister for National Development, Senator Spooner, stated that the end of the housing shortage was in sight in some States.<sup>1</sup> In reply to N.S.W. criticisms of his statement, Senator Spooner said that if the shortage in N.S.W. was to be overcome, the N.S.W. Government would have to supply the solution. The N.S.W. Government had "never used its own funds" or raised funds from "private sources" as other State Governments had done. This was strongly challenged by both the Premier, Mr. Cahill, and the Minister for Housing, Mr. Landa, who argued that the States could only spend what the Commonwealth allowed them.

The Prime Minister did nothing to unruffle feathers when he told a press conference that the demand for money "puzzled" him, and that the need was not for money but men and materials. He was criticised by Mr. Landa and, more significantly, by the Director of the Building Industry Congress, Mr. D. Stewart Fraser, a prominent member of the State Liberal Party. Both said that materials were in abundant supply and that unemployment of skilled workers rather than inflated wages threatened the industry. Senator Spooner attempted to debunk Stewart Fraser as the "paid official" of the building industry, but faced with the Federal A.L.P.'s moves to capitalise on the issue, he announced that he would submit a housing plan to Cabinet.

In the course of the debate it became obvious that at least some Liberals agreed with everything Stewart Fraser had said.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless he refused to be drawn into a discussion of his reported statements, claiming that the Commonwealth had previously been hindered by the Housing Agreement—a "socialist conspiracy" to nationalise housing—and that all would now be sweetness and light. After six hours of spirited debate the motion was passed on party lines.<sup>3</sup> Two weeks later the Opposition, despite Mr. Menzies' repeated assertions that "no crisis" existed, issued an official statement that the shortage had reached "crisis proportions".

Only three bills of importance reached the statute books, the most controversial being the Medical Practitioners (Amendment) Bill.<sup>4</sup> This was designed to ease the restrictions on foreign doctors seeking registration in N.S.W., and was attacked by some sections of the press as an attempt to lower medical standards. Despite the assurance of the Minister for Health, Mr. Sheahan, that the bill was "not introduced against the wishes of the medical profession",<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup>References to the factual information upon which this material is based may be found in the *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 Feb.-22 June 1957.

<sup>2</sup>*N.S.W. Parl. Debs.*, 13 Mar. 1957, pp. 3986, ff.

<sup>3</sup>*ibid.*, p. 4037.

<sup>4</sup>*ibid.*, p. 4134.

<sup>5</sup>*ibid.*, 27 Mar. 1957, p. 4133.

the B.M.A.'s N.S.W. Secretary, Dr. J. G. Hunter, announced that they had "strong views" on it and the Council of the B.M.A. registered "the strongest possible public protest" against it. Professional and Opposition resistance centred around the clause permitting the Minister to overrule the Medical Board on "regional" registration. The Government insisted on retention of the offending clause as a means of providing doctors in unpopular country areas, but amended it to allow for an oral test.<sup>6</sup>

The other two bills, the Hire Purchase Agreements (Amendment) Bill<sup>7</sup> and the Credit Sales Agreements Bill,<sup>8</sup> were complementary. Though primarily designed to control interest rates on such transactions, they were also aimed at curbing the excessive diversion of loan capital to finance companies. Speaking to the bill, Mr. Sheahan said that the proposed rates of seven per cent. to ten per cent. would tend to lower the high returns which these companies had been able to offer the investing public.<sup>9</sup> Opposition comment accepted the principle of some limitation and sought merely to ensure that the rates should be subject to periodical revision.

### **The Administration**

Two administrative decisions involved the Premier, Mr. Cahill, in conflict within his party. The first of these was to pay the retiring Governor, Sir John Northcott, a pension of £3,000 per annum. This followed earlier rumours that Mr. Cahill himself might succeed to the position, and, since it was to be the first pension paid to a Governor or Governor-General by an Australian government, involved the A.L.P. plank calling for abolition of such offices. At the State Conference in June, despite Mr. Cahill's personal appeals, a motion calling upon the Government to "reconsider" was passed by a vote of 344 to 264. The Government ignored both this and another motion calling for implementation of the abolition plank, and settled on a final figure of £2,600 per annum by applying the formula used for the pensions of judges of the Supreme and District Courts.

The second decision was to raise the estimated cost of the proposed State Opera House by a series of "mammoth lotteries". These were to run until the building was paid for, while the Sydney City Council, the Australian Broadcasting Commission, and the State Government would share running costs. Church groups and the Opposition questioned the morality of the lotteries and the A.L.P. Caucus was divided on the issue of homes *versus* Opera House. Mr. Cahill was able to win a clear vote of approval at the party conference and so silence Caucus opposition.

### **The State of the Parties**

By May Mr. Cahill was receiving some of the backwash from the Queensland struggle. After he had denied reports that he would help the Q.C.E. to campaign there were rumours that he would meet "the same fate as Mr. Gair". Despite the disquieting rumours and some difficult moments, he not only survived the State Conference, but consolidated his position. The "official ticket", which made a clean sweep of the Executive, gave him 21 supporters in a body of 32. An attempt by the platform to clean up the Sydney City Council by transferring pre-selection from the city leagues to the Executive was easily defeated, but Mr. J. G. Arthur, a former Minister for Mines, was readmitted to the party. Despite militant addresses by the President, Mr. F. Campbell, and Mr. A. A. Calwell, the Conference avoided any discussion of "democratic socialism".

Mr. Morton's leadership of the State Liberal Party was criticised by some backbenchers. They argued that he had played a "weak hand" by allowing quite junior members to lead for his party on important bills, and had lost a tactical advantage by voting with Labor against the Country Party on the Medical Practitioners (Amendment) Bill. However there is little real threat to his position as Leader if only for lack of suitable successors.

<sup>6</sup>*ibid.*, 10 Ap. 1957, p. 4511.

<sup>8</sup>*ibid.*, p. 4275.

<sup>7</sup>*ibid.*, 2 Ap. 1957, p. 4270.

<sup>9</sup>*ibid.*, p. 4822.



At the Country Party's Annual Conference the Leader, Mr. M. Bruxner, made a plea for more co-operation between the Country and Liberal Parties. Speaking of the recent elections where Liberal preferences had gone to Labor, he said the Liberals should not "intrude" into country areas. Some delegates suggested that if such vote-splitting continued they would be better served by being completely independent of the Liberals.

The Democratic Labor Party continued to develop its organization. After a "National Conference" in March devoted to a federal merger, the N.S.W. party held its first annual conference in May. Seventy branches were claimed. The conference clearly revealed the party's dilemma of sympathy to the Premier, whom they called a "political prisoner" of the Left, and opposition to "Evatt Labour". The *Sydney Morning Herald's* views to the contrary, the conference proved unable to produce a distinctive policy.

Electurally the party was successful in diverting votes, but showed little promise of winning seats. After a promising beginning in the Liberal stronghold of Burwood it failed badly in Kahibah, a blue ribbon Labor seat in the northern coalfields, where its policy of second preferences to the Liberals antagonised many Laborites.

### Local Government

Early in March the Legislative Assembly resumed its debate on local government finance and amalgamations from the previous session,<sup>10</sup> the motion being agreed to after a Government amendment which blamed the Federal Government for finance difficulties.<sup>11</sup>

The "Waratah Hotel Case" was wound up when James Goodman Ball, or "Mr. X", was arrested and charged with having obtained money by false pretences and resisting arrest. In May the licensee, Mr. Bell, had judgment executed against him by the Sydney City Council for repayment of £2,478/5/- owing for repairs. The Council also considered the cancellation of his lease.

No sooner had the "Waratah" sensation settled than there were fresh allegations of bribery. A King's Cross businessman told the Lord Mayor, Alderman H. Jensen, that he had paid £200 to a "go-between" for certain considerations regarding a block of land in Macleay Street, King's Cross. As in the "Waratah" case the allegations came to nothing on police enquiry, but the A.L.P. State Executive suspended Alderman A. J. Cahill, Chairman of the Council's works committee, and advised him to resign from the Council.

P.W.

## VICTORIA

Mutual frustration, for both the Government and the Opposition, was the mark of Victorian politics in the first half of 1957.<sup>1</sup>

By the end of the Autumn session, three of the Government's major bills had stalled in the Legislative Council.<sup>2</sup> Another had been vitally amended under combined Labor and Country Party pressure.<sup>3</sup> And an Opposition bill, aimed at limiting hire purchase rates of interest, had been forced through the Upper House.<sup>4</sup>

The Labor Party began the year with high, though vaguely founded, expectations of an early election. It perkily announced its own legislative programme of four major bills at the

<sup>10</sup>*ibid.*, 5 Mar. 1957, p. 3765. See *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. II, No. 2, May 1957, p. 232.

<sup>11</sup>*N.S.W. P.D.*, 12 Mar. 1957, p. 3952.

<sup>1</sup>References to the factual information upon which this material is based may be found in the *Age*, 12 Feb.-4 July 1957.

<sup>2</sup>The Landlord and Tenant (Control) Bill, the Bread Industry Bill and the River Improvement and Land Drainage Bill. See below.

<sup>3</sup>The Labour and Industry (Amendment) Bill. *cf. Vic. Parl. Debs.*, 1956-7, pp. 777-80, 1150-71, 1223-31, 1505-07, 1510-17.

<sup>4</sup>The Hire Purchase Bill. *ibid.*, pp. 926-48.

beginning of the parliamentary session. But it soon discovered that as long as the Country Party held the balance in the Upper House, Labor's own role in opposition was essentially a limited one.

The Government dexterously passed on to the Commonwealth responsibility for the £400,000 debt incurred during the Olympic Games. Faced with a growing crisis in hospital finances, it appointed a six-man committee to advise and placate. It also set up a nine-man building committee to plan the proposed new art gallery and cultural centre, even though there is little prospect of progress for a generation. It established yet another nine-man committee to help youth organisations. It planned a uniform rail gauge scheme with N.S.W. And together with other State Governments, it kept up the pressure on the Commonwealth for extra housing finance.

After considerable needling by the press, the Opposition and the Country Party, the Government appointed a Rental Investigation Officer to examine allegations of subtenancy, and other housing, rackets. And it promised legislative action to deal with the problem.

### **Autumn Session**

The session itself covered twenty sitting days between 9 April and 6 June 1957. During that period the House had before it 51 bills. Naturally, most of them were of minor administrative significance.

The Government's most important legislation was concerned with rent and housing, the reform of the bread industry, and the improvement of rivers and drainage systems in rural areas. The Landlord and Tenant (Control) Bill proposed, among other things, to free business premises from rent control, to repeal the provision of special protection for ex-servicemen, to continue the system of limited control on dwelling houses, and to strengthen the position of landlords who wished to regain possession.<sup>5</sup> Strongly opposed by the Opposition, it passed the Assembly with the Country Party supporting the Government. But in the Legislative Council, the Country Party combined with the Labor Party to hold the bill back till the following session, on the ground that the House had not had adequate time to consider it.

The Government's Bread Industry Bill suffered a similar fate. It aimed at preventing restrictive practices in the industry, including zoning. It proposed a Supervisor, to police the industry's organisation and standards.<sup>6</sup> The bill met a hostile response from the industry, and from the Labor and Country Parties. They argued that it would raise prices and depress conditions, without improving the quality of bread. And they objected to the "dictatorial powers" of the Supervisor. The second reading debate in the Assembly dragged on through the dying hours of the session, when the Government accepted an amendment substituting a committee of seven as the controlling authority, instead of a supervisor. But by this stage, the Upper House had adjourned till August.

The Government also fell foul of the Country Party with its River Improvement and Land Drainage Bill (which the Country Party had previously stalled in the Spring session of 1956). The bill, which the Government itself had amended 24 times since its first introduction, provided ten rural boards to control rivers and drainage, and to prevent flooding. It proposed to finance the work from a rate to be collected by the municipalities.<sup>7</sup> Combined Labor and Country Party opposition in the Legislative Council forced the Government to shelve the bill for the second time.

During this period the Government set up two commissions of enquiry. Dr. E. G. Coppel, Q.C., was appointed to enquire into the acquisition by the Melbourne City Council of a suburban area of nearly forty acres known as Debney's Paddock. He was instructed to examine its present use, including the terms under which parts of the area had been leased to private industry, and whether all or part of it could be legally used for recreation.

The enquiry occurred mainly because of strong opposition by the press—especially the Melbourne *Herald*—to the M.C.C.'s policy of leasing land it had allegedly acquired for recreational use. The whole issue aroused a surprising amount of publicity and acquired a remarkably

<sup>5</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 488-96.

<sup>7</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 170-77.

<sup>6</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 475-8.

controversial character. In Parliament the Labor Party alleged that both the enquiry's terms of reference, and the Commissioner himself, were too favourably disposed to the M.C.C. The Government denied both charges.

The Commissioner eventually recommended that a limited part of the area should be available for commercial and industrial purposes, but not alienated in perpetuity. The Premier (Mr. H. E. Bolte) referred the recommendations to the M.C.C. He said, with transparent relief, that the Government could now "wash its hand of the matter".<sup>8</sup>

A second board of enquiry investigated an allegation of corruption made against a Labor member of the Richmond Council and raised in Parliament by the member for Richmond (Mr. F. Scully, D.L.P.). The board found that there was no direct evidence of a bribe having been passed, as alleged.

C.B.

## QUEENSLAND

### *Preliminary Skirmishes*

The year opened with a sharp exchange over the proposal for three weeks leave. In a New Year message the Premier (Mr. V. C. Gair) declared that the Government would not gamble with the security and welfare of Queensland wage earners by granting industrial benefits which the State's economy could not afford. The President of the Queensland Central Executive (Mr. R. J. J. Bukowski) replied that Labor did not gamble, that the proposal had been fully considered in Convention, and that it was the duty of every Labor member to carry out the decisions of Convention. Further evidence of increasing differences within Labor came when Mr. Bukowski attacked the Government's hospital policy by urging the provision of a means test on a minimum income of £2,000 per annum, the elimination of huge and costly nurses' quarters from new hospital plans, and the establishment of a hospital insurance scheme.

### *The State Convention of the Australian Workers' Union and the Government*

Invitations to address the Convention were extended to the Deputy-Premier (Mr. J. E. Duggan), Attorney-General (Mr. W. Power), and the Secretary for Labour and Industry (Mr. A. Jones) but not to the Premier or the Treasurer (Mr. E. J. Walsh). Mr. Duggan accepted and spoke strongly in favour of the A.W.U. and against members of the Australian Labor Party trying to foment troubles within the party. Mr. Power at first accepted, but withdrew at the last minute, and Mr. Jones refused the invitation. Mr. Bukowski alleged their refusals to be the result of orders by Mr. Gair, whom he charged with dictatorship. In addition he bitterly assailed the Government for its policy in connection with the liquor trade. Strong replies came from the Ministers concerned, all appearing in the metropolitan press. It was rumoured that Mr. Gair intended to report Mr. Bukowski to the Q.C.E. for violent public attacks upon a Labor government. The question of party funds was raised. Mr. Gair declared that in the 1956 election the A.W.U. (of which Mr. Bukowski is State Secretary) did not contribute to election funds. Mr. Bukowski admitted the charge, but declared that the A.W.U. had given the support of all its organisers and the use of all its motor cars. No actual funds were contributed because the Premier had his own fund of £12,000, most of which had come from people unknown to the Labor Party.

### *Increasing Pressure on the Government*

Sections of the party began to urge the opening of a campaign to defeat certain members in pre-selection ballots. Other sections urged stronger action, namely the refusal of endorsement by the Q.C.E. To mobilise support the Trades and Labour Council distributed 3,000 petition forms requesting the immediate granting of three weeks leave. A steady stream of letters urging action came to the Q.C.E., some of these being considered by the Inner Executive on 11 February. The Premier's election fund, the enquiry into the Legion of Ex-Servicemen, and liquor reform also gained increased prominence. At a meeting of the parliamentary Caucus

<sup>8</sup>Age, 25 June 1957.



on 28 February a committee of enquiry into the liquor industry was appointed, but it contained only one member of the Q.C.E. instead of the three requested by the proposers of the motion.

### ***Ultimatum from the Q.C.E.***

A full meeting of the Q.C.E. on 28 February adopted by 51 votes to 11 a motion that all members of the Parliamentary Labor Party should be reminded of the decision of Convention on three weeks leave, of their obligation to obey the decisions of Convention, and the power of the Q.C.E. to deal with them if Convention's decision was not implemented. On 22 March, almost on the eve of the parliamentary session, this resolution was conveyed by letter to all Labor members of the Assembly. At a Caucus meeting on 27 March Mr. Duggan moved for a conference with the Inner Executive of the Q.C.E. An amendment that draft legislation should be prepared and the date of its implementation discussed with the Q.C.E. was defeated 26—21, and the original motion was carried 29—18. The committee appointed to meet the Inner Executive comprised the Premier, Deputy-Premier, Treasurer, the representative of the Parliamentary Party on the Q.C.E. (Mr. J. J. Dufficy) and Mr. A. J. Skinner (one of the Premier's supporters). At first some industrial leaders declared to the press that the compromise was unacceptable, but the Q.C.E. on 3 April decided that a conference between the parliamentary committee and the Inner Executive of the Q.C.E. should be accepted and that the Leave Committee appointed by the Mackay Convention should be invited to attend. The conference was set down for 5 April. Before the meeting could take place two further issues had arisen, from bills submitted to the Assembly.

### ***The Motor Spirits Distribution Bill (the Petrol Bill)***

For more than a year the oil companies had been seeking a rise in the price of standard petrol in Queensland. On 9 August 1956 application was made to the Prices Commissioner for an increase of 1½d. per gallon. On 23 January 1957 the Prices Minister (Mr. W. Power) declared the Commissioner was still awaiting certain information from some firms. On 25 January the Shell Company of Australia announced it would bring no more standard petrol to the State until a satisfactory price rise had been granted and its example was followed by the other major companies. The Premier announced that the Government would consider declaring a state of emergency. As most of the companies had now supplied the desired information Cabinet instructed the Commissioner to proceed to a determination. At the same time the companies sought a further ½d. increase. On 31 January Mr. Fullagar awarded a rise of 1d. per gallon, of which ½d. was to go to the retailers. The oil companies refused to accept the decision and continued the boycott. Following a conference with two company representatives the Premier suggested a compromise—the companies to lift the boycott and submit a further application, which would be considered by officers who had not already dealt with the matter. The companies refused to accept this.

The Premier sought support from other State Premiers, but with little success.

On 27 February Caucus gave the Government power to negotiate for a supply of petrol from Formosa—promptly christened "Dim Sim Petrol" in the Brisbane press. It was rumoured the Government would seize existing installations for the sale of the new petrol—the companies retaliated by filling all storage tanks with super grade petrol. The companies also held further discussions with the Premier. As a result a conference took place between two representatives from the oil companies and two from the Government, with the State Auditor-General (Mr. R. L. Murray) as Chairman. Shortly afterwards a further increase of 1d. was granted, whereupon the companies agreed to lift the boycott.

The Caucus meeting of 27 February had also approved new legislation to provide for the registration of all service stations and the banning of one brand stations. The bill was quickly placed before the House, which passed it on a party vote, despite bitter protests by the Opposition. The oil companies presented to the Administrator a petition signed by 27,000 people asking him to refuse assent, but the plea was unsuccessful.

The Government moved swiftly to secure alternative supplies of petrol. Arrangements were made for the petrol through an American broker (Mr. R. G. Gaylor) and for the establishment of a company with Mr. O. L. Josephson. The construction of a new terminal for the company was begun at once.

### ***The University Acts Amendment Act (the University Bill)***

This bill contained a number of amendments which had long been discussed with University authorities. Shortly before the bill was to be introduced information leaked out that it contained provision for an external appeals board. The University of Queensland Staff Association protested, especially because at a meeting some months earlier it had rejected such a proposal by an overwhelming majority. When a copy of the bill became available, revealing that the appeals board was to consist of a Government-appointed chairman, a representative of the Senate, and a member named by the appellant, the Staff Association again opposed it by an overwhelming majority, holding that such a plan constituted a grave threat to the independence of the University, and that its practical result would be to cause a progressive lowering in the quality of the staff added by new appointments. A deputation to the Minister failed to gain any concessions. The bill was passed on 28 March on a party vote 37—22, with the Opposition fighting it bitterly.

The University of Queensland Staff Association organised a public meeting, where a crowded City Hall was addressed by representatives of the Staff Associations of Queensland, the Australian National University, Melbourne, Sydney, and New England. All other Australian university staff associations sent messages of support. The University of Queensland Students' Union presented one petition from the students and another, with 30,000 names, from the public. The bill received royal assent but was not proclaimed.

### ***The Q.C.E. and the Bills***

At first the Labor movement had supported Mr. Gair in his battle with the oil companies. On 4 February, Mr. Bukowski had publicly expressed the hope that legislation would be quickly passed to combat the companies and that the licensing of service stations would be one of the first steps undertaken. On 24 February Dr. Evatt sent a telegram of support. On 6 March the Waterside Workers' Federation urged that the Government should buy 51 per cent. of the shares in the new company. On 3 April Federal Labor Caucus carried unanimously a resolution congratulating the Queensland Government on its stand against the companies.

But before this the Q.C.E. had taken action to examine the measures. On 31 March Mr. Bukowski complained that the Q.C.E. had no official knowledge of the contents of either bill, and had never had the opportunity of discussing them. Mr. Gair objected that no necessity existed for any such notification. A special meeting of the Inner Executive, already summoned for 3 April to consider the refusal to introduce three weeks leave, was instructed to review the two contentious bills. On 3 April the Trades and Labour Council, after hearing representatives of the University Staff Association, voted overwhelmingly to seek withdrawal of the University Bill in its entirety but it supported the Government in its attack on monopolies. On the same day the Inner Executive of the Q.C.E. after hearing four University speakers ordered that proclamation of the University Bill should be delayed. At the same meeting, after a scathing attack on the Petrol Bill by Mr. Duggan, the Executive by six to one ordered it to be repealed. Mr. Duggan voted with the majority. Despite this a Cabinet meeting on 9 April voted unanimously to advise the Administrator to give royal assent to both Acts. Press reports that a withering attack had been made on him were denied by Mr. Duggan, but Mr. Gair declared the unanimous vote could be regarded as a censure upon Mr. Duggan. It was also declared that the Administrator sought assurances from Mr. Gair that he had a majority backing of his party for the Petrol Bill. The full Q.C.E. meeting on 11 April by 32 votes to 27 modified the stand of the Inner Executive; it carried a resolution declaring opposition to monopolies and cartels and requesting the redrafting of the bill in conformity with Labor principles and policy.

Discussion of the University Bill and three weeks leave was postponed for a week. On 15 April Mr. Bukowski and Mr. J. M. Schmella (State Secretary of the A.L.P.) issued a joint statement criticising the Petrol Bill for granting unlimited powers to an individual.

By now the air was thick with rumours of impending expulsions from the party. In a television interview in Sydney on 14 April Mr. Gair said he would not be expelled by the Q.C.E. He also denied any connection with the Democratic Labor Party, defended the Government's action on the controversial bills, and criticised Mr. Bukowski.

### ***The Expulsion of Mr. Gair***

The meeting between the parliamentary committee, the Inner Executive and the Leave Committee on 5 April to discuss the leave issue had failed to achieve any agreement. As a result the adjourned meeting of the Q.C.E. on 18 April concentrated on this question. After a long debate a resolution was carried by 35 to 27 declaring that Mr. Gair no longer had the confidence of the Labor movement because he had flouted the decisions of the Labor-in-Politics Convention, he had openly defied the Q.C.E., he had broken the party pledge and he had acted in such a way as to bring confusion and embarrassment within the party. In addition the resolution summoned Mr. Gair before a special meeting to show cause why he should not be expelled. Among those who voted against the resolution were Mr. Duggan, Mr. G. Goding (State President of the A.W.U.) and Mr. E. Williams (Northern District Secretary of the A.W.U.). An amendment that all members of Caucus who voted against three weeks leave should also be called on to show cause was defeated.

Mr. Gair immediately summoned a special meeting of Caucus for the day before the next Q.C.E. meeting. Mr. Goding sought to convene a special meeting of the A.W.U. executive to decide how A.W.U. delegates should vote in the Q.C.E. meeting, but Mr. Bukowski refused, saying that the executive could not constitutionally instruct its delegates in that fashion. Further interest was roused by the discovery that Mr. T. Dougherty (Federal Secretary of the A.W.U.) was paying a visit to Brisbane for personal reasons.

At a meeting of State Cabinet on the morning of 23 April, Mr. Gair obtained a unanimous vote of support. All members signed a declaration<sup>1</sup> that Cabinet had complete confidence in the Premier, that at no time had he done other than execute the decisions arrived at in Cabinet, and that Cabinet regarded with utmost gravity the attempt to impose on the Premier the responsibility for decisions which were the responsibility of Cabinet as a whole. A further paragraph stating that Cabinet members would regard any action against the Premier as action taken against each Minister individually was accepted by nine of the ten Ministers, but Mr. Duggan specifically exempted himself from this paragraph. With this example before it, Caucus, after a five and three-quarter hours debate, by 26 votes to 21 pledged its support to the Premier who, it declared, had "at all times scrupulously carried out the decisions of Caucus". Mr. Bukowski declared the decisions of Cabinet and Caucus could do nothing to alter the fact that the Q.C.E. was the ruling body of the State Labor Party.

At the Q.C.E. meeting on 24 April, Mr. Gair was faced with a long list of charges:<sup>2</sup> (i) Defiance of the decision of the Labor-in-Politics Convention at Mackay; (ii) Refusal to accept decisions of the Q.C.E. interpreting Convention decisions; (iii) Breach of the party pledge; (iv) Discredit brought on the party by: (a) Redcliffe Commission—designed to discredit one individual, (b) Lands Commission—designed to discredit an affiliated union, but only brought discredit on the party and one Minister, (c) Club legislation<sup>3</sup>—initiated because of representations by one individual, (d) University Bill—initiated at the instigation of one individual and against all other authorities connected with the University of Queensland and all other universities in British countries, (e) Petrol Bill—contains some provisions of Fascist or Communist character

<sup>1</sup>For full text see *Courier-Mail*, 24 Ap. 1957.

<sup>2</sup>For full text see *Labor News*, Vol. 4, No. 17, May 1957.

<sup>3</sup>The Liquor Acts Amendment Act of 1954: *inter alia* this provided that an applicant refused membership of a club could appeal to a board of three, one from the club, one named by the appellant, and one appointed by the Liquor Commission.



such as onus of proof on the accused and concentration of power in one man, (f) Consistent false leadership by encouraging members of the Parliamentary Labor Party to refuse to accept decisions of Convention or the Q.C.E., (g) Soliciting financial support from non-Labor sources and rendering no accounting to the Q.C.E.; (v) Repudiation of a personal pledge on three weeks leave; (vi) Organisation of a statement by Cabinet which was a direct challenge to the Q.C.E. and political blackmail of the most vicious type.

An amendment proposing a conference between the Q.C.E. and the Parliamentary Party in an effort to effect a reconciliation was defeated by 35 votes to 30. After a five hour debate in which Messrs. Duggan, Goding and Williams opposed the expulsion, Mr. Gair was asked at 5.35 p.m. to leave while the vote was taken. By 35 votes to 30 the Q.C.E. decided on his expulsion. The meeting ended at 7.10 p.m. Mr. Gair said he had no intention of resigning as Premier until he was challenged in Parliament.

### ***The Australian Labor Party***

On 26 April the Federal Executive voted against any intervention in the dispute. On 27 April the State branch of the party began an advertising campaign in the press to put its case before the public. On 28 April Mr. Duggan broadcast over the Labor station 4KQ giving his full support to the A.L.P.: "Whether you like it or not, whether it is wise or unwise, the course to take is to endorse the official Labor action." On the following day he resigned from Cabinet, and with 22 other M's.L.A. attended the meeting of parliamentarians called by the Q.C.E. to hear the story of the expulsion. On 30 April these members met and selected Mr. Duggan as Leader and Dr. Felix Dittmer as Deputy. The party at once called for an election, and the Q.C.E. decided to call for nominations. On 24 April action had been taken to freeze the Premier's Fund, but the bank advised that the money had been withdrawn on 8 April. The party's strength was increased by the accession of Mr. J. Burrows (Port Curtis) and it was decided that Mr. Duggan should seek to become Leader of the Opposition. Conflict had now moved into the party branches, some of which were not remaining faithful to the A.L.P. On 5 April Mr. Bukowski announced that three Premiers, Mr. Cahill (N.S.W.), Mr. Cosgrove (Tasmania) and Mr. Hawke (W.A.) would assist in the election campaign, a claim that was immediately denied by all three, who said they had received no invitations.

### ***The Queensland Labor Party***

On 26 April a meeting called by Mr. Gair was attended by eight Cabinet Ministers, twelve other Labor M's.L.A. and two Independents (Mr. T. A. Foley, expelled from the party because of the Land Commission, and Mr. H. R. Gardner, suspended because of his criticism of the Q.C.E.). The Treasurer (Mr. E. J. Walsh), although not present, announced his support. The adherence of one more absent member brought the total to 25, giving Mr. Gair leadership of the largest group in the House. It was decided to constitute the Queensland Labor Party and a committee of five was appointed to draw up a constitution and rules. On 3 April Mr. Gair announced that the Q.L.P. would not affiliate with any southern breakaway groups. On the following day a Q.L.P. Caucus chose the officers of the new party and also a new Minister (Mr. T. Moores) to replace Mr. Duggan. All these were immediately expelled by the A.L.P.

### ***The Country Party and the Liberal Party***

At first the possibility was canvassed that the Country Party might give the Q.L.P. support in the House. On 30 April after a Cabinet meeting a conference took place between Mr. Gair and Mr. Nicklin. On the following day a three hour meeting of the Country Party followed by a fifty minute joint meeting with the Liberals resulted in the despatch to the Administrator of a letter requesting him to summon Parliament not later than 11 June.

### ***Pre-Election Preparations***

Although Mr. Gair refused to set any date for the elections, declaring that the printing of rolls must delay the date, all parties were actively engaged in preparations. All parties called nominations for seats, and the Labor Party decided that selections would be made by the Q.C.E., there being no time for plebiscites. Other parties followed suit, and the Liberal Party postponed

its annual Convention which had been set down for June. Continuous battles went on for the allegiance of A.L.P. branches, resulting in the appearance of complete sets of A.L.P. and of Q.L.P. branches. The Municipal Labor Party, at first apparently anxious to stay out of the dispute, came in on the side of the A.L.P., but one Alderman (Mr. W. P. Dower) went over to the Q.L.P. On 8 April the Q.C.E. issued an ultimatum to Mr. Gair to hand over the money in the Premier's Fund and on 10 April issued a writ against the Premier. The A.L.P. in addition to its earlier charges was now attacking the Q.L.P. as a sectarian organisation; the Q.L.P. was charging the A.L.P. with being forced to follow a Communistic line. On 23 May Senator Condon Byrne transferred to the Q.L.P.

On 9 April the Premier called on the Administrator who summoned the Assembly to meet on 11 June. A joint meeting of Liberal and Country Party members and party officials decided to refuse to grant any further Supply, which had been made available to the end of August. In the north the two parties signed an agreement for permanent co-operation in the Federal district of Herbert which includes the State seats of Townsville, Hinchinbrook, Mundingburra, Burdekin and Haughton, held by three Labor men, one North Queensland Labor and one Independent.

By now public interest was intense; meetings addressed by the rival leaders both in the capital and the country drew audiences much larger than had been seen for many years. The tempo of the campaign was increasing also in the press and over the air.

Although no announcement of the Q.L.P. constitution and rules had yet been made, on 20 May the party's campaign committee was announced, comprising Alderman Dower, Messrs. M. G. Lyons (a Brisbane solicitor and accountant), C. A. (Bill) Edwards (business man and chemist), E. G. Broad (barrister), W. Wright (accountant), W. P. Conelan (former M.H.R. and Senator) and G. J. Maule (economist and public accountant). On 9 June a long list of Q.L.P. endorsements was made public including many business and professional men.

### ***The Parliamentary Session***

#### ***(a) Leadership of the Opposition***

When Mr. Duggan announced his selection as Leader of the A.L.P., Mr. Nicklin (Country Party, Leader of the Opposition) asked whether this meant Mr. Duggan was claiming his post. The Speaker declared that the Queensland Standing Orders made no definite provision who should hold the position. However, Standing Order Number 333 declared that in cases not specifically provided for resort should be had to the Rules, Forms and Usages of the House of Commons. He referred then to Section 10 of the Ministers of the Crown Act of 1937, which named as Leader of the Opposition the Leader of the party in opposition with the greatest numerical strength in the House. The Speaker decided that the A.L.P. was now in that position in the Assembly. He gave no further ruling but left it to the House to decide, if it wished.

Mr. Nicklin then moved that the House should confirm the position of the Opposition as recognised in August 1956. He urged that Queensland was not bound by the Statute Law of England and therefore the Act cited could not be taken as a guide. Moreover he stressed the existence of a single united Liberal-Country Party Opposition as already recognised by the House. Mr. Duggan stressed the separate existence of the Liberals and the Country Party with their own party organisations and officials. He added that twelve months before the Government had refused secretarial assistance for the Leader of the Liberal Party on the ground that eight was too few a number for a party to be accorded such assistance. Mr. Gair emphasised that Standing Order Number 333 did not provide for guidance from Imperial Acts. The House itself must decide. Mr. Nicklin's motion was agreed to by 50 votes to 23, only the A.L.P. voting against it.

#### ***(b) Supply***

The Premier moved the suspension of as much of the Standing Orders as would prevent the passage of an Appropriation Bill in one day. Mr. Duggan opposed it and began his attack

upon the Premier. Mr. Walsh picked up the gauntlet. Mr. Nicklin agreed to the suspension, believing it was the right of the Government to state its case. The motion was agreed to by 49 votes to 23, Mr. Coburn (Independent) being absent.

Mr. Walsh then introduced the motion for Supply in a speech of 119 minutes of which four and a half were given to Supply and the rest to a survey of the political situation. From then until the House adjourned at 10.4 p.m. and again the next day until 10.38 p.m. the battle raged principally between the A.L.P. and the Q.L.P. The request for Supply was defeated by 45 to 25, with the Country Party and the Liberals on this occasion voting with the A.L.P.

#### **(c) Disallowance of Proclamations under the Motor Spirits Distribution Bill**

Mr. Hiley (Liberal) moved for the disallowance of those proclamations issued on 11 May bringing the bill into force in certain districts. He argued that the matter of enforcement of the measure should be left to an incoming government. Mr. Duggan supported the motion because of the A.L.P. opposition to certain sections in it. Despite protests by Government speakers, the motion was carried by 43 to 24. The House adjourned at 11.40 p.m.

#### **(d) Dissolution of Parliament**

On 13 June Mr. Gair advised the Administrator that his Government could not carry on and asked for a dissolution. The Administrator summoned separately Mr. Nicklin and Mr. Duggan, each of whom declared he could not form a Government and asked for a dissolution. The Administrator dissolved Parliament on 13 June.

#### **Acceleration of the Election Campaign**

During the session Mr. Gair had fought for an election late in August or early in September, but even with the dissolution he refused to name a date. Instead he set off on an eleven day tour of the north. Vigorous efforts were made by both the A.L.P. and the Q.L.P. to win seats from each other, with special attention to the seats held by the Leaders, namely South Brisbane (Mr. Gair), Bundaberg (Mr. Walsh), Toowoomba (Mr. Duggan) and Mt. Gravatt (Dr. Dittmer).

Large numbers offered as candidates, but none of the parties used plebiscites—the time was too short. In addition to the candidates endorsed by the parties, large numbers of Independents came forward. In the two central Queensland seats of Rockhampton and Keppel Liberal plans were upset. The selection committee had not on this occasion chosen Mr. R. B. J. Pilbeam as its Rockhampton candidate although he had been defeated by only 66 votes in 1956. Now Mr. Pilbeam announced his intention to stand as an Independent for Keppel (which includes part of the city of Rockhampton), while his wife stood as an Independent for Rockhampton. The two Labor parties followed the lines already developed, with special prominence to the anti-Communist and sectarian claims. On 21 June Mr. E. A. Bacon (Queensland Branch Secretary of the Communist Party) announced that the Communist Party would in general support the return of an A.L.P. Government at the elections, a move which the Q.L.P. welcomed as valuable election material, and which Mr. E. Lloyd (A.L.P. candidate for Kedron) described as a Red move to discredit the A.L.P.

On 25 June Mr. Gair announced 3 August as the election date. Nominations were to close on 12 July and the writs were returnable on 14 September, though this last date was to be subsequently altered to 24 August. Policy speeches were set down as follows: On 1 July Mr. Nicklin (Country Party) would deliver the first half of the Liberal-Country Party policy, with Mr. Morris (Liberal) completing it on 2 July. Mr. Duggan would officially open his campaign on 4 July, followed by Mr. Gair on 8 July.



## SOUTH AUSTRALIA

**Parliamentary Session**

The first session of the thirty-fifth Parliament, dealt with in the last issue of this *Journal*, adjourned on 13 February 1957 and was prorogued by Proclamation dated 28 February. The second session began on Wednesday 24 April and was devoted to a special ceremony to mark the centenary of responsible government in the State. The occasion was marked by the usual fraternal and loyal speeches from both sides of the House and even the Leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Council looked with pride "upon the wonderful progress that has been made", and went so far as to recognise "that we have achieved a lot in this State during the last quarter of a century". The atmosphere of harmony was somewhat dispelled by the speech of Mr. Lawn (Labor, Adelaide) who suggested that the term "responsible government" was a misnomer in view of the fact that "we cannot claim that this Parliament is using its powers in accordance with the popular will. . . . The returns [of the 1956 State election] show that the Australian Labor Party candidates polled between 29,000 and 30,000 more votes than Government supporters; so the will of the people was thwarted. . . . That is how the political set-up in South Australia has been gerrymandered." This was the only dissentient voice in the proceedings, however, and the presentation of a mace by His Excellency the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Australia restored the proceedings to their former spirit of good fellowship.

The third session began on 25 June 1957, and in the period under review in this Chronicle singularly little has moved either Government or Opposition to flights of parliamentary oratory. In the debate in the House of Assembly on the Supply Bill (No. 1) Mr. Jennings (Labor, Enfield) made some accusations about alleged serious deterioration in a large number of Housing Trust homes built only six or seven years ago. He strongly urged that the Government "in order to maintain public confidence in the Housing Trust" should agree to accept the financial responsibility for any loss suffered by purchasers of Trust homes which had unduly deteriorated. (This is an interesting commentary on the orthodox theory that "independent" public corporations are often established in order that the government of the day may avoid political odium.)

The Snowy River scheme and the controversy which has arisen over States' rights to River Murray waters brought some heartfelt comments from the Premier who was strongly critical of the fact that the River Murray Waters Agreement was announced not by the Commonwealth Government but by a private constructing authority. Somewhat irately the Premier condemned the secrecy with which the Commonwealth Government had surrounded the agreement, saying "for some reason this seems to be a hush-hush document which cannot be made available to me" and adding with emphasis "but if necessary . . . this State will take action in the High Court to force its production before it is signed".

On the Supplementary Estimates Mr. Walsh (Labor, Edwardstown) was concerned at the additional grant of £60,000 for the University of Adelaide. In a speech in which logic was by no means the strong point, Mr. Walsh deprecated this additional expenditure on university education while a number of schools in his constituency lacked suitable toilet accommodation. "We should not have to pander to the University"; this was the main theme of the honourable member's remarks and unfortunately this was the only mention the University achieved during the session. Question Time on 27 June brought a question on a topic the background of which is dealt with elsewhere in this Chronicle—long service leave. The Government's proposals on this topic are now the subject of debate and the course of this legislation through Parliament will form part of the next report from S.A.

L.B.

**Long Service Leave**

Preliminary sparring over long service leave has been the principal feature of S.A.'s extra-parliamentary politics.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>References to the factual information upon which this material is based may be found in the *News*, 11 Feb.-24 June 1957.

In March the Deputy-Leader of the Opposition (Mr. F. Walsh) announced that the Labor Party would make the granting of long service leave to all employees in S.A. a major proposal for the next State elections. The following month the Premier countered by announcing the Government's proposal. "A worker will qualify for leave by seven years' continuous employment with one employer. Past service up to seven years will apply. As soon as an employee is qualified by service he will be entitled to one week's leave on ordinary pay in each year in which he remains in this employment." Neither trade unions nor employers reacted favourably—the unions because of its alleged inadequacy, the employers because the matter should have been left to the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission.<sup>2</sup>

From a parliamentary point of view it was hinted that the Government was relying on Australian Labor Party support in the Legislative Council to overcome opposition from amongst its Conservative supporters in the Upper House. Considerable importance therefore was attached to the ruling of the State President of the A.L.P. that the Labor Party Conference had instructed Labor members of Parliament to oppose the Government's long service leave plan in its entirety and to support only the Labor Party's own, namely, three months leave after ten years service with additional leave for additional service.

It seemed clear that the Labor Party, casting about for a good election issue in 1959, was hoping for defections from the Government's Legislative Council majority in sufficient numbers to defeat the Premier's proposal. In which case the A.L.P. could submit its more attractive plan to electors while castigating the Government for failure to produce an acceptable bill.

This plan of campaign, characterized by the *News* as "Machiavellian", overlooks Sir Thomas Playford's ability at playing the "honest broker" between Labor Party and Conservative die-hards, thereby gaining support. The Premier's hand would seem to have been strengthened, therefore, when it was announced that the Metal Trades Employers had begun an approach to the Arbitration Commission to fix eight weeks leave after 25 years service.

By the end of June, although the battle had hardly been joined, the Premier had manoeuvred his proposal into a favourable position, setting it up as a sound and moderate compromise between the extremes of the Labor Party and the employers.

### ***South Australian Road Fee***

Early in the New Year the spectre of Section 92 raised its hoary head, the occasion being a new regulation made under the S.A. Roads and Railways Transport Act. The regulation declared that from 1 February commercial vehicles of more than two and a half tons tare weight would have to pay either S.A. registration fees or 1d. a ton mile charge.

This attempt to regulate the "absolute freedom" of interstate trade was opposed by the Interstate Road Transport Association and on 15 February it was reported that a High Court writ had been taken out challenging the validity of the S.A. Roads and Railways Transport Act. There the matter rests for the moment.

### ***Steps towards a Steelworks***

As part of an effort to establish a steelworks in S.A., the State Government has been carrying out investigations of iron ore deposits outside the Broken Hill Pty. leases around Iron Knob.

On the occasion of the annual visit of the Commonwealth Grants Commission the Premier told its members of widespread overseas interests in S.A.'s iron ore deposits. He felt the activity of the State Government would either stimulate B.H.P. into doing something or bring overseas interests into the field. In April the Premier undertook a personal inspection of the ore deposits.

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<sup>2</sup>See remarks of Mr. W. G. Gerard, President of the Metal Industries Association of S.A., *ibid.*, 7 May 1957.



**Banking Reform**

At the height of discussion on the banking reforms proposed by the Commonwealth Government, the Premier indicated that the S.A. Government was disturbed by certain of the suggested changes. Sir Thomas Playford sent telegrams expressing his disquiet to the Prime Minister and the Federal Treasurer: "I am concerned that alteration of the Commonwealth Bank Act might prevent continuance of long-term finance for semi-governmental bodies, house purchase and long-term loans to primary producers."

**The Democratic Labor Party**

Following upon a visit and address by Mr. Alan Manning in February, the S.A. Anti-Communist Labor Party changed its name to the Democratic Labor Party, and agreed to federate with bodies of a similar name in other States.

**Frauds in the Taxation Department**

Following on the trial and gaoling of two officers for malpractices, the Federal Labor member for Hindmarsh (Mr. Clyde Cameron) asked Sir Arthur Fadden whether or not large-scale irregularities had occurred in the S.A. division of the Commonwealth Taxation Department. The Treasurer replied that the Taxation Commissioner had had investigations carried out in S.A. and was very concerned at the disclosures that had followed.

**Snowy Waters Agreement**

Sir Thomas Playford has several times expressed concern at the failure to consult the S.A. Government concerning the distribution of water from the Snowy Mountains scheme. Sir William Hudson, Snowy Mountains Authority Commissioner, has stated that the Commonwealth Government's lawyers are satisfied that S.A. has no legal claims to water from the scheme. Half the extra water diverted into the Murray will go to Victoria and half to N.S.W., and all the extra water fed into the Murrumbidgee will be available for N.S.W. The Premier has threatened legal action once the Agreement is signed between the Commonwealth and the Victorian and N.S.W. Governments.

R.L.R.

**TASMANIA**

In the first six months of 1957 State politics in Tasmania were relatively calm following the instability and excitement that marked the Spring. Parliament came together after the Summer recess on 26 February and after sitting for eleven days stood prorogued until 27 August. During those few weeks only one legislative measure gave rise to contentious issues. This was a Government bill to give financial aid to private schools to the extent of £2/10/- for each primary school pupil and £10 for each secondary school pupil each year. The measure had special importance for the Premier, Mr. Robert Cosgrove, as it was due largely to his efforts that State Labor Conference had adopted the policy in the teeth of considerable opposition, and he had reason to believe that the formula worked out had the backing of all the private schools. Moreover, the Premier had made it clear in his electoral campaign in October that he would implement the policy if he were returned.

The debate in the House of Assembly was quiet and dignified, and no one raised the sectarian issue. The Labor members voted *en bloc*, though Dr. Gaha made it clear that he supported the measure reluctantly and at the command of Labor Caucus. Three members of the Liberal Opposition, Messrs. Marriott, Breheny and Hodgman, supported the bill, which was therefore carried comfortably. Everything now turned on the attitude of the Legislative Council, and lobbying began in earnest. Letters, cables and telephone calls poured in, and the sectarian issue was raised. In the end the bill was rejected in the Council by eleven votes to seven. So incensed was the Archbishop of Hobart, Dr. Guildford Young, that in a statement (*Mercury*, 15 March 1957) "he claimed the right to use every lawful and moral means in his power to defeat at the next elections members who had opposed the bill". But Cosgrove was made to drink the bitter cup to the dregs. The Federal Conference of the Australian Labor Party at



Brisbane almost immediately declared itself against state aid for private schools, and the State Labor Conference shortly afterwards adopted a resolution supporting all decisions of the recent Federal Conference, thereby humiliating Cosgrove and the parliamentary members of his party who had campaigned for and implemented a policy which was now officially reversed.

The State Labor Conference which met on 26 March gave Ministers and the whole Parliamentary Party cause for greater worry. The so-called industrial wing of the party had won control of the Executive at the last State Conference, and it was expected that every effort would be made to consolidate that victory. The arrival of Dr. Evatt at the Conference to make a presentation to Mr. Eric Reece, who as President of the Federal Labor Party had led the Evatt forces at the historic Hobart Conference in 1955, was a signal to the Left wing to voice their demands on the Ministers. Their most important demand was for a resumption of cost-of-living payments that had for some time been discontinued. They called for a ten per cent. reduction of hydro-electric charges for pensioners. Despite ministerial resistance these resolutions were carried. Next there was a move among certain unions to set up an industrial advisory body, but this failed, as the unions could not agree, and there was a marked lack of sympathy from the Hobart Trades Hall. The so-called political wing also had its victory, for Mr. Eric Reece, Minister for Lands and Works, defeated the occupant for the position of President on the State Executive. Parliamentary members had not forgotten the relatively poor showing of industrial wing candidates at the State elections in October 1956.

Back in Hobart Ministers were faced with the problem how to implement the policy that had thus been laid down for them. As the political storm gathered and broke in Queensland members of the Parliamentary Party realized they had to walk warily. When the Executive therefore enquired of individual Labor members whether they were prepared to support resumption of cost-of-living payments they gave a collective answer under the Premier's signature, invoking the A.L.P. rule that whatever happens within Caucus must not be made public. When a deputation of industrial unionists saw the Premier they were told that the Government would restore cost-of-living adjustments when it had completed an enquiry into possible economics within each department and when the extent of taxation reimbursement and Commonwealth financial assistance was known. Meantime Ministers toured the State enquiring of rank-and-file unionists whether they wished to persist with cost-of-living readjustments at the risk of creating unemployment. If the resolution recently passed at State Conference was now official, so also, argued Ministers, was the policy of full employment. Luck held for the Premier when on the basis of the first quarter of 1957 the Commonwealth Statistician announced the fall of 2/- for Hobart and 4/- for the State in the cost of living. However, the figures for the second quarter showed by July a reverse trend, and ministerial headaches reappeared. By this time, however, assisted by the Chamber of Manufactures' lamentations over the Japanese trade treaty, an atmosphere of impending unemployment had been created.

Throughout these months the newly appointed Treasurer, Dr. Turnbull, worked assiduously to prune departmental expenditure and to discover ways and means of increasing revenue to meet the large deficit budgeted for in October 1956. Revaluation and increased land tax was seen to affect two interests groups, the pensioners and racing clubs, which, however different, were assumed to support in the main the A.L.P. The Treasurer forecast a steep increase in bookmakers' licences. His most startling innovation was his proposal to institute football pools (on the English model) into Tasmania. Meantime money received from the Commonwealth by way of tax reimbursement and loans was declared insufficient to avoid cuts in public works expenditure. Much publicity was given by Dr. Turnbull, as Minister of Health, to the necessity for the closing of wings in public hospitals. Dr. Gaha, for some time critical of Dr. Turnbull, strongly attacked in a letter to the press the new hospital policy of the Government in allowing private practitioners to visit maternity wards in public hospitals. No move was made in the A.L.P. to censure Dr. Gaha.

One of the most important single contributions to the increase in government expenditure arose from the acceptance, after months of parleying and delay, of the quinquennial reclassification recommended by the Public Service Classification and Appeals Board. Late in 1956 the Government had asked the Board to reconsider its recommendations on the ground that Treasury

did not have the money to pay the increases. This the Board refused to do, stubbornly maintaining that it reached its decisions according to considerations other than that of the Government's capacity to pay. The Government finally conceded the point, and paid the increases from 1 January 1957 instead of from 1 July 1956. Apart from this there was considerable dissatisfaction within the Public Service with the new classification. Other government employees—teachers, police, servants of the Hydro Commission, etc.—have in their turn expressed some dissatisfaction with their salary and wage fixing machinery, and the Government is at present experimenting with the idea of one tribunal for all its employees.

During the six months the Labor Government has consolidated its position, and the party won a new seat, Newdegate (Hobart) in the Legislative Council. The A.L.P. now has five of the nineteen seats. Throughout the Liberals have been very quiet, recovering slowly from the mistakes and the disappointments of last September and October. Both their morale and party funds are at the moment rather low.

W.A.T.

## WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Though it was announced towards the close of the period under review that the second (1957) session of the twenty-second Parliament of W.A. would open a month earlier than usual—on 4 July—the customary six months freedom from parliamentary duties, and from even the mild degree of partisanship characteristic of politics in Perth when the Houses are sitting, enabled both Government and Opposition to devote themselves to the administrative and political consequences of the preceding session.

### *Opposition Discord*

This opportunity was more than usually welcome to the Liberal and Country Parties.<sup>1</sup> Evidence had built up throughout 1956, during the election campaign at the beginning of the year and in the opening session of the new Parliament, that all was not well in the ranks of the Opposition. The Labor Government of W.A., indeed, has the distinction, unique in Australia during recent years, not only of being less affected than its Australian Labor Party affiliates in other States by the prevailing split in the Australian Labor movement but also of watching and profiting by the effects of divided leadership and fluctuating policies among its political opponents.

The current uneasy relationship between the two non-Labor parties in the State dates back to the incident of Senator Agnes Robertson's re-election to the Senate of the Commonwealth in 1955. After the local Liberals had decided not to endorse Senator Robertson for re-election on the ground of age the Senator transferred her allegiance to the Country Party, was re-nominated by that party and secured re-election on the preferences cast by Labor voters.

Relations had not been improved by the maladroit handling of certain incidents during the 1956 State election campaign by the Liberal Leader and former Premier, Sir Ross McLarty.<sup>2</sup> Later in that year, moreover, after the new Parliament had opened, the Opposition parties revealed themselves to be divided on certain major measures introduced by the Government. When the Premier announced his intention to suspend services on more than 800 miles of State railways, as part of an attempt to reduce the very heavy losses on this field of government activity, the Country Party expressed its unequivocal opposition. The Liberals, on the other hand, mindful of their own experience in railway management and of the possibility that in due course they would inherit this financial liability, agreed in principle with the Government provided satisfactory alternative road services were arranged.

<sup>1</sup>The two Opposition parties are given their popular labels throughout this survey though their official designations outside Parliament are Liberal and Country League and Country and Democratic League respectively.

<sup>2</sup>See *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. II, No. 1, Nov. 1956, pp. 114-18.

Later in the year, over Mr. Hawke's proposal as Treasurer to increase the State land taxation, however, the two Opposition parties divided in reverse order. The Country Party accepted the increased taxation—presumably in the belief that the only alternative to this source of additional State revenue was an increase in country railway freights. The Liberals this time came out in firm opposition to the increased taxation.

Liberals in the State Parliament had also been more than a little annoyed by the support given to a Government measure by Country Party members, an action which alone permitted the passage through the Legislative Council (where the Government is in a minority) of the Unfair Trading and Profit Control Bill,<sup>3</sup> which the Liberal Party had denounced. The fact that farmers had been excluded from the operation of this anti-profiteering legislation did not lessen Liberal dissatisfaction. This was to find expression at a Swan conference of the party in 1957 which openly censured the Country Party for its support of some of "the most socialistic legislation ever passed in this State".

By April the "Political Writer" of the *West Australian* was referring frankly to the "increasingly evident" tension in the relations between Liberal and Country Party members. Personalities also entered into the policy differences. The President of the State Liberal Party, Mr. F. A. Johnson, had been very critical of the Country Party Leader, Mr. A. F. Watts, M.L.A., and of Sir Charles Latham, M.L.C., over the honorary Royal Commission on restrictive trade practices, of which Mr. Watts is Chairman. When the latter's motion for the establishment of this commission had been before the Legislative Assembly in the 1956 session, only two Liberal members, Messrs. Brand and Court, had supported it.

### **A New Liberal Leader**

A significant step preliminary to the closing of the ranks of the two Opposition parties was taken when the Parliamentary Liberal Party met on 26 February to elect a Leader in succession to Sir Ross McLarty who earlier in the month had announced his retirement from the leadership (but not from the Legislative Assembly) "in the interest of his health and his family".

The choice was narrowed down to Mr. David Brand, Deputy-Leader of the party, and ex-Cabinet Minister, and his less experienced but outwardly more vigorous colleague, Mr. Charles Court, Legislative Assembly member for the metropolitan constituency of Nedlands. Both men are returned soldiers. Mr. Court's chances were felt to lie not only in his ability and in his prominence during recent parliamentary skirmishes but also in the ill health suffered by the Deputy-Leader in recent years, though Mr. Brand had reputedly made a complete recovery by the beginning of the current year. Considerations which eventually influenced the party in electing Mr. Brand Leader and Mr. Court Deputy-Leader no doubt included the former's ministerial experience and the fact that he represented the country constituency of Greenough and might therefore be expected to facilitate easier relations with his Country Party colleagues.

### **Railway Closures**

Opposition parties were provided with an opportunity to form a united front by the action taken by the Government to implement its railway closure policy.

As early as the end of January rumours were circulating in country districts that certain lines would shortly cease running. Reports from Denmark in the south of the State predicted the early closing of the Nornalup-Elleker service, while at Laverton, in the central division, a "Citizens League of Rights" was formed to fight for the retention of the Laverton-Malcolm railway "for at least twelve months". Dissatisfaction, too, was reported in the south-west, where the Margaret River-Flinders Bay line was threatened; closure of the line from Meekatharra to Wiluna was also forecast.

The Liberal Party attitude was at first rather cautious. On 25 March, Mr. Brand appealed to his State party Conference not to formulate a specific policy regarding upkeep and repair of railways. He was reported as saying: "We may be crossing our bridges before we come

<sup>3</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. II, No. 2, May 1957, p. 246.



to them. . . . The lines may be uneconomical when we come to power. We might find ourselves in a difficult position."<sup>4</sup> Conference played safe by resolving that the railway lines then being discontinued should not be abandoned by removal of lines, sleepers, buildings and heavy stationary equipment. Earlier in the month the Country Party Leader, Mr. Watts, had not improved relations by pointing out that the situation would have been avoided had the Liberals supported the Country Party when the railway closure resolution had been before Parliament in the 1956 session. At this point Mr. Brand contented himself with saying that the Government would be defying Parliament and not observing the condition in the Liberal Party's amendment to the closure motion of 1956 if it closed lines without first giving "satisfactory proof" of the capacity and efficiency of alternative road transport arrangements in each case.

Opposition of interested groups in the country districts concerned then began to take formal shape. The Premier was the target for a series of deputations beginning with the Farmers' Union and including one from a special conference of the Country Party which emphasized the fact that a total of 5,750,000 bushels of wheat had been carted in 1956 on the lines now about to be closed.

Government spokesmen stood firm but were not unconciliatory. The Minister for Railways, Mr. H. C. Strickland, gave an assurance that discontinued lines would be reopened if alternative road services were found to be unsatisfactory; he insisted that the Government would welcome an enquiry into railway administration by "any competent person". The Premier also agreed to some short delay in particular cases. On 8 April, however, dates were announced for four closures—from Geraldton (67 miles) and Wokarma (38 miles) on 29 April; from Narrogin (57 miles) on 6 May and from Nornalup (61 miles) on 30 September—and a tentative programme for other suspensions was given for May, June and July. The first closure in fact took place on 29 April when the oldest government-owned railway line in W.A., the first sod in the construction of which had been turned by Governor Frederick Weld in 1874, ceased running from the port of Geraldton to Northampton. By the end of June, thirteen out of the seventeen country lines which the Government had decided to close had ceased their services.

Meanwhile the opponents of the closure had redoubled their efforts. In April Mr. Watts claimed that Mr. Hawke had virtually given an undertaking to the Country Party's special Conference deputation that a close enquiry into each line would be made by an expert before closure was decided upon; the Country Party Leader insisted that there had not been time for any such expert investigation. Further efforts to induce the Premier to receive deputations were unsuccessful. Mr. Hawke claimed that the case against closure had already been adequately presented and he asserted that the Government had no option to closure "if the railway system is to be rescued from its present intolerable position". Attempts were made to bring R.S.L. branches into the issue. Towards the end of June there was also some talk of direct action by farmers who were to conduct a "rolling strike" which would withhold food from the metropolitan area around Perth. The appointment of a "vigilante committee" was announced from Geraldton.

Much more serious from the Labor Government's viewpoint was the increasing uneasiness of railway employees. On 9 April the *West Australian* reported the opposition of the W.A. Amalgamated Society of Railway Employees and arrangements for a union deputation to the Premier a week later. The Minister for Railways then announced that there would be no sacking of railway employees as the result of the forthcoming closures. On 24 April, the Premier, who combines a reputation for resistance to Trades Hall dictation with a readiness for frank discussion with union representatives, attended a special meeting of the W.A. Amalgamated Society of Railway Employees. Reports that Mr. F. E. Chamberlain had used his good offices to bring Government and union policy into line were apparently confirmed when the State Executive of the A.L.P., of which Mr. Chamberlain is Secretary, resolved unanimously that same evening to back the Government's railway policy.

By the end of June the issue had been joined between Government and Opposition and Mr. Watts was able to announce that the Country and Liberal Parties would combine against

<sup>4</sup>*West Australian*, 26 March 1957.

the Labor Government on the closure of the railways when the State Parliament reopened in the following week. Though the Opposition ranks had closed on this issue and the new session might therefore be expected to reveal less evidence of disharmony between the Liberal and Country Parties, it would be going beyond the evidence to suggest that all differences had been removed in party circles outside Parliament.

Confirmation of this was given by the announcement by the Liberal Party's State President, Mr. Johnson, in the last week of June that the 63 members of the State Council of the party had unanimously voted to endorse a complete Liberal team, probably of three members, for the 1958 or 1959 Commonwealth Senate elections. This decision meant the abandoning of the arrangement made in the 1947 and the 1953 elections for a joint Liberal and Country Party team. The Country Party State President, Mr. E. D. P. Hayes, came out in strong protest at Mr. Johnson's announcement. Mr. Hayes regretted the decision to adhere to the separate Liberal team nominated in 1955 when there had been three retiring Liberal Senators, since only one Liberal Senator would be seeking re-election when the poll was held in late 1958 or early 1959.

### *Administrative Activity*

Apart from the highly contentious question of the railways closure other matters emerging from the legislative programme of the 1956 parliamentary session caused public discussion during the first half of 1957. Considerable opposition was expressed to the Government's announcement of its intention to use its powers under the amended Factories and Shops Act to impose uniform petrol selling hours on all metropolitan service stations with very limited provision for after-hours sales on a zoning basis, as from Easter 1957. This interference with the freedom of individual petrol station proprietors was resented by Perth motorists who have for some time enjoyed generous service facilities as the result of the increasingly competitive conditions now prevailing in many suburbs. Effectively led by the proprietor of one service station which trades under the "We Never Sleep" slogan, the Government's opponents in this matter were able to point to undertakings given by Ministers, in both Legislative Assembly and Council, when the Factories and Shops Amendment Bill was under consideration by Parliament. The Premier bent before the storm and the Act was not proclaimed; on 4 April Mr. Hawke announced a Cabinet decision that, in the coming session, Parliament would be asked to pass legislation providing for uniform petrol selling hours.

Some unexpected difficulties emerged over the overlapping functions of the Watts Royal Commission on restrictive trade practices and the actual investigations to be conducted by Commissioner W. J. Wallwork, who was appointed under the Unfair Trading and Profit Control Bill. These were ironed out but the Commissioner was challenged in his first major enquiry, into the cement industry in W.A. Cockburn Cement Pty. Ltd. sought a Supreme Court writ of prohibition against the Commissioner on the ground that he was acting beyond his statutory jurisdiction.<sup>5</sup>

The whole question of the future administration of the government railways also emerged out of an allegation of misconduct by senior railways officials. On 27 May the Government, which had appointed a magistrate, Mr. A. G. Smith, to investigate these charges, announced that the enquiry had been broadened to review the controversial three-commissioner system which had been introduced by the McLarty-Watts Government. In the second half of June, Mr. Smith and his Crown Law departmental assistant flew to the United Kingdom to follow up the original allegations regarding certain diesel engine contracts and the faulty operation of these diesels in W.A. Before he left for overseas Mr. Smith was made a Royal Commissioner with power to enquire into and report on the operation of the W.A. Government Railways Commission, on any allegations of misconduct and on measures for improvement. His return to Perth and report to Cabinet was anticipated at about the end of July.

<sup>5</sup>On 2 Aug. the State Full Court unanimously refused to issue a writ of prohibition. An appeal from this decision was likely to be heard by the High Court.

The political light relief of the period was provided in June by the Young Liberal Movement which moved its headquarters to the former premises of the Communist Party in London Court in the centre of the city. The redecorated rooms were officially opened by the Deputy-Leader of the Liberal Party, Mr. Charles Court, on 14 June. The exorcizing ceremony would seem to have been well and truly performed, for the *West Australian* was able to report on the following morning: "Only the floor stays red" !

F.A.



# Book Reviews

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE 1820-1953. By Michael P. Fogarty. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957. Pp. 461. 45/- stg.

The rise of Christian Democracy has been perhaps the most important development in the post-war political history of Western Europe. In 1953 the lower houses of the Parliaments of France, Italy, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria and Luxemburg had a total of 2,428 members, of whom 890 were Christian Democrats; Social Democrats, next in numerical strength, numbered 530. This is a very rough indicator, but an analysis of the national and international policies of these countries in the post-war period would show that Christian Democrat thinking has made a major contribution. This is particularly true of international policies. The European Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market scheme owe much to Christian Democratic ideas and were made possible largely by the strength of Christian Democrat parties in the Parliaments of the countries concerned.

Withal, the phenomenon of Christian Democracy is little understood and somewhat suspect in the United States and the countries of the Commonwealth. Although the politics of these countries have a generous mixture of Christian idealism, the direct intervention of churches in party politics is regarded as an evil, and this prejudice is particularly strong in the case of the Roman Church. Notwithstanding the record of European Christian Democrat parties in social reform, the Roman Church is by some regarded, partly because of its attitude to socialism, as a prop of reaction and because of its authoritarian structure it is questioned whether its acceptance of the democratic state can be other than a matter of temporary expediency. The British prejudice against Christian Democracy is of some international consequence, for among the reasons which have kept Britain somewhat aloof from the movement for European political and economic integration is the feeling that a movement which owes so much to the political influence of Roman Catholicism must be dangerous. Whether these prejudices are justified is for the moment a question which can be put on one side; the important point is that they *are* prejudices rather than reasoned judgments, since they are usually unsupported by any knowledge of the structure and ideas of Christian Democrat parties or of their record in action. And in support of that statement it is only necessary to say that Professor Fogarty's book is the first comprehensive treatment of the subject in English.

It is, indeed, rather too comprehensive, for the writer takes Christian Democracy to include almost any movement, organised or unorganised, Catholic or Protestant or both, which is active in social or political affairs. Thus, in his view Christian Democracy exists and flourishes in both Britain and the United States. And at times it would seem that he includes under Christian Democracy almost any sort of Christian action, whether or not its methods and objectives are democratic. Professor Fogarty would, I think, have written a better book if he had kept to the common notion of Christian Democracy as a social and political movement of specifically Roman Catholic inspiration (though with substantial Protestant support in some countries) having democratic objectives and methods.

Professor Fogarty is, however, entitled to his point that in English-speaking countries Christian Democracy is too often thought of simply in terms of political parties. His book deals mainly with "that weightier part of the iceberg which lies for the most part below the vision of the British or American press"—the profusion of Christian organisations dealing with the problems of the family, youth, women, trade unions, management, farmers and the professions. They are the foundation on which Christian Democracy, viewed as a political movement, is based. And it is in dealing with these organisations that Professor Fogarty—who is an economist by training and holds a chair of industrial relations—is most at home. The best parts of this book are Part II, which describes and analyses the social theories of Christian Democracy in considerable detail, and those chapters in Part III which deal with the rise of the various functional organisations. The least satisfactory sections are those which deal with the rise of the various Christian Democrat political parties.

It is easy to find faults in this book. Its wide scope—both in time and in range of subject matter—imposes problems of arrangement which are not very satisfactorily solved, and the reader's task is made more difficult by a skimpy and at times inaccurate index. It is also arguable that Professor Fogarty, by relying too much on material supplied by religious organisations, overestimates the strength of Catholic, and for that matter Protestant, social organisation in some countries. But when all qualifications have been made, it remains true that this survey, if only because of the amazingly wide range of sources which the author has consulted, is a valuable and on the whole reliable introduction to a neglected subject.

The main inadequacy in Professor Fogarty's book, as has been noted, is his treatment of the Christian Democrat political parties, and while his statement that his training and interests lie elsewhere than in the field of politics must be accepted as an adequate reason for this, it is not so easy to accept his view of the relative importance of the political and the social elements in Christian Democracy. Like many Roman Catholic social theorists, he tends to undervalue the state and political power. Impressive as may have been the record of Christian social and industrial organisations, it is the political success of Christian Democracy which has made it a force in national and international policies, and it is in the political field that Christian Democracy has asserted and must vindicate its claim to be democratic. After all, Christian trade unions, professional organisations, and employers' groups can—and do—exist in states which are not by our standards democratic. The British and American peoples may err in not paying enough attention to the industrial and social antecedents of Christian Democracy; they do not err in regarding the political manifestations of Christian Democracy as being of major importance, because it is at this level that its compatibility or otherwise with democracy as the West understands that term is being tested.

The question whether Christian Democracy is basically and securely democratic is one which Professor Fogarty does not ask directly, let alone attempt to answer. He does, however, raise it in an indirect form when he deals with the relations between Christian Democrat parties and the Roman Church. When all allowances have been made for the Protestant element in the Christian Democrat movements of some European countries, it remains true that the core of Christian Democracy, both as to organisation and as to social thinking, is in Roman Catholicism. And no one whose knowledge of European history goes back as far as Pius IX will be prepared to assume that Rome has made a binding commitment to the democratic form of government. This, of course, is not a reason for questioning whether Christian Democracy is genuinely democratic—provided it can be assumed that Christian Democrat parties are fully autonomous. In the case of Germany and Holland it is perhaps possible to make this assumption, because in these countries Christian Democracy draws considerable support from Protestants and must continue to do so if it is to remain a political force. In Italy Sturzo and after him De Gasperi were emphatic that Christian Democracy must be independent of ecclesiastical control, must confine its objectives to the social and economic sphere, and must avoid becoming the champion of the Church's claims against the State. "Our party", said Sturzo in 1919, "is a party of national integration. It cannot and will not take religion as its flag." Brave words, but they ring ironically in the Italy of today. Mario Einaudi, whose essay in *Christian Democracy in Italy and France* (which unfortunately has not found a publisher outside the United States) is by far the best treatment of the political aspects of Christian Democracy which has yet appeared, has said that the question is not whether a Christian Democrat party can be free of Church control but rather: "Have there been times when a Christian Democrat party has been free of Church control?" Einaudi claims that Sturzo's Popular party was briefly free of Church control, a conclusion which most students of Italian politics would be inclined to dispute. He does not make this claim for the present Italian Christian Democrat party—nor would many Italians.

It will be obvious that this book has a certain relevance to the present conditions of Australian political life. Over the past two or three years Protestants in Australia have said many foolish things about the influence of Roman Catholicism in politics, and from the other side have come some curiously naive disavowals. Professor Fogarty, who is a Roman Catholic and

a member of the British Labour Party, puts the problem of the Church in political life in its perspective and in its complexity. It is recommended reading for Australians of all creeds, political and religious.

Oxford

LEICESTER WEBB

**PATHS TO PEACE: A STUDY OF WAR, ITS CAUSES AND PREVENTION.** Edited by Victor H. Wallace. Melbourne University Press, 1957. Pp. xx + 397.

Its sub-title alone might suggest why this collection of essays, taken as a whole, fails conclusively. The Editor found it necessary, he tells us (p. v), "to decide upon the sections or headings under which all the possible causes of war and the means by which war may be prevented could be discussed"—which is to presuppose (i) that particular wars are instances of War, (ii) that War has a finite number of causes, and (iii) that War can be prevented by the eliminating of all of them.

"This may be a somewhat simplified approach", Mr. Nehru demurs in a gently authoritative Foreword. Even if we are able to discover and formulate all these causes, it may turn out that "the economic, ideological, social, racial and other factors are so woven into our institutions that they cannot be readily isolated in regard to their evil aspect alone!" (p. xii).

On "Historical Aspects of the Problem of Recurrent Wars", Professor R. M. Crawford makes quite evidently the best-prepared and (in the present writer's view) the most humane and distinguished contribution of the volume. From former ideology-ridden periods, notably 1494-1648 and 1792-1815, he derives not rules but interpretations of what he is not afraid to call our "dilemma"—in which (pp. 15-16) "a multiple balance has broken down into a simple balance of two mighty opposites, lacking any third and uncommitted power of equal magnitude" so that "the peace of the world is endangered by an inescapable mutual suspicion, irrespective of the virtue or vice, the paranoia or the moderation of those who decide policy".

To all this, Professor Crawford has no "single answer"; but he does suggest (pp. 17-21) certain "piecemeal actions directed towards preventing a dangerous situation from getting out of hand": private citizens can speak and vote against fear and hysteria; while governments, recognizing the task's precarious complexities, might attempt in various ways to modify the simple balance of power or reintroduce a multiple balance. Hobbesian fear itself, exacerbated by the new weapons' virtually qualitative increase in destructiveness, may restrain governments from making war (that, by the way, being one of the book's few nods in the direction of deterrence).

Little else in the work comes near the Foreword or the first essay, and many of the contributors present broad targets for at least one rebuke that Crawford administers (p. 4): "It is a naive delusion of some social scientists that social science, pursued far enough, can enable us to master all situations; but one is forced by the study of history to recognize that from time to time situations develop that are intractable in themselves. The effect of increased knowledge of such situations may prove to be a clearer understanding of their intractability. . . ."

Some of the contributors qualify for this rebuke by their simple if unpretentious trust in education, in rationalism, in the cultivation of mystical experience, in the forces allegedly making for "social evolution", and so forth—even the late Sir Frederic Eggleston prefaces his generous and moderate comparison of the League of Nations and the United Nations with affirmations concerning a dialectic of peace which has spiralled up from one to the other. But more attention perhaps should be paid to the few and more clamant purveyors of the grander specifics, such as "social psychology" or Marxism.

Mr. F. E. Emery, a psychologist dealing with "Economic Conflicts in Relation to War", and Mr. G. Sharp, a Lecturer in Social Studies, dealing with "The Social Structure and War" would now—*i.e.* after Hungary—quite probably disavow the post-Stalinist orthodoxy of their contributions. Mr. Emery (p. 41) regards war as "a non-economic activity or social institution purposefully directed to the maintenance of the conditions of a society's economic life" (italics deleted by the reviewer). The stock version of World War I's origins, pointed up with



"inevitables", is developed into an account of the 'thirties and the outbreak of World War II—more "inevitability". Neither the Russo-Finnish War nor the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact are mentioned; and when we are brought to the present day, we learn of a dilemma-free Soviet which "during all its years of existence, apart from . . . 1939-45" has adopted a "stolid defensive posture" (p. 62). A virtue of the Communist interpretation is that its errors follow pretty well directly from its premises—in this case the belief that war is superstructural, and generated only at those levels of socio-economic organization where radical contradiction persists. Mr. Emery was ill-served by his dead-line and his Editor alike: p. 58 tells us that "West German industry . . . has seized such plums in the present field of colonial investment as the Nile Dam near Assuan". On p. 64, the 'thirties' practice of settling disputes by force is breath-stoppingly contrasted with "present-day incidents . . . settled peacefully and, to all appearances . . . followed by a lessening of international tension". The doctrinaire virtues and vices are also those of Mr. Sharp, *e.g.* p. 78: ". . . Although the Soviet Union accorded freedom and independence to other nations and pursued external relations of peace with the ruling classes of the imperialist states, its very existence formed a two-pronged threat to the rear of the foci of imperialist power."

We may turn, for an instructive comparison, to J. F. Cairns, M.H.R., on "Economic Policy and the Prevention of War". He rejects the Stalinist analysis, and argues vigorously for the democratic socialist policy of assisting under-developed countries. Given that nuclear deterrence provides a temporary safeguard against major wars this policy, he hopes, might stabilize the grey areas; but he does not really face the overwhelming probability that the advanced economies will accelerate even further away from the under-developed nations, thus leaving them more vulnerable than ever.

Professor P. H. Partridge's "The Conflict of Ideologies" is disappointing, especially if one agrees with most of what he says—*e.g.* p. 92: that ideologies seem not to be a "*constant and leading influence*" upon the fundamental politics of power and security. The article somewhat understates the internal difficulties of the Soviet orbit, and perhaps makes too little of the short-run effectiveness of ideologies. Professor Partridge sees its embodying of a peculiar theory of world history as the feature that makes Communism ideologically novel (p. 106); and in a most important section (pp. 112-14), captioned "Are the Democratic States Fighting for Democracy?", answers "No" to his own question. From this point on, especially, your reviewer has difficulties: Professor Partridge seems to understand "liberal democracy" as "Anglo-Saxon capitalistic institutions" (India?); and to assume that democratic régimes can hardly match *e.g.* Chinese Communist social and economic reconstruction. He, too, has been ill-served by time—. . . It does not seem that the propagation of the classical ideology of liberal-democracy in Asia, or in those parts of Europe (*e.g.* Poland) where the Communists have already gone a long way with agricultural reform and other phases of political and social reconstruction, is likely to have much effect" (p. 116).

A psychoanalyst, the late Reg. Ellery, and a Professor of Psychology, O. E. Oeser, discuss respectively "Frustration and Aggression in Relation to War" and "Culture Patterns and Social Tensions". The former (pp. 135-6) recommends anti-war indoctrination of children, censorship of conflict-glorifying films, and more power to psychologists. The latter moves from a one-page outline of scientific development through an explanation of the falsity and danger of the biological theory of war, to an exposition of the "evidence from social anthropology and psychology, especially social psychology". This evidence appears to consist of (1) studies of children's and adults' attitudes to their own and to foreign nations and nationals—from which Professor Oeser concludes (p. 148) that "realistic appraisal", though a minor element at first, has more part as children become adults; (2) certain psychological conclusions *e.g.* that haters are the love-deprived; and that Hitlerian society hinders the development of normal personality; (3) studies—in the psychology of small groups—supporting democratic against autocratic and anarchic structure; and (4) observations to the effect that many characteristics go to make a leader, and that groups which discuss perform better. Professor Oeser appears to believe that this "evidence" has some bearing upon the "question" of the causes of war. As to its prevention, he tells us (p. 155) that "in the relations between large groups called nations similar

principles must hold as between small groups: autonomy or sovereignty in its old-fashioned sense must make way for syncratic co-operation". One would like to be told what—beside begging the question—the "musts" in that sentence are supposed to effect, especially since thereabouts the word is used eight times in fifteen consecutive lines.

Professor Macmahon Ball, in "Nationalism as a Cause of War", distinguishes nationalist claims to self-determination from what they invariably evoke if met, *viz.* claims to sovereignty which incline to war. The former claims, though difficult to oppose on moral grounds, tend to be dangerous, and may not always be realizable simultaneously. Much recent historical detail illustrates the point, and the whole essay at least bears upon the subject.

Sir Samuel Wadham contributes an interesting and detailed study of population and food production, concluding (p. 192) "that there is no need for lack of food to be a cause of war in the world" but that it might be used as a pretext. Professor Oliphant writes with his usual clarity and liveliness about fission and fusion, but has time-trouble *e.g.* p. 227: "The problems of intercepting . . . missiles and rockets with any appreciable chance of success appear to be insoluble." He does ask "Can a victory be won in an atomic war?" but makes little of the answer's implications. He examines disarmament proposals, but finally sees hope only in an armed international authority.

W. G. K. Duncan, a Professor of History and Political Science, deals professionally with "The Balance of Power and the Preservation of Peace". He is inclined to hide his own more-than-adequate light under a bushel of quotations exemplifying the 'twenties' mistrust of the whole conception. Recognizing the diminishing appropriateness of balance-of-power thinking in the present context (*i.e.* without a balancer, and with nuclear weapons) he looks to a world government, but takes account of the objection that (p. 252) "the absence of world government renders impossible the achievement of world government". Henry Osborne, M.P., on the other hand, ignoring such objections, commends it as the only real solution. He at least recognizes the matrix of war, but seems to assume that a world government would resemble the American rather than the Soviet model.

The Editor develops at length a world population policy, both for its own sake and as a means to preventing war. This, of course, is to resolve a dilemma by a flat impossibility. The abolition of the sovereign state would be child's play to the sort of eugenic control that Dr. Wallace proposes for the human race. Professor Geoffrey Sawer comperes the work to its conclusion, and probably should not be held strictly to account for every detail of his lively summing up. Weapon-systems and therefore books on international relations all nowadays invite the epitaph *ars longa, vita brevis*.

Canberra

A. L. BURNS

FROM BALANCE TO DETERRENCE: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS. By A. L. Burns. Australian National University Social Science Monographs No. 9 (1956). 7/6.

This short but closely-packed monograph is intended as a contribution to the "general theory" of international relations. It has for some time been a controversial question whether international relations is a distinctive field of study with its own subject-matter. Mr. Burns thinks that it is. It is concerned with systems of powers, *i.e.* of sovereign states deploying military force (p. 2), and a general theory of such systems may be possible. It is recognized that there are other kinds of international relationship, for example, economic relations. But the theory of these is part of the general theory of economics, and they enter into Mr. Burns's system only insofar as changes in economic relations cause changes in the relations of alliance, pressure, opposition between powers.

The basic elements in his model are thus: (i) units called powers or blocs; a bloc is a group of countries which can be treated as akin to a single power (*e.g.* a power and its client states); (ii) relations of alliance, pressure/opposition between powers, such that, for example, the more closely A and B are allied, the more the pressure/opposition between A or B and C. Alliance and pressure here signify some concrete act such as reciprocal reduction of armaments, or the



earmarking of increased forces for possible use against one another; (iii) the military potential of powers, which in the long run depends on resources—hence too much, as well as too little short-run security (in terms of forces maintained) may be dangerous to long-run security. There will be an optimum for any given set of external relations and internal conditions (military efficiency, level of resources, etc.).

Mr. Burns then introduces into his system a set of principles of strategy for leaders bent on maximising security, taking some hints from game theory. It is complicated for him by the recognition that "certainty as well as security may be an objective of foreign policy". For example, part of the business of seeking the optimum may lie in contriving situations in which the optimum is easiest to calculate; or where miscalculations are least momentous. I did not find this part of Mr. Burns's monograph very easy to follow; but this seems to be one of the important things he is saying.

We are then asked to consider the number of powers or blocs that make for maximum stability in a balance of power world. Two make for considerable unpredictability, as there is no balancer. A three-bloc world leaves open the danger of A and B allying against C; C may be left with little alternative but to risk war; that is, unless C can successfully "pose the dilemma of the victor's inheritance" (p. 8) and show up the dangers of the two-bloc world that would follow its defeat. Four blocs would enable C to seek counter-alliance, but with the danger of a two-bloc polarized world re-emerging. "For that reason, the most stable arrangement would seem to be a world of five or some greater odd numbers of Powers, independent and of approximately equal strength" (p. 12). An increase in the number of powers beyond a certain point will reduce stability by excessively multiplying the number of decisions to be anticipated. Mr. Burns thinks that we might have had a stabler world between the wars if Eastern Europe had formed a bloc comparable to the Axis, U.K.-France, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.; though he adds that "folly and short-sight" were doubtless more important than the structure of the system (p. 13).

However, the central point of Mr. Burns's analysis is that the balance of power world has ceased, or is ceasing, to exist. In place of it we have a state of deterrence or "balance of terror". We have for the time being a smaller number of great powers possessing global weapons such as hydrogen bombs; and they are approaching, or have reached, the point at which they can "wipe out the other's economy and have some means of attack unused" (p. 17). Efficacy of attack on the economy is very great and efficacy of attack on means of attack is very small. This situation has already had various effects on the policies of the deterrent powers, including concentration on limited military objectives and "peripheral wars". It has also rendered out-of-date many of the old nice adjustments of the balance, for example, the need for degrees of alliance short of the absolute.

What conditions determine the number of powers that will seek to become deterrent powers? A prime one is the economic ability to maintain optimum global forces. But there are others. For example, if A and B are such powers, and C a lesser power closely allied to A, independent deterrent forces may improve C's short-run security, but may also deprive C of the chance of sharing in A-benefits and innovations; which might in turn include impregnable ways of A's defending itself. Another factor would be any effect on C's command of the "remaining non-military sources of influence on other nations" (p. 26), economic or ideological.

This can be only a crude account of Mr. Burns's line of argument, one which does not do justice to its subtleties and qualifications. But we may turn to consider what predictions he feels he can make on the basis of his model, when he applies it to the present international situation. First, if "our rulers come to accept the deterrent as much the most likely future state, we may expect them to consider the desirability of expanding their nation's sphere of influence or even of occupation before that kind of thing should become impossible" (p. 28). "The transition from balance to deterrence will be characterized by much *more* intense activity in those areas where power-balancing still prevails. Minor wars, reversals of alliance or revolutions will be frequent" (p. 33). Nationalism and ideological movements will continue to alter the relative potential of nations, as the deterrent weapons are not much use in civil strife. Mr. Burns thinks it unlikely that there will be a concert of deterrent powers to share out the rest of the world between them.



Second, Mr. Burns thinks that the advantages of becoming a deterrent power may remain high, and that the present ones may well be added to. He discusses the balance of advantages and implications of this at some length; and concludes that such an increase would cause a major shake-up, as the new power becomes able to bully its non-deterrent neighbours, and also raises the costs of deterrence for existing powers.

Finally there need be no long continued armaments race in the old sense, once powers reach the deterrent optimum. But the new version of the arms race is "a scramble after innovations" (p. 32). It is interesting to note that at this point Mr. Burns consciously deserts his model, to suggest that the only hope of checking this scramble is a strong movement by "the international republic of science" for the restoration of open scientific publication, which would greatly reduce the value of discoveries to the discoverer.

Some readers may feel that, having permitted us this glimpse of moral factors that may influence the world's future, Mr. Burns might have gone further and discussed some other ways in which these might be brought to bear on the situation. But that would be unfair to him. He has already packed the maximum amount into his pages. Indeed, this is one of the few books one wishes had been longer. Not only is the theory sometimes too compressed to be readily intelligible, but the application of the model to the real world has to be in summary terms. I would like very much to see Mr. Burns work out its implications at length, and hope that this is only a first taste of a fuller book on the subject.

*Sydney*

R. N. SPANN

REFLECTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION. By A. Loveday. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1956. Pp. xi + 334. 42/- stg.

The author of this book, who is now in his seventieth year, was Warden of Nuffield College from 1950 to 1954 and an economist at Cambridge before the first world war. In between Cambridge and Nuffield College he spent over a quarter of a century as an international official, much of the time as a senior official. He joined the Secretariat of the League of Nations at Geneva in 1919, in the first months of its existence, and in 1931 he succeeded Sir Arthur (later Lord) Salter as Director of the Financial Section. In 1940 he took the rump of the League Secretariat to the United States where he headed it as Director of the Economic, Financial and Transit Department until its dissolution in 1946. Though he draws heavily on his League experience his book is no exercise in nostalgia for the golden days of Geneva, an era about which he is objective and at times critical; while as for the post-war international institutions, what he has to say is based on a decade of first-hand observation and of studying the reports of various committees of the U.N. and of the twelve Specialized Agencies as well as reports of certain separate bodies such as O.E.E.C.—an exercise which must have entailed reading some thousands of pages, and of reading matter about as winsome as seventeenth century Scotch Calvinist sermons, though with nothing like as much intellect in them.

The book is divided into two parts. The first, consisting of 150 pages, deals with the international secretariat. The second, rather longer, deals with the mechanics of international co-operation.

In Part I there are chapters which examine in turn the characteristics of life peculiar to the international official; the nature of his job; the qualities required; how to recruit him so as to make a loyal and efficient service out of a miscellany of individuals with highly differing languages, beliefs, education, and experience; how to keep up his morale; and staff rules and regulations.

In Part II the chapters are on the Structure and Functions of Advisory Committees; Procedure in Committees; Councils and Boards; the Dispersion of the post-war international bodies; Research; and Finance.

A reasoned case for or against this or that practice in the international institutions, pre-war and post-war, is offered at many points. The cases are too important as well as too numerous

to be discussed in a review of this length, but I will touch on a few examples from the U.N. and other post-war international institutions.

Mr. Loveday is at pains to make clear both the difficulty and the indispensability of maintaining morale amongst international officials, notably the unmarried and especially the unmarried women. Those who have ever had to wrestle with this problem will appreciate the truth and wisdom of what he says. . . . Again, he is at pains to make clear what standards are required in, and what attitudes are required towards, international officials and to show how far the conditions imposed upon the new Secretariats of the U.N. and the Specialized Agencies by the all-powerful United States delegations in 1946 departed from them. He argues that the nineteen grades into which the U.S. system divided the Secretariat, according to a fixed set of nineteen so-called "job description schedules", were too mechanical, too rigid, too restrictive in the trade union way, and too glued to the notion that each grade must correspond to a readily definable trade or profession. What was overlooked, he says, was the fact that there is the profession of civil servant; just that, which was nearly everything. His words are severe on this, as they are on some other characteristics of the U.N., but no words could be too severe for denominating the mixture of provincial ignorance and overbearing self-confidence of the "Personnel Engineers" let loose on Lake Success in 1946-7. Those who saw them at first hand are not likely to forget them. "Jugoslavia", "Where is Bangkok?" are among their sayings that sweeten the memories of those days, which are not generally sweet. It was this irrelevance of equipment which also led to the purchase of Emily Post's book on etiquette (which, like the Bible, is a constant best-seller in the United States) as a guide to protocol. (The several copies then bought are presumably still in the U.N. Library.) The Personnel Engineers left for Detroit and other factories a year or two later, but it will be years before their effects can be undone. . . .

Next, Mr. Loveday explains the primordial role of committees in international organization and he examines ten major separate kinds of international committees. He argues that a crucial mistake was made in the U.N. and in the other post-war international institutions by making committees at all levels committees of government nominees instead of committees of independent advisers. The expression of really objective opinions prior to "the chaffering on the political market" is now precluded. This accounts for the fact that nearly all U.N. committees, no matter what subject they are dealing with, are political (in the pejorative sense) rather than expert. Even as political committees they perform at a very subordinate diplomatic level. . . . Further, he states the case against the U.N. practice of holding all meetings in public and considers that a heavy price is being paid for this American literal-mindedness about what is democracy. . . . He believes, too, that as far as possible votes should not be taken. This would be practicable in most committees as regards the efficacy of the work; but it must remain a counsel of perfection when not a few member states possess, not expert or relevant knowledge, but their vote and nothing but their vote. They are likely to cling to their right to vote for reasons of prestige, if not for trading their vote. . . .

The Economic and Social Council, which, he says, might have been a most important body for negotiating multi-national economic and social policies, comes in for a withering scrutiny. According to him it has been charged with too many and incompatible functions so that the agenda of every meeting are habitually so overloaded that nothing can result except superficial resolutions which mean little if anything. Ministers and even senior officials have long given up wasting time at ECOSOC meetings, which as a consequence are attended largely by delegates of no great standing. A related consequence is the huge superstructure of advisory commissions and committees and sub-commissions and sub-committees. Taking 1952 as an example, there were fourteen sub-committees and working parties reporting to ECOSOC, eleven functional commissions and sub-commissions, three regional commissions, eleven Specialized Agencies, and eight miscellaneous bodies; 47 in all. In addition, 109 non-governmental organizations had the right to submit written statements to ECOSOC. . . .

Mr. Loveday also discusses the position of the Secretary General. In his view the Secretary General should be excluded from expressing an opinion or from having a publicly known policy on an issue until he is called upon to do so. Once he has taken sides publicly he loses his authority as the experienced neutral counsellor. That is to say, Mr. Loveday is arguing for what

was the League practice as against what is the U.N. practice. One wonders, however, whether in fact Drummond or Avenol ever had this authority, or whether a Secretary General with the equipment of a Trygve Lie would ever have it even though his lips were sealed with triple brass and his silence were covered with a Delphic mysteriousness. . . .

There would be less controversy on certain other matters Mr. Loveday ventilates, such as the dispersion of the U.N. organs (headquarters in seven different cities and branches and main offices in 65) and how this dispersion complicates the transaction of international business as well as increasing costs; or on the present unsatisfactory nature and operation of the Budgets systems and financial control in the U.N. and various Specialized Agencies; or on the U.N. headquarters building in New York; or on the current *Etatisme* and its slant towards the subjective, the emotional, the prejudiced—race, class, ideology—instead of addressing itself to the best solution.

Among the grave problems now confronting humanity few are more weighty than the problem of running the machinery of the modern state—that is to say, the problem of administration. The problem transcends all political régimes, being equally insistent in a democratic, a Fascist, a Communist, or a clerical state, or in any blend of these régimes. There is and can be no final solution as the institutions of the state are always changing, and always growing bigger and bigger as the state enlarges its jurisdiction. In the supranational or international institutions the problem is certainly not easier than inside the state. If the human race is to survive in any appreciable numbers, which at the moment is far from assured, problems of international administration will become sharper because there will be no escape from international organization, whatever one might think of this or that particular sample of it today.

Mr. Loveday's book is a masterly contribution to the subject of international administration. If it did nothing more than to show that there are real problems and difficult ones in running international institutions, it would have justified itself. Foreign Ministers and senior officials in Foreign Offices, burdened as they are with a workload so heavy that the day is rarely long enough for them to get through it, usually have little knowledge of what is really going on inside the huge and complicated structure of the post-war international institutions; and the average politician—there are of course conspicuous exceptions—is in this as in other matters more noted for his open mouth than his open mind, and he just goes on bawling out whatever are the slogans in vogue. Hence in the last ten years the thousands of tons of paper issued by the international institutions, the tens of thousands of meetings, the millions of pounds spent, and the tens of millions of miles travelled by delegates.

Mr. Loveday leaves no doubt about the ignorance, the illusions, and the insufficient supervision or control of the international institutions. But he does more than this. He entitles his book *Reflections* and insists that he is dealing with only some selected topics. There has of course been selection and for my own part I believe that his book would have been even better if at some point or other he had looked at international organization as a whole as well as at a series of topics, comprehensive though these latter are. That would have put them in their proper context, which includes the *zeitgeist*. The book, too, though a technical treatise, is rather more dry than it need be or, as his astringent or biting phrases here and there show, than he could have written. Ridicule and irony if not the only are certainly the most effective weapons left for puncturing that monstrous balloon—that monstrous inflation of pretence and pretensions, fabricated reputations, and "public relations counselling", as well as of money—that has been blown up in our days to obscure realities. Statistics are available and could have been quoted with great effect on the tonnage of paper used by the U.N. for its reports each year, or the thousands of resolutions to which the governments of the world are now beholden, and so on. But the fact remains that a trained and acute mind, drawing on great experience and exhaustive study, has produced the most authoritative book so far written on international organization. Sections in Foreign Offices dealing with the U.N., Diplomatic Missions to the U.N. and other international bodies, and senior officers in international institutions, will find it to have the same kind of usefulness as the diplomat finds in Satow's *Guide to Diplomatic Practice*.



FEDERALISM, FINANCE AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN CANADA, AUSTRALIA AND THE UNITED STATES. By A. H. Birch. London, Oxford University Press, 1955. Pp. xiv + 314. Index. 35/- stg.

An unusual feature of the Uniform Tax case decided in August 1957 by the High Court is that two leading constitutional lawyers, acting for the Commonwealth, introduced in argument the opinions of a young lecturer in government at the University of Manchester, from his first book. This might be thought a sign of desperation, but lawyers so experienced do not fall for weak arguments, know very well the court's distaste for extraneous submissions, and do not recklessly risk their hard-won professional reputations. It is a high tribute to this book to have been taken so seriously.

Mr. Birch has tackled a difficult subject—in fact nine difficult subjects. True to its title, the book describes the division of legislative powers, the division of taxation and federal grants to the states, and the development of social welfare schemes in each of the three countries. This is done historically, from the beginning of the federal constitution in each country. These nine themes are united in a single thesis: squabbles about money between the central government and the states delay and distort the development of necessary social welfare policies. To calm inter-governmental political controversy what is needed is a settled division of revenues, an agreed method of determining grants, and administrative co-operation between the central government and the states in carrying out welfare measures such as unemployment insurance and assistance, old age pensions, health insurance and family allowances. Australia and the United States have succeeded in working out fairly satisfactory financial arrangements. The Loan Council and the Commonwealth Grants Commission in Australia, and the Social Security Act with its conditional grants and tax-offset device in the United States, are successful institutions which pass Mr. Birch's test that they permit political harmony between the two levels of government. Canada, on the other hand, has been less successful. The breakdown of negotiations over the Rowell-Sirois Commission proposals in 1941 and the Dominion's reconstruction proposals in 1946 are examples of the friction over finance which has bedevilled the development of a welfare state.

Since the 1930's and especially since the second world war in all three countries there has emerged a system of "co-operative federalism", defined simply as "a division of powers between one general and several regional governments, each of which, in its own sphere, is co-ordinated with the others", each acting directly on the people. This is a shortened version of Professor Wheare's definition of federalism, which also requires that each government be limited to its own sphere of action and be, within its sphere, independent of the others. The Australian constitution no longer meets the latter requirements, since some sixty per cent. of State revenues come from Commonwealth sources. Professor Wheare calls Australia "quasi-federal" but Mr. Birch prefers to retain the name of federalism while broadening and modernizing its meaning. There is room in his definition for the increasing use of conditional grants in Canada and the United States, the uniform taxation system in Australia, and the post-war Dominion-Provincial tax-rental agreements under which all of the Canadian provinces except Quebec ultimately gave up their income and corporation taxes in return for compensatory Dominion grants.

Giving new systems an old accepted name does not make them good systems. The history of the word democracy should be proof of that. There is more than a theoretical danger that astute politicians, keeping up a facade of "co-operative federalism", can replace federation with total centralization. Centralization is more efficient, no doubt, but less permissive of regional variation than a federal system. A hint that co-operation may in fact be just another name for central coercion is contained in this sentence from Mr. Birch's discussion of conditional grants in the United States at the turn of the century (page 15): "Federal grants could not of themselves lead to a development of continuous co-operation between administrators until Congress was willing to authorize federal officials to exercise some degree of discretion in their approval of state expenditures." "The basis of political independence is financial independence", Mr. Birch declares (page 25). If that is so, I wonder why he views "co-operative federalism" without alarm. Is it because he regards efficient social services, uniform taxation and redistributive inter-governmental payments as more important than "political independence"? The

political independence of regional governments may seem unimportant to Englishmen, or possibly to Australians, but to a French Canadian in Quebec it may be more important than any amount of money or social services. How else explain the refusal of the Duplessis Government in Quebec to accept the tax rental agreements? Quebecers have paid the same federal income taxes as other Canadians, but their Province has refused more than a hundred million dollars in freely offered compensatory grants because it believes in political independence. More recently Quebec has refused federal grants in aid of universities, unconditional though they are, because Premier Duplessis insists that the provinces have exclusive power to legislate on education and the federal government ought not to encroach on this field by making grants.

One may deplore the results of Mr. Duplessis' stubbornness, just as one deplores the repressive acts of his provincial administration, but his defence of his province's independence compels admiration. Those who value regional political independence will choose Mr. Duplessis' and Professor Wheare's realism about the essentials of a federal system rather than the baited trap of "co-operative federalism". If we seriously want centralized finance and social services (and arguments for them abound) then we should face the fact that it may ultimately mean the abandonment of federalism.

The problem of a book such as this is to keep it short. The subject is huge, Mr. Birch has studied hundreds of books, articles and documents, and the temptation to follow up the side-issues must have been enormous. Mr. Birch has done an excellent job of selecting and insisting that every point is not only relevant but of high priority. For instance, at page 71, he wisely skims over the judicial slanting of the British North America Act toward provincial power, a well-worked theme, and concentrates instead on less familiar political aspects of the shift of power to the provinces. The lack of a bibliography is regrettable, but the footnote references to sources are useful and numerous. An error appears on page 204 where the author mistakenly states that there were no insurance schemes for industrial accidents in Canada in 1946. He seems to have overlooked the long-established workmen's compensation boards at the provincial level. Quite out of keeping with the excellence of the author's language and style is the jarring "a criteria of need" (page 144). Where were the tireless classically-trained editors of Oxford? Slips like this are rare however, and do not seriously detract from the great merit of this book, which deserves a place among the half-dozen indispensable books for students of federal governments.

*University of British Columbia*

DAVID CORBETT

AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL POLITICS AND LAW, 1901-1929. By Geoffrey Sawer, B.A., LL.M. Melbourne University Press, 1956. Pp. 350. £2/17/6.

No student familiar with Professor Sawer's *Cases on the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia* (second edition 1957) and his essay on "The Judicial Power under the Constitution" could approach this, his most recent contribution to an understanding of the structure of our federal system and the interaction of its several organs, without anticipating a lucid, scholarly and rewarding analysis. In the result, that anticipation is at no point disappointed. In this book we have, in effect, an epitome of the political history of the selected period into which, as conspicuous strands, are skillfully woven the personnel of successive governments; the legislative output, motions and procedural determinations of and in eleven parliaments; the dominant issues in debate; the changing scope of governmental action; and the meaning, not always constant, ascribed by the High Court to the sections of the Constitution that litigation brought into focus.

All the references to the material ordered under the several headings into which each of eleven chapters is divided are, of necessity, brief. Such brevity would be tantalizing were it not for Professor Sawer's clarity and concision of statement and the abundance of his footnotes. Indeed his footnotes are by no means the least valuable section of his work for they contain, not only supplementary explanatory matter and illuminating comments or citations, but detailed



references to Parliamentary Debates, Parliamentary Papers and judicial decisions for which all students who wish to follow up in more detail some matter thus located will again and again murmur their thanks.

In this book Professor Sawyer convincingly demonstrates the importance of law reports as sources of material for the historian. One cannot conceive of an adequate history of the Commonwealth of Australia for mature students that has not been deeply informed by recourse to such data. Unfortunately, comparatively few of those who have essayed such a task are themselves sufficiently equipped to use such source material, and their studies have been commensurately circumscribed. Professor Sawyer, on the other hand, follows an issue from the market place to the party room and the legislative chamber, and then, when it is enshrined in a statute, notes, where such is available, the interpretation of that statute by the High Court and the significance of such interpretation.

By thus associating the genesis and the making of a law with the judicial interpretation of it, the learned author also demonstrates the degree to which the politico-social philosophy of a judge may influence his construction of a particular statute. The original members of the High Court, he writes, "had been through a political experience which enabled them to adopt a set of broad assumptions without any feeling that they were departing from the judicial tradition of the common law world. But, as soon as Higgins and Isaacs began to oppose those assumptions with another set, equally strongly held and expressed with some vehemence, then the spectre of judicial politics was raised." He notes, however, "a marked difference of politico-social atmosphere" in the 1923-25 "period of the Court's post-war history" "as compared with that of the decade before the war. By this time, a considerable body of precedents had been established; hence argument and decision could and did become far more a matter of syllogistic or casuistical reasoning from dogmatic jural postulates. Hence also there were no longer obvious divisions into 'parties' based upon divergences in the general view of the Constitution and the general picture of a good society in the minds of the Justices."

By so interrelating opinion, law and judicial decision, our Australian Dicey also explains to the student of our polity how, *inter alia*, it has come to pass that, as construed, that "roughly drafted document", that "meagre set of generalizations", which is the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, has contracted the power of the States and expanded that of the Commonwealth. An arresting example in point is the scope ascribed to the defence power by the High Court in *Farey v. Burvett*, 21 C.L.R. 433. The historian who would explain how, after November 1916, the former Labour Leader, W. M. Hughes, was able as Prime Minister to extend the functions of the Commonwealth in a manner disquieting to the majority of his newly acquired supporters in Parliament, must fall back on this historic judgment, under which, as Professor Sawyer reminds us, the defence power becomes, in time of war, "the pivot of the Constitution", and "could, for practical purposes, turn the Constitution, at least during grave and large scale wars, from a federal into a unitary one". So too, by the same medium, the scope of the federal arbitration power has been expanded until the Federal Court has become, in fact, "an economic legislature".

None of the problems that confronted the Federal Parliament and Courts during the first 29 years of the life of the Commonwealth proved so troublesome as that of industrial relations. It "wrecked governments", Professor Sawyer remarks, "split parties and even made Justice Sir Edmund Barton testy towards his colleagues". Its last victim in the period covered by the volume under review was the Bruce-Page Administration. The resulting election of October 1929 placed J. H. Scullin and Labour in office, fed fat the grudge borne by W. M. Hughes against those who had deposed him in 1923, and denied the Commonwealth the parliamentary services of S. M. Bruce. With a characteristic economy of words, Professor Sawyer states the essence of the issues involved in Bruce's attempt to solve the industrial arbitration problem but, perhaps because of lack of space, he does less than justice to one of Australia's outstanding Prime Ministers and to the then Attorney-General, J. G. Latham, later a Chief Justice of the High Court. He refers to Latham's "excessive attention to logic and insufficient attention to the human aspects of industrial relations", to Bruce's "tendency to rotund and heavy platitudes", and, fully seized of the alternatives then before the Government, adversely criticizes



it for not leaving matters as they were. Hansard's report of the historic debate permits of a different appraisal of the principals in it.

Furthermore there are other references to Bruce that lend colour to the suggestion that he was handicapped by deeply rooted class prejudices. The debate relating to the sale of the Commonwealth Woollen Mills "became largely a personal contest between Scullin and Bruce", writes Professor Sawyer, "in which each revealed the limitations of his class". It is but fair to state that at least some members of private and public audiences, in which Bruce was the dominant figure, detected no such shortcomings, although it is true that he was in the habit of wearing spats and that he did, at times, use his own car on public occasions.

So, also, the author's depiction of Deakin creates a vague feeling of dissatisfaction. Was Deakin not a Liberal of the Herbert Samuel School who favoured radical social reforms because he believed that, if a person was to be truly free, he must be relieved of such handicaps as ignorance, poverty, excessive hours of labour and degrading surroundings, and who, to these ends, was therefore prepared, without subscribing to Utopian, Fabian or Marxian socialism, to enlarge the area of state action? Spice is added by Professor Sawyer to his accounts of personal clashes between Deakin and Hughes by citations from Hughes's invectives, but we are not given the full text of Deakin's reference to "an urchin dragged screaming from the tart shop"—a graphic and incisive image.

Unfortunately, despite achieving a masterpiece of compression, Professor Sawyer has been obliged, by the magnitude of his undertaking, to relegate a number of his pithy summations to his footnotes: e.g. "O'Connor has been under-rated, and Barton over-rated, in Australian professional tradition." Or again: "Theodore's great ability, strength of will and capacity for resolute leadership were effectively neutralised by the association of his name with transactions of a questionable nature." It is to be hoped that time will some day permit Professor Sawyer to present full-length portraits of some of those of whom, perforce, he here has only given thumb-nail sketches. Such a portrayal by him of Dr. Earle Page, for example, could not fail to be refreshing.

Happily, Professor Sawyer is now engaged in the preparation of a volume to carry forward from 1929 the survey brought up to that year by this one. All students of the social sciences interested in Australian affairs will join in the hope that it will soon be made available to them.

Sydney

C. H. CURREY

PARADISE OF DISSENT: SOUTH AUSTRALIA 1829-1857. By Douglas Pike. London, Longmans Green and Co., 1957. 70/- A.

A generation ago, Dr. Grenfell Price was producing scholarly studies of the foundation and the founders of South Australia. His mantle has now fallen upon Dr. Pike, whose *Paradise of Dissent* exemplifies some cardinal virtues of the historian—accuracy and pertinacity of research, significance of theme, distinction of style.

The book is a large one, 516 substantial pages of text supported by two appendices, a table of population and migration and forty odd pages of references. This reviewer thinks it better practice to put each reference at the foot of its appropriate page, but he knows that his protest will not recall the good custom of a past time. He does, however, protest most belligerently against Dr. Pike's scrappy five-page index. Here is a book which both deserves and demands a comprehensive and scholarly index. To cite one example: Dr. Pike discusses in a good many places the ideas and activities of a group of people whom he calls the "self-dependants". These people stood for a policy, or at least an outlook, which had great economic, social and political significance throughout the early decades of South Australian history; but the index ignores their existence. One could cite many similar examples of its inadequacy.

The barrenness of the index is all the more annoying because Dr. Pike makes large demands upon those of his readers who have no previous familiarity with the persons, places, situations and circumstances of the early decades of South Australian history. He has erected so few signposts to the paths that lead through the thickets of his narrative that a reader in—let us

say—Ontario would find it hard to follow him and might decide that the trouble was not worth while. But this would be a pity. The communities of Ontario and South Australia have many things in common, including a strong Protestant *ethos*, the pride of "respectability" and a disposition to think of themselves as patriotic British provinces. Their histories, also, contain contrasts so striking that each vividly illuminates the other. For example, in the very decade of South Australia's foundation, a rebellion broke out in the colony of the United Empire Loyalists. Its leader was an ancestor of the late Mr. MacKenzie King. How could such a thing happen in respectable, conservative Ontario? Why was such a thing unthinkable in respectable, radical South Australia?

The answer to these rhetorical questions is suggested by the adjectives "conservative" and "radical", which must be understood in the context of circumstance, thought and feeling of the 1830's. Although South Australia and Ontario seem today in many respects so similar, it would hardly be an exaggeration to suggest that the Ontario of 120 years ago was an exemplar to the South Australian Founders of what their colony *must never* become. Ontario—or, as it was then called, Upper Canada—possessed a dominant Anglican Church richly endowed through the system of Clergy Reserves. From this original evil of religious inequality, the radicals believed, there followed the consequential civil and political inequalities that were systematised and symbolised in the monstrous "Family Compact". Such evils must never be permitted to root themselves in South Australia; and yet they would inevitably root themselves there unless the South Australians put first things first—unless, that is to say, they put religion first.

Dr. Pike, as the title of his book makes plain, puts religion first. He is, I believe, the first Australian historian of substantial performance to do so. This does not mean that he offers a religious, still less a theological interpretation of events in the political, economic and other spheres of historical development; it means rather that he has a Halévy-like habit of placing the accent upon the religious thought and life of the community and from this base exploring its political and economic activities. Mercifully, he does not propound any new theory of historical method; instead, he uses familiar methods to enlarge and illuminate the field of Australian historical enquiry. He has explored a neglected but very rich territory of fact and idea. It is my guess that some of the younger Australian historians will become his fellow-explorers.

A reviewer ought if possible to epitomise the content of the book he is discussing; but *Paradise of Dissent* is so crowded with personalities, proceedings, arguments, episodes and developments in the religious, political and economic spheres that this reviewer will restrict himself to a few comments on those chapters that seem particularly relevant to the title. It would be quite wrong to infer from the title that Dissenters could muster a numerical majority in early South Australia, for the censuses of the 1840's ascribed to the Church of England more than fifty per cent. of the population. It is true (see p. 264) that in 1844 only eighteen per cent. of the town dwellers who called themselves "Church of England" were attending places of worship, as compared with 87 per cent. of the Roman Catholics, 65 per cent. of the Wesleyans and 58 per cent. of the other Dissenters; but this dilution of religious fervour might not have prevented the Anglicans from sitting as heavily upon South Australia as their co-religionists sat upon Upper Canada, had they possessed comparable privileges and powers. If South Australia did genuinely deserve to be called a Paradise of Dissent, it was because the principle of religious equality was established there.

Not without struggle. Even at the outset, the principle of complete equality between religious denominations was marred by the "chaplaincy clause" of the South Australia Act, which required or permitted the government to make special financial provisions for Church of England (and Church of Scotland) worship. The radical promoters of the South Australian venture, who had made a great song about non-establishment, played down the importance of the chaplaincy clause, although they felt in their hearts that it was a dangerous exception to the principle for which they were contending. During the 1840's the danger became immediate and extreme, not because of any innate aggressiveness among Anglicans (many of whom set as much store as the Dissenters did upon "the voluntary principle") but because

congregations of all denominations were unable or unwilling to give sufficient money for the establishment and maintenance of churches, schools and clergy. In these circumstances, Governor Robe decided that the colony must choose between atheistical neglect of religion and official aid for it. In making and implementing his decision, he tried to dis sever the connection between "establishment" and privilege by providing financial support for *all* denominations.

The Anglicans, Presbyterians, Roman Catholics, Wesleyans and Lutherans accepted money and land from the government; the other denominations rejected it. Even within the acquiescing Churches there were violent divisions of opinion. A League for the Maintenance of Religious Freedom summoned mass meetings, sabotaged the meetings of its adversaries, petitioned the Legislative Council and the Queen. Congregations split on the voluntary principle and sects multiplied. Religious freedom, one gathers, was a matter for more violent debate in churches and halls, in the press and the Legislative Council than were the economic and political questions which were exciting South Australians during the 1840's. Yet all these questions, as Dr. Pike makes us realise, hung together, and were arranged during the 1850's to the satisfaction of a community which was discovering the compatibility between its own versions of radicalism and respectability.

In his last chapter, Dr. Pike enumerates and discusses five roads to respectability of the South Australian brand—"early arrival, thrift, temperance and its illegitimate offspring abstinence, piety, and the ownership of land". He has a feeling, one gathers, that this respectability was achieved too early and subsequently survived too long. Did it engender a mushy South Australian exemplar of the Family Compact? But perhaps the review of so ample and accurate a book ought not to end with such a vague question. Here, then, is a gritty fact. "From 1836 to 1915 Sunday school enrolments far exceeded those of day schools. . . ." But Sunday schools, of course, have no mention in Dr. Pike's index.

Canberra

W. K. HANCOCK

A CENTURY OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT 1856-1956. Edited by F. C. Green. Government Printer, Tasmania, 1957. 21/-.

The centenary of the foundation of New South Wales in 1888 fertilised the writing of important books on Australian history—from the scholar came G. B. Barton's *A History of New South Wales from the Records*, and from the journalist came A. Gayll [F. J. Donohue] *The Bulletin's History of Botany Bay*. In contrast the centenary of the introduction of responsible government was almost barren. The Premiers of the States paid their compliments to the past. R. Windeyer and C. H. Currey read learned papers to the Royal Australian Historical Society in Sydney. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association and the Tasmanian Historical Research Association sponsored the publication of this book.

Several authors have contributed to it. F. C. Green, until 1955 clerk of the House of Representatives in Canberra, has written a lively introduction. Professor Townsley, the Professor of Political Science in the University of Tasmania, has contributed three chapters on constitutional history, one on the history of Parliament, including the relations between the Assembly and the Council, a second on the history of the electoral system, and a third on the history of the Executive. J. Reynolds, the biographer of Edmund Barton, has written some potted biographies of the Premiers and political leaders, while E. C. Briggs and C. K. Murphy, clerks of the Council and the House of Assembly, have done short biographies of Presidents, Speakers, and lists of Ministers, Members and Officers of the Parliament.

The aim of the authors was to record the facts. A writer in a sponsored work has to dispense with criticism, while writers about centenaries have to generate in themselves and in their readers some glow or pride in achievement. The attempt to wed here the tradition of academic scholarship to the traditions or conventions of books for centenaries did not quite succeed. The Introduction was written with gusto, enlivened by a personality and a point of view. In the three chapters on constitutional history the point of view was suppressed, though from time to time the embers from the fire of achievement, kindled by Mr. Green, received a



passing puff. Professor Townsley knows the facts, but did not make up his mind whether to write for his academic colleagues—a task for which he is very well equipped—or to write for posterity. The result is a compromise.

J. Reynolds makes no pretence to write for the academics. His approach reminds one of the biographies of P. Serle in the *Dictionary of Australian Biography*. That is to say, the main facts are there, also some good stories, and a tolerant, understanding all-forgiving-all standard of judgment. One gathers that Tasmanian political leaders came from good families, served with distinction, made their contribution, their attempt to defeat anonymity and then retired. But were they like that?

The shorter biographies of the Presidents and the Speakers compiled by the clerks are modelled on the lives in the Concise D.N.B., and, as such, should be useful as a reference, as indeed should their lists of Ministers, Members and Officers of the Parliament.

In general the biographical and reference sections will be useful to students of Australian history, while the chapters on constitutional history do supplement the very scrappy treatments in Sweetman and Wood. They may also remind mainland historians that Victoria was not the only colony to experience constitutional conflicts, nor New South Wales the only colony to be convulsed by factionalism in the 'seventies and 'eighties. Indeed one of the uses of this book is that it makes it possible for teacher and student to draw examples from Tasmania where before it was easy and traditional to concentrate on Victoria and New South Wales. This book does give the facts of the constitutional history, and it may stir someone to do for 1852-1939 what West did for the early history of Tasmania: to write a history which belongs to its own and succeeding ages.

Canberra

M. CLARK

PRODUCTIVITY AND PROGRESS. Australian Institute of Political Science, edited by John Wilkes. Sydney, Angus & Robertson, 1957. Pp. xxii + 306. 25/-.

AUTOMATION. Second Labour-Management Conference, University of Western Australia, edited by K. F. Walker. University of Western Australia Press, 1957. Pp. ii + 93. 5/-.

THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF AUSTRALIA. By F. G. Davidson. Melbourne University Press, 1957. Pp. 26. 3/6.

It is a happy fact that when representatives of labour and management are brought together to discuss their common problems in the company of academic persons, the result is much more than the usual list of platitudes. The outstanding features of the first two books listed above are the frank recognition of problems by both labour and management and their readiness to indulge in self-criticism.

The papers submitted to the 1957 Summer School of the Australian Institute of Political Science, mainly by industrial relations experts, trade union leaders and business executives, have been published under the title *Productivity and Progress*. What is the importance of productivity increase? What are the determinants of productivity increase? What conflicts arise in the formation and distribution of productivity increase? What is the impact on productivity of the web of rules of institutionalized industrialization? Do different systems of industrial relations produce significant differences in results? These questions are discussed by Professor K. F. Walker of the University of Western Australia and Professor Clark Kerr of Berkeley. The two other "academic" papers are by H. W. Herbert and H. F. Cruise. The former provides estimates of productivity in recent years in Australia, U.K., Canada and U.S.A., based on the somewhat questionable method of deflating incomes per head of population by retail price indexes.

Mr. Cruise's paper on "Restrictive Practices in Australia" is a painstaking piece of research covering four industries—metal trades, metal mining, coal mining and stevedoring; though interspersed are references to experience in other industries. This tightly packed paper makes up nearly a quarter of the book and is in some ways the most valuable part of it.

The trade union views are presented by Sir Charles Geddes, General Secretary of the Union of Post Office Workers (U.K.); Mr. A. E. Monk, A.C.T.U.; and Dr. Lloyd Ross, Secretary N.S.W. Branch of the A.R.U. Trade unions appear to welcome increased productivity provided that the distribution and human effects are properly handled. Sir Charles's paper on "British Trade Unions and Productivity" is a particularly candid statement of some of the difficulties in the way of unions taking a more active role in productivity increases, and he admits that "the more productivity is increased the greater the change at the point of production and the more chance there is of situations developing which lead to strike action".

Management is represented by Sir Harold Hartley, who was Chairman of Council for the Duke of Edinburgh's Study Conference at Oxford, Messrs. J. M. Dixon and R. W. Harvey, Assistant General Manager and Industrial Officer respectively of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, and Mr. G. d'A. Chislett, Secretary, Graziers' Federal Council.

Three points stand out in the "management" group of papers. First, the frank admission that the onus is on management to take the initiative and responsibility for greater productivity. Second, that management has not provided sufficient initiative for greater productivity. And third, the need for more extensive education and training in management.

It is to be hoped that *Productivity and Progress* will be widely read.

One of the more important methods of increasing productivity is through technological change. In recent years, this process has come to be associated with the mysterious word "automation", with visions of robots, space ships and, on the economic side, unemployment.

The Second Labour-Management Conference of the University of Western Australia was devoted to the problem of automation and the papers delivered at this Conference have been published in a slim volume entitled *Automation*. Among the contributors are a trade union official, a representative from management and four professors—engineering, psychology, economics, industrial relations. The result is a balanced, if brief, analysis of the various aspects of automation—what it is; the human problems likely to result from it; the problems for management and unions; the economic problems and the implications for government policy. The main points raised by the Conference are neatly summarized by Professor D. Cochrane.

The brevity of the papers is an advantage. The salient features of automation, so far as they can be anticipated, are brought out succinctly. We are assured that the process is likely to be slow (perhaps too slow) because of capital and skill requirements, that its impact on unemployment is unlikely to be alarming, but that it will require the joint consideration of government, employers and unions.

The size of the Australian sheep population tends to obscure the fact that Australia, in terms of its labour force, is one of the most highly industrialized countries in the world. *The Industrialization of Australia* by F. G. Davidson is an excellent little booklet dealing with the size and distribution of the labour force in manufacturing. He also examines criticism expressed by Colin Clark and others of the "excessive" rate of industrialization.

The statistical tables and the author's comments on them are particularly useful. Statistics from Production Bulletins have been re-grouped into more convenient categories, and statistics from less accessible sources have been included.

Melbourne

J. E. ISAAC

AUSTRALIA IN WORLD AFFAIRS 1950-1955. Edited by Gordon Greenwood and Norman Harper. Published for the Australian Institute of International Affairs. Melbourne, F. W. Cheshire, 1957. Pp. vii + 356. Index. 45/-.

It is now generally accepted that the experience of near invasion by the Japanese and the reliance upon American aid to repel them caused a revolution in Australian international thinking and forced subsequent Australian governments, so used to sheltering behind the "soft clasp of British strength" (p.v) to search for a new basis for the "preservation of the physical integrity" of Australia.

*Australia in World Affairs 1950-1955* is largely concerned with this search in a post-war world in which Australia is no longer geographically isolated, can no longer count on European dominance in Asia and has to face the fact of a serious relative decline in the power of the United Kingdom. The intention of its sponsor, the Australian Institute of International Affairs, is that this book should be a forerunner of a series entitled *Australia in World Affairs* which would provide from time to time an appraisal of the record by Australian scholars. It is to be hoped that future volumes will attain the standard set by the present one, for let it be said immediately that this is an important book which will do much to enhance the prestige of the Institute both in Australia and overseas.

The six years chosen for the first volume, while providing a focus for what are in reality ten distinct essays, have been interpreted loosely by the nine authors. It so happens, for example, that two of the most provocative chapters, "The Australian Community" by Professor Alexander and "Australia and Suez" by Associate Professor Harper largely fall outside the period 1950-1955.

In the course of setting the background of Australia's international outlook and policies Professor Alexander raises some interesting ideas, difficult of clear-cut resolution. Has, for example, the insularity, the contempt for the "Chow" and the "Dago" departed with Pearl Harbour, the post-war Labor Government's authorization of large-scale non-British migration from Europe and the acceptance of Asian students in Australia's universities? From some of the comments made at the time of the Suez crisis it would appear that many Australians still hanker after the good old colonial days in Asia, and recent advocates of "bringing out more Britons" have more than once hinted at the increasing strength of "alien influences" in Australia. In short, the Australian community's views on international affairs appear to be more conditioned by what it has gleaned from school ("I love my country, the British Empire") and from its conservative press than Professor Alexander seems prepared to admit. On most occasions, of course, the well-known lack of public interest in matters of vital concern to Australia leaves Australian international relations and attitudes in the hands of a small minority of politicians, diplomats and commentators, but occasionally on issues such as Suez or the recognition of Communist China one is struck by what can only be called the ossification of the Australian public's ideas and by the bounds this sets to the more enlightened ideas of the minority.

Of this minority the Department of External Affairs receives a well-deserved tribute from Professor Sawyer who reminds us of the high reputation of its officers at United Nations and at the same time of the Department's difficulty in rebutting the ill-informed criticisms of the "simpler sort of socialist or tory" (p. 124) because so much of the information upon which it acts is wholly or in part secret. Some account of the evolution of the Department is given by Professor Alexander, including an interesting resuscitation of the part played by Sir George Pearce in its development.

On Suez Mr. Harper has written a restrained chapter which sets out clearly the course of events as they related to Australia. The division of opinion in the Australian Cabinet, the complete isolation of Australia and New Zealand in support of the United Kingdom, France and Israel in the General Assembly, the failure of London to inform Washington or Canberra (Sir Arthur Fadden, as Acting Prime Minister, admitted that Australia had not even been consulted or informed about the Canal Users' Association) are all chronicled in a low but effective key. Mr. Harper contents himself with the comment that "Mr. Menzies' action (1 November) in committing Australia was probably the last occasion on which automatic support will be given" (p. 356).

In addition to the principal chapters concerning Australia's relations with the United Nations, the Commonwealth of Nations, Asia in general and India in particular, there are separate chapters on the South-West Pacific and on Papua and New Guinea which give a connected account of regions and events rarely if ever discussed in Parliament or the press. The work of the South Pacific Commission, for example, receives an all too rare attention, and the political and economic policies of Australian administration in New Guinea are brought to light. Both these chapters, together with the one on India, bring out the value of outside



criticism of the administration of trust territories, even though Australia tends to regard such administration as an internal matter not subject to the scrutiny of the Trusteeship Council.

In a composite work such as this a certain amount of overlap is inevitable, but in future volumes in this series it may be well for editors to be more severe in pruning out repetitions and the references in different chapters to identical quotations. Some conclusions, rounding off the work and surveying the period as a whole would have been welcome and might have given the book a unity which it tends to lack.

*Adelaide*

R. L. REID

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# Book Notes

CHARLES JOSEPH LA TROBE. By Alan Gross. Melbourne University Press, 1956. Pp. ix + 157. 18/6.

Not a biography nor yet a thorough historical monograph, but a modest, readable, gossipy chronicle of La Trobe's experiences and contributions as Superintendent of the Port Phillip District, 1839-51, and Lieutenant-Governor of Victoria, 1851-4. The book is nicely illustrated with contemporary sketches and prints, and very pleasantly produced.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN NEW ZEALAND. Edited by R. J. Polaschek. New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, Wellington, 1956. Pp. 122. 22/6 A.

Also handsomely printed, this is the fourth collection of papers with an editorial introduction summarising the discussion, from annual conventions of the N.Z. Institute of Public Administration. The authors include public servants, academics and local government administrators, and their analyses, well-documented and frank, show the same problems of local government that are so familiar in Australia—"a profusion of small, static local bodies . . . which . . . cannot deal with the larger problems of the region", resulting in "duplication, high costs, waste, inefficiency and, above all, the lack of broad vision". In considering possible reforms of local government, the authors do not shrink from the question "whether its continued existence serves any useful purpose at all", and some aver that the central government could provide the same services more efficiently and at lower cost, and that without hurting a practically non-existent local civic interest. However, they fall back on the pessimistic conclusion that while such a deliberate revolution is politically unthinkable, unless there is radical revision of the present structure local government will wither away of its own accord through apathy and inaction.

BUSINESS RECORDS AT THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY. By N. G. Butlin. A.N.U., Canberra, 1957. Pp. 11. Copies obtainable without charge from the Department of Economics.

This is a brief account of the collection of business archives being built up by Mr. Butlin, with some discussion of how this collection and similar ones elsewhere may serve the interests both of business men and of historians.

RAISING AGE PENSIONS: A FIVE-POINT PROGRAMME. By R. I. Downing. Melbourne University Press, 1957. Pp. 22. 2/-.

This is a careful and well-argued case for a more reasonable Australian pensions policy, embodying the conclusions reached in discussion over some months between Professor Downing, Ritchie Professor of Research in Economics, and colleagues in various departments of Melbourne University. It represents one of the best kinds of academic contribution to immediate social problems; needless to say, its sober pleas were ignored in the recent Budget which its publication was doubtless intended to influence.

# Problems of Australian Foreign Policy

July-December 1957

By B. D. BEDDIE

## Introduction

In his review of current problems of Australian foreign policy in the last issue of this Journal, Professor Sawyer was able to say: "The general atmosphere in which Australian foreign policy has operated in this period [June 1956 to June 1957] remained much the same as in the previous year." The same cannot be said of the period July to December 1957. In these months Soviet technological and scientific advances, supported by a series of bold diplomatic initiatives, brought the cold war, or at least the popular conception of it, into a new focus. The launching of two relatively heavy earth satellites not only confirmed the Soviet Union's claim to possess long-range missiles, but also showed that in certain crucial fields of pure science Russia was equal to, if not ahead of, the West. The Western notion that the Soviet as a totalitarian state must lag permanently behind in pure, as opposed to applied, science was shaken. It was, of course, not seriously doubted that the United States would, within a reasonably short time, make up the lag in the exploration of outer space and in the perfection of long-range missiles. Nevertheless the West was presented with serious short- and long-term problems. The United States, now threatened by a direct surprise attack on its home territory, urgently sought to obtain intermediate range missile bases on the territories of the European NATO countries. A new element of "inter-dependence" entered into the relations between the United States and its European allies. The bargaining power of the latter was unexpectedly increased and the concept of Europe as a third force took on a new significance. The NATO Heads of States meeting in December 1957 gave clear evidence, though no definition, of the new factors that had been partly crystallised, and partly caused by, events within the Soviet Union in the preceding months. The American request for missile bases was conceded, except in the case of Britain, only in principle and was balanced by the European demand for summit negotiations which, it was hoped, might obviate the necessity for the bases. At the same time, in unofficial circles, especially in Europe but also in the United States, there was widespread discussion of the new strategic and political factors that had entered into the cold war and of the possibility of a negotiated settlement in Europe.

The Australian Government viewed these developments with deep concern. When, at the end of the second parliamentary session, the Government eventually provided time for a debate on foreign policy, Mr. Casey, the Minister for External Affairs, repeatedly stressed the gravity of the international situation. It was, of course, to be expected that the Government should find any relative deterioration in the strength and influence of its allies disturbing. The tone of the Minister's



speech<sup>1</sup> however—his emphasis on “the need to increase our sense of emergency or perhaps rather of urgency”—suggested that, within the general unsettled state of world relations, he felt that Australia’s position was especially insecure. The clue to his pessimism is perhaps to be found in those passages in which he stressed the importance of global security. “. . . The Australian Government”, he said, would like to feel that the NATO partners will not lose sight of the bearing which events in Asia can have on global security and on the effectiveness of their capacity to maintain a barrier to Communist expansion in Europe. Communist strength and the Communist threat are world-wide. Success by NATO in deterring Russian aggression by no means disposed of the threat of Communist expansion. We must expect that everywhere—perhaps particularly in areas far removed from Europe—the Communist powers will probe the possibilities of gaining ground without involving themselves in a nuclear war which they cannot hope to win. They have opportunities for fomenting insurrection, using subversion, guerilla forces and similar tactics. It is a global need not a regional interest to frustrate these tactics. We need the maintenance of armed strength, and, possibly even more important, the elimination of any differences in political attitudes towards situations in the Pacific and south-east Asia and the Middle East. We need full and continuing consultations on all these problems.

The anxiety of the Minister on the point of global security is readily understandable if, as suggested above, the new strategic situation has both increased the importance of the European countries within NATO and their demand to seek a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union. Should negotiations on disarmament<sup>2</sup> or on some kind of disengagement in Europe be undertaken, the inclination of the European powers might be to turn a blind eye to appropriately disguised Soviet encroachments in other parts of the world, especially in Asia. And, in certain circumstances, the United States might find it difficult to resist their demand for a relaxation of pressure in Europe, even though it should involve concessions elsewhere.

Whether or not it was considerations of this kind that the Minister had in mind early in December 1957, he proceeded to express an almost unqualified opposition to the current demand for summit negotiations with the Soviet Union.

If there was the slightest chance of a summit conference having even modest prospects of reaching agreement on the basic issues which divide the world—then no man in his senses and no country could disagree with it being held. But the simple and gloomy fact is that there is no evidence whatsoever that such a conference would do more good than harm. . . . Russia started the cold war shortly after the end of the last war in 1945. . . . No conciliation, no getting together, no discussions at however high a level are likely to make the Communists abandon it. There is no more dangerous term than ‘conciliation’ when we are grappling with the Communist threat of expansion and their aim of subjugation of the non-Communist world.

<sup>1</sup>*Current Notes*, Vol. 28, No. 12, Dec. 1957, pp. 965, ff.

<sup>2</sup>In the disarmament discussions in the First Committee of the General Assembly Dr. Walker expressed opposition to any negotiations which omitted to take account of China’s forces (*ibid.*, Vol. 28, No. 10, Oct. 1957, p. 804).

Mr. Casey's attitude on these issues, therefore, was identical with the views then held but shortly, under European pressure, to be modified by the United States Secretary of State.<sup>3</sup>

Whereas the Minister for External Affairs opposed a summit conference on the principle that, while the cold war lasts, negotiations with Russia are largely futile and often dangerous, the Leader of the Opposition supported such a conference on the even more general principle that meetings of Heads of States are always desirable. Dr. Evatt's criticism of the Government's rejection of a summit conference at this particular stage was weakened by the generality of his approach. In espousing the questionable thesis that high level negotiations must at all times lead to a lessening of international tension, he almost completely lost sight of the quite special strategic and political factors which, in the opinion of a great many informed commentators in Europe and America, make the present an appropriate time for negotiations. He failed to make the point that, even if the Government's estimate of the Soviet's motives was correct, there might still be a case for not adopting the inflexibly negative attitude of the Minister for External Affairs, for not permitting the Soviet to monopolise the diplomatic initiative and for not necessarily attempting to preserve at all costs a *status quo* which is highly precarious and possibly favours the Soviet Union. Opposition speakers might also have devoted more critical attention to the Minister's plea for global security. While, in general terms, global security is of the greatest importance for Australia, Mr. Casey's proposals for obtaining it, namely, a closer drawing together of NATO, the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, left many questions unanswered. Too close a co-ordination of these treaties could well reduce the strength of the West's defensive chain to its weakest link. Moreover, the temper of the NATO powers at the time of Mr. Casey's speech, and subsequent comment in the British press,<sup>4</sup> seems clearly to indicate that, however much Australia might want co-ordination of the defensive treaties, the chances of realising it, except in a merely formal way, were slim.

### **Indonesia and West New Guinea**

The nineteen-nation resolution requesting the Twelfth General Assembly to invite Holland and Indonesia to resume negotiations on the "Question of West Irian" differed only in formal respects from the resolution which had been submitted to the previous session less than nine months previously.<sup>5</sup> Except in matters of detail, the discussion of the question raised no new issues. Nevertheless, in the second half of 1957, the future status of West New Guinea became a topic of widespread concern in Australia. This was because of the internal dissension and the threatened re-orientation in foreign policy that accompanied Indonesia's complaint to the United Nations.

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<sup>3</sup>The caution of the Minister and his strict adherence to U.S. lines of policy may be contrasted with the two rather more daring sorties which the Prime Minister made into foreign affairs when, in July, he outlined a reform in U.N. procedures and when, in November, he outlined the conditions for a negotiated settlement in the Middle East (see *ibid.*, Vol. 28, No. 7, July 1957, p. 588 and Vol. 28, No. 10, Oct. 1957, p. 826).

<sup>4</sup>e.g. the *London Times*, 14 March 1958: "To think that the linking of all three pacts will strengthen each is the worst kind of Maginot line mentality. In Asia especially a military ring will do nothing to stop the spread of the Communist idea."

<sup>5</sup>For the text of the resolution and for the main statements made on it in the First Committee see *Current Notes*, Vol. 28, No. 11, Nov. 1957, pp. 885, ff.

From the end of 1956, a deep-seated crisis had been developing within Indonesia.<sup>6</sup> Following an attempted *coup* by a group of army officers, certain provinces in Sumatra defied the authority of the central Government in December 1956. In March 1957 the autonomy movement spread to East Indonesia and, shortly after, the Ali Sastroamidjojo Government resigned. President Soekarno proclaimed national emergency law and warned that unless the military revolts in the areas outside Java were checked the state would disintegrate. A month earlier Soekarno had outlined his plans for a new form of "guided democracy" involving the formation of an all-party government and of a National Council which, on a functional basis, would represent the whole community and would exercise supervision over the Cabinet. According to his proposals, the Communist Party was to receive an adequate degree of representation in the Cabinet and in the National Council. The President's plan evoked widespread criticism and he was not able fully to implement it. Nevertheless, when the parliamentary leaders failed to form a new government, Soekarno announced that he would select an "emergency extra-Parliamentary Cabinet of experts". The new Government, led by Dr. Djuanda, in fact included both party politicians and non-party experts. Three of its members were reported to have distinct Communist sympathies. In May an emergency law establishing a National Council was promulgated, but Djuanda was at pains to insist that its purpose was not to usurp the authority of Parliament or of Cabinet. Despite these departures from the Constitution in favour of Soekarno's "Conception", the policies of the Djuanda Government were cautious, conciliatory and ineffective. Unsuccessful attempts were made to bring about a new accord among the armed commanders, to pacify the outer provinces and to re-establish the *Dwitungal* (the dual leadership of Soekarno and Hatta).

To Australians it seemed incomprehensible that a government which had lost effective control of a great part of its territory, which, even in Java, was uncertain of its armed commanders, and which was faced by an acute economic crisis, should regard the sovereignty of West New Guinea as a matter of prime national interest. Hence when in October as a prelude to the United Nations debate on the issue the Indonesian Minister for Information launched a campaign for the liberation of West Irian, it was widely believed both in official and unofficial circles in Australia that he was simply seeking to divert public attention from domestic ills.<sup>7</sup> There may, of course, have been something in this rather glib explanation of Indonesian motives. But inasmuch as it led to the conclusion that the Indonesian campaign for West New Guinea was not in earnest and would not be pursued to the point of the "irrational" disregard of their "real" national interests, it proved to be highly misleading. Whatever the motives that inspired them, it now seems clear that Indonesian leaders of all parties and from all areas were agreed in pushing the West Irian issue to the limit before the Twelfth Assembly.

It might be argued that had the Dutch and Australian Governments fully appreciated the state of Indonesian feeling they would have chosen a different

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<sup>6</sup>For the political background to the internal crisis in Indonesia see articles by J. M. van der Kroef in *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. XXVI, Nos. 4 and 8, Ap. and Aug. 1957.

<sup>7</sup>See, for example, *Sydney Telegraph*, 13 Nov. 1957.



time—either earlier or later—to issue their Joint Statement on Co-operation in New Guinea. Appearing on 6 November, a short time after the launching of the West Irian campaign in Indonesia and before the matter was to be debated in the First Committee of the Assembly, the immediate effect of the statement may have been simply to strengthen Indonesian intransigence. This is not to deny, of course, that in the longer term the statement may provide an important and reasonable basis of policy. In it the Australian and Netherlands Governments stated:<sup>8</sup> (1) that their policies in the territories of New Guinea for which they are responsible are based on the interests and inalienable rights of the inhabitants in conformity with the provisions and spirit of the U.N. Charter; (2) that, since the territories of New Guinea are geographically and ethnically related, the future development of their respective populations must benefit from co-operation in policy and administration; (3) that such co-operation will be pursued by co-ordinating policy in the fields of political, economic, social and educational development; (4) that the co-operation existing between the two administrations will be strengthened; (5) that this process will be developed “until such time as the inhabitants of the territories concerned will be in a position to determine their own future”. The statement was followed by talks in Canberra between Dr. Helders, the Netherlands Minister for Overseas Territories, Mr. Casey and Mr. Hasluck.

Indonesian Government spokesmen condemned the Joint Statement as an attempt to influence the peaceful solution of Indonesia's claim to West New Guinea. They also suggested that it could be interpreted as a first step towards a military alliance between Australia and the Netherlands. This interpretation was vigorously rejected by the Australian Government. In denying the rumour that Australia had sent troops to Merauke in Dutch New Guinea, Mr. Casey, using stronger language than usual, connected this “fantastic story” with “a deliberate campaign of falsification from the mouths of responsible ministers of the Government of Indonesia”.

On 18 November representatives of political, military and youth organisations reportedly from all parts of Indonesia met in Djakarta and urged the Government to take retaliatory measures against Dutch economic interests if the United Nations did not solve the West Irian question in Indonesia's favour. The meeting urged the establishment of a “West Irian Reconstruction Brigade” and a “West Irian Liberation Fund”. Dr. Hatta supported the stand of the meeting.

In opening the debate on West New Guinea in the First Committee of the General Assembly,<sup>9</sup> the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Dr. Subandrio, studiously avoided technical issues. While clearly implying that Indonesia already possessed legal sovereignty over the territory, he based his appeal for the resumption of negotiations on other considerations. He claimed that West Irian was “an integral part of the former Netherlands East Indies” and that Indonesia, as the successor state, was therefore entitled to it on historical grounds. “Indonesian unity”, he said, “is based not on any theory of racial or ethnical unity but on a unity derived through centuries of living together, which is the true meaning and test of nationality.” Hence, while admitting the special ethnical character of the people

<sup>8</sup>For full text see *Current Notes*, Vol. 28, No. 11, Nov. 1957, p. 882.

<sup>9</sup>*ibid.*

of West New Guinea, he denied that this meant that they should be accorded the right of self-determination. He argued that Indonesia was capable of developing West New Guinea whereas the Dutch for all their technical ability, lacked the "feelings of equality and of brotherhood" which are

the most essential requirements in promoting technical and managerial know-how among people. . . . Let us beware of repeating past misdeeds towards our fellow human beings by allowing West Irian to be turned into a colony for white settlers, thus freezing the present status of the Indonesians, the native population in that territory.<sup>10</sup>

Turning to a rather different kind of argument, Dr. Subandrio asked the United Nations to consider the serious consequences that might ensue should Indonesia in being deprived of West New Guinea either disintegrate or change its attitude to the Western military alliances that "have been established in Asia to stem the possible expansion of foreign ideologies".

In rebuttal of the Indonesian case the Netherlands and Australian representatives argued that, since Indonesia claimed that West New Guinea was already an integral part of its territory, the question of sovereignty must be fully investigated. The proper organ to deal with it was not the General Assembly but the International Court. While the Netherlands had offered to seek a ruling from the Court Indonesia had refused to do so. Legally the claim of Indonesia had been further weakened by its abrogation in 1956 of the very agreements (The Round Table Conference Agreements of 1949) under which, according to the Indonesian Government, the Netherlands had surrendered its sovereignty over the whole of the former N.E.I. Indonesia's request that the General Assembly should deal with the West New Guinea situation on the ground that it constituted a threat to the peace should not be allowed since it was clear that the Indonesian Government had consciously set out to manufacture a threat to the peace. Finally, the Netherlands and Australian representatives insisted that the people of New Guinea, because they are ethnically and culturally distinct, must eventually be permitted to exercise the right of self-determination. "Indeed the choice", Dr. Walker said, "is between annexation and self-determination. Annexation by Indonesia or self-determination by the Papuans of western New Guinea."

The final voting on the nineteen-nation resolution in the General Assembly on 29 November was 41 in favour, 29 against, 11 abstaining. Since a two-thirds majority is required for decisions of this kind the resolution was lost. The main support for the Indonesian case came from the Afro-Asian and the Soviet blocs. Included among the countries voting for the resolution were some which are connected with Western security arrangements—Greece, Japan, Laos, Malaya, Pakistan and Thailand. The representative of the Philippines supported the resolution in the Political Committee, but was absent from the plenary session. Nationalist

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<sup>10</sup>This was the closest that Dr. Subandrio came to an attack on white colonization in New Guinea. Inasmuch as the claim to West New Guinea is based on the evils of white colonization, logic would require Indonesia to extend its claim to Australia's territories. By relying primarily on the historical relation between West New Guinea and the former N.E.I., the Indonesian Government has sought to convince the world that it has no designs on eastern New Guinea.

China was the only Asian country to vote against the resolution. The United States was included among the countries that abstained.

Speaking after the vote, Dr. Subandrio said:

Up to now we have done our utmost to conduct our policy in such a way as to discourage any action which might lead to disturbances in the territory under dispute and its surroundings. To uphold this policy now would be an impossible task for any Indonesian Government. . . . We have no alternative course apart from action outside the United Nations.

At the conclusion of his speech the Minister addressed his remarks specifically to Australia:

Towards our closest neighbour, Australia, I should like to say this. Our security in many fields are [*sic*] interlocked with each other. In this context, the Indonesian people do not understand why the Australian Government harbours aspirations toward West Irian. Either in terms of defence or economics, Indonesia as a whole is far more important for Australia than the territory of West Irian alone. We hope that at this very juncture, where there is a growing desire in both countries to give full substance to their relationship, the establishment of close friendship will not be blurred by the incomprehensible attitude of the Australian Government on the problem of West Irian. Once Australia realizes that Indonesia as a whole is more important than a Netherlands colonial enclave in West Irian, then I think we will have achieved our aim in laying the basic foundations of peace and security in that region.

On 1 December the Minister of Information, acting as Chairman of the Action Committee for the Liberation of West Irian, authorised certain reprisals against Dutch economic interests and especially K.L.M. airline operations. This action, possibly designed merely to bring pressure upon the Dutch to reconsider the West New Guinea question, set off a popular movement, led to a greater or less degree by Communist dominated trade unions, for the confiscation of all Dutch enterprises. In an attempt to gain control over this movement, the Government had virtually to acquiesce in the principles of confiscation. On 5 December the Minister for Justice announced a plan for the expulsion or repatriation of the Dutch nationals in Indonesia. Four days later all Dutch-owned estates and plantations were placed under the control of the Government pending a settlement of the West New Guinea question. At the same time the Government and the army (General Nasution was now acting as General Military Administrator) warned the public and workers against excesses and illegal seizures.

At the request of the Netherlands Government the Indonesian situation was discussed by the North Atlantic Council on 8 December. What Holland expected of its NATO partners is not clear, but it is understood that the Dutch representative appealed to them to display a common front of opposition to the actions of the Indonesian Government. The other members of NATO apparently refused this request and satisfied themselves with an expression of sympathy for Holland.

Throughout the December crisis the Australian Government adhered to its policy of firmness combined with restraint. While repudiating Indonesian suggestions that it was contemplating the use of force, it maintained its solidarity of



interest with Holland offering both to assist in the evacuation of Dutch refugees and, if necessary, to receive them in Australia. Early in the month the Australian Government was reported to be seriously concerned about the possibility of an imminent Communist *coup* in Java. When Cabinet met on 11 and 12 December it gave detailed consideration to the Indonesian situation. After the Cabinet discussions, the Minister for External Affairs issued a statement<sup>11</sup> designed to quieten the feelings both of the Australian public and of the Indonesian Government. Though slightly avuncular in tone the statement was otherwise a masterpiece of caution, restraint and firmness. It asked the Indonesian Government to consider "both quietly and justly" the ultimate consequences which it might draw upon itself if, as a relatively weak nation, it disregarded the United Nations and if, as a poor nation, it permitted or encouraged action which "will gravely discourage the introduction of foreign capital".

The immediate response to the Australian statement was not encouraging for, on the day after it was issued, the Indonesian Government drew up a communiqué re-defining the extent of Indonesian territorial waters. It claimed that

all waters around between and connecting the islands or parts of the islands belonging to the Indonesian state, irrespective of their width or dimension are . . . an integral part of the island or national waters subject to the absolute sovereignty of Indonesia. The peaceful passage of foreign vessels through its waters is guaranteed as long and insofar as it is not contrary to the sovereignty of the Indonesian State or harmful to its security. The delimitation of the territorial sea with a width of twelve nautical miles shall be measured from straight base lines connecting the outermost points of the islands of the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>12</sup>

This claim was clearly unacceptable to the main maritime powers in the Pacific (United States, United Kingdom and Japan) and especially unacceptable to Australia whose sea routes to Singapore were affected by it.

A more conciliatory attitude was evident in the Memorandum, circulated on 19 December, by the Indonesian Permanent Mission to the United Nations.<sup>13</sup> The Memorandum contained statements which may yet be important in future negotiations if a moderate or conservative government emerges from the present crisis. "The temporary assumption", it read,

by the Government of administrative control over Dutch enterprises is designed to avoid excesses by extreme elements and, at the same time, to prevent owners from taking measures disruptive of the national economy. It is, consequently, incorrect to interpret this assumption of administrative control as an act of confiscation or of nationalisation. Dutch enterprises have been placed under a supervisory council by the Government in order to preserve authority and secure the continuity of these enterprises in the national interest.

The Memorandum also denied that it was intended to expel the 46,000 or more Dutch nationals in Indonesia. On 23 December the Netherlands representative to the U.N. circulated a letter questioning certain of the arguments in the Indonesian

<sup>11</sup>*Current Notes*, Vol. 28, No. 12, Dec. 1957, pp. 978-9.

<sup>12</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>For full text see *ibid.*

Memorandum and referring both the taking over of Dutch property and the expulsion of Dutch nationals to the Security Council and to the General Assembly.

The policy pursued by the Australian Government in regard to West New Guinea received fairly general support from within the country. The Leader of the Opposition limited himself to mild and cautious suggestions about the possibility of following a more conciliatory policy.<sup>14</sup> The solution to the problem, he said, was contained in a decision made by the Federal Conference of the A.L.P. two years ago.

A mutual regional pact for security and welfare should be negotiated between Australia, Holland and Indonesia. The pact should aim at promoting the security of the entire area of Indonesia and New Guinea. . . . We want to conciliate and take an attitude that will prevent threats and counter-threats.

Did Dr. Evatt mean by these words that Australia should support the nineteen-nation resolution which, after all, only called upon the parties (Indonesia and Holland) to resume negotiations? Apparently not, for Indonesia had left no doubt that the purpose of resuming negotiations was to settle the sovereignty of West New Guinea.<sup>15</sup> Dr. Evatt took the precaution of saying that "the United Nations cannot be expected to decide the issue" (*i.e.* the issue of sovereignty). But if he did not mean that the nineteen-nation resolution should be supported it is difficult to see what he did have in mind. As Mr. Casey said, in a comment on Dr. Evatt's suggestion, "a regional pact would be no solution whatsoever to the present problem of Dutch New Guinea which is solely one of disputed sovereignty. The Right Honourable Gentleman has proposed a cure for a particular disease which is not the disease that is current."

While then there was little direct criticism of the Government's policy, there is no doubt that throughout Australia in the last six months there has been much re-thinking of the whole West New Guinea problem. Recent events in Indonesia have strengthened the conviction that that country is unlikely to succeed in promoting either the welfare or security of West New Guinea. On the other hand, the same events have emphasised that West New Guinea could in certain circumstances tip the scales between Communist and non-Communist forces in Indonesia. If such circumstances arose would Australia prefer a non-Communist Indonesia with sovereignty over part of New Guinea to a Communist Indonesia deprived of, but violently demanding, West New Guinea?

Two other factors have entered into Australian thinking about West New Guinea. The first relates to the position of Holland. In recent years and especially in recent months, reasons of national prestige have strengthened the Dutch determination to defend their right to West New Guinea; they have been disinclined to give way before what they regard as broken promises and unjustified threats on the part of Indonesia. But, assuming that to remain in New Guinea the Dutch

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<sup>14</sup>His statement, made in the House of Representatives on 14 Nov. 1957, is reprinted in *ibid.*, Vol. 28, No. 11, Nov. 1957, p. 883.

<sup>15</sup>Dr. Evatt's statement preceded the debate in the First Committee and it would appear that Dr. Subandrio's remarks on the issue of sovereignty may have been influenced by what Dr. Evatt had said. Even so, as Dr. Walker pointed out, Dr. Subandrio did not really say that the question of sovereignty should be waived but only that the Netherlands should waive it.

will have to continue to incur substantial costs for development and for defence and to sacrifice whatever good will they may retain in Indonesia, how long can they be expected to desire to stay there? If at any particular time Holland did decide to withdraw there may be little or nothing that Australia could do to withhold West New Guinea from Indonesia.

The second factor relates to the future policy of the United States. Although the United States abstained from voting in the General Assembly, it is common knowledge that a section of opinion within the State Department considered that the Indonesian request for negotiations should have been supported. In the present state of affairs the United States would be unlikely to prejudice its good relations with Holland, a member of NATO, and Australia, a member of SEATO, to support a disintegrating neutralist Indonesia. But suppose that Indonesia emerges from its present crisis and becomes reasonably stable under a conservative pro-Western Government. Could the United States then afford to alienate it by refusing to lend positive support to its demand for West New Guinea?

The conclusion that Australians, or at least their Government, have drawn in the light of these possibilities is that in future the West New Guinea issue will call for a more subtle diplomacy than that which has been employed in the past. The Joint Netherlands-Australian Statement of 6 November provides a possible basis for such a diplomacy. By emphasising the right of self-determination of the inhabitants of New Guinea and by co-ordinating their administrative activities throughout the whole country, Australia and Holland are better placed to parry accusations of colonialism. They can also speak of the possibility of an emergence of an independent New Guinea or Melanesia. There are some (for example, Sir Wilfred Kent Hughes) who think that Australia and Holland should now definitely proclaim their objective as being the creation of such a state. The objections to such a policy are, first, that it encourages the notion (which the Afro-Asian and the Russian blocs are bound to exploit) that the New Guinea people are more advanced and closer to the threshold of nationalism than they in fact are. The second objection is that to proclaim a national ideal for the territories of New Guinea is not altogether consistent with guaranteeing their right of self-determination. When the time comes they may prefer not to attempt to establish their own state, but to join Australia or Indonesia. Whether for these or other reasons, the Government has so far consistently refused to particularise the very general ideas of the Joint Statement. While it has thus retained room for diplomatic manoeuvre in the future, it may, if events move quickly, find itself lacking any definite defensive position.

## Japan

After lengthy negotiations, beginning in 1956, Australia and Japan signed a Treaty of Commerce on 6 July 1957.<sup>16</sup> The purposes of the Treaty were, first, to provide a firmer basis for the substantial trade which had already developed between the two countries; secondly, to make possible an expansion in the volume of their

<sup>16</sup>For the statement on the Treaty by the Minister for Trade see *Current Notes*, Vol. 28, No. 7, July 1957, pp. 580, ff. See also the *Oriental Economist*, Vol. 25, No. 562, Aug. 1957.



trade; and, thirdly, to enable Japan's highly unfavourable balance of trade with Australia to become somewhat more favourable. While it is generally recognised that Japan's balance of trade with Australia will, under all conceivable circumstances, continue to be unfavourable, the position before the treaty was, from her point of view, aggravated by the existence of special discriminations against the entry of Japanese goods into this country. In 1956-7 Japanese exports to Australia were only ten per cent. of Australian exports to Japan, and this was partly due to the fact that Japanese products entering Australia not only paid duty under the highest tariff schedule, but were also subject to special discrimination by the licensing authorities. Had this position been allowed to continue there was a distinct possibility that Japan would have retaliated against Australian exports either by imposing an excise tax on wool or by entering into bilateral arrangements with other countries to supply her with the commodities which she has hitherto purchased in Australia. Under the trade agreement Australia agreed to abolish discrimination directed specifically against Japanese goods and, in the matter of tariffs, to grant her most-favoured-nation treatment. At the same time Australia reserved the right to impose special restrictions should Japanese goods threaten serious injury to local producers. The Japanese Government also declared that it would maintain a "voluntary restraint" on exports that might severely damage Australian industries.

In return for these concessions, the Japanese Government extended to Australia most-favoured-nation treatment in tariff matters and gave guarantees that Australian products would not be subject to special import or exchange controls. The Japanese Government also entered into undertakings concerning the treatment of specific Australian commodities. It agreed not to impose a duty on wool for three years and to make ninety per cent. of its total foreign exchange for wool available on a global basis (that is on a basis which will enable Australian wool freely to compete with the wool of other nations). Specific undertakings likely to increase Japanese purchases from Australia were also obtained in respect of wheat, sugar, barley and other commodities.

The Government justified the treaty on the grounds that, negatively, it would serve to prevent a contraction of Japanese buying in Australia and that, positively, it would provide the basis for an expansion of our exports. To secure these advantages Australia had to be prepared to import a greater volume of Japanese products. The Minister for Trade, however, confidently maintained that, under the safeguards written into the treaty, the increased quantity of Japanese exports could be absorbed without serious damage to local industries and without causing unemployment. While the Government insisted that the treaty was justifiable on purely economic grounds it also admitted that there were political reasons for entering into it. There is perhaps no country in the world more dependent on overseas markets for its livelihood than Japan. Her internal affairs depend upon her ability to find satisfactory markets in the non-Communist world. Since Australia, however reluctantly, has come to rely on a defensive system in which Japan is a key factor, it was only logical that the Government should be prepared to do something to ease the Japanese balance of payments problem.

It was also only natural that the Labor Party should have been critical of the treaty. Not only has that party been traditionally more suspicious of Japan than the Liberal Party, but it also has had doubts about the wisdom of the security systems with which Australia has become associated. In addition, it was genuinely concerned about the economic effects of the agreement on domestic production (especially textile production) and employment. It rightly pointed out that an expansion of our imports from Japan could only take place at the expense of our imports from Britain. But, unless one takes into account the party's need to make political capital, it is not understandable why it should have exploited opposition to the treaty in the irresponsible way that it did. The soundness of its predictions about the dire economic effects of the treaty have yet to be proved. What the debate has showed decisively, however, is that Labor's professed internationalism and sympathy for Asia can in a concrete case be converted into a narrow parochialism which seeks to justify itself by seriously misrepresenting conditions in a foreign country.

On 28 November Mr. McEwen outlined the procedure that would be followed in determining whether as a result of the operation of the agreement, Japanese imports were in fact doing serious damage to Australian industries. Industries likely to be adversely affected were invited by the Government to form panels which could consult with the Department of Trade and make representations to the Minister for protection against Japanese competition. Mr. M. E. McCarthy, retiring Chairman of the Tariff Board, was appointed to advise the Minister on what action, if any, should be taken in respect of the panels' representations. By the end of 1957, the Minister had received a few representations asking for emergency action. None of the representations was accepted. From the evidence so far available, it appears that the Japanese Government has been fulfilling its promise to watch the situation carefully and to exercise voluntary restraint on its exporters.<sup>17</sup>

The Australian-Japanese *rapprochement* was carried a step further when the Japanese Prime Minister, Mr. Kishi, visited this country early in December. The visit was carefully arranged and occasioned virtually no hostile demonstrations and relatively few protests. Equally, as was to be expected, it evoked little popular enthusiasm. The Prime Ministers of each country delivered carefully prepared addresses designed to impress upon the public that relations between the two Governments were now normal and even cordial. "Each of our nations", Mr. Menzies said,

has a destiny in the Pacific and in the world. Japan's destiny is not to be a mere cog in somebody else's machine. It is to be a great power in a community of great powers. Australia is taking its part in easing the entry of Japan once more into the community of nations.<sup>18</sup>

Mr. Kishi replied:

It is over 12 years since hostilities ceased and over six since the formal conclusion of peace. Notwithstanding that passage of time it is my official duty, and my personal desire, to express

<sup>17</sup>See articles in *Australian Financial Review* of 12 Dec. 1957 and 27 Feb. 1958.

<sup>18</sup>As quoted in *Sydney Morning Herald* on 5 Dec.

to you, and through you to the people of Australia, our heartfelt sorrow for what occurred in the war.

One of the main objects of Mr. Kishi's earlier visits to the United States and to Asia had been to promote Japanese plans for "economic co-operation in south-east Asia". The responses he received were less than enthusiastic. The language of the Joint Communiqué issued at the end of Mr. Kishi's visit to Canberra suggests that the Australian Government was reluctant to commit itself on this issue. "The Prime Ministers welcomed the international programmes already being conducted, and they discussed ways in which Australia and Japan might, through the Colombo Plan and in other ways, co-operate in furthering economic development in south-east Asia."<sup>19</sup>

### Viet Nam and Laos

The circumstances in which the Republic of Viet Nam was brought into existence have rendered it difficult for it to obtain the confidence of other nations. The Australian Government, however, from the time of the Geneva settlement in 1954 has sought to encourage and to lend support to the Government of President Ng Dinh Diem. Shortly after the President had returned from his trip to the United States in May of this year, it was announced that he would later visit Australia. He arrived here in September and entered into official talks which were reported to have been "frank and cordial, reflecting the close and happy relations between Viet Nam and Australia". In a Joint Statement<sup>20</sup> issued after the talks the Australian Government endorsed the President's view that Viet Nameese unity could not be achieved "while the presence of a Communist régime prevented the genuinely free expression of the will of the people living there", and stated that it regarded "the security and welfare of Viet Nam as most important to all countries of south-east Asia and the Pacific". Later in 1957, President Diem also visited India where, despite the previously strained relations between the two countries, he was apparently well received.

The satisfaction that the Australian Government was able to find in the relative stability of South Viet Nam was offset by developments in Laos.<sup>21</sup> The Geneva agreement of 1954 failed to lay down a final settlement of the political situation in Laos. It simply stated that the fighting units of the *Pathet Lao* (a movement closely affiliated to the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists) were to move into two northern provinces and were to remain there, retaining their arms, until a political settlement had been reached. At the same time, the Royal Government declared that it would take measures to "integrate" all citizens into the national community and, pending the holding of elections, to extend representation in the Royal administration to the provinces controlled by the *Pathet Lao*. Over two years passed before any progress was made towards a political settlement. Agreement was eventually reached in December 1956. The implementation of the agreement was impeded, however, when the *Pathet Lao* increased their conditions by demanding that they be given four, instead of two, Cabinet seats and that the

<sup>19</sup>*Current Notes*, Vol. 28, No. 12, Dec. 1957, p. 694.

<sup>20</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. 28, No. 9, Sept. 1957, pp. 742, ff.

<sup>21</sup>For recent developments in Laos see *World Today*, Oct. 1957, and *Economist*, 11 Jan. 1958.



Government accept economic aid from Communist China. The Royal Government refused to accede to these demands and in November 1957 the *Pathet Lao* eventually accepted the terms of the 1956 agreement.<sup>22</sup> In return for regaining control over the two northern provinces, the Royal Government had to concede to the *Pathet Lao* (1) two Cabinet seats; (2) the integration of 1,500 *Pathet Lao* troops into the Royal Army and the restoration of full civil rights to the remainder of their troops; (3) integration of *Pathet Lao* officials into the civil service; and (4) the right of *Pathet Lao* sympathisers to form a political party.

Supplementary elections for 21 parliamentary seats are to be held in May 1958. While the *Pathet Lao* cannot win sufficient seats in these elections to control the Parliament, there is a distinct danger, unless the Royal Government abandons its present complacency, that they will be in a strong position to contest the general elections scheduled to be held in 1959.

Commenting on the situation in Laos, in his statement on foreign affairs of 5 December, Mr. Casey said:

We can sympathise with the desire of the Laotian people to re-unite their country, but it will be a tragedy for them and for the rest of the area if, in their eagerness to achieve re-unification, they have accepted a settlement which affords the Communists the opportunity to bring the country into the orbit of Communist domination. The geographical position of Laos is such that Communist penetration of this country would threaten the security of the whole of South East Asia.

More particularly, it can be said that the situation diminished the effectiveness of SEATO. Laos, though not a member of SEATO, is a "designated" state under the treaty and, as such, is protected against external attack or internal subversion. But before the SEATO powers can act in the territory of Laos, the Laotian Government must invite them to do so, or at least consent to their doing so. The likelihood of its making such a request has been diminished by the November settlement, especially by the admission of *Pathet Lao* representatives into the Government.

If, as is not improbable, the *Pathet Lao* should for the time being strictly adhere to the November settlement, their restraint will also be embarrassing to the West and to the SEATO powers. For in this event the Communist claim that internal co-existence is workable will seem to be confirmed and the pressure to extend the same kind of settlement, *mutatis mutandis*, to Korea, Viet Nam, Burma and Malaya may be hard to resist.

Hence while the security of a vital part of the SEATO area may now be dependent on the *Pathet Lao's* observing their agreement with the Royal Government, the successful functioning of the agreement could encourage developments which, from the point of view of the SEATO powers, would eventually weaken the whole of South-East Asia. In the meantime, the SEATO Governments, not least the Australian Government, are placed in the awkward position of having equally to condemn all Communist policies whether violent or apparently conciliatory. So long as the Communists choose to promote the tactic of peaceful co-existence such condemnation may only serve to commend them in the eyes of neutrals and waverers.

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<sup>22</sup>See Joint Communiqué, *Current Notes*, Vol. 28, No. 11, Nov. 1957, pp. 913, ff.

## **The European Market and the Free Trade Area**

In March 1957 France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg signed the Treaty of Rome providing for the creation of a European Common Market.<sup>23</sup> The Treaty officially became effective on 1 January 1958. In 1959 the six powers will take the first step towards the eventual elimination of their internal tariff and the establishment of a common external tariff.

Apart from its provisions on tariffs, the Treaty of Rome provides for the establishment of supra-national organs of administration, the free movement of capital and labour and the "harmonization" of social services. Its signatories undoubtedly regard it as an important contribution to the realization of political integration in Europe. That political considerations weighed heavily with the six powers is certainly confirmed by the speed with which they managed to reconcile their highly diverse economic interests and by the solidarity with which they have subsequently faced the rest of the world.

While the Australian Government has generally welcomed the European Economic Community as an important step towards European integration and towards lasting co-operation between Germany and France, it has been less happy about some of its economic provisions. The Government's fears were fully set out by Dr. W. A. Westerman in his address at the plenary session of GATT in October 1957. The general fear expressed by him was that

the ultimate for the customs union countries in the cosy domesticity of their mutual trade relations could easily be accompanied by—in fact could lead to—the creation of new obstacles to the trade of countries outside the customs union, and thus to serious impairment of the basic objectives of the wider trading community in GATT.

It was, however, the implications of the agricultural sections of the Treaty that caused special concern to Australia. Agricultural production within the community will be subject to special arrangements the effect of which will be "not to bring about free trade in agricultural products between the Community countries, but rather to constitute a system of managed or regulated trade". The attempt to regulate and stabilize agriculture, Dr. Westerman argued, was likely to result in the raising of barriers against outside countries. Finally, he asked whether the scheme to associate with the Community the overseas colonies of its partners (primarily the colonial possessions of France, Belgium and Holland) would not establish a preferential system harmful to other agricultural countries attempting to compete in Europe and to industrial countries that might wish to find markets in the colonial possessions of the Six.

Australia's criticisms found widespread support from other members of GATT, especially from under-developed countries like India and Indonesia. No agreement was reached with "the Six" but arrangements were made to enable negotiations to proceed.

Of more importance for Australia than the European Common Market is the proposed Free Trade Area.<sup>24</sup> Since the end of the war, Britain has collaborated

<sup>23</sup>For background see article in *World Today*, Feb. 1957. Also R. Marjolin, "Prospects for the European Common Market", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 36, No. 1, Oct. 1957.

<sup>24</sup>The fullest outline of the proposals is to be found in the U.K. Government's White Paper (Cmd. 72) of 7 Feb. 1957.

fairly enthusiastically in European economic arrangements. In accordance with long established policy, however, she has refused to participate in schemes for European political integration. Such political involvement in Europe, it has been argued, would be inconsistent both with the preservation of Commonwealth interests and with the special relationship that has existed between the United Kingdom and the United States. Since the Common Market is a decisive move towards both political and economic integration, the reaction of Britain, when the scheme was first outlined in 1955, was to keep entirely free of it. As the six powers progressed in their negotiations during 1956, however, it became clear that the British attitude of "benevolent abstention" was inappropriate. Were Britain simply to stand outside the Common Market, she would be bound to suffer serious economic loss. Her exports to the Common Market area would suffer through having to pass through a common tariff barrier not applicable to the products of France, Italy, Benelux and, most seriously, Germany. On the other hand, Britain could not undertake full membership of the Common Market without sacrificing imperial preferences, the sterling area and, probably, the political bonds that held together the Commonwealth.

The compromise scheme put forward by Britain, together with the other O.E.E.C. countries that are not members of the Common Market, proposed the formation of a "Free Trade Area". The original proposals for the Free Trade Area were very much tailored to the United Kingdom's requirements; their purpose was to enable Britain to get the best of two worlds—to maintain her Commonwealth trade while obtaining entry into an industrial free trade area covering most of Europe. Under the scheme, Britain and such other O.E.E.C. countries as desired to do so, would join with the Common Market countries in creating a free trade area in industrial goods. Unlike the Common Market countries, however, they would not adopt a common external tariff, but would retain their individual tariffs *vis-à-vis* third countries. Agriculture was to be entirely excluded from the Free Trade Area.

Opinion on the benefits that Britain and the Commonwealth could expect from the original Free Trade Area proposals was divided. The official view, which was supported by the *Economist*<sup>25</sup> and a considerable section of British industry, was that by participating in the rapidly expanding European market Britain and indirectly the Commonwealth would derive substantial benefit. Academic economists, on the other hand, were more cautious in their estimates. Some feared that by entering the Free Trade Area the British economy might suffer not only temporary dislocation but permanent ill-effect from European, especially German, competition. Professor Johnson suggested<sup>26</sup> that:

The new enthusiasm for participation, like the uninterestedness which preceded it, probably owes more to political emotion than to economic calculation; at any rate, strong undertones of fear of German domination of Europe, dissatisfaction with the

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<sup>25</sup>Apart from weekly *Economist* see the publication *Britain and Europe* issued by the Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1957.

<sup>26</sup>*Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Feb. 1957, p. 33.



Commonwealth, and the revulsion from the Atlantic Alliance which prompted the Suez disaster, have been clearly detectable in the favourable reaction to the Government's scheme.

The British Government admitted that it had a political motive for entering the Free Trade Area, namely the fear that the Common Market if not unmodified by the Free Trade Area might divide rather than unify Europe as a whole, but it strongly denied that it was in any way fascinated by the concept of Europe as a third power mediating between Russia and America.

The Commonwealth Governments, somewhat to the surprise of the opponents of the Free Trade Area in Britain, appear to have been satisfied by the United Kingdom Government's assurances and at the British Commonwealth meeting in July the negotiations received a qualified approval. In the next few months it became clear that the original Free Trade Area proposals were not acceptable to the Six European powers and that Britain would have to make certain concessions at least in regard to agriculture. Even so the Commonwealth Finance Ministers, meeting in Canada in October 1957, were able to reaffirm

that the establishment of an outward looking free trade area in Europe would broaden the advantages to be derived from economic integration in Europe, not only by the United Kingdom but by all other participants. This was regarded as important as it could contribute to agreed Commonwealth policies of expanding world trade.

The United Kingdom again gave assurances about the safeguarding of Commonwealth interests in the United Kingdom market for foodstuffs, drink and tobacco and thus implied that any concessions in agriculture would be primarily at the expense of the home producer in Britain.

A slightly less optimistic view of the negotiations found expression in Mr. Menzies' address to the Liberal Party on 21 October. He suggested that the trend of the talks had made it necessary for the Australian Government vigorously to represent its "views on the treatment of agricultural products and the preservation of our preferential rights" and on not permitting "the inclusion of dependent overseas territories in the free trade areas".

The fact is that in the negotiations of October and November Britain was faced by an unexpected resistance on the part of the Six Common Market countries. Certain of their objections, for example the exclusion of agriculture from the Free Trade Area, were supported by other O.E.E.C. members (*e.g.* Denmark). It was, however, France which constituted the core of resistance within the Six. The French apparently found the Free Trade Area proposals objectionable in detail and in principle. They seem to believe that the proposals are aimed not at complementing but at destroying the Common Market. They would like to make the conditions of association with it so strict as to force the United Kingdom to face the highly objectionable choice of declaring for or against Europe. How long France can sustain this attitude and how long her partners will support her in doing so, remains to be seen.

Whether the negotiations succeed or fail, the Common Market, presuming it becomes a reality, is bound to produce profound structural changes in the British Commonwealth.<sup>27</sup>

The extent to which the Australian Government can perform an active part in negotiations of the kind in which Britain is now involved, is limited. Though there is doubtless constant consultation between the Australian and the United Kingdom Governments, Australia must remain an outsider to the extraordinarily complex and detailed negotiations involving a dozen or more European Governments. This is perhaps the reason why the Government's attitude conveys a sense of resigned waiting for the outcome of the negotiations and why, in the country at large, they remain virtually undiscussed. It is nonetheless true that Australia's economic and political future, in the international sphere, will be profoundly affected by the situation which has made necessary the Free Trade Area proposals. This will be the case whether the proposals fail or succeed or lead to a compromise. If they fail, there is likely to be a determined attempt to reverse the trend of recent years and to strengthen the sterling area and the British Commonwealth as a regional bloc. If the negotiations succeed or lead to some compromise, it may be some years before the effect on Australia's international position will become clear. The optimistic view is that Britain will succeed in maintaining such a balance between free trade Europe and the Commonwealth that the partners in each will acquire greater strength and greater political solidarity. The more pessimistic view is that Britain's decisive abandonment of her traditional policy of non-involvement in Europe can only lead to a contraction of her interest in other parts of the world and the further loosening of Commonwealth bonds. The *Economist* though a strong proponent of the Free Trade Area proposals admits, in its franker moments, that what Britain now faces is a choice between Europe and the Commonwealth.<sup>28</sup> It suggests that while "the 'old' Commonwealth wants Britain to find new strength by close unity with the region of Europe with which it shares so many interests", the new "African and Asian" members must be expected to drift away. Australia, though an "old" and a European member of the Commonwealth could hardly welcome such a development. Since the end of the war, at least, all Australian Governments have aimed at bridging the differences between Europe and Asia, and one of the main foundations of this policy has been the multi-racial Commonwealth.

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<sup>27</sup>On the relation between the Commonwealth and the Free Trade Area see: *Australian and New Zealand Bank Quarterly Survey*, Jan. 1958; articles in *S.M.H.*, 28 and 30 Jan. 1958; B. Miller, "The Commonwealth Looks at Europe", *The Listener*, 9 Jan. 1958; and Bailey, "Die Britische Einstellung zum Gemeinsamen Markt und zur Freihandelszone", *Aussenpolitik*, Dec. 1957.

<sup>28</sup>See especially *Economist*, 12 Oct., p. 6 of Supplement.

# East Asia in General Education: Philosophy and Practice

By JOHN K. FAIRBANK

American instruction concerning Asia has been caught between two pressures—on the one hand the prospective doubling of college enrolments in the United States, on the other hand, the need for public understanding of Asia as a basis for dealing with urgent national problems.

Course instruction to meet this need is being developed in colleges and universities all over the country on a variety of different bases—focusing the student's attention on the Far East, or India, or the Far East and India in one course, or all of Asia in one course. My personal belief is that a course of lectures dealing with foreign societies or cultures had best deal with one area at a time, in order to save the student from hopeless confusion and superficiality.

The present article describes the practice and the philosophy of a course at Harvard University on the "History of Far Eastern Civilization". As will soon appear, the philosophy of this effort is idealistic, the practice realistic. Thus we aim ideally to give the citizen-to-be a view of East Asian history, culture, society, and current problems. (The course is set up under the programme on General Education.) Yet in practice we have to limit the data very strictly, present it under general headings but within definite limitations, and make it intelligible and palatable with pictures, maps, syllabi, and reading assignments.

To deal with the philosophy, first of all—I must confess that I have more faith in the teacher than in the system. The first essential for any course on Asia is that it be well taught. If well taught, with enthusiasm for and understanding of the subject, almost any course will do. No amount of organization of instruction will substitute for the simple fundamentals that the student should want to study and should know how to study and that the teacher should really teach.

Within this framework, however, the organization of a course becomes important as the means of defining its intellectual problems and posing the challenge to student and teacher. Thus some Americans in a fine optimistic tradition will urge the broadest possible scope in a course on Asia, so as to give the student an overall view of the world scene. In its extreme form, however, this argument runs into the cognate principle that the student must penetrate his subject, and for that purpose master data which will permit him to think independently within their limitations. In short, if the student is to deal with an intelligible universe of thought, there must be a balance between breadth and depth. Either extreme will defeat the aim of general education. The main issue thus becomes: what is the optimum mixture of broad scope and factual penetration?

On this score, I think an axiom can be enunciated: a course which is very broad and tries to take in, for example, all of Asia must be either very elementary or very sophisticated. The course that a college student requires in this particular generation in the United States has to give him a sufficient mastery of data so



that he can make his own analysis of them. That is, he must be able to look at the subject matter in a multi-disciplinary way, through the eyes of narrative history, social institutions, economics, politics, and all the other systematic approaches in our modern curriculum. Our minds are now in the habit of understanding the world in political, economic, social, cultural, and other categories. The student must be enabled to approach his subject to some degree through each of these disciplines. He must be supplied with subject matter of the humanities, as well as concepts of the social sciences.

All of this argues for a study of the non-Western world which concentrates upon one culture or civilization or society at a time. In the course abovementioned at Harvard, we concentrate on the Chinese culture area, which we take to include China, Korea, Japan, most of Inner Asia and also Vietnam. All these regions have felt the impact of the Chinese Empire and the Chinese language. Fruitful comparisons can be attempted among the sub-regions of China, Japan, and Korea, or between the agrarian society within the Great Wall and the nomad society outside of it.

Our philosophy is plainly in part a rationalization of the happy fact that East Asia is indeed the Chinese culture area. India and West Asia are other culture areas, and we leave them out of account. South-East Asia, like Central Asia, is peripheral to the Chinese scene, and consequently gets peripheral treatment.

In practice, there are a number of useful operating principles that such a course can pursue. The first, in my view, is that the lectures should begin with the contemporary problems of the current scene, in order to set up in the student's mind the sanction for an historical approach to the Far East. We must first define the current problems, before asking where they came from.

The second operating principle is to define these problems in terms of major disciplines—for example, the traditional economy and its modern development, the traditional social structure and its modern break-up, the traditional polity and the modern revolution. Introductory lectures, in other words, must indicate the nature of the modern revolutionary changes and define some of the social science terms and concepts to be used in studying these changes. The first two weeks are therefore devoted to showing the relevance of traditional institutions to present problems and incidentally establishing a basic vocabulary of ideas.

A third point is the use of visual materials, particularly slides projected on a screen, in the latter part of each lecture. These seem to me essential in the early part of this course in order to convey a direct visual impression of Chinese economic life, the use of manpower, and ecology generally.

Fourthly, we consider it inevitable to study China in a chronological framework. The second section of the course therefore deals with the origins and development of the traditional society, first in China and secondly in Japan and Korea. This seems necessary in order to take proper advantage of the tremendous continuity and the wealth of historical evidence in the cultural record. Both the Chinese and the Japanese also understand themselves in historical terms. One chief means of understanding the present is to compare it with the past; in their minds as well as in ours.

A fifth method used at this point is the grouping of subject matter by both chronological period and analytic discipline. That is to say, in dealing with a certain period we also concentrate upon a certain aspect of the society which seems appropriate for discussion in connection with that period. For example, the period of the Warring States was also the age of philosophers and the two can be taken up together. The Han dynasty saw the first emergence of the empire and its bureaucracy, and a lecture on the Han dynasty can be devoted profitably to the bureaucratic system in large part, even with the inclusion of some reference to the T'ang. Again, the Six Dynasties era of collapse of central power saw the influx of Buddhism and the barbarians, and the two latter elements can be stressed at this point. The revival of strong central government under the Sui and T'ang provides a basis for a lecture which is largely on political institutions and government administration. Under the Sung one can deal with economic development and also with philosophy and the arts. In each case, the lecturer is free to roam the field away from the chronological period and treat his topic as a whole. Our hope is that it is possible at the same time to maintain sufficient chronological framework to make successive periods distinct in character from one another.

The treatment of the traditional societies down to modern times lays a basis for the dramatic confrontation of East and West. In general, the second term of a two-term or two-semester course—about 35 or 38 out of 70 or 76 lectures—accordingly deals with the modern period since the arrival of Europeans in the Far East by sea. This course may be divided at 1500 or equally well at 1800. If divided at 1500, China under the Manchus and Japan under the Tokugawa can come in the second term. If divided at 1800, the activity of Europeans in the Far East from 1500 to 1800 can be brought mainly into the second term.

Naturally the contact of cultures in the modern period gives the teacher a remarkable opportunity. The concepts of the Western impact, of the Japanese and Chinese responses to it, of the growth of modern nationalism, and of the process of economic development are all of fundamental interest.

In addition to the structure of lectures outlined above, certain aids should be mentioned: *maps* are essential for American students. In general we require that half a dozen outline maps, which preferably show physical but not political features, be purchased, filled in, and presented for inspection. A list of required place names and features is issued for each map and the process of map study is policed by setting a map question in an examination.

Another essential device is to distribute a *syllabus* sheet at the time of each lecture. Such sheets may give an outline of the main lecture headings but should not be a resumé or brief of the lecture itself. Rather, their aim is to give the student the essential names and terms and their spelling, to obviate the time required for writing on the blackboard, and to give him an essential quota of such items to associate with the content of the course as useful tags or basic data. The mastery of these special names, which must be kept to a minimum, can be policed likewise in an examination.

Still another device which I find most pleasant is to show several *slides* of an historical nature at the end of every lecture. Quite aside from lectures on fine

arts or geography, pictures on a screen are effective in illustrating the writing system, imperial personages, and other aspects of the historical record. Assignment of literature to be read in translation is of course also desirable, particularly in view of the rather inadequate textbook materials thus far available.

Bringing in outside lecturers to deal with special subjects such as fine arts, literature, linguistics, philosophy, and the like is a stimulating device if not over-used. Our own experience is that an alternation of two principal lecturers can be spiced up during a term by bringing in half a dozen other professors.

Proponents of any intellectual procedure are usually found to be supporting the course of action which they have themselves taken. While this cynical view does not disqualify the argument presented above, I think the idea of confining a course on Asia in General Education to the limits of a single culture area can be further buttressed. The facts of history in Asia are against the all-Asia approach. Asia has seen a good deal less unity than Western civilization. The facts of historiography are also against the effort to deal with all of Asia in a single course of lectures within any reasonable time. The essential monographic studies have not yet been built up, and the historical literature is inadequate for the lecturers who take on such a task, to say nothing of the students who seek to read about it. Indeed, it is temerity enough to deal with all of East Asia in one year.

The inherent danger in covering a broad scope is that of superficiality. Specifically, this means presenting the content of the course and the lecturer's analysis of the subject at too high a level of abstraction. It is axiomatic that the degree of abstraction and of generality increases with the degree of comparison. That is, to generalize about a single historical period requires less making of comparative generalizations than if one generalizes about an entire culture during several historical periods. The latter is at a second level of abstraction. A third level of abstraction is reached when one indulges in the comparison of cultures, each considered throughout its chronological span and in all its disciplinary aspects. The result can only be to increase the role of the lecturer's and the student's assumptions. At the higher levels of abstraction, subjective values and choices may play so critical a role that in the end both student and teacher may be indoctrinating themselves or achieving the self-delusion that verbalization is equivalent to understanding.

From our earliest contact with the Far East, Westerners have taken to Asia certain general assumptions and conclusions, prefabricated. In our enthusiasm for the study of Asia today we can quickly begin to talk about the historical influence of Buddhism on societies which it penetrated, or the variant forms of nomad society, or the nature of the agrarian village society wherever it may be found. This interesting type of enterprise can lead us into enormous generalizations of little value except for the transient satisfaction which they may give us.

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# Australian Nationalism and the Imperial Connection 1900-1914

By CHARLES GRIMSHAW

The late 1880's and the early 1890's have customarily been taken as pivotal years for the understanding of Australian nationalism for it was at this time that a vocal and assertive Australianism manifested itself. Recent studies by Robin Gollan and Russel Ward have removed part of the distortion attaching to the traditional picture of this awakening of an Australian national consciousness.<sup>1</sup> By showing something of the political and social growth of the values and ideals of a distinctive Australian nationalism they have helped give perspective to the happenings of a decade. Equally, however, the traditional picture has been distorted by being foreshortened at this end of the time scale. If the late 1880's and early 1890's saw the forceful expression by radical nationalists of the ideology of Australian nationalism which was to prevail, the first decade and a half of the Commonwealth saw the legislative efforts to implement these ideals. Still raw and sensitive, it is nonetheless a more responsible nationalism which is apparent in the new century, the jagged teeth of the 1880's honed by the achievement of federation, by economic growth and prosperity, by extending agreement on national values, and by the shifting balance of world power.

The expression of Australian nationalism in the new century in domestic developments, in art and in literature, has already been considered in some detail by writers such as Greenwood.<sup>2</sup> Its expression in terms of Australian attitudes to the imperial connection and in terms of Australia's developing national position within the British Empire has received little detailed consideration except in the constitutional field. This neglect has had the justification that during these years Australian energies were preoccupied with building a nation within Australia while the international interests of the Empire were left substantially in the hands of the British government. Although there is considerable truth in this view, the heavy emphasis on it has falsified the complete picture. Once it became almost universally accepted, as it was by 1900, that Australian nationalism was compatible with continued Empire membership, a form of Empire imperialism became a component of the nationalism of possibly the majority of Australians, and to underestimate this element is to misinterpret Australian nationalism at that time. Yet, at the same time, Australia did have its regional, social and economic interests which did not always square with those of Britain so that while an extensive loyalty to the imperial connection continued, Australia nevertheless moved gradually towards national independence within the framework prescribed by its dual loyalties.

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<sup>1</sup>Robin Gollan, "Nationalism and Politics in Australia before 1855", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. I, No. 1, Nov. 1955. Russel Ward, "Social Roots of Australian Nationalism", *ibid.*, Vol. I, No. 2, May 1956.

<sup>2</sup>"National Development and Social Experimentation", Chapter in G. Greenwood (ed.), *Australia, a Social and Political History*, Sydney, 1955.

It is with several aspects of this gradual movement towards national independence that this paper is concerned. In the first section an effort is made to determine the prevailing understanding of Australian national aspirations and of Australian attitudes to the imperial connection in order to define the broad limits within which Australian imperial relations were to be conducted. In terms of the limits imposed by these attitudes, the second and third sections attempt to appraise the movement towards increased national independence which occurred in the two major fields of relations at this time, economics and defence.

## I

It was clear by 1900 that providing Great Britain's power remained sufficient to protect both her European interests and her Pacific Empire, Australia would move only gradually into the orbit of fully fledged powers controlling their own independent foreign policy. The Australian Constitution Bill did confer on the Commonwealth Government control of its own external affairs, but Joseph Chamberlain, discussing the bill, made it abundantly clear that the British Government was in no way abdicating its authority over "those common interests . . . which form the peculiar sphere of the central authority of the Empire".<sup>3</sup> Nor did the fathers of the Constitution intend that there should be an abdication of this central authority. The bill expressly provided that Australia was "constitutionally a subordinate and not an independent sovereign community or state"<sup>4</sup> and the title "Commonwealth" was seen by Quick and Garran as aspiring to convey the idea of a nation, like the American Commonwealth, only "in a restricted and potential sense".<sup>5</sup>

To many observers in the 1880's, it had not been at all apparent that Australia would enter on its national existence in this sober fashion. The Honorable T. A. Brassey observed that in 1887 "it was an open question whether Australia would remain an integral part of the Empire or not".<sup>6</sup> B. R. Wise stated in 1900:

I certainly did not anticipate at that time [1888] that in so short a period of twelve years the then prevalent indifference on the part of Great Britain and suspicion on ours would have given place to the mutual confidence which is now so significant of the relations between the two countries.<sup>7</sup>

Though there was a residue of republicanism in 1900, the separation movements were a spent force. One ardent republican paper of the late 1880's, the *Boomerang*, had gone out of effective existence after Lane left the editorship in 1890. The other, the *Bulletin*, had modified its platform from republicanism to "alliance not dependence".<sup>8</sup> The Republican Union and the Republican Leagues of the late 1880's had died "of anaemia".<sup>9</sup> The Australian Natives' Association with a

<sup>3</sup>*Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Bill. Reprint of the Debates in Parliament, the official Correspondence with the Australian Delegates and other Papers*, authorised ed., London, 1900, p. 150.

<sup>4</sup>J. Quick and R. R. Garran, *The Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth*, Sydney, 1901, p. 367.

<sup>5</sup>*ibid.*, p. 312.

<sup>6</sup>*Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute*, 1902-3, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 6-7.

<sup>7</sup>*Bulletin*, 5 May 1900.

<sup>8</sup>*ibid.*, 10 Aug. 1901.

<sup>9</sup>G. Black, *The Origins and Growth of the Labor Movement in N.S.W.*, Sydney, 1915.

membership of 20,000 in 1900 had changed its policy from one which regarded separation as tenable to a policy "devotedly loyal".<sup>10</sup> The *Sydney Daily Telegraph*, which in 1889 had regarded separation as regrettable but inevitable, saw good reason in 1900 to strengthen imperial ties and the Chairman of its board of directors, Carey, played a leading role in organising a bushmen's contingent for despatch to the Boer War. Queensland, which in 1888 had returned a "national" party, partly because of its anti-British election campaign, was the first Australian government to offer troops for the Boer War in 1899; republican or separatist sentiments which had been expressed by both protectionist and free trade leaders in New South Wales in 1888 now found no voice except from a few Labor members.<sup>11</sup> It is not the purpose of this paper to explain in detail why the extensive discontent of the 1880's was converted to support for the Empire by 1900. To make clear, however, the climate of opinion within which governments had to operate in their external relations from 1900-14, it is necessary to consider briefly both the prevailing conception of Empire loyalty that had emerged by 1900 and to consider the understanding of national aspirations which were dominant. They imposed broad limits on the freedom of government action and helped determine the lines along which Australia would move to independent national status within the Empire structure.

The first emphatic evidence that the anti-imperialist, Australian nationalism, which the *Bulletin* continued to espouse until 1905, did not have the support of the rank and file Australian became apparent in the Australian reaction to the Boer War. Though there is no certain way of recapturing the pulse of opinion at that time, the evidence does lean heavily to the view that Australian opinion overwhelmingly favoured Australian participation on the side of Great Britain. So substantial did this opinion appear to be that in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia only three members of the political Labor parties continued to oppose Australian participation by December 1899-January 1900 when the question of despatching a second contingent was discussed. Three months earlier, 44 of the Labor members had openly opposed participation. There was no doubt that the surprisingly spirited resistance by the Boers and the moral support of the Boers by Britain's European rivals was part of the reason why not only Labor but also some non-Labor members who had initially opposed Australian intervention now reversed their attitudes; there is no doubt either that all politicians of all parties were convinced that public opinion enthusiastically favoured Australia's active participation in the campaign.<sup>12</sup> Even the small number within and without Parliament who continued openly to express opposition, the *Bulletin*, the *Catholic Advocate*, Professor Wood and his Anti-War League, Holman, Higgins, Murray, Thomas, Christopher Brennan and a few country papers such as Holman's *Grenfell Vedette* accepted that their viewpoint was that of a small minority.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>10</sup>*Procs. R. C. I.*, Vol. XXXII, 1900-01, p. 66 and Vol. XXXIV, 1902-3, p. 6.

<sup>11</sup>See e.g. *N.S.W. Parl. Debs.*, Legislative Assembly, 1887-8, Vol. XXXII, p. 4785.

<sup>12</sup>*N.S.W. P. D.*, Aug.-Nov. 1899, Vol. C, pp. 1374, ff. and Dec. 1899, Vol. CII, p. 3504, p. 3528; *Vic. Parl. Debs.*, Vol. 92, p. 1790 and Vol. 93, p. 2864; *Q. Parl. Debs.*, Vol. LXXXII, p. 479 and Vol. LXXXIII, p. 1554; *S.A. Parl. Debs.*, 1899, p. 661, p. 1075; in the W.A. and Tasmanian Parliaments there was no opposition to the despatch of the first contingent.

<sup>13</sup>See H. V. Evatt, *Australian Labour Leader*, Sydney, 1942, Chs. XIX and XXI. The Anti-War League petition, circulated late in 1901, secured only 1,206 signatures.



There was of course no single factor creating this approval but in general the attitude was determined by a desire both to help the Empire "right or wrong", and to demonstrate Australia's growing nationalist status. In the opinion of Professor Wood and of two other contemporary historians, Turner and Coghlan, it was the strong imperialist feeling that was basic. "It was", wrote Turner, "the practical expression of a sentiment that the lion's whelps were ready at the slightest call to rally around the national flag."<sup>14</sup> On the other hand, the belief that Australian participation was an expression of Australian national growth was also widely held. Richard Jebb, who had been in Australia at the time, remarked that

Some of the most wholehearted supporters of the sending of contingents were nationalists who knew that the undertaking of responsibility would develop national self-respect, and the respect of the authorities in London for Australian nationhood.<sup>15</sup>

And B. R. Wise justified his support in terms which displayed a remarkably modern conception of Australian imperial relations.

A federated Australia able to protect herself and ready to play her proper part in the protection of the British Empire, by guarding British interests in the East, may be in a position far sooner than anyone had dared to hope to make the alliance with the other free communities of the British Empire which was the political ideal of Sir Henry Parkes, from which you accused me of having departed.<sup>16</sup>

Whichever of these sentiments was more significant in moulding public opinion cannot be determined but from this time until the conscription split, at least, there could be no doubt that an Empire war was an Australian war not for constitutional reasons but because opinion favoured participation. Reduced to the least sentimental level, as it was by Hughes, the view was that an attitude of neutrality by one part of the Empire when others were engaged in international warfare was "incompatible with any form of alliance".<sup>17</sup> Expressed in its most total form as it was by Fisher on the eve of World War I, Australia was ready to stand by Britain "to our last man and our last shilling".<sup>18</sup> When the issue was joined Australia showed itself to be "substantially unanimous" in approving Australian participation. It was clear, then, that from the 1890's, when Australia was caught up in the wave of imperialism sweeping Europe, public opinion favoured Australia's continued active membership of the Empire and favoured it to the extent that an Empire war was an Australian war. As the Boer War had illustrated, this sentiment towards the Empire imposed one set of limits on the freedom of government action.

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<sup>14</sup>H. G. Turner, *A History of the Colony of Victoria*, London, 1904, Vol. II, p. 343. cf. Essex Evans' poem, "The Lion's Whelps", Dec. 1899. T. A. Coghlan, *Labour and Industry in Australia*, Oxford, 1918, Vol. IV, p. 1960. For Professor A. Wood's statement, Sydney *Daily Telegraph*, 29 May 1902. Quoted in Evatt, *op. cit.*

<sup>15</sup>R. Jebb, *Studies in Colonial Nationalism*, London, 1911, p. 27.

<sup>16</sup>*Bulletin*, 5 May 1900.

<sup>17</sup>*Sydney Morning Herald*, 25 July 1911. Hughes made this statement in reply to a very considerable outburst of feeling provoked by Prime Minister Fisher having been misrepresented in the *Review of Reviews*. He was reported as having said that "if we thought the war unjust, and England's enemy in the right—we would haul down the flag and start on our own". Fisher denied having made this statement. *S.M.H.*, 31 July 1911.

<sup>18</sup>E. Scott, *Australia During the War*, Vol. XI of *Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18*, Sydney, 1936, p. 22; and see pp. 23, ff. for a survey of Australian opinion towards participation.

The limits imposed by nationalist opinion are not so readily defined. There was, however, a remarkable degree of unanimity achieved by 1907 in the broad definition of Australian nationalist values. In that year Hackett, whom Deakin described as being in the tradition of the British philosophical radicals, expounded the objectives of Australian nationalism. His definition was accepted by Deakin, the leader of the Protectionist Party and by Hughes, one of the most aggressive as well as one of the most able Labor leaders. Australia, said Hackett, desires that there should be defence without militarism; hence her conception of the form in which the Commonwealth should assist in the defence of the Empire; that there should be development of her country and employment for her people; hence her feeling towards protection; that there should be no infiltration of undesirable aliens and low-waged workers; hence her immigration restrictions. I may add that she requires that there should be equality of opportunity for all; hence the contributions of millions yearly by the state to the cause of education. And all these purposes it is impossible not to see she is prepared to urge forward as national objects, with such light and means as she may find at her disposal.

Hughes found himself "greatly surprised" that he was "almost entirely in accord with the lecturer" and stated that he "would say that Dr. Hackett had presented a fair and impartial statement of the opinions and ideals of Australia". Deakin believed that in Hackett's "brief recital of the creed of Australia today" he had "unimpeachably and most accurately expressed" Australian aspirations.<sup>19</sup> And there is no shortage of additional, corroborative evidence in the legislation of Australia, in regard to Protection, New Protection, Defence, Immigration Restriction, and social welfare legislation that such values were manifestly the majority supported values by this time.<sup>20</sup> It was with the external implications of the pursuit of these objectives that Australian-British relations were largely concerned from 1900 to 1914. But before considering their consequences for the development of Australia's national status within the Empire, it is necessary to mention, briefly, several further influences stemming from the pre-Commonwealth period, which also continued to condition some Australian attitudes towards national development within the Empire structure.

The separatist and near-separatist movements within Australia in the late 1880's, although they did overlap, fall roughly into three categories. Probably least significant by this time were the remnants of the Australian version of the Manchester School, men such as McMillan, the "representative of the importers" and "leader of the commercial class" in Sydney. He was reported by Dilke in 1890 as having stated "not long ago that he believed the present relations with the Mother Country might last twenty years, and would be succeeded, to his regret, by independence".<sup>21</sup> This Australian equivalent of "little Englandism" was already dated by European imperialism and soon ceased to be professed. By the end of the 1890's, the emphasis of the argument had changed to advocacy of continued

<sup>19</sup>*Procs. R.C.I.*, Vol. XXXVIII, 1906-7, pp. 239, ff.

<sup>20</sup>See Greenwood, *op. cit.*

<sup>21</sup>C. W. Dilke, *Problems of Greater Britain*, London, 1890, p. 181. cf. A. W. Martin, "William McMillan, A Merchant in Politics", *Royal Aust. Hist. Soc. J. & P.*, Vol. XL, Pt. IV, March 1955.

Empire membership and support for either orthodox free trade or Empire free trade. The significance of the movement for the new century was that it left a residue of loyal Empire imperialists who possessed no national policy towards the Empire. In the federal arena, they gathered under the aegis of the free trade banner and argued for Australian freedom on fiscal questions and the uncritical acceptance of British control of Empire foreign policy and defence. But without a coherent policy of national development, and mortgaged to an increasingly unpopular fiscal policy, they ceased to be of effective political importance from about 1907. To that stage, however, they did present a viewpoint which had considerable press support.

Of greater moment was the discontent of the more militant nationalists. In essence, it was the expression of an uncertain colonial nationalism's reaction to the dilemma created for the British Empire by the surge of European imperialism. The disinterest of the Gladstone Liberals in a forceful imperialism galled Australian expansionists and those sensitive to Australian weakness in a Pacific being occupied by Germany and France and in which Russia was thought to have designs; but the revived British imperialism, if it took the form of closer Empire association, might jeopardise colonial freedoms already won, re-establish the ascendancy of the Anglo-Australian and endanger "the social and political rights" of native born Australians.<sup>22</sup>

The reaction to this dilemma took one of three forms. A small but by no means unenlightened group of nationalists which included Deakin, Service and Griffith, tended to lend their weight to the idea of some kind of imperial federation in order to win for the self-governing colonies a voice in the making of Empire foreign policy. However, the advocacy of imperial federation by British Conservatives and the support which the Imperial Federation League gained from Australian conservative interests to 1900, made the movement highly suspect in the eyes of the more radical wing of the Australian Natives' Association and of the militant nationalists. More generally, there appears to have been an extensive apathy towards the League's essays in planning projected Empire constitutions.<sup>23</sup> Even so, the role of the League in Australia is not to be lightly dismissed, particularly from 1905 when Deakin assumed its presidency. Not only Deakin's 1905 presidential address but also the continued friendly association of members of the League with the senior officers of the Dominion section of the Colonial Office kept before the attention of these officers the interest of an influential group of Australians in obtaining a voice in Empire foreign policy.

Ironically, because the imperial federation movement accepted the existence of colonial nationalism and was seeking a method of reconciling it with Empire membership, the emergence of the imperial federation movement led to the outbreak of organised republicanism in Australia.<sup>24</sup> As an organised movement it attracted

<sup>22</sup>*Imperial Federation League, Report of Inaugural Public Meeting*, Melbourne, 1885, p. 4.

<sup>23</sup>See C. S. Blackton, "Australian Nationality and Nationalism: The Imperial Federationist Interlude, 1885-1901", *Historical Studies, Australia and New Zealand*, Vol. 7, No. 25, Nov. 1955. H. L. Hall, *Australia and England: A Study in Imperial Relations*, London, 1934.

<sup>24</sup>B. Mansfield, "The Background to Radical Republicanism in New South Wales in the Eighteen-Eighties", *Hist. Studies, A. and N.Z.*, Vol. 5, No. 20, May 1953.



little support, but the sentiments had a more pervasive influence than the membership of the Republican Leagues and Unions suggests because of the influence of the *Bulletin* and the *Boomerang* on the shearers and miners.<sup>25</sup> The version of republicanism which they preached envisaged the creation of a utopian, egalitarian state, safe from the evils of the Old World by severing its political ties with them.

The defeat of republicanism was implicit in the setback Labor idealism suffered during the 1890 strikes and the 1893 depression. The increasing constitutionalism of the movement as it turned to political action, canvassing the support of the small farmer, the small employer and the lower middle class, converted it temporarily to a movement with empirical objectives.<sup>26</sup> There was no strong revival of republicanism in the new century but the ideals which, though not new, had been co-ordinated and baptised in the first large class conflict in Australian history did become ingrained in the fabric of Labor thinking—isolationism, egalitarianism, anti-militarism, opposition to hereditary position, to titles, to pomp and ceremony. In the prosperous days from 1906 to 1913, they were increasingly pushed aside in the thinking of federal political Labor at least, though they remained strong in the militant centres of unionism. Conscription provoked them into full strength but by that time the Empire had evolved sufficiently for them not to be translated into republicanism, except amongst some radical Australian Irish. Nevertheless these continuing attitudes while not denying Australia's willing participation in Empire wars did contribute to defining the extent of this participation.

Falling between the republicans and orthodox free traders, and best symbolised by the Australian Natives' Association, was the third group who at least regarded separation as an "open question". This group believed that Australian national autonomy within the Empire demanded that Anglo-Australianism should give pride of place to Australianism and that Australia's imperial interests should be regarded as imperial interests and not as colonial aspects of British imperial interests. The failure of the Imperial Federation League in the 1880's and the achievement of Australian federation appeared to ensure the first objective.<sup>27</sup> The decline of European rivalry in the Pacific after 1890 and the sympathetic and active Colonial Office administration under Joseph Chamberlain gave promise of the achievement of the second.<sup>28</sup> Nonetheless the possibility of Australia's regional interests not being adequately safeguarded by Britain had been brought to the forefront, and after the defeat of Russia by Japan in 1904 the revival of regional defence fears played once again a substantial role in advancing Australian national cohesion and Australia's national status within the Empire.

It was the combination of the fears and aspirations outlined, the growth of the Australian economy, the naval challenge to Britain by Germany, and the economic challenge to Britain by Germany and the United States, which determined the broad lines of Australia's national development within the Empire.

<sup>25</sup>R. Gollan, *Radicalism and Socialism in Eastern Australia, 1850-1910*, unpublished thesis, University of London, 1951.

<sup>26</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>27</sup>See e.g. *Imperial Federation League, Presidential Address, Mr. Justice Holroyd*, Melbourne, March 1900.

<sup>28</sup>See e.g. *Procs. R.C.I., 1900-01, Vol. XXXII, p. 70.*

## II

Perhaps the most striking feature of Australian attitudes to Australian-British economic relations from 1900-14 is the weight of interested opinion which favoured the closest economic relations. In itself this was a signal illustration, not only of the belief in the economic value of the United Kingdom to Australia, but also of the substantial satisfaction of the body of Australian nationalists with the economic and social evolution of the self-governing section of the Empire. There was no influential political opinion, either Labor or non-Labor, which saw Australia as a colony being exploited by British economic interests despite the very significant amount of British capital invested in Australia. In the early years of the Commonwealth, the *Bulletin* sporadically made this accusation but even then it did not address its complaint against Britain. The cure, it believed, was in the Labor Party's own hands.<sup>29</sup> It is significant that at the very time when the Left wing in Britain was marshalling for its attack on economic imperialism, spearheaded by Hobson's brilliant study, the majority of Australian political Labor was not opposed to an Empire policy of mutual preference which, the Australian free trader did not hesitate to point out, was designed to return the "Tory Imperialists" to power in Britain.<sup>30</sup> But with growing Australian prosperity, with economic protection becoming assured, and with the growing promise of political office, political Labor in Australia was not concerned with doctrinaire political theory. It wrote Left-wing anti-imperialism back into its platform only under the tension of war and the conscription conflict.

But if majority interested opinion favoured the closest Australian-British economic relations, these ties were in fact loosened if not weakened over this period. Britain in 1914 still occupied the predominant position in relation to the Australian economy and there was little likelihood of any other country usurping her place. Nonetheless by 1914, relative to the 1880's, Australia was much less dependent on British capital; proportionately to the total British trade with Australia had declined significantly; there was extensive Australian criticism of imports from Britain; and the hopes of the advocates of mutual preference had not been realised. These developments helped advance Australian nationalism and Australia's national status within the Empire in two main ways. The growth and prosperity of the Australian economy, particularly after 1906, and the subsequent ability of Australia to redeem some loans as well as to finance increasingly its own development from its own resources provided the economic basis for the pursuit of bi-partisan policies with national and imperial implications, in particular policies of defence and encouragement to immigration. More basically perhaps, if Herbert Burton's criteria of national economic growth are economically acceptable, they represented the gradual movement of the Australian economy from a quasi-colonial to a more national level.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>29</sup>e.g. *Bulletin*, 19 July 1902.

<sup>30</sup>e.g. *S.M.H.*, 20 May 1903; *Melbourne Argus*, 1 June 1903.

<sup>31</sup>In his "Growth of the Australian Economy", Burton mentions capacity of Australia to finance, increasingly, her own loans and declining dependence on the British market as evidence of growing maturity. See C. H. Grattan (ed.), *Australia*, Berkeley, 1947, p. 167.

In political terms, the factor which determined that Australia would develop away from Britain economically was the decision to go protectionist. This provided no constitutional problems since Britain had long conceded to the self-governing colonies the right to determine their own fiscal policies. As early as 1859 the general principle was expressed and though there were heated disputes from 1869 to 1873 between Australia and Great Britain about the continuing restrictions preventing the colonies imposing discriminatory duties on imports this question, too, was resolved with the withdrawal of the relevant imperial Act in 1898. Of the remaining restraints two became issues of some moment after 1901—control of merchant shipping and the question of the right of the dominions to withdraw from commercial treaties—but neither was in the least likely to jeopardise Australia's Empire membership.

But if there was no question of any agitation for withdrawal on economic grounds the success of protection did determine that only an economic relationship which allowed Australia to protect adequately her secondary industries would be satisfactory to the majority of the people. This virtually precluded either the possibility of imperial federation or of the more limited proposals by the Chamberlain imperialists for an imperial *zollverein*. A system of imperial preference was the only possible type of economic co-operation. The debate which the 1903 tariff reform proposals of Chamberlain stimulated provided an illuminating illustration of the limits set by both Australian and British economic policies on Empire economic co-operation.

Australia's expressed attitudes to the Chamberlain proposals ranged the full scale from total rejection to ardent support. Though the *Bulletin* was initially suspicious of the benefits of mutual preference to Australia,<sup>32</sup> the protectionists generally favoured the scheme. Their argument as it was advanced by Deakin was three pronged. Conceiving protection as a national policy, they saw mutual preference as its external complement. The groups not directly considered under Australian protection were the "foreign trader", the pastoralist, the farmer and, to a lesser extent, the mine owner. The protectionists refused to accept the argument of the foreign trader that there would be any decline in overall foreign trade as a result of protection; they argued, moreover, that protection complemented by mutual preference would considerably increase Australia's trade. In fact the foreign trader was of little real concern to the protectionist.<sup>33</sup> Nor was the pastoralist of great concern. Deakin pointed out at the 1907 Imperial Conference that Australian wool and minerals were finding adequate markets in Germany and France despite the fact that these countries were raising protective barriers against the importing of other primary products.<sup>34</sup> Though wool remained the largest Australian export, the protectionist had little fear in the increasingly prosperous years from 1903 that Australia would lack adequate markets for the sale of its wool and minerals.

Australia's other primary products, however, appeared to be in a less secure position. Deakin stated at the 1907 Conference that the Australian production of

<sup>32</sup>*Bulletin*, 13 June 1903.

<sup>33</sup>e.g. *Minutes of Proceedings of 1907 Colonial Conference*, London, 1907, p. 327.

<sup>34</sup>*ibid.*, p. 240.



these goods was increasing more rapidly than the population's capacity to consume them. Expanding markets were needed but, except for wool and ores, the great consuming markets of Europe were closed to Australian primary produce. The expansion of British demand for these goods, Deakin argued, would benefit both all classes of producers in Australia and British manufacturers since the development of primary industry would encourage growth of population which would produce larger home markets for both Australian and British manufacturers.<sup>35</sup>

The second prong of the argument of the preferentialists was that imperial preference was a policy in keeping with the self-dignity of the dominions. Deakin asserted that a fundamental principle of mutual preference was that it should not threaten the liberty of each state to frame its own tariffs to suit its domestic interests. And the third strand of the argument was that the scheme would benefit Empire organisation and growth. Deakin stated his "political gospel" on this point.

. . . Anything that encourages the development of imperial organisation which without limiting the self-governing powers of the several parts, or unduly trespassing on the individual liberty of the citizen shall compact them together in co-operative relations for the discharge of social duties, political obligations, and industrial efforts, every possible increase in co-operation—marks a higher stage in civilisation giving greater opportunities to the individual and greater strength to the nation.<sup>36</sup>

To the political free trader, protectionist arguments for mutual preference based on Empire sentiment were, in Reid's phrase, "a mean, sneaking, disloyal fraud", an excuse for establishing a higher protective tariff under the guise of trade concessions to Great Britain.<sup>37</sup> Free traders were not, however, in agreement in their interpretation of Australian free trade nor consequently in their attitudes to the principle of mutual preference.

At one extreme were the "foreign traders", mainly importers such as McMillan and Bruce Smith, supported in their attitudes by the weight of the free trade press, the *Sydney Morning Herald*, the *Sydney Daily Telegraph*, the *Melbourne Argus* and the *Brisbane Telegraph*.<sup>38</sup> This group was intensely loyal to the British connection, many of them advocating the uncritical acceptance of British control of Empire foreign policy and, at this stage, supporting the payment of subsidies to an exclusively Admiralty controlled navy. They were opposed, however, to any restriction on Australia's overseas trade and so were opposed to all schemes of preference. One argument which they advanced consistently was that preferential tariffs must lead to French and German retaliation and so endanger the continental market for Australian wool.<sup>39</sup>

It appears, however, that in this attitude this wing of the free trade political party and press was not reflecting the views of the primary producers whose case it purported to argue. The *Australasian Pastoralists' Review* discussed the question of preference frequently between 1903 and 1907 and remained convinced of its

<sup>35</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>36</sup>*ibid.*, p. 238.

<sup>37</sup>*Annual Register*, London, 1903.

<sup>38</sup>e.g. *S.M.H.*, 20 May 1903; *Melbourne Argus*, 1 June 1903; *Brisbane Telegraph*, 19 May 1903.

<sup>39</sup>e.g. *S.M.H.*, 1 June 1903; *Sydney Daily Telegraph*, 2 Oct. 1906.

economic and sentimental value to Australia and the Empire. It believed that its value for Australian meat, butter and wheat was unequivocal and though in one issue it conceded that the wool industry "is as likely to be hurt as helped by preferential trade arrangements",<sup>40</sup> it soon revised this attitude. Germany and France, it argued, were unlikely to retaliate against Australian wool "as their manufacturers cannot get the fine wools they want in sufficient quantities elsewhere".<sup>41</sup> During these years the journal gave evidence that mutual preference was supported actively by leading New South Wales pastoralists.<sup>42</sup>

Nor did the extreme free trader and anti-preferentialist have the unequivocal support of the major insurance, banking and mercantile journal, the *Australasian Insurance and Banking Record*. Strongly free trade and bitterly anti-Labor, it nevertheless continued to discuss the Chamberlain proposals dispassionately long after the extreme free trade press had condemned them. Initially it saw the proposal as being potentially momentous, of vital importance to all Australian producing, financial and mercantile interests. It appreciated, however, the major difficulties which were to kill the schemes, the fact that the colonies would not concede their protectionist tariffs and that Britain could scarcely be expected to buy food on a dear market.<sup>43</sup>

The moderate attitude of these journals was possibly more representative of majority Australian free trade opinion than was the extreme view. It is impossible to be certain of this for the victory of protection in Australia meant that the free trader was never tested critically regarding his precise attitude to imperial preference. There was, however, a considerable body of expressed opinion willing to support a scheme of Empire free trade if it could have been established.<sup>44</sup>

The return of the British Liberals in 1906 and the rejection of the Deakin arguments at the 1907 Imperial Conference virtually ended the debate. There was no possibility of resurrecting mutual preference while the British Liberals remained in office. In the 1907-8 tariffs the Deakin Government did make provision for unilateral preference to Britain. This tariff provided for a general duty of fifteen per cent. against British goods and twenty per cent. against goods imported from foreign countries. As such it was designed to protect adequately Australian secondary industry against all outside competition and, then, to offer to Britain preference against the foreigner. The preference was, as Hancock has remarked, "a concession to sentiment that is not allowed to interfere with business".<sup>45</sup> Insofar as it was possible to determine the consequences for British exports to Australia of the preferential tariffs, the Commonwealth statistician found to 1914 that they were having no "differential effect".<sup>46</sup>

<sup>40</sup>*Australasian Pastoralists' Review*, 16 July 1903.

<sup>41</sup>*ibid.*, 17 Nov. 1903.

<sup>42</sup>*ibid.*, 16 Dec. 1903.

<sup>43</sup>*Australasian Insurance and Banking Record*, 20 June 1903, 20 Jan. 1905.

<sup>44</sup>e.g. *South Australian Register*, 19 May 1903. *Procs. R.C.I.*, 1901-2, Vol. XXXIII, p. 214. E. A. Harney, "Imperialism from an Australian Standpoint", *Procs. R.C.I.*, 1904-5, Vol. XXXVI, p. 112. And see statement by G. Wall, President of Sydney Chamber of Commerce—"with strong British inclinations, he favoured trade within the Empire". *Coloured Labour Question, Press Cuttings*, 28 July 1905, Mitchell Library.

<sup>45</sup>W. K. Hancock, "The Commonwealth", *Cambridge History of the British Empire*, Vol. VII, Pt. I, Cambridge, 1933, p. 507.

<sup>46</sup>*Commonwealth Year Book*, Canberra, No. 7, 1914, p. 559.

Perhaps, then, Australian preferences were of no immediate material benefit to the mother country. Yet the sentiment which actuated their introduction and their potential importance is not to be dismissed. They brought Australia into line with New Zealand, South Africa and Canada, all of whom offered preferential tariff rates, and in this way helped pave the way for the introduction of mutual preference in the post-war period. More significant, perhaps, was their symbolic value, an indication of a positive willingness to seek a method of reconciling national and economic self-interest with Empire membership. And perhaps most revealing was the evidence of the debates on both mutual preference and unilateral preference that the Australian economy was discarding many of the remnants of its colonial character. The extreme free trader who thought of the cities as commercial *entrepôts* for a colonial hinterland was a small minority. He did not command the support of the growing industries of butter, wheat, and meat, nor apparently of the body of pastoralists. Though the *Australian Pastoralists' Review* could not support tariffs of the height of the 1907-8 tariffs, it did support the growth of Australian manufacture, commending the Australian Natives' Association on its 1905-6 campaign to sell Australian manufactured goods.<sup>47</sup>

Clearly the Free Trade Party was in a state of disintegration lacking a coherent national policy. This can equally clearly be illustrated in their attitudes to defence. On the other hand, the Deakin protectionists, reinforced by the majority of political Labor, were able to argue, with differences of emphasis, a policy which reflected the majority belief in the national need for the growth of secondary industry and the growth and diversification of primary industry, while still offering some preference within the Empire. These developments were underwritten by the pattern of Australia's trade and finance.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, British exports should have had a favourable market within Australia. Not only had all Australian trade been conducted with or through Britain until 1883,<sup>48</sup> thus establishing extensive business associations between the countries and Australian familiarity with British business practice, but to 1913 at least it appeared that the sentiment of the majority of large Australian importers favoured buying British, other things being equal. Of the 27 important business and government representatives who gave evidence before the dominions Royal Commission on Empire trade, 25 made this point directly or indirectly.<sup>49</sup> Yet, although the total value of British imports to Australia increased between 1886 and 1914-15 the percentage of imports from the United Kingdom to the total Australian imports declined significantly. Of the principal direct imports the United Kingdom share fell from 89.31 per cent. to 69.89 per cent. The value of these imports from the United Kingdom increased from £20,489,513 in 1886 to £30,826,905 in 1914-15 or by 50.45 per cent., but the total

<sup>47</sup>*Australasian Pastoralists' Review*, 15 March 1906.

<sup>48</sup>T. A. Coghlan, *The Seven Colonies of Australasia*, 1901-2, Sydney, 1902, p. 1054.

<sup>49</sup>*Royal Commission on the Natural Resources, Trade, and Legislation of Certain Portions of His Majesty's Dominions—Minutes of Evidence Taken in Australia in 1913*, Pt. I (Cmd. 7171) and Pt. II (Cmd. 7172), London. Cmd. 7172, pp. 210, ff.



value of similar imports increased from £22,937,818 to £44,104,547 or by 92.28 per cent.<sup>50</sup>

This decline in Britain's position in Australian trade was due to two major external factors and to one emanating from within Australia. The two external causes were the search for overseas markets by continental countries, particularly Germany, and in certain fields, the United States, and the unwillingness or inability of British industry to adapt itself to the demands of the New World.<sup>51</sup> The major internal cause was the growth and diversification of Australian exports and the increasing tendency for Australia to ship directly to the importing countries instead of distributing her trade through London. Between 1894-5 and 1909-13 the percentage of exports shipped to the United Kingdom declined from 66.82 per cent. to 45.14 per cent. The decline in Australia's export trade with the United Kingdom meant that Australia had to buy less from her.<sup>52</sup>

Despite the preponderance of Australian tradition and of sentiment in favour of buying British, then, the relative decline in Britain's world industrial position and the development of the Australian economy brought about some loosening of the economic bonds between the two countries. In itself this development was not in the least likely to jeopardise Australia's Empire membership, not only because the United Kingdom continued to be Australia's major market, but also because in the absence of a satisfactory system of mutual preference, a diversification of markets was an essential corollary to Australia's economic growth and as such was likely to help keep Australia content within the Empire. Nonetheless it was evidence of decreasing dependence on Britain and, if Burton's criteria are acceptable economically, of "growing maturity" and of a "decline in the colonial character of the Australian economy".<sup>53</sup>

The multiplication of Australia's direct trade relations was inevitably paralleled in the decline of Britain's monopoly of the carrying of Australian trade. Until the war, British shipping continued to occupy an outstanding position, about 75 per cent. of the tonnage entering and clearing Commonwealth ports still being British in 1912. At the same time, however, the percentage of foreign trade increased between 1881 and 1914 from about six per cent. to 25 per cent. This increase, noted the *Commonwealth Year Book*, was "the corollary of the extension of the trade of the Commonwealth with foreign countries".<sup>54</sup>

The growth of foreign shipping in Australian waters was not welcomed by either the Deakin Governments or the Labor Party. Partly on the grounds of sentiment, partly to encourage the development of Australian shipping, partly because of Labor's interest in protecting Australian seamen against cheap Asiatic and Indian labour, and partly because of the fear of potentially hostile shipping

<sup>50</sup>*Com. Year Book*, No. 9, 1916, p. 578.

<sup>51</sup>This view was advanced by the Australian witnesses at the Royal Commission and was in agreement with the reports explaining the reasons for the decline in British trade in Australia submitted by R. S. Jaffray of the British Board of Trade in 1905 and B. H. Morgan of the Manufacturers' Association of Great Britain in 1908. See *ibid.*, No. 6, 1913, pp. 623-4.

<sup>52</sup>*ibid.*, No. 9, 1916, p. 557. And see evidence by Knibbs, Commonwealth Statistician to the Dominions Royal Commission, Cmd. 7172, pp. 283, ff.

<sup>53</sup>Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

<sup>54</sup>Coghlan, *The Seven Colonies of Australasia*, p. 729. *Com. Year Book*, No. 7, 1914 p. 579.

in Australian waters, the Deakin Governments and the Fisher ministry sought to obtain the agreement of the self-governing section of the Empire to a policy of encouragement of British shipping manned by British seamen. But these efforts to increase British shipping in Australian waters as well as to write incidentally into the legislation Labor's social and racial aspirations, failed. The core of the problem was stated by Buxton, President of the Board of Trade at the time of the 1911 Imperial Conference.

Out of the 285,000,000 tons of British shipping all the world over no less than 164,000,000 tons go to foreign ports and a comparatively small proportion goes to Australian ports and therefore for the advantage and no doubt the considerable advantage of trade of the Commonwealth, we do not think it would be worthwhile to risk the possibility of disadvantage accruing to the very enormous trade which we have with other Powers.<sup>55</sup>

Australian support for mutual preference, the worried interest of both Labor and Liberal protectionist governments in maximising British shipping in Australian waters, and the sentimental inclination of major Australian importers to "buy British" if British industry would produce reasonably competitive goods, were all ample testimony of the interest of dominant, relevant Australian opinion in reinforcing and extending Australian-British economic relations. The British rejection of mutual preference, the failure of the shipping proposals and the decline in British-Australian trade were equally ample testimony that Australia's relations with Britain in a world context were changing measurably modifying the colonial character of the Australian economy of the 1880's. This was equally observable in Australian-British financial relations.

From being one of the major centres of British overseas investment in the 1880's Australia in the first decade and a half of the twentieth century ceased to occupy a significant place amongst the borrowers of new capital. The economic significance of this development has been examined in considerable detail in an unpublished work by Dr. A. Hall and the complementary study of Australian public and private capital formation has been and is being intensively investigated by Mr. N. Butlin.<sup>56</sup> There are, however, several of the more superficial aspects of its implications for Australian national growth within the British Empire to which reference might be made.

While Australia had remained almost totally dependent on British investment for new development there had been amongst governments and interested groups an acute sensitivity to the prejudices of the British investor. Martin has shown the interest of commercial, land finance and banking groups in federation as a possible method of re-establishing British investor confidence in the Australian market after the 1893 slump.<sup>57</sup> An extensive range of similar organisations

<sup>55</sup>*Minutes of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1911* (Cmd. 5745), London, p. 135. For the Deakin Government attitude, see *Minutes Procs. Col. Conf.*, 1907, p. 260.

<sup>56</sup>See A. R. Hall, *The London Capital Market and the Flow of Capital to Australia, 1870-1914*, unpublished thesis, University of London, 1951, p. 136. N. G. Butlin and H. de Meel, *Public Capital Formation in Australia: Estimates 1860-1900*, Australian National University Social Science Monographs, No. 11, 1954. N. G. Butlin, *Private Capital Formation in Australia: Estimates 1861-1900*, Australian National University Social Science Monographs, No. 5, 1955.

<sup>57</sup>A. W. Martin, "Economic Influences in the 'New Federation Movement'", *Hist. Studies, A. and N.Z.*, Vol. 6, No. 21, Nov. 1953, p. 64.

petitioned the Australian Federation Convention of 1897-8 and the British Government in 1900 against the proposal in the draft federal constitution to restrict appeals to the Privy Council on the grounds that the restriction of appeals would jeopardise, further, Australian credit in Britain.<sup>58</sup> Even Labor governments felt the need to tread warily and when the first Federal Labor Government was returned in 1904 the Prime Minister, Watson, immediately issued a statement assuring the British investor that the Labor Government would not indulge in any schemes of wildcat financing.<sup>59</sup> The *Bulletin*, strongly opposed to the extent of British economic interest in Australia, was constantly critical of the inadequate stand being taken by political Labor against this form of "sweating Australia".<sup>60</sup>

The sensitivity to the British investor did not extend generally to servility. Certainly in the legislative record of the early years of the Commonwealth there is no evidence that national policies of immigration restriction and social legislation were to be withheld however distasteful they might be to the British investor. But withal, there was still some substance to 1905-6 in Jebb's remark that

the course of self-respect could not escape the pressure, subtle but unmistakable with which the mortgagee knows how to check the independence of his victim. A whisper from the City, and Australian patriots sorrowfully weigh the prospects of the investment loan or the impending conversion against the behests of the national conscience.<sup>61</sup>

From about 1905-6 there was a noticeable change in the relationship in which Australia stood to the British investor. There was a ring of independence in Sowden's claim that the low rates offered Australian securities were repulsing Australian loans from the London market and had led to "the prospect of Australia . . . securing better treatment in New York".<sup>62</sup> More generally, however, the note of independence was expressed in terms of Australia's increasing ability to finance its own development.<sup>63</sup> And this probably was the deeper and more permanent significance of the development which had occurred. The prosperity of the late 1870's and early 1880's had been financed by an almost fabulous invasion

<sup>58</sup>The Commercial Banking Company of Sydney, the City Bank of Sydney, the Savings Bank and the Bank of N.S.W. as well as all other banking companies trading in Victoria and N.S.W.; the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works, the Incorporated Institute of Accountants of Victoria, the Victorian Division of the Society of Accountants and Auditors Incorporated, England, the Accountants and Clerks Association Limited, the Cambrian Society of Victoria, "fifteen or twenty" Victorian insurance companies, the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, the Society of Notaries of Victoria, the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, the Melbourne Chamber of Mines, the Geelong Chamber of Commerce, the Melbourne Wool Brokers' Association, the Federal Institute of Accountants, the Victorian Licensed Victuallers' Association, Victorian Employers' Union, the Pastoralists' Association of Victoria and the Southern Riverina, the Council of Geelong and Western District Agricultural and Horticultural Society of Victoria, the Royal Agricultural Society of Victoria and the Ballarat Agricultural Society; the Australasian Federal League (in S.A.) and the Australasian National League, also of S.A. See *Official Records of the Australian Federal Convention* (Third Session, Melbourne, 1898) and *Papers Relating to the Federation of the Australian Colonies* (Cmd. 124 and Cmd. 158).

<sup>59</sup>A. N. Smith, *Thirty Years: the Commonwealth of Australia, 1901-31*, Melbourne, 1933, p. 86.

<sup>60</sup>*Bulletin*, 19 July 1902.

<sup>61</sup>See Jebb, *op. cit.*

<sup>62</sup>W. J. Sowden, "The Anglo-Australian Position from an Australian Viewpoint", *Proc. R.C.I.*, Vol. XXXVII, 1905-6, p. 17.

<sup>63</sup>e.g. *ibid.*, 1906-7, Vol. XXXVIII, p. 337; *ibid.*, 1907-8, Vol. XXXIX, p. 319; Cmd. 7171, pp. 238, ff.; and note decision of 1905 Interstate Conference of the Political Labor Party to restrict public borrowing and the Fisher Government's subsequent repeal of Deakin's Naval Loan Bill.



of British money. The prosperity from 1906 called for proportionately much less new capital and a substantial part of the new capital required was able to be raised locally. In the 1880's virtually the whole of government loan money was raised in London. By 1913 when approximately seventy per cent. of the London issued capital outstanding in Australia was in government loans, the proportion of the national debt floated in Australia had risen to 30.59 per cent.<sup>64</sup> Of the aggregate of loan and company capital in Australasia, Nash estimated that the percentage which was Australasian capital had increased between 1902-12 from about 29 per cent. to 43 per cent.<sup>65</sup> Though there must be some reserve felt about Nash's figures, Hall's estimate appears soundly grounded. While, then, Australia was still heavily dependent on overseas capital, there is no dispute that from 1893 she did become increasingly financially self-sufficient. Again if Burton's criteria are acceptable economically, in the fields of finance as in the field of trade, Australia was "reaching towards maturity".<sup>66</sup> These developments economically underwrote the achievement of her national aspirations in the field of defence.

### III

The subordinate position of the self-governing colonies after 1900 rested basically in the fact that the British Government retained the sole right to determine Empire foreign policy. As late as 1911, Asquith asserted that in relation to "the conduct of foreign policy . . . [and] the conclusion of treaties . . . the responsibility of the imperial parliament . . . could not be shared".<sup>67</sup> This was an opinion which the governments of Canada, South Africa and New Zealand did not wish to dispute.<sup>68</sup> It was, however, a statement which in the eyes of the Foreign Office was already qualified by the fact that the self-governing dominions controlled their own armed forces, particularly their own naval units.<sup>69</sup> Although majority Australian opinion, in its support for independent dominion forces, had not been motivated by a desire to load Australia with responsibility for high questions of Empire foreign policy, nonetheless the establishment of separate forces, particularly navies, did help bridge the final gap between colonial and complete dominion status.<sup>70</sup> The Great War was the catalyst which embroiled dominion leaders in the making of Empire policy but dominion intrusion into the residual domain of British control had been made by 1911. Australia played an important part in this movement, a role which was the consequence of the prevalent understanding of national dignity, of Deakin's

<sup>64</sup>A. R. Hall, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

<sup>65</sup>Cmd. 7171, p. 305. R. L. Nash was financial editor of the Sydney *Daily Telegraph* and editor of the *Australasian Joint Stock Companies Year Book*. Note that Knibbs questioned Nash's statistics. See Cmd. 7171, pp. 296, ff.

<sup>66</sup>Burton, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

<sup>67</sup>Quoted in R. M. Dawson, *The Development of Dominion Status*, London, 1937, p. 11.

<sup>68</sup>*Minutes Procs. Imp. Conf.*, 1911. Cmd. 5745.

<sup>69</sup>Grey to Rumbold, 26 May 1916: "I informed the Japanese Ambassador to-day that, as it was part of our policy, now that the self-governing Dominions had separate fleets and forces, to consult them on matters of foreign policy, we had discussed with them the prolongation of the Japanese Alliance." G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley (eds.), *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914*, London, 1927-33, Vol. VIII, p. 525.

<sup>70</sup>Grey at the 1911 Committee of Imperial Defence: "What really determines the Foreign Policy of the country is the question of sea power. It is the naval question which underlines the whole of our European Foreign Policy, and more than the European Foreign Policy." *ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 782.

interest in advancing the status of the dominions, and of the increasing cohesion of Australian attitudes regarding defence as a result of German naval development and the marked increase in Japanese power.

To 1905 there was no urgency in the Australian demand for adequate regional defence and for Australian control of her own defence units. When Barton returned from the 1902 Colonial Conference with the naval agreement under which Australia was to pay £200,000 a year towards the upkeep of an Admiralty controlled and British officered unit, there was a considerable popular outcry. Of the speakers who debated the bill in the House of Representatives, 29 were either directly opposed to the agreement or hesitant about accepting while fourteen favoured it.<sup>71</sup> The ardent, nationalist press, the *Bulletin*, the *Melbourne Age*, the *South Australian Register*, supported by the *Brisbane Courier*, strongly criticised the agreement.<sup>72</sup> But the basis of all the criticism was that the bill was an affront to national dignity. Feeling was not sufficiently strong to lead to the defeat of the Government on this issue, probably because there was little real fear for Australian security. Insofar as a threat was anticipated it was Russia which was seen as the most likely enemy of Australia rather than Japan.<sup>73</sup> The fear of Japan occurred after the Russo-Japanese War and was a powerful impetus in advancing Australian national consciousness and in making more urgent the demand for Australian controlled defence forces. It contributed to advancing Australian national independence within the Empire and to increasing the pressure on the Admiralty for a policy of Empire naval strategy more consonant with the fears and aspirations of the self-governing dominions.

With the exception of the *Bulletin*, Australian press opinion was sympathetic to Japan throughout the Russo-Japanese War. Until the peace the picture which the Australian press painted of Japan was of an idyllic country harshly treated in the past by the great powers. "The present war", said the *Brisbane Courier*, "was due to the previous wanton interference with the rights of Japan" and spoke of "the inspiration of national enthusiasm in a just cause".<sup>74</sup> Japan on this occasion, the *Sydney Morning Herald* argued, should get the fruits of her victory. "There can be little doubt", wrote the *Argus*, "that Japan needs the indemnity in order to arm itself effectively against any possibility of revenge on Russia's part." The full range of the free trade press, including the free trade but very nationalist *South Australian Register*, welcomed the opportunity of expanding trade with Japan. But with the final defeat of Russia, and as its implications sank home, soul searching commenced. Almost overnight the *Sydney Morning Herald's* thinking changed as it commenced to argue that "the yellow man has taught the white man a lesson that Australians can neglect only at their peril". The *South Australian Register* and the *Melbourne Age* began to doubt whether the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was an adequate safeguard of Australian interests. For the previously isolationist *Bulletin*, Australia's geographically provided protection against embroilment in

<sup>71</sup>*Com. Parl. Debs.*, 1903, Vol. XIV.

<sup>72</sup>e.g. *Brisbane Courier*, 22 May 1903; *Bulletin*, 6 June 1903; *S.A.R.*, 29 May 1903.

<sup>73</sup>*Com. P.D.*, 1903, Vol. XIV, e.g. pp. 2319, 2330, 2419.

<sup>74</sup>For press opinion at this time see *Brisbane Courier*, *S.M.H.*, *Melbourne Argus*, *S.A.R.*, and *Melbourne Age*, June-Sept. 1905.

world conflicts had evaporated with the outbreak of the war.<sup>75</sup> The *Australasian Pastoralists' Review* as well as *Advance Australia*, the journal of the Australian Natives' Association, reiterated this theme.

'It was fashionable to say that as Australia was far removed from Europe her duty was to remain aloof from old world strife.' Now the feeling is 'Australia is one of the most meanly insured countries on earth and the riches we own are tremendous'.<sup>76</sup>

Under the impact of this growing disquiet the movement for more adequate national defence took on weight. The National Defence League was established in 1904 and it drew its leaders from the front ranks of all political parties. The *Bulletin* swung behind the movement discarding its anti-imperialism. Political Labor and the Labor press temporarily abandoned their opposition to compulsory military training. "Militarism is a curse of the greatest", said the *Worker*, "but it is less a curse than the armed occupation of your country by invaders—possibly by invaders of an inferior race."<sup>77</sup> And Labor fought the 1906 election campaign partly in terms of the "Yellow Peril" and the need for a satisfactory system of Australian military and naval defence. The 1908 Conference of the Australian Labor Party carried by 24 votes to seven Watson's motion "approving the principle of compulsory military training".

By 1909 when the first bill providing for compulsory military training was introduced there was little organised opposition to the proposal. The *Sydney Daily Telegraph* was occasionally critical, repeating the anti-militarist arguments, and the *Barrier Truth* was outspoken against compulsion. More extensive criticism did develop after the scheme was introduced but much of this was directed against administrative inefficiency, alleged social discrimination and cruel discipline rather than against the principle in itself.<sup>78</sup>

The introduction of compulsory military training created no constitutional Empire problems. The right of the self-governing colonies to control their own military defence had long been conceded and Britain had withdrawn her last garrison forces from Australia in 1870. In military matters there was no problem of compatability of Australian Empire membership and Australian national independence. Yet, undoubtedly, in the growing acceptance within Australia from 1904-5 of the need for compulsory military training there was evidence of increasing national cohesion, in no small part the result of geographically determined fears. The underlying problem for Australian-British relations inherent in this development came to the surface in the more vital problem of naval defence.

Between 1905 and 1909 the Australian naval question was settled. The Imperial Defence Conference of 1909 approved the creation of separate navies in the self-governing dominions under the control of the dominion governments,

<sup>75</sup>e.g. *Bulletin*, 18 Feb. 1904 and 23 March 1905: "The rout of the Russians at Mukden is an event of history more important than any since the fall of Constantinople. . . Australia is a lonely outpost on the very borders of Asia."

<sup>76</sup>*Advance Australia*, 15 Nov. 1905, 15 Feb. 1905, 15 March 1905. *Australasian Pastoralists' Review*, 16 March 1904.

<sup>77</sup>*Worker*, 15 March 1905.

<sup>78</sup>See L. C. Jauncey, *The Story of Conscription in Australia*, London, 1935.



although it was recognised by the dominion governments that in time of war the naval forces would be placed under the general direction of the Admiralty. These navies were to be more than the coastal defence units envisaged by the Admiralty at the 1907 Colonial Conference.<sup>79</sup> They were to be distinct fleet units capable of being used as such in war. To make the units effective, it was proposed to reorganise Far Eastern naval deployment by establishing a Pacific fleet to consist of three units based on the East Indies, Australia and China.<sup>80</sup>

Although the final stages of the negotiations resulting in this agreement were conducted by the Fisher ministry and the third Deakin Government, when Deakin was in his decline, it was from 1905 to 1908 that Deakin had borne the heat of the battle. And within the Empire he bore it alone. At the 1907 Imperial Conference, Laurier, aware of the French-Canadian opposition to expenditure on naval defence, and aware that the United States had entered on a policy of naval expansion, could only refuse to make a cash contribution and be negative about the possibility of establishing a local navy. In 1909 Canada emerged as one of the dominions favouring an independent fleet unit but it had played no positive role in budging the Admiralty from its 1902 position. "New Zealand in 1907 'subscribed absolutely' to the maxim 'Trust the Admiralty', and to the postulate 'One sea, one Empire, one Navy'." In 1909, New Zealand still "preferred to adhere to her present policy of contributions".<sup>81</sup> Cape Colony and Natal in 1907 favoured a local defence unit, while Transvaal was almost an inland state. But South African energies were taken up with the possibilities of federation or union.

It would need a separate study to trace the course of Deakin's negotiations with the Admiralty from 1905 to 1908 and to consider Deakin's motivation in these negotiations. There are some grounds for assuming that Deakin's intention was to achieve more than a coastal defence unit and that he was thinking in terms of a more sophisticated conception of nationalism than implied in the wish to remove the smirch of the 1903 agreement on national self-respect. There is reason to believe that his aim was to advance the dominions to full equality of status with Great Britain which meant gaining for them that right of consultation on questions of high foreign policy which, according to Grey, the establishment of independent dominion forces had brought nearer.<sup>82</sup> Whatever Deakin's motivation, it is a reasonable assumption in view of Grey's statement that Deakin's efforts to establish an Australian navy did advance the dominions closer to the post-war meaning of dominion status.

<sup>79</sup>*Minutes Procs. Col. Conf.*, 1907, p. 75.

<sup>80</sup>*Correspondence and Papers relating to a Conference with the Representatives of the Self-Governing Dominions on the Naval and Military Defence of the Empire* (1909), Cmd. 4948, pp. 20-23.

<sup>81</sup>*ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>82</sup>*e.g.* Deakin's statement in his 1905 Presidential Address to the Imperial Federation League: "Defence . . . becomes of the greatest possible importance to the development of the modern State. It is the first condition of its being. In defence the governing power plays in one sense the greatest part. . . . The governing power of the Empire to-day is its sovereign. . . . We are the unrepresented subordinate states. . . . We are then subject to a Government which is not ours except by tradition and precedent, but which possesses absolute authority over us . . . always exercised so far with the greatest consideration and caution, and always likely to be. For all that, its power is exercised with no direct warrant from us. It is surely unreasonable to suppose that this state of affairs can continue indefinitely."

The Australian reaction to the 1909 agreement indicated the extent to which national agreement on the need for an Australian controlled navy had advanced between 1902 and 1909. There was not one major newspaper which did not welcome the new arrangement. The less nationalist press, the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the *Argus*,<sup>83</sup> saw the agreement as retaining the "essential principle" of imperial co-operation while recognising Australian wishes. The more nationalist press, the *Age*, the *South Australian Register*, and the *Bulletin*, supported by the *Brisbane Courier*, each emphasised their parental claim to the proposals. Australia, the *Bulletin* pointed out, would now be defended in the Pacific and not in the North Sea.<sup>84</sup>

The amicable compromise between nationalist demands and Empire membership contained in the 1909 agreement began to show signs of strain in 1912-13 as it appeared that neither the East Indies nor the China unit was being formed. Then in March 1914 these deteriorating relations were brought to a climax by the report that Churchill had stated "that a battle cruiser was not a necessary part of a fleet unit provided by the Dominions" and that "the presence of such vessels in the Pacific is not necessary to British interests".<sup>85</sup> It was a speech which set off a considerable *furor*.

Despite the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Australia's suspicion of Japan does not appear to have diminished after the immediate shock of the Japanese defeat of Russia. Rather was there a hardening determination to assure Australia's security. The journals most consistently vocal in drawing attention to the Japanese challenge were the *Bulletin* and its offshoot, the *Lone Hand*, but they were joined, increasingly, by the range of the Australian press. In 1913, for example, the Australian press watching closely the Japanese reaction to the California immigration restriction legislation, became markedly perturbed by the degree of recognition which Japan was now demanding for its nationals. This was a view not restricted to the more radical nationalist journals but was also advanced by the *Round Table* and the *Sydney Morning Herald*, both very sympathetic to the imperial idea.<sup>86</sup> Then when Churchill's statement was issued in 1914 the Australian press, the *Round Table* and Senator Millen, the non-Labor Government Minister for Defence, emphasising the difference between Australian and British relations to Japan, all expressed their acute dissatisfaction with Britain's newly enunciated naval policy and with the failure of the 1909 defence agreement proposals to materialise.<sup>87</sup>

This was an attitude with which New Zealand now agreed. There had been between 1911 and 1914 an almost revolutionary change in New Zealand's policy. Not only the ordering of the *New Zealand* to the North Sea, but also the failure of the British Government to provide the other two vessels promised under the 1909 agreement, temporarily reversed New Zealand's policy. Massey believed that

<sup>83</sup>*S.M.H.*, 21 Aug. 1909; Melbourne *Argus*, 18 Aug. 1909.

<sup>84</sup>*Brisbane Courier*, 19 Aug. 1909; Melbourne *Age*, 26 Aug. 1909; *Bulletin*, 26 Aug. 1909.

<sup>85</sup>See *Round Table*, Vol. IV, Pt. II.

<sup>86</sup>e.g. *S.A.R.*, 15 Ap. 1913; *S.M.H.*, 11 and 27 Ap. 1913; *Brisbane Courier*, 14 Ap. 1913; *Round Table*, Vol. III, p. 735.

<sup>87</sup>*S.M.H.*, 19 March 1914; *Brisbane Courier*, 19 March 1914; *Brisbane Daily Mail*, 19 March 1914; *Age*, 20 March 1914; *Round Table*, Vol. IV, Pt. II, pp. 391, ff.

the Japanese Alliance "is not sufficient protection for New Zealand, and New Zealand, therefore, must do something for herself". He proposed a scheme for a great Pacific Navy arguing that the Pacific "would yet become the battleground of the nations".<sup>88</sup>

It was the outbreak of the war which temporarily re-focused Australian attention on the European scene.

#### IV

Australian attitudes to defence from 1901-14 provide, probably, the clearest illustration of the development of Australian national consciousness and of the growth of national cohesion in the formative years of the Commonwealth. It would be just to regard both the major parties as national parties from about 1906 and if the press was reflecting public opinion, there was also a remarkable degree of unanimity in regard to Australia's conception of its defence responsibility.

Towards the Empire, Australia's defence policy was almost bi-partisan as early as 1903, and certainly was bi-partisan from 1907. Deakin did give an emphasis to the Liberal policy which differed in degree from that of Labor. His ideal was not only to fashion a national Australia, grounded in self-respect, but also to help fashion an Empire of equals. The significance of his importance in this movement has not yet been adequately appraised. By writers such as Keith, he has been assessed too much on the failure of his detailed proposals and not sufficiently on his contribution both towards the understanding of what the new Commonwealth was to be and towards the conversion of the Empire into this Commonwealth. Labor, under Fisher, did not display this intensity of understanding and was probably more diffident in asserting Australia's claim to a voice in high policy. Yet it was neither insular nor parochial and at the 1911 Conference Fisher stood out as an Empire realist, willing to accept the necessary degree of dominion responsibility.

The Australian debate on defence from 1900 to 1914 could leave no doubt of the essential loyalty of Australia to the Empire. Equally it could leave no doubt that a conception of Empire in terms of a strategical disposition of colonies in relation to the mother country would not be countenanced. This had been reasonably clear in the 1880's. It was prominent by 1902. And as Japan began its triumphant march it became undeniable. From that time, in the opinion of the overwhelming weight of Australians, there could be no turning the clock back on Empire evolution as the Admiralty had appeared to do in the 1903 Naval Agreement.

Yet, despite the acquisition by Australia of control of its own defence services and despite the gradually emerging national economy, Australia in 1914 did not wish, nor was it obliged, to launch an independent foreign policy. Empire evolution had kept abreast of nationalist demands for a steady increase in national independence, and British power, if it had been challenged, was to continue of first order

<sup>88</sup>*Round Table*, Vol. IV, p. 409.



significance for another thirty years. Australia was afforded a further generation of protected apprenticeship and national evolution before it had to assume responsibility for an independent foreign policy. But as contemporary Australian foreign policy acquires a history, it is becoming increasingly apparent that, although it inevitably contains much that is new, its principles are grounded in much that is old within Australia and, not least, the understanding of Australian nationalist aspirations and regional fears as they were expressed in the formative years of the Commonwealth.

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# The State as Employer: An Early Twentieth-Century Discussion

By BRUCE E. MANSFIELD

The part taken by the state in the development of the Australian colonies in the late nineteenth century is well known. A question posed was: how far should the state employ men directly for its developmental work, how far should it rely on the private contractor? In New South Wales, in the last years of the nineteenth and in the first years of this century, there was such an extension of direct employment by the state as to provoke a public controversy which revealed precisely the social attitudes of the time. The differences revealed were not superficial. The part of the state in economic life and the principles which ought to govern the employment of labour in industrial society were both involved. What degree of security in employment does society owe the worker? What degree of efficiency does the worker owe society to earn that security? These questions are at the centre of this controversy. The language and much of the substance of the controversy seem to belong to the colonial and late Victorian period, but it marked also the early stages in New South Wales politics of some of the most characteristic political debates of the first half of the twentieth century. The purpose of this article is to reveal these things by analysing some of the records of the controversy.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, when the Reid Government was in office in New South Wales, the state began to employ men directly for many kinds of works of construction and development. In the Government Architect's Department, for example, the day-labour system was first used in 1894 when additions were made under it to some government buildings in Sydney. In the time of the Reid Government the day-labour principle was adopted widely in the work of the Government Architect. When E. W. O'Sullivan became Minister of Public Works in the Lyne Government in 1899, it was applied in all branches of the Public Works Department. A significant extension in the range of public employment was involved.<sup>1</sup>

The fact is reflected in the Annual Reports of the Public Works Department. While O'Sullivan was in office there was a continuous fall in the proportion of the Department's expenditure spent on contracts. In 1899-1900, contracts accounted for nearly £890,000 out of a total expenditure of £2,224,000.<sup>2</sup> By 1902-03 the corresponding figures were £623,000 out of nearly £4½ million. By comparison the proportions spent on wages and materials increased remarkably. The wages bill

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<sup>1</sup>History of day-labour system in Report of Public Service Board into day-labour work at the Prince Alfred Hospital, p. 7. *N.S.W. Votes and Proceedings*, Legislative Assembly, Session 1904, p. 653.

<sup>2</sup>All details in Annual Reports of Public Works Department, 1899-1900, *N.S.W. V. & P.*, Legislative Assembly, Session 1901, Vol. V, p. 1099; 1900-01, *ibid.*, p. 1261; 1901-02, *ibid.*, Session 1902, Vol. V, p. 957; 1902-03, *ibid.*, Session 1903, Vol. VI, p. 665; 1903-04, *Joint Papers*, 2nd Session 1904, Vol. IV, p. 561.

rose from less than £650,000 in 1899-1900 to over £1,000,000 in 1900-01, and did not fall far below that figure before 1903. (In the last year of the Government's life, 1903-04, lack of money forced retreats everywhere, and not least in day-labour.) The expenditure on materials was a little above a quarter of the whole in 1899-1900; in 1902-03, it was well over a half. The branch responsible for constructing roads and bridges spent 27 per cent. of its total on wages in 1899-1900 and 53.8 per cent. on contracts; by 1902-03 the one figure had risen to 36.8 per cent. and the other had fallen to 37.6 per cent. This enhancement of the role of the state as employer went along with two other aspects of the Government's policy which increased its controversial significance. Until frustrated by lack of money, the Government pushed on as fast as it could with the construction of public works. At the end of June 1901 there were 560 miles of railway under construction in New South Wales, compared with 245 a year before. At the same time the Government required that a minimum wage of 7/- per day should be paid on all regular government works (as distinct from works of relief for the unemployed).<sup>3</sup>

These things were the personal policy of the Minister, E. W. O'Sullivan. One may be warned, and rightly, against laying too much emphasis on a personal influence. O'Sullivan developed what the Reid Government had begun. Besides, the Government needed the parliamentary support of the Labor Party, and O'Sullivan's programme was Labor policy. However, for understanding the relation of this Government to the Labor Party, the simple physical or mechanical metaphors of "pressure" and "support in return for concessions" are not completely happy. Indeed, the nuances in the relationship between the Labor Party and the various governments which it supported and assisted in the first decade or so of its existence were certainly more subtle than is allowed by the assumption that the political initiative lay simply with it. This Government of 1899-1904 raises the problems precisely. In 1902 McGowen, leader of the Labor Party, called those who said that Labor's policy was one of political support in return for concessions to the working-class "unfair" and "un-British", and added: "... We support the Government because they are advocating the principles which we are advocating."<sup>4</sup> No doubt the Government was desperately anxious to have Labor's support but, for a man like O'Sullivan, this required no trimming of the radical mantle which he had long worn of his own choice. He described the situation precisely as he saw it thus: "They support us, because their views harmonise with ours. Our views are their views."<sup>5</sup> Certainly not all of O'Sullivan's colleagues in the Cabinet would have described the relationship so bluntly. O'Sullivan represented a radical wing, and was, for a long time, reputed the favourite of the Labor Party.<sup>6</sup> But, until the times of financial stringency, that wing had the initiative in the Government and led it into a forward policy. The *Bulletin* believed that the minimum wage was a case of O'Sullivan's "going alone",<sup>7</sup> and the Opposition constantly refer to

<sup>3</sup>N.S.W. *Parl. Debs.*, 2nd series, Vol. I, p. 379. For some remarks on the employment policy of the Government in its first two years, see W. P. Reeves, *State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand*, London, 1902, pp. 216-42.

<sup>4</sup>N.S.W. *P.D.*, Vol. V, pp. 170-1.

<sup>5</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. VIII, p. 3470.

<sup>6</sup>It was generally believed that Labor wanted O'Sullivan as Premier. See e.g. remarks of D. O'Connor, *ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 304.

<sup>7</sup>26 May 1900.



him as one of the "strong men" of the Cabinet.<sup>8</sup> The point is that O'Sullivan's part is decisive and his outlook must be analysed if the day-labour programme and the controversies which gathered around it are to be understood.

O'Sullivan belonged to an Australian radical tradition of the later nineteenth century which to some extent was continued and developed in the Labor Party, but which, in some of its most interesting representatives, remained independent of that party. (This independence and the reasons for it are easily misunderstood if one views the Labor Party as the inevitable summing-up of the whole late nineteenth century reforming movement. Might it not be truer to the realities of the 'eighties and 'nineties to discern there a general critical ferment of which the Labor Party was but one expression? Not all those whose training for public responsibilities was had in the debating-society movement found their destiny in the Labor Party.) Despite his own long association with the trades unions, and despite also the warm praise which he bestowed on the Labor Party while he was Minister, O'Sullivan had ultimate reservations about the tendency of the party. His reservations concerned the socialist, Utopian strain which he found there. But his position can be best understood through positive analysis of the influences which shaped his mind. He was affected by three main tendencies of the later nineteenth century, all essential for any understanding of the Australian life of the time: Australian nationalism, protectionism and the Catholic social movement.

The attitudes characteristic of the Australian nationalists of the later nineteenth century are all to be found in O'Sullivan. He has their large and too optimistic faith in the country's future. (He had once said: "She is, perhaps, the most self-contained country in the world. . . . She has hundreds of millions of acres of splendid agricultural soil. . . .")<sup>9</sup> The practical expression of this optimism was the programme of development which the Government entered on in the first year or so of its life. A well-known feature of the Australian national myth is its exaltation of the country. This theme was well in tune with O'Sullivan's main motif of development. "There is", he said,

a class of politicians who seem to think that if they climb the Post Office tower and look upon one side and see the Blue Mountains and on the other side the blue Pacific, they see the whole of New South Wales. To understand New South Wales, one has to travel it from end to end, to mix with the people, to ascertain their wants and wishes, and do his best to supply them.<sup>10</sup>

He considered the selectors as "the very backbone of the community".<sup>11</sup> He was for years member for a selecting constituency and the support of "the free selectors, farmers and the intelligent democracy"<sup>12</sup> was the foundation of his political career.

The place of religious ideas, both Protestant and Catholic, in late nineteenth century Australian history deserves more attention than it has so far received. O'Sullivan at any rate was plainly affected by the contemporary movement of social concern in the Catholic Church. Some of the historical myths of the movement are, unhappily, reflected in what he wrote as editor of the *Freeman's Journal*

<sup>8</sup>e.g. Carruthers, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 12 Feb. 1903.

<sup>9</sup>*Centennial Magazine*, Feb. 1890.

<sup>11</sup>*ibid.*, 1st series, Vol. C, p. 1097.

<sup>10</sup>*N.S.W. P.D.*, 2nd series, Vol. I, p. 96.

<sup>12</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. XCIX, p. 164.

in the late 1890's: "The eclipse of labour was caused by Protestantism";<sup>13</sup> Bakunin's anarchism was "the natural outcome of the Reformation"<sup>14</sup> and so on. But much more important was the hold which he took on the positive social teaching of the movement. A *via media* must be found between "the system which produces pauperism and plutocracy and the wild schemes of the extremists",<sup>15</sup> whose remedy is worse than the disease. Social reforms must so improve the lot of the poor that new opportunities will be created for the co-operation rather than the warfare of classes. Industrial partnership and profit-sharing are mentioned; but O'Sullivan's support for trades unionism, arbitration, old age pensions and state action in general must also be set in the frame of his whole conception of society and its ends. So, too, must his rejection of the socialist ideal. Human nature could not bear a co-operative commonwealth. Only two things could make possible such a commonwealth: "a profound religious or devotional feeling in the work undertaken, which will induce those who undertake the work to submit to self-sacrifice and self-denial"; and secondly, "strict discipline by which all the regulations of the community can be rigidly enforced". Neither of these requirements can be found in modern civilization, even in Australia, "where we have, perhaps, the highest civilization in the world".<sup>16</sup>

O'Sullivan's regard for the state as employer and as the instrument of social reform and development may thus be best understood in the light of its origins. His long association with the protectionist movement in New South Wales contributed the conception of the state as the guardian and defender of the community's interests.

Protection is based upon the instinct of self-preservation, that great natural influence which guides and controls mankind in all its actions. If we violate that natural law, rely upon it that, sooner or later, we will pay dearly for it, just as we are punished for the violation of other natural laws. Governments are formed for protective purposes. . . .<sup>17</sup>

A pragmatic state socialism is the inevitable way for modern civilization. "We are all in favour of extending in a rational way the jurisdiction of municipalities and the sphere of the state."<sup>18</sup> But that extension must be directed at meeting a real need. It is right for the state to become a banker, "if by so doing it can relieve the citizens of a great deal of hardship and distress". ". . . The time has come when governments must take departures of any kind wherever they can benefit humanity."<sup>19</sup> The state's doing its own work and employing its own labour was such a departure since, O'Sullivan contended, the contractor had proved unjust to his workers as well as expensive and litigious for the state itself.

These then were the foundations of O'Sullivan's policy of increasing state employment. The policy, on O'Sullivan's showing, was not a relief measure for

<sup>13</sup>*Freeman's Journal*, 8 Oct. 1898.

<sup>14</sup>*ibid.*, 21 Jan. 1899.

<sup>15</sup>*ibid.*, 12 Feb. 1898.

<sup>16</sup>*N.S.W. P.D.*, 2nd series, Vol. XVIII, pp. 135-6.

<sup>17</sup>*Protection or Stagnation; Which?* Sydney, 1897, p. 16. The reference to natural law is interesting.

<sup>18</sup>*N.S.W. P.D.*, 2nd series, Vol. XVIII, p. 137.

<sup>19</sup>*ibid.*, 1st series, Vol. XCIX, p. 170.

dealing with the long-standing problem of the unemployed and the severe drought which gripped the State in the Government's time. It was "started to develop the resources of the country, . . . and it so happened that it was done at a time when there was distress everywhere owing to the drought"; in this latter respect it "staved off a financial and industrial panic".<sup>20</sup> The Government's programme and especially its use of day-labour could be defended as the best means of carrying the community through a natural disaster, an "almost unparalleled drought" in which "everything pastoral and agricultural suffered enormously, and thousands usually employed in these industries lost their employment. . . ."<sup>21</sup> The reply of the Premier, John See, to the critics of the Government's programme of public works was simply: "Knock off public works and you will have more unemployed."<sup>22</sup>

The drought and the economic difficulties, however, cut both ways for the Government's programme. It was haunted and shadowed from the start by the difficulties of the unemployed. The machinery for dealing with this intractable and apparently permanent problem<sup>23</sup> was being improved, but a long tradition established direct political patronage as the surest remedy for the needs of the distressed. O'Sullivan could say that nearly half his time was spent in trying to find employment for men whose distress had been pressed on him by members of Parliament.<sup>24</sup> This was scarcely a favourable atmosphere for making experiments with state employment.

There were also, no doubt, practical and administrative difficulties. Direct supervision and control of large bodies of workmen was a new and trying experience for many officers of the Public Works Department. Labor members of Parliament more than once declared that senior officers in the Department were opposed to the Minister and the day-labour principle and were, in fact, engaged in sabotage. "No system can live", said one, "if it is not properly administered by those who have the power to administer it."<sup>25</sup> However that may be, the administration of the day-labour system must have been found burdensome in the Department. "On the whole", said the Under-Secretary in his Report in 1902, "the system has proved most successful in operation, but the result has only been obtained by greatly increasing the work and responsibility of the officers of the Department."<sup>26</sup> A year later he estimated that 326 persons beyond the regular staff of the Department had been employed to administer the day-labour system.<sup>27</sup> The system required then such an extension of the public service as has been a frequent cause of political controversy in the twentieth century. But even so, the resources for administering

<sup>20</sup>*ibid.*, 2nd series, Vol. X, p. 427.

<sup>21</sup>Report of Labour Commissioners of N.S.W., 1902-03, p. 2. N.S.W. V. & P., Legislative Assembly, Session 1903, Vol. III, p. 1285.

<sup>22</sup>N.S.W. P.D., 2nd series, Vol. V, p. 49.

<sup>23</sup>See O'Sullivan's remarks, *ibid.*, p. 618: "I can see very well that there is no bottom to it."

<sup>24</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 791.

<sup>25</sup>*ibid.*, Vol. X, p. 794. It is interesting in this context that Métin wrote that in the Australian colonies "l'Etat ne doit pas être tyrannique puisqu'il est commun d'entendre des chefs de service critiquer librement les lois démocratiques ouvrières". A. Métin, *Le socialisme sans doctrines*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1910, p. 250.

<sup>26</sup>Report of Public Works Department, p. 3, N.S.W. V. & P., Legislative Assembly, 1902, Vol. V, p. 959.

<sup>27</sup>Report of Public Works Department, p. 13, *ibid.*, 1903, Vol. VI, p. 679.



it efficiently were probably not yet present. A trades union spokesman went to the heart of the system's difficulties when he said:

Day labour, so far, is a thing which has grown up from small beginnings; it has been carried out in a haphazard way; no principle has been laid down for its control. . . . We think some statutory or other kind of authority should be devised to control State enterprise of this kind.

He showed also some appreciation of the genuine difficulties of the departmental officers: ". . . We do not think it is wise to place trained professional officers, architects, of the Department in the position of a contractor."<sup>28</sup> There are interesting problems in administrative history to be discerned here, but we need, for our present purpose, to investigate them no further. That purpose is to analyse the conflict of social attitudes which the working of the day-labour system provoked. It was a conflict about the state as employer, about the effect which state employment had on the morale and discipline of workmen and the quality of their work, and indeed, ultimately, about the whole character of industrial organisation in modern society. We can now come to a study of the two documents which most clearly reveal this conflict.

The first is the report of an enquiry by the Public Service Board into the causes of the alleged excessive cost of an important piece of day-labour work, the erection of two new pavilions at the Prince Alfred Hospital. The work was done by the Government Architect's branch of the Public Works Department. Vernon, the Government Architect, plainly was without enthusiasm for the day-labour system. His annual report speaks of it with resignation, if not with sourness. He declared the cost of the stone-work at Prince Alfred to be excessive, and blamed the excess on the workings of the system. On his representations, the Government instructed the Public Service Board to make an enquiry. The Architects' branch, the Operatives Stonemasons' Society and the private contractors of the city were represented at the enquiry. In the end, the Board accepted Vernon's and the contractors' allegations of excessive cost, and, by and large, their diagnosis of the ailment. That diagnosis was, in brief, that, because of the conditions under which stonemasons were employed for day-labour, proper supervision of the men and their work was impossible.<sup>29</sup> A precise statement of those conditions is necessary to make the issues clear.

In August 1901 an independent step had been taken in Parliament to release the day-labour system from the incubus of political patronage. O'Sullivan himself was aware of the evils and inconveniences of this patronage, and accepted the idea of establishing a State Labour Board of departmental officers to control the employment of men on state works. It was to furnish the ordinary public works with the skilled labour which they required. Its function was to be quite distinct from that of the three Labour Commissioners, whose thankless task henceforth was to relieve the unemployed, and in particular the unskilled unemployed.

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<sup>28</sup>Report of Public Service Board, App. III, p. 81, *ibid.*, Session 1904.

<sup>29</sup>*ibid.*, p. 30.

The Commissioners had earlier set up, for the convenience of unionists, a branch at the Trades Hall, and, not long after the State Labour Board began its work (January 1902), this branch was brought under its control. Artisans wanting state employment registered with the Board, either at the Trades Hall or at its own office, and were taken on, by its direction, in rotation, in the order of their registration. In the middle of 1902, the Minister directed that three-quarters of the men required for public works should be drawn in equal proportions from the State Labour Board's office and its Trades Hall branch. Thus unionists could be specially provided for (at the Trades Hall), while non-unionists would be given a chance of finding state employment through the Board's own office. The remaining 25 per cent. were to be put on directly by the officers in charge of the work. This percentage was reduced in September 1902 to fifteen; despite constant pressure from the unions to have the rotation system applied universally, O'Sullivan refused to reduce the proportion any further.<sup>30</sup>

In the particular case of the stonemasons, there was a further development. The Minister made it possible for stonemasons to register with the secretary of their society, who would submit their names in rotation to the State Labour Board. It was an attempt to overcome men's distaste for registering themselves with a state body because of the stigma of "relief" which such registration bore. Apart from this, the arrangement was, in O'Sullivan's eyes, simply an administrative convenience.<sup>31</sup> The men who did the stonework at the Prince Alfred then, were, apart from a small minority of fifteen per cent., employed after registering themselves with their union and being taken on in rotation by the State Labour Board. "The result of this", said the hostile report of the Public Service Board, "is to place the nomination of practically all stonemasons for employment on Government works in the hands of an irresponsible individual."<sup>32</sup> It was the need to assail or to defend this system in the enquiry before that Board which produced a plain clash of social principles and attitudes.

The rotation system, as used for the stonemasons, was defended on the principle that society owes to all tradesmen equally the right to employment, that citizenship (provided that minimum technical qualifications are met) carries with it such a right. "One set of men", O'Sullivan said, "should not monopolize state work whilst others are suffering from want of employment."<sup>33</sup> The Board summed up the unionists' view of the rotation system: "It gave every man an equal chance of obtaining State employment"; "all should have a share of such work at some time or other."<sup>34</sup> The unions believed that there was no alternative to the rigid

<sup>30</sup>*N.S.W. P.D.*, 2nd series, Vol. I, p. 781; Report of Public Service Board, pp. 11, 30-32, *N.S.W. V. & P.*, Legislative Assembly, Session 1904; Report of Labour Commissioners, 1901-2, p. 8, *ibid.*, Session 1902, Vol. V, p. 125. The rotation system was first used in N.S.W. at a time (1901) when the Commissioners were responsible both for relieving the unemployed and for providing a channel for labour to pass into government employment. (See Reeves, *op. cit.*, p. 221.) It replaced a ballot system which had proved both unjust and inefficient. Report of Labour Commissioners, 1901, pp. 3-4, *N.S.W. V. & P.*, Legislative Assembly, Session 1901, Vol. VI, p. 369.

<sup>31</sup>Report of Public Service Board, App. I, p. 61, *N.S.W. V. & P.*, Legislative Assembly, Session 1904.

<sup>32</sup>*ibid.*, p. 11.

<sup>34</sup>*ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>33</sup>Quoted *ibid.*, p. 31.

egalitarianism of the rotation system but personal or, what would be worse, political favouritism. "The masons as a body", said their secretary,

are bitterly opposed to the idea of having to wait upon a Member of Parliament to get a job. They are also opposed to come into Mr. Vernon or any other officer. . . . We do not want favouritism at all. We want to get there by reason of our being tradesmen, and by reason of our being citizens.<sup>35</sup>

There was here a simple insistence on the personal dignity of the artisan. There was also, perhaps, the fear that, without rigid safeguards for their employment, unionists would be passed over, and, consequently, unionism itself would be threatened. O'Sullivan could say in his evidence: "Many overseers in the Public Works Department are apparently antagonistic to Trades Unionism and the Rotation System, and I believe that a good deal of trouble has arisen from this cause."<sup>36</sup>

The unionists defended the rotation system as being bound up with their own essential rights. Their defence of it reflected at the same time their way of looking at society and its problems. They assumed a practical equality among the men working at the one trade. "We have contended all along", said one, "that any fifty men taken by rotation from the list of the Society or from the list of the State Labour Board would cut as much stone in a week as the next fifty."<sup>37</sup> Of course, they were prepared to accept the foreman's power to dismiss incompetent workmen, and this, in their view, amounted to an effective power of selection; but they insisted on each man's right to an opportunity of proving himself.

While the union stood by the equal rights of tradesmen and citizens, and assumed that effective work would be a happy by-product of an observance of these rights, the critics of the rotation system put efficiency in the first place and beside it, necessarily, labour discipline. For them, the day-labour system could work and compete with the contract system only if, under it, the officer in charge of a work had complete command of his workmen; for most of them, indeed, day-labour itself was so bound up with the egalitarian and insubordinate assumptions that expressed themselves most clearly in the rotation system, that it would be better to be done with it, and to return, for all major works, to the contractor.

The late Victorian industrialist demanded a control of his workmen which was complete. The Government Architect quoted one of the contractors as saying that, for proper discipline

the workman must know that his employer has absolute power of dismissal, without any appeal whatsoever; that, in my opinion, is essential, and a very important matter of discipline, because I have found that the workmen, taking them as a whole, have not the high reasoning powers that will enable them to see that dismissal, or any action against them, is justified, from the employer's point of view. . . . If the workman, then, has a knowledge that his position depends on the amount of work he does, and the way he does it, and he is part of an organisation which is governed by the employer, he becomes a part of the whole machine, as I might term it, and takes his place, and there is no trouble, no friction, no block in the working of the machine.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>35</sup>*ibid.*, App. II, p. 71.

<sup>36</sup>*ibid.*, App. I, p. 64.

<sup>37</sup>*ibid.*, App. III, p. 74.

<sup>38</sup>*ibid.*, App. IV, p. 98.



From this standard, the rotation system fell far short. Under it (said another of the contractors) the workers

feel that the employer is not their master, and that makes a very great difference in the feeling that the men have while going about their work. They feel that they are quite as good as the foreman, and, perhaps, just as good as their employer, and they get that independent spirit that some people take particular pride in, but which is not at all times for the good of the possessor.<sup>39</sup>

The master builders insisted that theirs was "a democratic business"; most employers had once been themselves mechanics.<sup>40</sup> An effective enterprise could, however, only be built on an effective labour discipline. The principle was taken by Vernon and, indeed, by the Public Service Board, as the basis of their assessment and rejection of the rotation system and of their criticism, to some extent, of the day labour system itself. Men were taken on in the order of their registration, not of their competence. What was more serious, they obtained their employment independently of the officer whose job it was to supervise their work. The view of the officers of the Architects' branch was summed up neatly by one of them: "We could get better value from the same men if we selected them."<sup>41</sup> The result of the existing system was slow and costly work.

The union's contention was that if the foreman had the right of dismissal (as he had) proper discipline would be assured. The reply that was made to this contention reveals how haunted responsible employers were by a fear of labour indiscipline. By the regulations of the State Labour Board, a discharged workman could appeal against his dismissal. Vernon said that this right of appeal created an "absolutely impossible" position, and that indeed attempts were deliberately made to keep from the men knowledge of their right.<sup>42</sup> He also said that the right made the foreman "powerless", although he admitted that, in fact, forty per cent. of the men put on at the Prince Alfred work had been turned away.<sup>43</sup> The Public Service Board apparently accepted the contention that "the power to discharge had been greatly interfered with, if not rendered a nullity", although it admitted inability to find more cases than one (in which exceptional circumstances were allowed) where the society pressed for a man's reinstatement, and one other in which the Minister himself interfered.<sup>44</sup> It was feared that the men would take advantage of the smallest qualification on the employer's or officer's control of their work. Only complete control could protect the work from their indolence or rebelliousness.

Reference to the Minister's intervention on behalf of a discharged man brings forward an issue which, for the Prince Alfred enquiry, was subsidiary, but which occupied the centre of the stage in the second enquiry to be analysed, the issue of political and especially ministerial interference. The critics of the day-labour system wanted the officer's control of his job to be protected from the intervention not only of the unions, but also of the Minister. Indeed, everybody believed that political interference should be cut out of the employment of men on public works.

<sup>39</sup>*ibid.*, p. 42.

<sup>41</sup>*ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>43</sup>*ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>40</sup>*ibid.*, App. VI, pp. 111-12.

<sup>42</sup>*ibid.*, App. IV, p. 94.

<sup>44</sup>*ibid.*, p. 35.

The unions believed it; their attachment to the mechanical rotation system which excluded all external interference is testimony. But, fearing for unionist principles at the hands of officers whom they believed to be unsympathetic, they overcame their repugnance and hastened to a Minister whom they knew to be sympathetic. O'Sullivan himself was in the same dilemma as the unions. Many times he declared his opposition to political interference and his weariness at having to cope with the applications of members of Parliament and others on behalf of artisans needing work. But where an important principle was at stake, especially that of justice to the workman, he believed a Minister's duty was to intervene. "I have always endeavoured", he said, "to do justice to both officials and men, and it certainly does seem to me that cases may arise in which the workmen can only obtain fair play from the overseer by appealing directly to the Minister."<sup>45</sup> The Chairman of the enquiry discerned the underlying assumptions:

I gather from your remarks that you do not look at it altogether as a business man. You look upon yourself as one of the high officers of State, and you have to take into account the State reasons in the employment of men which contractors and business men would not.<sup>46</sup>

A high view of the Minister's office accompanied a high view of the state's role as employer.

Our second enquiry, that of a Royal Commission into the workings of the Government Dock (Fitzroy Dock) at Cockatoo Island, revealed precisely the same conflict as the enquiry into day-labour at the Prince Alfred Hospital, although this was a long-established state enterprise under the Public Works Department, and not part of the newly extended day-labour system. There was a dock at Cockatoo Island where men-of-war were repaired and fitted out; more important, there was a large engineering shop where work was done for the Public Works and other government departments. The establishment had had a long history of enquiries into its administration and workings, and according to O'Sullivan (who would naturally be tempted to play up its chronic and long-standing evils) had been a "source of trouble" and "a sink of wastefulness" for many years.<sup>47</sup> Late in 1902, O'Sullivan, for reasons that cannot be clearly discerned,<sup>48</sup> decided that something drastic should be done about the Dock at once. The Under-Secretary paid the Dock a visit, reported a "chaotic state of affairs", and advised "a searching inquiry".<sup>49</sup> It was finally decided to appoint a Royal Commission.

The Commission's report was badly received by the Government's supporters. One of them declared that it was "not an impartial report".<sup>50</sup> Labor members of Parliament who had often criticized the management of the Dock, especially for being hostile to the unions, returned to the attack when the Commission's report was being discussed. The Report was, in their view, one-sided. "Nearly the

<sup>45</sup>*ibid.*, App. I, p. 64.

<sup>46</sup>*ibid.*, p. 66.

<sup>47</sup>*N.S.W. P.D.*, 2nd series, Vol. X, p. 774.

<sup>48</sup>It was alleged that he was faced with the problem of putting men off, and chose to shift the responsibility to a Royal Commission, *ibid.*, p. 746.

<sup>49</sup>Papers relating to appointment of Royal Commission, p. 2, *N.S.W. V. & P.*, Legislative Assembly, Session 1903, Vol. IV, p. 1007.

<sup>50</sup>*N.S.W. P.D.*, 2nd series, Vol. X, p. 802.

whole of the commission", one of them said, "were opposed to the day-labour system."<sup>51</sup> What the Commissioners did was to blame most of the evils at the Dock on "political interference", in the form especially of ministerial injunctions about the employment of labour. "The vital principle of successful management of any enterprise", they said, "is that responsibility and power shall be in the same hands. In the case of the Dock, nothing but the shadow of power can be discovered anywhere but in the hands of the Minister."<sup>52</sup> It was, of course, accepted that O'Sullivan acted in this way not for himself, but under the ceaseless pressure of members of Parliament, but that, nevertheless, he was the person primarily responsible for the wretched state of the Dock.

One feels that there is some justice in the case of the Commission's critics. Evidence showing that the bad effects of political interference were to be found at the Dock before O'Sullivan's time was given too little weight.<sup>53</sup> Hindrances to the Dock's efficient running which had nothing to do with political interference were also passed over too lightly. The manager was clearly incapable of doing his job properly;<sup>54</sup> the whole atmosphere reeked of favouritism and intrigue.<sup>55</sup> There was also a good deal of evidence about technical inefficiencies at the Dock. The real explanation of the Dock's trouble (and of its long history of political influence) probably lay in the great fluctuations in the amount of work done there, and consequently in the numbers of men employed.<sup>56</sup> An expert witness saw that political influence could be excluded only by keeping the Dock's labour force constant.

If there is a certain staff of good men obtained, outside of political influence, and they can be kept constantly employed under proper supervision, I maintain it would be far more satisfactory than to have, say, 200 men, and then all at once go up to 600 men, because as soon as you go to increase the staff, then political influence is brought to bear to try and get on men whether they are suitable or not.<sup>57</sup>

When allowance has been made for this factor and also (as it must be) for the long history of political interference, we must still seek an explanation of the state of the Dock in O'Sullivan's time in the attitudes of those who ran it and worked in it then. An analysis of those attitudes reveals the same differences of approach as can be found in the day-labour work at the Prince Alfred. Why did the men at the Dock look to the Minister? Why did the Minister interfere in the affairs of the Dock, often against his own expressed wish to put an end to

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<sup>51</sup>*ibid.*, p. 816. S.M.H. said that Labor had promoted the Commission as an attack on the Dock officials, and was chagrined to have the findings directed virtually against itself (17 July 1903).

<sup>52</sup>Report of Royal Commission, p. 29, *N.S.W. V. & P.*, Legislative Assembly, Session 1903, Vol. IV, p. 785.

<sup>53</sup>e.g. evidence of R. R. P. Hickson, Minutes of Evidence, p. 86, *ibid.* See also *Daily Telegraph*, 10 July 1903.

<sup>54</sup>He was said to have very good mental powers, but to be "not an active man", heavily built and slow-moving and without strength of character. Minutes of Evidence, p. 131.

<sup>55</sup>Of his foremen, the manager said: "They are always quarrelling among themselves. If they do not consult each other about the work, they are no good." *ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>56</sup>There were 603 men working at the Dock in 1900, but only 300 when the Commissioners wrote their report. Report, p. 5.

<sup>57</sup>Minutes of Evidence, p. 110.



political influence? Some of the answer to the latter question lies, of course, in O'Sullivan's nature, his too ready sympathy with every complainant. He later blamed himself for his excess of good nature.<sup>58</sup> But the explanation of his approach to the Dock's affairs lay more deeply than in a mere desire to please or to dominate. It lay in his whole view of the position of labour in industry, of the rights that labour could claim of industry, and the obligations that industry owed it. It is instructive that the man in the Public Works Department who was in the best position to know how things were at the Dock expressly declared that the Minister interfered only in matters to do with employment, never with the actual work at the Dock. "The Minister does not do this with any other desire than to see that the working man is treated with justice, as he considers"; "his general disposition is to shield the men."<sup>59</sup>

In practice, the unions' approach coincided with O'Sullivan's. For them industry had a social as well as a business character. It had to meet other needs besides those of efficiency and expedition in production. There had to be a certain even-handed justice in which the not so competent would not be cast aside completely.<sup>60</sup> Even though it might be ruinous for the management of the work, the Minister must be the last court of appeal to see that justice was done. It was said that the manager's dealings with the men working at the Dock were unscrupulous and inequitable, and that, in his decisions about such a matter as accident pay, he brought "no process of reasoning to bear on the matter at all". "Then", one artisan commented, "people say you should not get political influence; there is no other course left open."<sup>61</sup> In his evidence, O'Sullivan said that members of Parliament and others had often complained to him that the men at the Island were not getting fair play. "To me it appears that when a man cannot get justice, there is only one thing left, and that is to appeal to the head of the Department."<sup>62</sup>

The place of the unions in industrial life had also to be defended. O'Sullivan had instructed that unionists be given a fair percentage of the work in the docking section when he had heard from the Shipwrights' Union that they were being altogether excluded there.<sup>63</sup> The unions had done their best to establish union rules of working at the Dock, something which the Royal Commission as well as the managers viewed with distaste. One of the commissioners was given an affirmative answer when he asked a foreman: "And society matters over-rule everything else in the shape of departmental discipline?"<sup>64</sup> The unions showed the same defensive spirit as at the Prince Alfred. They insisted on the principle of first to come, last to go.<sup>65</sup> They defended their members' rights in the work being done against the encroachments of other bodies of workmen. "At the present time", a fitter said,

our trade is trying to retain as much of the work as they are legitimately entitled to. We have little enough work to do at the

<sup>58</sup>N.S.W. P.D., 2nd series, Vol. X, p. 775.

<sup>59</sup>Minutes of Evidence, pp. 130-1.

<sup>60</sup>Reeves' remark might be relevant: "Only the strongest men had any chance of being taken on by a Government contractor; second-class labourers were shut out altogether." *op. cit.*, p. 233.

<sup>61</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 50, 54.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup>Report, p. 27.

<sup>64</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 136.

<sup>65</sup>*Ibid.*, p. 119.

present time, and we are entitled to all the work we can possibly get, regardless of any one else at all.<sup>66</sup>

Industry was in short a province of the men who worked in it, and it owed them work and support.

The contrary, strictly business, view was as strongly argued before this enquiry as before the other, and was to some extent adopted by the Commission. Trades unions, the Commission said, had become "an established and apparently a permanent part of the social economy", but it pointed to the evidence which showed that "owing to the zeal of the Union delegates, the work at the dock is interfered with to an extent which is subversive of discipline, and not favourable to economy of working".<sup>67</sup> Efficiency was the only acceptable criterion in the eyes of the commissioners who scouted egalitarianism.

Effective control of an industrial establishment depends chiefly upon the power of its Manager to select his own workmen, to reward the best of them by increase of pay and permanence of work, and to deal with the comparatively inefficient by reduction of pay or dismissal.<sup>68</sup>

In the case of the Dock, the approach of O'Sullivan and the unions was said to have had two unhappy results. In the first place, ministerial and union interference was said to have been disastrous for discipline. It is difficult to decide from the evidence just how bad discipline was at the Island. Some dismissed men had returned after taking their case to the Minister, and these men showed a pretty independent attitude in their work. One man reputedly said: "So long as Mr. Brunker [a member of Parliament] is alive you will never put me out of this shop."<sup>69</sup> But, as in the case of the day-labour work at Prince Alfred, the concern over discipline seems greater than the actual evidences of indiscipline would warrant. Where the foreman is without the absolute power of dismissal, said one of the commissioners, the worker "presumes on that and slackens his work, and does a good deal as he pleases".<sup>70</sup> Without strict industrial discipline, the whole structure of industry would become precarious.

Secondly, it was contended that costs at the Dock were inordinately raised because of the various concessions granted the workmen. Apart from the payment of a minimum wage of 7/- a day, those concessions amounted to one week's ordinary and one week's sick leave annually for workers with a year or more's continuous service and pay on public holidays for those with four weeks' continuous service. One witness considered them "a dangerous precedent" which, by increasing costs, could lead to the undoing of the day-labour system.<sup>71</sup> The Manager of Mort's Dock, the private rival of the Fitzroy Dock, asserted that he had lost some of his best men to the Government Dock, attracted there by "so many holidays a year". For him, business considerations dominated; a workman's place could be determined by his efficiency alone. When good workmen grow old, he said, "we do not do any pension business. As far as we are concerned, workmen have just to drop out."<sup>72</sup>

<sup>66</sup>Minutes of Evidence, pp. 94-5.

<sup>68</sup>*ibid.*, p. 6.

<sup>70</sup>*ibid.*, p. 31.

<sup>72</sup>*ibid.*, p. 72.

<sup>67</sup>Report, p. 12.

<sup>69</sup>Minutes of Evidence, p. 18.

<sup>71</sup>*ibid.*, p. 107.

My argument in this article has been that, in these two comparatively obscure enquiries, we see clearly represented two different late nineteenth century attitudes towards industrial organisation, and especially towards labour's place in industry. On the one hand, it was held that industry had in its organisation to meet certain demands of social justice. When he had reached a minimum of technical competence and good behaviour, a workman had a right to work equal to that of all others. One of industry's concerns should be to make possible his exercise of his right. The unions and the state have the duty of defending that right (and especially in state enterprises) against unsympathetic managers. In itself, this is an argument for state enterprise and for day-labour, since in them the demands of justice can be better met, and their fulfilment better policed. Industrial efficiency must be pursued, but within the limits imposed by these demands. The contrary view was that even state enterprise was a business which must justify itself by business success. The rights of labour might be protected, but not beyond the point at which efficient running was affected. Disciplined, organised work could alone ensure efficient running, and it depended in its turn on singleness of control. Power and responsibility must be in the same hands. No rules of the union or state should stand in the way of the manager's complete control of his enterprise, and especially of its workers. That state enterprise is especially open to the imposition of such rules is a strong argument against it. The Fitzroy Dock enquiry, said an Opposition newspaper, showed up vividly "defects that are more or less inevitable to State-controlled enterprises".<sup>73</sup>

This controversy, in the way in which it touches on the relative merits of state and private enterprise, anticipates the characteristic debates and problems of the twentieth century. If it shows how persistent were the habits of political patronage learned in the colonial period, it also shows how completely at an early stage the difficulties and dilemmas of "state socialism" came to light in this country, and those especially of ministerial responsibility and of the competing claims of justice and efficiency.<sup>74</sup> At the same time, the sharpness of the clash about these problems and especially about labour discipline shows that Australian history has been far from being an agreed march towards egalitarian democracy.<sup>75</sup> Ten years after the irruption of Labor into New South Wales politics, views on industrial organisation directly contrary to its own egalitarian outlook were being strongly and (in part) successfully urged before official enquiries. There has been more real substance in social and political discussion in Australia than might appear at first sight.

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<sup>73</sup>*Daily Telegraph*, 18 July 1903.

<sup>74</sup>See, of course, F. W. Eggleston, *State Socialism in Victoria*, London, 1932.

<sup>75</sup>See also C. M. H. Clark, *Select Documents in Australian History, 1851-1900*, Sydney, 1955, Introduction, pp. xi-xii.



# Some New Letters of Richard Cobden: A Comment

By J. A. LA NAUZE

The widespread literary activities of John Hill Burton (1809-1881) touched English and Scottish intellectual and practical life at many points. After studying at Marischal College he qualified as an advocate at Edinburgh; but his life was spent as a professional writer. He wrote much for *The Scotsman*, of which he was for a time Acting Editor, for the *Edinburgh Review* and for *Blackwoods Magazine*. He was Bowring's principal assistant editor for the *Works of Bentham*. His *Life and Correspondence of David Hume* (1846) despite the strictures on its use of material which the modern editor of Hume's letters feels bound to make<sup>1</sup> is still an indispensable work. In the best modern opinion his *Book Hunter* is "an old-fashioned but still respectable authority".<sup>2</sup> His *History of Scotland* (1853 and later volumes) was for long the standard work on its subject and in some respects still is. Its publication brought him in 1867 the honorific office of Historiographer Royal for Scotland. He also wrote on political economy, sanitation, emigration, bankruptcy and numerous other subjects. He was, in short, one of those extraordinary nineteenth century figures of whom perhaps John Stuart Mill is the most eminent, who devoted earnest thought to a vast range of many subjects; who put their thoughts into words at any length from a paragraph to a treatise; and who generally had something sensible to say.<sup>3</sup>

Burton was a Whig in politics; a Benthamite, a sanitary and prison reformer, an anti-Corn-Law man, an advocate of state aid to education. His name was well-known in the 1840's to the leaders of these movements in the south, partly as one who could give useful help as a journalist, partly because at this period of his life he was prepared to join in the organization of reform associations in Edinburgh. He appears to have been a careful preserver of correspondence. A large collection of letters to him has been carefully preserved by his grandson, Emeritus Professor J. B. Cleland of Beaumont, South Australia, to whom I am indebted for permission to use them.

Much of the Burton correspondence is of minor interest. There are the isolated letters from Macaulay, Carlyle and others which a man of his interests and reputation might be expected to have received. There are several series, however, of special relevance for the social or economic historian; these include the letters of John Bowring and others to Burton, mainly about the standard edition of Bentham's *Works*. Though I am not concerned with these in the present note I cannot refrain from quoting one point—a remark on the authoritative pronunciation of Bentham's

<sup>1</sup>J. Y. T. Greig, *The Letters of David Hume*, Oxford, 1932, Vol. I, p. xxx.

<sup>2</sup>John Carter, *Taste and Technique in Book-Collecting*, Cambridge, 1948, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup>There is a notice of Burton in the *Dictionary of National Biography*; and a long account by his second wife forms the introduction to the 1882 edition of *The Book Hunter*.

name. Richard Doane, another of Bowring's assistant editors, writes to Burton on 25 September 1841:

You will smile I dare say at the alteration I have made in the division of Mr. Bentham's name, but as he always called himself *Bent-ham*, and repudiated *Ben-tham* I don't wish to give currency to a false pronunciation of it.

Somewhat similarly, the pronunciation of the name Malthus is almost certainly "Maultus",<sup>4</sup> with a hard "t".

The series of letters to be discussed here was written by Richard Cobden. It is hardly to be expected that it should contain anything strikingly new about the activities of one of the best-known Englishmen of the nineteenth century; but it does, as it seems to me, contain some matter which historians would have been glad to use had it been available.

It will be recalled that after Bowring's lecture at Manchester on 10 September 1838 there was a meeting at the York Hotel to form an Anti-Corn-Law Association. By 28 January 1839 when its Rules were adopted and its Executive Committee appointed similar associations had been formed in other towns. On 20 March, at a second meeting of delegates in London, it was resolved to form an Anti-Corn-Law League, with its central office in Manchester, and "the delegates then separated to agitate the question in all their various localities".<sup>5</sup>

It is at this point that Cobden's letters to Burton begin. They are concerned with a project to establish a newspaper in Manchester to advocate reform, and particularly free trade. Cobden was looking for an editor. Burton's name had probably been mentioned to him by William Weir, at that time Editor of the *Glasgow Argus*, who had been a delegate from Glasgow at various meetings of the Anti-Corn-Law associations at Manchester and London. The project failed after long negotiations in Manchester which extended until the middle of November. When it was successfully revived in 1845, Burton was no longer concerned with it.

There are several matters of interest in these letters. The first concerns the domestic history of the League, and its historian Archibald Prentice. He was one of the prime movers in its foundation and at the time Editor and proprietor of the *Manchester Times*.

It is determined [wrote Cobden in his first letter of 25 March 1839] to buy the copy-right of Prentice's paper, 'The Times', well regarded for its sound policies, honesty, & consistency, but a little indolent & slovenly in management, & to place it with a competent capital in the hands of other conductors—The Times circulates about 3,000 a week. It is a weekly paper but we intend to publish it twice a week. 'The Guardian' paper, which has fallen to leeward in Politics, has a circulation of between 5 & 6,000 & is said to pay as many thousands a year.

As negotiations proceeded, it became evident that Prentice was not in a position to sell, being deeply indebted to many persons and in particular to Wrigley, who supplied the paper on which the *Times* was printed. Cobden's comments on

<sup>4</sup>cf. J. M. Keynes, *Essays in Biography*, new ed., London, 1951, p. 82.

<sup>5</sup>A. Prentice, *History of the Anti-Corn-Law League*, London, 1853, Vol. I, p. 125.

Prentice grow increasingly severe. He was not inclined to take a sympathetic view of the difficulties of a man to whom he had lent money which was apparently lost for ever. Prentice might perhaps have argued that his difficulties and debts were due largely to his devotion to the Cause. "During that long struggle", he afterwards wrote, "I was often told that it would be more to my interest if I made the *Manchester Times* more of a newspaper. It mattered not. If the journal was not to effect public good it was not the employment for me."<sup>6</sup> In the end, in 1845, the manufacturers did finance a new paper, the *Manchester Examiner*, the competition of which within a few years drove the *Times* out of business and into amalgamation. There is a bitter comment upon this by Prentice's friend John Childs, the printer:

I have known him for more than thirty years, a faithful, earnest, principled man and he never forfeited a principle. He was the father, the intellectual and moral guide of the League through its childhood and youth, and I should like to know what Cobden and Bright would have done on many a stormy day without him. . . . But now that they are become machines for working Reform-Club tactics, and Prentice does not, as he never did, go in that groove, the insolence of factory-system wealth swaggers in his face with an opposition paper and ten thousand pounds.<sup>7</sup>

Cobden, it may well be, was somewhat deficient in sympathy; but the letters do show that Prentice had been approached when the project was first mooted, that he was then prepared to enter into negotiations for the sale of his paper, that in certain respects he misled the projectors, and that it was not through initial ill-will on the part of Cobden and his associates that the negotiations broke down in 1839.

The most important, and the lengthiest, letter is that of 23 April 1839. The plans for the establishment of the paper were proceeding; Cobden invited Burton to write a prospectus which might be used as an advertisement: "Ideas are all I offer you, which you will embody in language without reference to my phraseology." It is difficult to see what Burton, as a prospective editor, could have had left to say on his own account, but the document is of considerable interest as a revelation of Cobden, who had been agreeing emphatically with Burton's opinion that the editor should have absolute control over the literary and political department of the paper. Probably any student of the period would guess correctly at some of the items which—apart from the cause of free trade—Cobden might have advocated if he had been in charge of a newspaper in 1839; he had said and written much already about "monopoly" in various forms, and had tried to convey to the public something of his sense of the enormous importance to England of the rapidly expanding society of the United States. But nowhere else, I think, had he at this time set down so succinctly a programme of general political action. We have here the apparent paradox of what was for its time a "radical" programme in which the working class comes in only as an afterthought; a paradox of which the explanation lies in the peculiar alignment of "classes" so well described by Mr.

<sup>6</sup>*ibid.*, p. 89.

<sup>7</sup>To Colonel Thompson, quoted in the *Dictionary of National Biography* notice of Prentice by Robert Dunlop.



Kitson Clark.<sup>8</sup> If it is misleading to label Repeal as in any simple sense the "Victory of the Middle Class", it is nevertheless difficult to think of any other term so completely appropriate to this programme of Cobden's as "Middle Class"—the triumph of the League was as we can see it more, and less, than that; but as seen by its leaders it was just that.

... First then—it must be borne in view that the paper is for a manufacturing and trading community and the object is to make it a *vehicle for conveying sound principles of commerce*—this must be the sheet anchor. The minds of people here are awakening to the knowledge of how much their individual concerns are suffering from the effects of restrictive laws, to which they have been little accustomed to pay attention & which many I believe have been accustomed to consider beyond their comprehension. A paper professing to devote itself to the clear illustration of the injurious operation of monopolies, in corn, colonial products, & the Bank of England; and the advocacy of a reform of the fiscal laws which obstruct commerce, oppress the manufacturer, and thereby impoverish the exchequer—such a paper would find its way into the counting-houses of our people & *for no other kind of paper is there any opening.*

Of course articles of *political* faith must be avowed. But upon this I rely far less, than upon allusion to those political grievances above referred to, which are the fruits of misgovernment.—'The ballot' should be advocated, as the only remedy ever offered for the servility, falsehood and immorality of the present system. I would put the ballot upon this footing of being favourable to political *morality*, in preference to any other, because we have a body of evangelical dissenters and quakers, who are thorough going free-traders; but who are not so *political* as they ought to be;—but who are the sinews of the liberal party, when the day of election comes. The tone of the prospectus must be one of justice and sound morality, devoid of clap-trap, or any ad. cap. phrases.—Of course, I don't wish on the other hand any savouring of puritanical cant.—For the shortening of Parliaments, I would recommend three years, (your own doctrine) and why not recommend this to Englishmen, who love precedent, by reminding them that the septennial act was passed merely for a temporary object, and that good faith to the people demands that the parliament should again return to the triennial reckonings of their ancestors?—I would treat the suffrage thus—It is vain and unjust for those who promote further popular education to think of excusing permanently any portion of the community from the enjoyment of the rights of free citizens. Education not only teaches men to prize those rights, but qualifies them to possess them. Whilst admitting that changes must necessarily be gradual to be safe,—advocate the extension of the suffrage to the utmost extent & by every means consistent with peace order and the supremacy of the law. Upon the above three topics *be as brief as you possibly can.* Peoples minds are nauseated with the battle-cries of 'Triennial Parliaments', 'Vote by ballot', & 'Household Suffrage',—I would

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<sup>8</sup>"The Repeal of the Corn Laws and the Politics of the Forties", *Economic History Review*, 2nd Series, Vol. IV, No. 1, 1951.

avoid the very terms if possible. There is another point—the *unequal distribution* of the elective power upon which you might more strongly insist; because people here are beginning to feel that any other reform would be useless without it,—and it has not been much dwelt upon. You might fortify this with a fact or two, showing Manchester and Salford returning three members, whilst forty or fifty members are sent by small boroughs, the aggregate of whose wealth and population is not greater than ours: You might devote as much space to this one grievance (of unequal distribution) as to the above war-cries, which have been so much hackneyed and prostituted by political jobbers and shallow demagogues.

National education is a favourite theme with the sound reformers here. The present grant of thirty thousand pounds a year is only to be regarded with satisfaction as the beginning of a system which must be extended until it be made to comprehend the whole of the uninstructed. For this end, no religious test must be allowed to intercept a boon in justice due to all. The funds are drawn from the taxes paid by dissenters and churchmen alike; & they have equally the right to receive as to pay. (Recollect that the reformers here are nearly all Dissenters.) It must be urged, upon the head of education, that an attempt to clog the instruction of the poor with the condition of their imbibing the Church of England catechism, must be particularly inapplicable to the state of society in these manufacturing districts, where the great majority of the labouring classes are dissenters.

But the greatest stress of the prospectus must be upon the mighty evils that impend over the commerce of the country, if the present restrictions and suicidal laws which cramp its energies be not speedily removed. Men's minds are now prepared to take up these evils. They must be promised, that they shall be laid bare with a constant and an unflinching hand. *They should be apprised that the abuses of a long cancer of aristocratic misgovernment lie unredressed in the corn-laws, timber duties, sugar and coffee duties &c.* The nerve and force of your prospectus must all be thrown into this topic. People here will bear uncompromising language against the aristocracy, in connexion with such evils as these, when they would shrink into their natural conservatism, (natural for wealth) if the same language were used, in reference to such topics as the 'ballot' etc.

A deep and lowering grudge is felt (justly) against the Bank of England, whose unseen and irresponsible agency has caused much mischief here. Nothing can be wiser than a declaration of open war against the Directors of the Bank; who retain a monopoly altogether anomalous & inconsistent with the principles on which the legislature has professed to govern the people. Allude to the evils which the *fluctuations* in the value of property occasioned by the operations of the Bank of Engd. cause—evils far surpassing those arising out of the failure of private banks. Those evils are not confined to the capitalists—they affect the morals and the very existence of the labouring classes through the sudden contractions of the labour market, and the consequent want of employment. You should promise the constant and watchful exposure of the proceedings of the Bank of England—and *pledge*

*yourself* to do all that you can to prevent a renewal of its Charter. *But don't venture to propound views for a substitute for the present system*—that is not our present business.

It will appear that all the prospectus is addressed to the masters or capitalists. It is to this class, and the intelligent middle class, that you will have to look for patronage. Still, a word must be said to the working-classes, who are now becoming great newspaper readers. Their interests you must promise to point out to them with a candid and fearless spirit of truth. You must promise to explain the principles which govern wages and profits—capitalist & labour & other operations which affect their 'businesses and bosoms'—Matters too much neglected by our public teachers—matters wholly lost sight of in those institutions ('Mechanics' & others) where they teach astronomy & the abstruse sciences!

I have thus hastily run over the topics;—& have scarcely left room to apologize for the abrupt & perhaps crude way in which it is done. You will however be able to understand it, & that will be enough. . . .

"*Don't venture to propound views for a substitute for the present system*—that is not our present business." In that sentence the agitator of any period would recognize the touch of the master.

Cobden's references to "a body of evangelical dissenters and quakers" likely to respond to measures favourable to "political morality" strike a familiar note. That "curious holy smell" to which Mr. Kitson Clark refers was, as he reminds us, originally induced by methods which in any less righteous cause could well be regarded as faintly cynical. Here the Burton correspondence adds another illustrative footnote, from the letters of William Weir. Cobden must have been conscious for years of the importance of securing the support of Morality, in any great reform movement to be based on middle-class support; but its more or less official blessing seems to have been bestowed only some time after the League's campaign had been opened in earnest. At a great banquet in Manchester on 13 January 1840 the Rev. Thomas Spencer asked a blessing so eloquently that "the majority of that meeting felt that to support a movement which was to give bread to the people was a religious duty".<sup>9</sup> Approaches were made to the clergy during 1840, but the Conference of 700 ministers of religion was not organized by George Thompson until August 1841. In Scotland the League was in this respect quicker off the mark.

In June 1839 William Weir was busy organizing the first official Anti-Corn-Law lecturing tour in Scotland, and planning the itinerary of the young orator, A. W. Paulton. He wrote to Burton on 15 June:

Shearman, the Secretary of the League has been going about among the evangelical dissenters trying to get them to take up the question in a moral and religious point of view. One of their parsons has lent his church for a lecture on the subject on Tuesday and intimates it from the pulpit tomorrow. The rest will follow and if we can set the puritans in array against the corn-laws as they took the field against the slavery of the blacks we will have enlisted a potent auxiliary. Shearman is to follow Paulton at a little distance trying to organise where he has excited—And he

<sup>9</sup>Prentice, *op. cit.*, p. 144.



will carry recommendations to all the evangelical dissenters of Scotland from Glasgow.

To which he added three days later:

We are getting the saints (among the dissenters) to open against the corn-laws. If they only work half as well as they did against slavery I shall be satisfied.

The fair-minded Hammonds, loathing his point of view, acquit Wilberforce of hypocrisy in his attitude to social injustice within his own country; whether the same verdict may be given on the League's methods of securing that the truth about the bread tax was revealed from the pulpit, is a question which admits debate.

University of Melbourne

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# The Development of Political Geography and Geopolitics in the United States

By JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

World War III, the Soviet style, that the Soviet Union is waging now, is, to the Americans, a non-declared sort of warfare, but mostly "psychological warfare". As far as the Soviet strategists are concerned, Soviet Russia's moves are only part of a grand strategy, a geopolitical plan mostly copied from Haushofer's concepts, whose direct objective is to avoid a direct clash with the United States, and let others do most of the fighting until Europe and the Middle East are strangled (possibly also with Asia) and the United States and her allies isolated—with the U.S.S.R. ruling the rest of the world. War of this kind is no less real than the old-style war of head-on conflict. In this kind of war, as waged by the Kremlin, shooting flares up at times. Thousands have been killed with Soviet arms. In Korea, Americans and the United Nations soldiers died under fire from Soviet-made guns. In Central Europe, Hungarians seeking freedom died, too. In Egypt, British, French and Israeli troops have been killed with Soviet-supplied weapons.

The formula for this long-range plan was, however, foreseen long ago. The most prominent theoretician of geopolitics, Sir Halford J. Mackinder, in 1904 outlined the thesis that was adopted by Haushofer and is today being executed by the Soviet planners. The Mackinder thesis, now being put to a practical test by Soviet leaders (who profess to scorn "geopolitics"), is simply this:

Who Rules East Europe Commands the Heartland  
(the strategic centre of the Eurasian land mass, protected  
by mountains, deserts and the Arctic Ocean);

Who Rules the Heartland commands the World-Island  
(the continents of Europe, Asia and Africa);

Who Rules the World-Island Commands the World.<sup>1</sup>

As Mackinder saw geopolitics, the "World-Island" of three continents is a single unit around which are clustered various "satellites" or smaller islands—North America, South America, Britain, Japan, the Indies and Australia. During World War II these ideas created such an attention that Mackinder brought his ideas up to date in a study published in *Foreign Affairs* (July 1943).<sup>2</sup> In this later study, he found no reason to change his conclusions because of the development of air power. "I am impressed by the broad implications of a recent utterance of a practical airman: 'Air power depends absolutely on the efficiency of its ground organization.'" The British geopolitician declared that air power could not effect permanent changes in strategic considerations and was subject to the loss of its ground bases to ground forces.

<sup>1</sup>Sir Halford Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, New York, 1942, p. 150.

<sup>2</sup>Sir Halford Mackinder, "The Round World and the Winning of the Peace", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXI, July 1943, pp. 595-605.

In practical terms, the Soviet today rules most of Eastern Europe, the thousand-mile frontier through which the "Heartland", Sir Halford said, can be commanded. Also, the U.S.S.R. today does in fact command most of the "Heartland" itself—the vast area secured by the Arctic, the great wilderness of Western Siberia, the deserts of Mongolia and Tibet, and the Himalayan mountains. This area is a natural fortress, in Mackinder's thesis, against sea and amphibious power. Standing in opposition to this fortress is the defensive power of the U.S. and her allies. In the Mackinder concept, the U.S. controls the "Midland Ocean"—the North Atlantic; Mackinder saw three elements—a bridgehead in France, a "moated airdrome" in Britain, and a reserve of manpower and materials in the U.S. and Canada. As Soviet strategists see the world, there remains a key portion of the "Heartland" for Russia to conquer—the vital area of the Middle East, a bridgehead on three continents.

Yet, the whole field of geopolitics and the approach used by geopoliticians is one not only neglected in the United States but even resented and condemned, since, in general, the standard American approach to the world problems is usually couched in the framework of legalism and romantic idealism. Although history shows that Washington's statesmen have had to take periodically geopolitical steps—such as the acquisition of Louisiana, the Monroe Doctrine, Lincoln's insistence on the departure of the French soldiers from Mexico, the "Manifest Destiny" idea, the Spanish-American war and the acquisition of the Panama Canal, and the participation in both world wars in order to prevent the domination of Eurasia by a single power—these steps are always described in idealistic terms ("saving the world for democracy", etc.) which do not even touch upon the geopolitical facts of life.

Academically speaking, this inability to pin down the discipline of geopolitics is also reflected in the confusion facing the definition of the subject itself. There have been many volumes published in America on the specialized problems of political geography.<sup>3</sup> And nearly all of them differ in their approach as to what is "political geography" or "geopolitics", or what this field "ought to be".<sup>4</sup> Basically, the question eternally bothering the Anglo-Saxon writers is whether political geography is also geopolitics, whether it should be more dedicated to geography than to politics, or more to politics than to geography.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup>Jean Gottman, *A Geography of Europe*, New York, 1950; Walter Fitzgerald, *The New Europe*, New York, 1946; Norman Pounds, *An Historical and Political Geography of Europe*, New York, 1947; Derwent Whittlesey, *Environmental Foundations of European History*, New York, 1949 and *The Earth and the State*, New York, 1939; Brigadier D. H. Cole, *Imperial Military Geography*, London, 1950; H. W. Weigert, V. Stefansson et al., *Compass of the World*, New York, 1944; N. J. Spykman, *American Strategy in World Politics*, New York, 1942, and *The Geography of the Peace*, New York, 1944; G. T. Renner and associates, *Global Geography*, New York, 1944; etc.

<sup>4</sup>Y. M. Goblet, *Political Geography and the World Map*, New York, 1955, is the best and most up to date effort to systematize the field of political geography. But, significantly enough, it was prepared by a French specialist, who finished the manuscript in 1939 and whose work was translated into English. It analyzed "that part of human geography which deals with those political complexes which have a territorial component".

<sup>5</sup>Goblet refines his definition by propounding: "So we will try to discover, in what follows, the permanent values that attach to those geographical elements which the contemporary politician has so studiously ignored" (p. x). See also Richard Hartshorne, "Political Geography", Ch. 7, pp. 167-225, in P. E. James and C. F. Jones (eds.), *American Geography: Inventory and Prospect*, Syracuse University Press, 1954.



## The Resentment of "Geopolitics"

In general, the American political geographers and geographers in general did dislike the concept of "geopolitics" from the very time that the concept was known to them—and dislike the term even today. This has been due to the identification of the concept with the doctrines of Haushofer.

Although the ideas of Haushofer and contributions of his Institut für Geopolitik were known to the European academic and military circles before World War II<sup>6</sup> the American specialists (and their popularizers and interpreters) not only ignored, but also thought that the ideas of the "geopolitikers" were too fantastic to take too seriously. For instance, Banse was translated in 1934<sup>7</sup> but was ignored as the work of a crack-pot; the same happened in regard to Rauschnig's warning in his *The Revolution of Nihilism*.<sup>8</sup> It was only after the series of Hitler's easy victories over Europe that Rauschnig was more appreciated and Banse reissued (1941). Thereafter came the resurrection of the ideas of Sir Halford Mackinder and the popularization of his classic theory.

Then came a flood of articles and books, prepared mostly by those able to read German,<sup>9</sup> "discovering", suddenly, the cursed world of Haushoferism.<sup>10</sup>

The crest of the wave popularizing Haushofer's school was reached in 1942 and the ebb began in 1943. One of the fruitful results of this "discovery" was the concurrent "re-discovery" of the ideas of geopolitics in American history and some outstanding American thinkers.

## The Search for American Geopolitics

Specifically, American scholarship started to note that the relationship between geographic conditions and political and social events had been studied by Herodotus,

<sup>6</sup>See, for instance, Edward Thormaehlen, "Geopolitics and Political Geography", *Baltic and Scandinavian Countries*, Vol. 1, May 1938, pp. 165-76; Colonel Emanuel Moravec, *The Military Importance of Czechoslovakia to Europe*, Prague, 1938.

<sup>7</sup>Ewald Banse, *Germany Prepares for War*, New York, 1934.

<sup>8</sup>Hermann Rauschnig, *The Revolution of Nihilism*, London, 1939.

<sup>9</sup>R. H. Lochner, *Geopolitik: Nature and Aims*, Chicago, 1941; Andreas Dorpalen, *The World of General Haushofer*, New York, 1942; R. Strausz-Hupé, *Geopolitics*, New York, 1942; Isaiah Bowman, "Geography v. Geo-Politics", *Geographical Review*, Vol. XXXII, Oct. 1942, pp. 646-58; W. J. Canman, "Methods in 'Geopolitics'", *Social Forces*, Vol. XXI, Dec. 1942, pp. 147-54; Jean Gottman, "The Background of Geopolitics", *Military Affairs*, Vol. VI, Winter 1942, pp. 197-206; Andrew Gyorgy, "The Geopolitics of War: Total War and Geostrategy", *Journal of Politics*, Vol. V, Nov. 1943, pp. 347-62; Charles B. Hagan, "Geopolitics", *ibid.*, Vol. IV, Nov. 1942, pp. 478-90; Charles Kruszewski, "Germany's Lebensraum", *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXXIV, Oct. 1940, pp. 964-75; Johannes Mattern, *Geopolitik*, Johns Hopkins Univ. Pr., 1942; R. S. Nathan, "Geopolitics and Pacific Strategy", *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. XV, June 1942, pp. 154-63; Joseph S. Roucek, "German Geopolitics", *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. II, July 1942, pp. 180-9; F. L. Schuman, "Let Us Learn Our Geopolitics", *Current History*, Vol. II, May 1942, pp. 161-5; Hans Speier, "Magic Geography", *Social Research*, Vol. VIII, Sept. 1941, pp. 310-30; R. Strausz-Hupé, "It's Smart to be Geopolitical", *Saturday Review of Literature*, Vol. XXVI, 6 Feb. 1943, pp. 4, ff.; Paul Sweet, "Recent German Literature on Mitteleuropa", *J. Cent. Eur. Affairs*, Vol. III, Ap. 1943, p. 1024; H. W. Weigert, *Generals and Geographers*, London, 1942; Derwent Whittlesey, *German Strategy of World Conquest*, New York, 1942, and "Haushofer: The Geopoliticians", Ch. XVI, pp. 388-411, in E. M. Earle (ed.), *Makers of the Modern Strategy*, Princeton Univ. Pr., 1943; etc.

<sup>10</sup>For their list, see Joseph S. Roucek, "Political Geography and Geopolitics", Ch. XV, pp. 313-36, in Roucek (ed.), *Twentieth Century Political Thought*, New York, 1946.

Hippocrates, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle and the Moslems in ancient times;<sup>11</sup> that Bodin, Montesquieu, Burke, Taine and Turgot were the modern exponents of geographical determinism.<sup>12</sup> Carl Ritter and Alexander von Humboldt were noted as the founders of modern geography, together with Ratzel.<sup>13</sup> The organismic concept of the state, the militaristic ideologies of imperial Germany and the economic traditions of Germany's Neomercantilism, were featured on the American academic horizon as the precursors of geopolitics.<sup>14</sup>

The carpet of American history began to be combed for the historical figures and thinkers related to geopolitical thinking. Ramifications were discovered in *The Federalist*, where Alexander Hamilton expounded the ubiquity of the struggle for power among sovereign nations, regardless of time or place and, more particularly of political ideology and form government.<sup>15</sup> President Monroe's doctrine and the purchase of Louisiana were now evaluated as purely geopolitical steps. The influence of the theories of Admiral T. Mahan on the emergence of the United States as a world power in 1898, due to the Spanish-American War, was especially stressed.<sup>16</sup>

An even more important role in the sudden appreciation of American scholars was granted to the influence of Sir Halford Mackinder. Dr. Edward Mead Earle of Princeton expressed the belief that the theories of this great English geographer were more significant for an understanding of the dynamic forces of the day than those of Mahan.<sup>17</sup> The re-issue of Mackinder's *Democratic Ideals and Reality* (1942) was widely read and quoted.

Probably the most discussed American (but Dutch-born) "geopolitician" was Nicholas J. Spykman, who might not have been completely original (depending on Ratzel, Morton Fullerton, Ellsworth Huntington and Haushofer) but is regarded by many as having crystallized the American thinking of his day and as having led American thought away from crude imitations of geopolitics. Spykman defined geopolitics as "the planning of the security policy of a country in terms of its geographic factors".<sup>18</sup> He frankly espoused power as a means of preserving the future peace, and noted that geopolitics revealed a picture of forces relative to a

<sup>11</sup>William A. Dunning, *A History of Political Theories: Ancient and Mediaeval*, New York, 1902, pp. 82-3; Franklin Thomas, "Some Representative Contributions of Anthropogeography to Political Theory", in Charles E. Merriam and Harry E. Barnes (eds.), *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times*, New York, 1932, pp. 472-8; Franklin Thomas, "The Role of Anthropogeography in Contemporary Social Theory", Ch. VII, pp. 143-211, in Harry E. Barnes, Howard Becker and Frances B. Becker (eds.), *Contemporary Social Theory*, New York, 1940.

<sup>12</sup>William A. Dunning, *A History of Political Theory from Luther to Montesquieu*, New York, 1931, pp. 112-14.

<sup>13</sup>Richard Hartshorne, "The Nature of Geography", *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, Vol. XXIX, 1939, p. 209.

<sup>14</sup>Francis W. Coker, *Organic Theories of the State*, New York, 1910; Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism*, New York, 1937; Albert T. Lauterbach, "Roots and Implications of the German Idea of Military Society", *Mil. Affairs*, Vol. V, Spring 1941, pp. 1-20; Edgar Salin, "Romantic and Universalist Economics", *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. V, p. 385.

<sup>15</sup>Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay, *The Federalist*, ed. by Max Beloff, Oxford, 1948, pp. 20-25, 31-3.

<sup>16</sup>Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660 to 1783*, Boston, 1898 and *The Influence of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire*, Boston, 1892.

<sup>17</sup>Harold and Margaret Sprout (eds.), *Foundations of National Power*, New York, 1951, pp. 153-69.

<sup>18</sup>Spyskman, *America's Strategy in World Politics and The Geography of the Peace*; N. J. Spykman and A. A. Rollins, "Geographic Objectives in Foreign Policy", *Am. Pol. Sci. R.*, Vol. XXXIII, June 1939, pp. 391-410 and Aug. 1939, pp. 591-614.

given frame of reference at a given time. Questioning Mackinder's thesis of the Heartland, he believed that the Heartland would not be a centre of world power in the immediate future due to the climatic conditions and agrarian productivity, the distribution of coal, iron, oil and water power, and the geographical obstacles along the north, east, south and south-west boundaries of the huge pivot area; he considered the "rimland" of Eurasia more important than the Heartland, as a buffer zone between sea power and land power. His thesis was "Who controls the rimland rules Eurasia; Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world". The potential power of Africa and Australia was restricted, and their destiny would be determined by the state controlling the seas. The leading political objective of the United States, in war or peace, should be to prevent the unification of the power centres in the Old World against the United States.

Any closer analysis of Spykman's thesis indicates how outmoded it is. Even more specifically, Spykman generally believed that Russian power would remain primarily west of the Urals and not in the central Siberian region, underestimated the role of airpower (whose development was glaring already during the time he was writing his thesis) and underplayed the role of Africa and Australia. But he was right in warning that the United States must not be lenient in allowing any overwhelming power develop in Europe, and that a unified rimland would be a menace to Russia as well as to the United States. At any rate, with the publication of his *America's Strategy in World Politics*, Spykman became the focus of bitter controversies. Earle points out that:

It has been enthusiastically hailed by those who feel, with justification, that, generally speaking, American professors and publicists have been living during the past twenty years in a dream world of their own creation and that they have misled themselves, their students and the general public concerning the facts of life in a dynamic world. It has been violently denounced, on the other hand, as a primer for a new American Prussianism, which would base the policies of the United States almost exclusively upon the power factor, with almost cynical disregard of those human, psychological and moral considerations which frequently determine the course of history and which of necessity play a large role in the calculations of free men and free peoples.

With the passing of Spykman, the academic leadership in promoting the field of geopolitics and political geography was assumed by the late George T. Renner (1900-55), known in his two major interests of geography and military and civic planning through his teaching (at Columbia University), prolific writing, lecturing and service as a government consultant. His undergraduate education was interrupted temporarily by Army service in World War I. He later failed to pass the physical test for entrance into the United States Military Academy. As compensation, he began what was to become a lifelong study of military and political geography and history. Geographical editor of the Thomas Y. Crowell Company (publishers), Renner held a similar post for the King's English Dictionary; he was also education map editor for the Denoyer-Geppert Company and served as a special map editor for the Rand McNally Company and as an



associate editor of the *Journal of Geography*. Between 1923 and 1955 he authored numerous articles, and was author or co-author of nineteen books, among them *World Climatic Regions*, *Human Geography in the Air Age*, *World Economic Geography*, etc. As Spykman, he was bitterly attacked during World War II for his geopolitical approach. But he was one of the few far-seeing American thinkers appreciating the role of airpower on global strategy.<sup>19</sup>

### Contemporary Trends

With the passing of Spykman, and the formal ending of the hostilities in 1945, the ideas of geopolitics went into eclipse. The general as well as the academic climate of public opinion gave up the abhorrent ideas of realism, of "power politics", for the time being. In spite of the difficulties at Teheran, Yalta, Potsdam, and other international conferences (whose decisions brought fateful and most disastrous geopolitical results to the United States and the free world), the United States continued pursuing policies which stressed moral principles rather than geopolitics.

Meanwhile, even before World War II ended, Soviet expansion had been taking place, partly by direct territorial acquisition, and partly through the action of foreign Communist parties controlled from Moscow. Territorial acquisitions, however, have been only one form of the extension of Soviet aggressiveness; taking advantage of the opportunities presented at the end of World War II, the Soviet Union established its control in Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe and the Far East (especially Manchuria). Again, as in World War I, America had to be disillusioned regarding the "Crusade" in Europe, and learn the horrible implications of the territorial extensions of domination by Soviet Russia in Central-Eastern-Balkan Europe and over China.

The year 1947 marked a turning point in international relations. The Soviet Union had been entrenched in Central-Eastern Europe, and was threatening Greece, Turkey and Iran. The United States took a significant geopolitical step: it enunciated the Truman Doctrine, designed to save Greece and Turkey, as the "soft underbelly" of the Balkans, from the Communists. The official policy of Washington shifted to a policy of "containing" Soviet expansion and of countering Communist activities. The Marshall Plan offered economic assistance to Europe, contingent on the initiative and co-operation of the European states in drawing up a joint recovery programme. Then came the Brussels Pact, the Berlin blockade, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Mutual Defence Assistance Pact. All these steps were involved in Washington's switch from the idealistic aims of world co-operation to a policy of defensive containment against Soviet Russia. Then came the Communist invasion of Korea in June 1950, and Washington's decision to try to stop Communist expansion along the Asiatic coast came overnight. These steps remind us, in a hazy sort of way, of the teachings propounded by Mackinder ("Who Rules East Europe Commands the Heartland . . .") and of Spykman's rimland theory. Actually all the historical evidence shows that none of the American politicians, statesmen, or planners had been aware of Mackinder or Spykman. The credit for the needed academic or theoretical props is usually given, in this respect, to George F. Kennan.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup>G. T. Renner, *Human Geography in the Air Age*, New York, 1942.

<sup>20</sup>George F. Kennan, *Realities of American Foreign Policy*, Princeton Univ. Pr., 1954.

In July 1947, as the not-so-mysterious "Mr. X", Kennan unveiled the containment theory for the readers of *Foreign Affairs* in an article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct". Despite the claims of its critics, it was not purely a defensive doctrine. For behind the idea of "unalterable counterforce" lay the notion that the United States, by increasing the strains under which Soviet policy operates, could force upon the Kremlin a greater degree of moderation and circumspection, and in this way "promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power". Kennan suggested that the United States might begin to see evidence of such a turn of events if it could frustrate Soviet expansion for ten or fifteen years. The answer: the containment policy, the echo of Mackinder and of Spykman.

The containment theory, however, did not prove enough and in his subsequent writings Kennan recognized that the Kremlin's leaders have no time-tables of military conquest; their major design is to divide the non-Communist world by exploiting its supposed internal contradictions and thus to hasten its "inevitable" decline. The corollary is that American major design, thinks Kennan, must be to unite and strengthen the free world. Thus, assuming we maintain an adequate defence posture, the things we most need to do to prevent further Soviet expansion are "things we must do in our relations with the peoples of the non-communist world".

This is the heart of the containment theory and the informing idea of the mid-century *Pax Americana*. It is reflected in the Greek-Turkish programme, the Marshall Plan, Point Four, NATO, the Eisenhower doctrine, and American world-wide system of alliances and aid agreements. (But it has also led to "Pactomania"; in 1955 the United States was committed to defend no less than 47 nations on five continents.)

Kennan served, at one time, on the Policy Planning Staff of the American State Department. Two of his associates, Halle and Marshall, wrote recently penetrating accounts of the geopolitical problems of American foreign policy, whose point of view is also strikingly similar.<sup>21</sup>

Especially noticeable is that all three authors strike at American immaturity in foreign affairs—the American penchant for absolutes, black-and-white judgments, cosmic creeds, moral platitudes, crusades for the impossible; for thinking of legalisms and words as substitutes for realities; for the bland assumption that all foreigners, like the Americans, are contented with their lot and ready to be frozen into an international *status quo*; and the cardinal failing of Americans in international relations to refuse the acceptance of the balance of power as the working system in international relations. The results have been false expectations, miscarriages, frustration, and a dangerous diverting of American attention from the realities of foreign policy (the Hague Treaties, the Root-Taft-Knox-Bryan arbitration treaties, the Kellogg Briand Pact, the numerous disarmament proposals, the entrance of

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<sup>21</sup>L. J. Halle, *Civilization and Foreign Policy*, New York, 1955; C. B. Marshall, *The Limits of American Foreign Policy*, New York, 1954.

the United States into World War I in order to "save democracy" rather than to handle the German threat to the balance of power); the absurd insistence in World War II to make a distinction between "aggressor nations" (American enemies for the time being) and "peace-loving nations" (American friends for the time being, including Russia); the urge of the doctrinaire internationalists to solve all international problems by a single plan or perfect and completed organization.<sup>22</sup>

While Kennan's influence has been far-reaching in the execution of American foreign policy decisions, a growing number of geopolitical contributions can be observed on the academic front. Although the field of international relations is still under the influence of the proponents of peace, international understanding, "brotherhood", international organization, there has been recently a growing number of textbooks favouring more and more the geopolitical point of view.

In the immediate years following World War I, the desperate desire of the American people for peace and the conviction that all war was useless, produced textbooks and courses which had nothing to do whatever with any geopolitical realities but which were deadly concerned with "what ought to be" (how the League of Nations "ought" to work, how to abolish war, the evils of patriotism and nationalism, etc.)<sup>23</sup> Most professors were specialized in international law and organizations (Clarence A. Berdahl, Kenneth Colegrove, C. G. Fenwick, James W. Garner, James H. Hyde, Pitman B. Potter, James T. Shotwell, Quincy Wright), and were uninterested in war, power politics, and the balance of power, or any geopolitical factors, but stressed mostly only the need for international organization and the enforcement of international law. When Charles Hodges published his textbook, which included many geopolitical concepts, he was disappointed with adoptions.<sup>24</sup>

It was only when Hitler started his march over Germany's borders that such courses in international relations began to pay more attention to the "facts of life". But it was only in 1942 that the first textbook in this field devoted a special chapter to the field of geopolitics and related areas.<sup>25</sup> (Army's *Geographic Foundations of National Power* and Spykman's works were not used as academic textbooks—although their ideas reappeared in the subsequent textbooks.) A helpful step in using more realistic texts in the courses in international relations was the appearance of Carr's book which did not stress geopolitics, but promoted the trend toward the acceptance of geopolitics by showing how the utopian work of the inter-war years eventually led to the outbreak of World War II.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>22</sup>Both Kennan and Marshall point to the dangers in the United Nations which spring from doctrinaire conceptions of that organization. For a brilliant analysis of these works, see William G. Carleton, "Brain Trusters of American Foreign Policy", *World Politics*, Vol. VII, July 1955, pp. 627-39.

<sup>23</sup>Joseph S. Roucek, "Political Science", Ch. II, pp. 101-9, in P. L. Harriman *et al.* (eds.), *Contemporary Social Science*, Vol. I, Harrisburg, Pa., 1953, and "Illusions and Fictions of International Relations", *The Social Studies*, Vol. XXXVI, Dec. 1945, pp. 335-40, and Vol. XXXVII, Jan. 1946, pp. 9-16; Kenneth W. Thompson, "The Study of International Politics: A Survey of Trends and Developments", *Review of Politics*, Vol. XIV, Oct. 1952, pp. 433-67; Waldemar Gurian, "The Study of International Relations", *ibid.*, Vol. VIII, July 1946, pp. 275-82; Grayson Kirk, *The Study of International Relations*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1931.

<sup>24</sup>Charles Hodges, *The Background of International Relations*, New York, 1931.

<sup>25</sup>"The New Pseudoscience of Geopolitics", Ch. 21, pp. 609-35 of T. V. Kalijarvi and associates, *Modern World Politics*, New York, 1942.

<sup>26</sup>E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919 to 1939*, New York, 1939.



The post-World War II "utopian" period characterized by the hysteria of pro-Russian climate and the hopes placed in the United Nations was too brief to be effectively reflected in textbook writing. After around 1948, the writings in this field started to stress national goals and the operation of power politics, with geopolitical implications given more and more prominence.<sup>27</sup> Kieffer's approach, for instance, was purely geopolitical and was built on the other special geopolitical studies of the post-war period.<sup>28</sup>

### Recent Textbooks

The year of 1957 appears to be a turning point in the coverage of the field of political geography by textbooks, following the usual tendency of the American textbook publishers to ignore persistently certain branches of knowledge and then, hurriedly, flood the market with numerous texts all at once, once it is apparent that there is a demand in that field. Probably the most widely used and noted have been Percy-Fifield, *World Political Geography* (originally published in 1948 by T. Y. Crowell, and reappearing in 1957 under the editorship of G. Etzel Percy and associates). Hans W. Weigert, Henry Brodie, Edward W. Doherty, John R. Fernstrom, Erich Fischer, Dudley Kirk are the authors of *Principles of Political Geography* (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957), a superior book to that of Percy. W. Gordon East and A. E. Moodie, editors, *The Changing World* (World Book Co., 1956) is mainly English both in regard to the authors and philosophy but has been reprinted for the American market.

In spite of the growing number of studies covering the field of political geography and geopolitics, and all its related fields, there is still hardly any agreement among the American (and Anglo-Saxon) scholars on what this area of knowledge actually covers. Although the number of textbooks is evidently growing rather rapidly, all these studies show glaring divergencies of approaches and definitions. Even Percy-Fifield's textbook, which had formerly led the field, can be accused of frequently confusing simple geography with political geography and geopolitics; and the same applies to the works we have just evaluated.

Yet, in spite of the glaring confusion and inconsistencies, two discernible tendencies can be noted regarding the field of political geography and geopolitics: (1) the efforts to revise Mackinder and bring him up-to-date; (2) the growing use of the findings of geopoliticians by the military specialists and the persistent efforts to formulate the geopolitical theories within the framework of the astounding (or implied) impacts of the jet and the H-bomb age.

### Mackinder Reconsidered

When the extension of the Nazi shadow over Europe led to the popularization of Mackinder's Heartland theory, Sir Halford was asked, in 1943, to state whether

<sup>27</sup>Kalijarvi, *op. cit.*, and subsequent editions; Sprout, *op. cit.*; H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, New York, 1948.

<sup>28</sup>J. E. Kieffer, *Realities of World Power*, New York, 1952; Joseph S. Roucek, *The Politics of the Balkans*, New York, 1939, and *Governments and Politics Abroad*, New York, 1948; F. H. Simonds and B. Emeny, *The Great Powers in World Politics*, New York, 1939; Whittlesey, *The Earth and the State*; etc.

he thought that his strategic concept of a Heartland had lost any of its significance. He answered in an article in *Foreign Affairs*. Mackinder reiterated his faith in the Heartland idea as "more valid and useful today than it was either twenty or forty years ago". The concept did not, he granted, admit of precise definition on the map; enough to say that the territory of the U.S.S.R. was equivalent to the Heartland—with the exception that the Soviet Union was bulwarked still more by the area which he called "Lenaland", the territory drained by the great river Lena which flows northward from Mongolia to the Arctic Ocean. In short, the Heartland provided "a sufficient physical basis for strategic thinking". The Soviet Union, he saw, would emerge from World War II the greatest land power on the globe. He lived to see the war brought to a close by the explosion of atomic bombs, but not long enough to write about it.<sup>29</sup>

That Mackinder still fascinates the political geographers of America is certified to by the special session of the A.A.G. Committee on Political Geography, held as a part of the National A.A.G. Meeting in Memphis (1 April 1955), where, under the chairmanship of Derwent Whittlesey, Arthur R. Hall, Richard Hartshorne, Major Alexander P. de Seversky and Alexander Melamid, "Mackinder in 1955" was analyzed.

The conclusions were interesting. According to Hall, Mackinder's analysis was incorrect in two important aspects: (1) He contended that the possessor of the Heartland was in a pivotal political position and was able eventually to dominate the world. But, in fact, in the first part of the twentieth century the Heartland did not occupy a pivotal position because political power had become concentrated in Europe, and nearly all other parts of the world, including the Heartland, were only in peripheral positions. (2) Mackinder overemphasized the importance of the World Island in relation to the rest of the world and underrated the importance of Anglo-America which, at present, serves as an effective counterweight to the Communist bloc seated in the Heartland. Then propaganda and subversion have become much more significant in Heartland expansion than Mackinder could have foreseen. But Mackinder was right in predicting that the Heartland power would develop and expand, and in some respects the expansion has been even more successful than he foresaw. The free world alignment against the Communist bloc is also similar to the combination of "insular" and "bridgehead" states that he proposed to counteract Heartland expansion. "For these reasons it would seem that Mackinder is more important today as prophet than he is as analyst." Hartshorne feels that Mackinder's Heartland theory has, in fact, impeded objective scientific analysis, because the term embodies four different meanings, each of distinctive geographical significance: (1) central-geometrically controlled location; (2) internal location deep within a land-mass, *i.e.*, remote from the sea; (3) power house—maximum intensity of power production; and (4) focal—an organic unit functioning as the focus of a larger organized area. In any major area of the world, the attempt to identify a "Heartland" in terms of those four concepts produces at least four, often more, areas which correspond but little with each

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<sup>29</sup>A good summary is Charles Kruszewski, "The Pivot of History", *For. Affairs*, Vol. XXXII, Ap. 1954, pp. 388-401.

other. "The attempt to combine these into a single heartland area leads to distortion and confusion of thought", for "no place on the surface of a sphere can be considered geometrically as more central than any other place"; in terms of intensity of production the world has four major, separate units: Europe, Southern Asia, East Asia and Anglo-America. No one of these "heartlands of production" could be called focal in an unorganized world, but to some degree the economy of the world is oriented on the dual foci of Europe and Anglo-America joined across the North Atlantic. The remaining productive and populated areas of the world lie largely south of these four major areas connected by seas. Within the circle formed by the major areas around the world is a vast "internal" area of low production and inaccessibility from the open ocean—the "dead centre" of the world (Central and Northern Asia, together with the Arctic ice area, most of Greenland and northernmost North America); across it run potential air routes among all four major areas, land routes among the three of Eurasia, and one narrow sea route, in summer only, from Europe to East Asia. Excepting by air, the greater part of this area is inaccessible from Anglo-America and Southern Asia, and somewhat more accessible from the Middle East and East Asia (China), and most readily accessible from the East European plain, where in modern times has developed the only bordering state of great power, Russia. Russia is invulnerable to attack, except from the west and south-west, because it backs up to the vast empty centre of the world over much of which it has unchallenged control; hence the great defensive strength of Russia. But for offensive strength, Russia does not have the strongest base in Europe and its power can be applied only in one direction, and only by land. The greatest offensive strength in Europe is based on the major powerhouse, the "Heartland" of Central Europe, which is also not far from the geometric centre. Until 1945, Germany, because of its central location among other powers, could not attain sufficient security on the land to concentrate on sea power, sufficient to break the block of marginal sea power on the west, based primarily on the island base and powerhouse of Great Britain. The basic validity of Mackinder's thesis, whether in 1904 or 1919, was this: if it were politically possible to combine under one power the peripheral defensive power of Eastern Europe (Russia) with the powerhouse and nearly central location of Central Europe (Germany), the power thus formed would have the greatest defensive and offensive strength of any world unit. Conquest of the essential bases of seapower would give the dual power of Central and Eastern Europe control of sea routes, as well as the land routes, to the other two major areas of the world land-mass, Southern and Eastern Asia. The remaining small land-masses and islands of the world, containing but one major powerhouse in Anglo-America, could not match such an all European force, in any form of power. What importance is to be attached to technological changes since 1919 depends primarily on the effectiveness of air power and its relation to the factor of distance.

This aspect was not reported at all by Seversky in terms of Mackinder, except by noting "Transpolar Concept": two self-contained world islands, dominating their respective hemispheres; geopolitical significance of this transpolar dichotomy. Alexander Melamid noted the similarity between some of Thuenen's and Mackinder's theories on the spatial distribution of economic activities. Studies by East and



others have shown that Mackinder's views are not invalidated by either air-warfare or atomic bombs; therefore the reinterpretation of Mackinder's hypothesis in the form of Thuenen circles should be equally valid.<sup>30</sup>

### Geopolitics and American Military Thinking

Mackinder lived to see the war brought to a close by the explosion of atomic bombs, but not long enough to write about it. In 1943, he did not feel that air power had revolutionized military strategy. "The conquest of the air gave the world's unity a new significance for all mankind", he said; but he agreed with those airmen who noted that the effect of air power depends upon the efficiency of its ground organization:

It can only be said that no adequate proof has yet been presented that air fighting will not follow the long history of all kinds of warfare by presenting alternations of offensive and defensive tactical superiority, meanwhile effecting few permanent changes in strategical conditions.

The changes brought by the sudden rise of air in regard to the Heartland theory have been studied by D. W. Smith, Edward Warner, and others.<sup>31</sup> Roucek concludes that air power has a tremendous advantage over land power and sea power. While land and sea restrict and canalize communications, the air alone permits relatively unfettered movement. The development of air power has disrupted the traditional concepts of national power. The United States and Great Britain in combination fulfill Mahan's requirements for command of sea space. Yet two world wars have demonstrated that this supremacy has limited advantage when applied against a land-based power. Soviet Russia controls most of the European-Asian continent, yet her power has ebbed from its fullest tide and she hesitates to launch an all-out bid for power. The answer to the malfunctioning of traditional axioms of geopolitics may lie in the rise of air power. No longer can navies and merchant marines rule the waves without the permission of land-based air power. No longer can the possessor of the largest land army count his Heartland inviolable. Air power has entered the equation. Since the range of aircraft has become almost limitless, here is a weapon which is a major factor preventing the Politburo from using Eurasia (the Heartland) as the jumping-off place for its world conquest. For the first time in history, the Heartland can be directly and

<sup>30</sup>As far as the author knows, none of these articles have been published. The present survey is a summary of the abstracts, mimeographed by the A.A.G. Committee on Political Geography. Good evaluations of the need to revise Mackinder's thesis can be found also in: John A. Morrison, "Geographic Factors (and Fancies) in Russian and Soviet Expansion", pp. 1-23, in *Recent Soviet Trends*, Proceedings of the Conference held at the University of Texas, 11-12 Oct. 1956, ed. G. W. Hoffman; Gordon East, "The Soviet Union and the 'Heartland'", Ch. XVIII, pp. 432-50 in East and Moodie, *op. cit.*; "Critique of Mackinder; the Heartland as Viewed over the Top of the World", pp. 214-29, in Weigert *et al.*, *Principles of Political Geography*; D. W. Meinig, "Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History", *Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 3, Sept. 1956, pp. 553-69.

<sup>31</sup>Donald Eugene Smith, *A Comparative Study of the Influence of Airpower upon the National Policies of Germany, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union*, George Washington University Studies in Politics, Government and International Law, Abstract Series, Vol. I, p. 6; Edward Warner, "Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare", in Earle (ed.), *Makers of Modern Strategy*, pp. 485-503; Joseph S. Roucek, "Geopolitics and Air Power", U.S. Air Force, *Air University Quarterly Review*, Vol. V, Fall 1952, pp. 52-73.

devastatingly attacked. Air power has thus rewritten the probable course of international geopolitics. A force has arisen which was beyond the ken of Mackinder and Mahan.<sup>32</sup>

Yet, even Mahan's thesis still has its defenders today. Captain Puleston has presented us with a brilliant thesis that sea power is still the dominant force in war, demonstrating his point by the accomplishments of American sea power in World War II.<sup>33</sup> Even more impressive is a massive narrative and analysis of the development of navies and sea power, with emphasis on the history of major naval engagements, written for use at the U.S. Naval Academy under the editorship of Potter and Fredland.<sup>34</sup>

### **Britain Folds Up as Sea Power**

In spite of the convincing arguments of the prophets of Mahan, the decisions taken by Great Britain at the turn of 1957 fail to support glaringly the proponents of sea power. In a White Paper published in April 1957, the Conservative Government presented the world with a five-year plan for a defence policy sweeping in scope and revolutionary in thinking. The salient features of the plan outline Britain's role in the world of tomorrow. Convinced that the small island cannot be defended from catastrophic attack in the nuclear age, British energy and ingenuity will be devoted to the establishment of nuclear weapons that will deter such an attack by the U.S.S.R., this deterrent to take the form of British bombers carrying hydrogen and atomic bombs manufactured in Britain; then guided missiles furnished by the United States will assume the task; finally, ballistic rockets made in Britain with nuclear warheads manufactured in the United States will take over the role of chief deterrent. Meanwhile, strength of the Royal Navy, the British Army and Royal Air Force, at 690,000 (1957), will be cut to 375,000 by the end of 1962; conscription will end; battleships with their old proud names will be scrapped. As "far-call'd our navies melt away", the garrisons that held an empire and kept the peace east of Suez will prepare to follow (except at Hong Kong, Aden and in East Africa). The main strength of an army will be concentrated in a mobile, airborne reserve stationed in the home islands and trained and equipped for intervention across oceans and continents. The Earl of Selkirk, First Lord of the Admiralty, stated that it was "improbable" that Britain's giant men o' war—the battleships—would be used again on operations. The First Lord reported the Navy considers aircraft carriers as its "capital ships" around which the fleets are organized; although nuclear propulsion in ships would play a vital part in the future, the Royal Navy's nuclear fleet "is not just around the corner", the Earl said.

Thus, with an almost audible sigh of relief, Great Britain laid down its role as the mistress of the seven seas, as the policeman of the world, and in one step advanced into the nuclear age. Written in tones of resignation—to domestic

<sup>32</sup>The implications of air strategy are also brilliantly analyzed in: Cyril Falls, "Geography and War Strategy", *Geographical Journal*, Vol. CXII, 1948, pp. 4-18, reprinted in F. E. Dohrs, L. M. Sommers and D. R. Petterson (eds.), *Outside Readings in Geography*, New York, 1955, pp. 731-45.

<sup>33</sup>Captain William D. Puleston, *The Influence of Sea Power in World War II*, New Haven, Conn., 1947.

<sup>34</sup>E. B. Potter and J. R. Fredland, *The United States and World Sea Power*, New York, 1955.

economics and to the march of progress in atomic age weapons—this message to the world was a historic landmark in military history, which will result in numerous geopolitical analyses in the near future. (Said the British White Paper, "The free world is today mainly dependent for its protection upon the nuclear capacity of the U.S.")

### Geopolitics and the Nuclear Age

In fact, the most recent discussions in this field have been related to the hydrogen bomb and the nuclear weapons, although the theories in this field have been related to the general thesis and need to be yet formulated in a systematic and digested manner.

Most, if not all, such speculations so far have tended to overlook the implications of the U.S. air bases strung around Soviet Russia, and have been prone to stress that absolute atomic deadlock is a real possibility for the near future; but atomic deadlock does not offer a stark, final choice between absolute mutual destruction and perpetual peace based on absolute fear.<sup>35</sup> The United States and the Soviet Union already are near a stage where each has the power to smash the other into radioactive rubble. Yet, with thousands of bombers poised, or soon to be ready to be poised, for instant take-off with thermonuclear bombs, both nations are not confident of their power to destroy the other's deadly reflexes. Up to very recently, the United States complacent conviction of its ability to stay ahead of Soviet Russia in all things technological has now been shattered. Several specialists have pointed out that the eternal goal of Communism is world domination; that atomic stalemate will not change this goal, but will merely force a switch in method, seeing "a peaceful world" boiling with limited wars. Most recent critics have shown the danger of overdependence on the doctrine of massive retaliation (as shown in Korea and Indo-China); therefore, the United States must not only maintain its strategic deterrent; it must also establish a tactical deterrent and punish local aggressions with such speed and force that the Communists will finally call a halt (the concept of the double deterrent). Basically, therefore, the United States must be able to pulverize the U.S.S.R. by thermonuclear strategic attack and control, at the same time, a swift, deadly, flexible and tactical claw.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup>"The Pistol and the Claw", *Time*, 10 Jan. 1955, pp. 16-17; Thomas K. Finletter, *Power and Policy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age*, New York, 1954; Asher Lee, *Air Power*, New York, 1956; R. A. Preston *et al.*, *A History of Warfare*, New York, 1956, Ch. 25, "Postwar approach to Problems of War"; Henry A. Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense of the 'Grey Area'", *For. Affairs*, Vol. XXXIII, Ap. 1955, pp. 416-28; S. B. Jones, "Global Strategic Views", *Geog. R.*, Vol. XLV, 1955, pp. 492-508; H. A. De Weerd, "Britain's Changing Military Policy", *For. Affairs*, Vol. XXXIV, Oct. 1955, pp. 102-16; Charles J. V. Murphy, "A New Strategy for NATO", *Fortune*, Jan. 1953, pp. 80, ff.; Herbert S. Dinnerstein, "The Impact of Air Power on the International Scene, 1933 to 1940", *Mil. Affairs*, Vol. XIX, Summer 1955, pp. 65-71; Dale O. Smith, "The Role of Airpower since World War II", *ibid.*, pp. 71-6; Raymond L. Garthoff, "Soviet Attitudes toward Modern Air Power", *ibid.*, pp. 76-80.

<sup>36</sup>Finletter, *op. cit.*, argues that we must have overwhelming air atomic superiority but are not getting it; Dale O. Smith, *op. cit.*; Kissinger, *op. cit.*; Murphy, *op. cit.*; "The Pistol and the Claw", *Time*, 10 Jan. 1955; T. W. Stanley, *American Defense and National Security*, Washington, D.C., 1956; etc.



# History and Sociology

By JOHN PASSMORE

How is history related to sociology? One possibility is that history is the pre-scientific, dilettante, antecedent of sociology, destined to be absorbed by it as soon as it firmly establishes itself as a science. This view, still not without its adherents, was advocated with particular zeal in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Even historians, however regretfully, bid an anticipatory farewell to their subject—although they sometimes named political science rather than sociology as the principal heir to their property. Sir John Seeley wrote thus:

History is the name of a residuum which has been left when one group of facts after another has been taken possession of by some science: . . . the residuum which now exists must go the way of the rest and . . . the time is not very distant when a science will take possession of the facts which are still the undisputed property of the historian.<sup>1</sup>

The fate of the American Historical Association seemed to suggest that Seeley might be right; from that Association there had broken away, in a relatively short period of time, the American Economic Association, the American Association of Political Science, the American Sociological Association. Confronted by such notable declarations of independence, historians might well wonder if there was living-space left for them.

Furthermore, at the end of the nineteenth century, history seemed to be visibly converging towards the newest and most ambitious of the social sciences—sociology. Sociology, for Comte, was "history philosophically considered"; if it is distinguishable from history this is only because it seeks to detect broad historical tendencies, whereas the historian is absorbed in minutiae. On the other side, many historians were impatient of the concentration on detail—political, diplomatic, military—which had so far been characteristic of the historian. For them, too (most markedly for such American historians as Beard, Robinson, Becker) the centre of interest was the progress of the human mind. In short, their "history" and Comte's "sociology" coalesced.

An indictment of history by the historically-minded sociologist H. E. Barnes will reveal, more clearly than any general description, what many sociologists and some historians had come to feel about traditional history: "The present type of history", he writes,

instead of attempting to explain the origin, nature and developments of the state, simply recites the most striking episodes connected with the history of some *particular* state or group of states. . . . The average student would gain more enlightenment regarding the evolution of political institutions from Edward Jenks' *The State and the Nation* or Franz Oppenheimer's *The State*

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<sup>1</sup>*Introduction to Political Science*, London, 1896, pp. 9-12. Seeley was prepared to admit that "history of the old kind will probably always subsist as a somewhat insignificant branch of literature".

than from the most pretentious historical work ever produced by the conventional type of political historian. It is not unfair, then, to designate the current political historiography as an incomplete and melodramatic exposition of a superficial and distorted view of human society and social evolution.<sup>2</sup>

To this spirited statement of the case against history, most traditional historians would, I think, reply as follows:

(1) It is not the object of the historian to explain "*the origin of the State*". If this task can be undertaken at all, it is the responsibility of those who are attempting to construct general sociological hypotheses. The historian, when he concentrates upon "*the history of some particular state*", is undertaking the properly historical task; those who are interested in *the history of the state* should go elsewhere than to history for enlightenment.

(2) Similarly, the historian does not attempt to describe "*the evolution of human society*". Considered in relation to this ideal, no doubt, the historian's work will appear "superficial" and "incomplete". But it ought rather to be judged by its success in achieving the objective it sets before itself: to describe the state of a particular society at a particular time, or the way in which certain changes came about in such a society. By the thoroughness of what he does, not by its incompleteness from a sociological point of view, the value of the historian's work ought to be estimated.

(3) An intimate enquiry into what took place in a particular community can be at least as enlightening as a set of broad generalisations about social institutions. Just as we acquire from literature a knowledge of the personal life of human beings which is of a different order from, but no less valuable than, what we learn from psychologists, so from an historical study of a society in growth we extend our knowledge of the social and political life of man—but not by taking over from the historian a set of generalisations.

(4) No doubt some historians, looking for a popular audience, select for their attention the more dramatic episodes in human history. But does not the sociologist, for similar reasons, sometimes concentrate upon the more lurid aspects of human society? Historians ought to be judged by their serious work, not by school histories, or best-sellers.

I have stated the historian's case in very moderate terms, and I believe that in this form it is wholly defensible. But some historians would wish to go further: historical study, they would say, is *the only way* of understanding human society, since human actions are unique; they are hopelessly distorted, in consequence, by any attempt to confine them within the bounds of an abstract, generalising, science. F. W. Maitland's famous dictum is an expression of this point of view: "My own belief", he wrote, "is that by and by anthropology will have the choice between being history and being nothing."<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup>*The New History and the Social Sciences*, 1925, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup>"The Body Politic" (probably composed in 1899), reprinted in *Collected Papers*, Cambridge, 1911, Vol. III, p. 295. A number of philosophers have argued that it is only in history that we have access to reality; in England, for example, that view has been taken by James Ward and by Collingwood. See John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy*, London, 1957, pp. 83 and 309.

Thus Maitland is not content to say, simply, that it is for someone else, rather than for the historian, to generalise about human societies; such generalisations, he is suggesting, are impossible in principle. Nor is he alone in adopting this position; not only other historians but even some anthropologists would fully agree with him. "While there are many differences between social anthropology and historiography", writes Evans-Pritchard, "they are differences of technique, of emphasis and of perspective, and not differences of method and aim." Indeed he is prepared to assert that "social anthropology is a kind of historiography".<sup>4</sup>

Now in what is normally said about the "uniqueness" of human society and the "uniqueness" of human beings there is certainly an element of logical confusion. Evans-Pritchard continues as follows: "It [social anthropology] is interested in design rather than process, it seeks patterns and not scientific laws, it interprets rather than explains." But if social institutions were, in some sense that logically precludes the possibility of generalising about them, "unique", we could not so much as describe their "design" or "pattern". They are describable only if we can apply to them such quite general concepts as "kinship", "religion", "law". Indeed, Evans-Pritchard seems to recognise as much—anthropology discovers, he says, "latent structural forms, the light of universals". But if this is so, then one cannot rule out *a priori* the possibility of discovering connections between these concepts, *i.e.* laws.

As Namier points out—quoting from Anatole France—"The lives of all men can be summed up in eight words: 'They were born, they suffered, and they died'."<sup>5</sup> There is much more to be said of any man, but this much can be said of us all. Socrates exemplifies the generalisation that "All men are mortal"; yet he is still "unique"—if all we mean by thus describing him is that we can apply to him a complex description which would not truly apply to anybody else. Similarly, although a human society is "unique" insofar as it can be described in such a way as unmistakably to identify it, this "uniqueness" does not rule out the possibility of discovering universal propositions into which that society enters as an example.

What we can grant to Maitland and to Evans-Pritchard, however, is this: confronted by a society, we may wish to consider it, and may more profitably consider it, as a system of interrelated activities rather than as exemplifying some general law. Furthermore, they are right, I should say, in maintaining that this sort of enquiry can be conducted either by an anthropologist or by a historian—although, in some circumstances, the techniques used by the anthropologist will be different from the techniques used by the historian. There is a species of history, that is—what I shall "cross-section"<sup>6</sup> as distinct from "narrative" history—which is identical in its objectives with a species of social anthropology (or sociology).

<sup>4</sup>E. E. Evans-Pritchard, "Social Anthropology: Past and Present", *Man*, 1950, p. 122. This article is discussed in David Bidney, *Theoretical Anthropology*, Oxford, 1953, with reference to its sources in the work of A. L. Kroeber. See also the subsequent correspondence in *Man*.

<sup>5</sup>"History" in *Avenues of History*, London, 1952, reprinted in F. Stern (ed.), *The Varieties of History*, London, 1957, p. 376.

<sup>6</sup>*cf.* J. C. Burckhardt in *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, trans. into English as *Reflections on History*, London, 1943: "We shall confine ourselves to observation, taking cross-sections of history from as many directions as possible" (p. 15).



Thus there is no difference in principle between an attempt to describe the institutions of a primitive society in their inter-relations one with another, and an attempt to do the same for, say, England in the late Middle Ages; no difference, again, between a work which describes the role played by the town in mediaeval Europe and a work which describes the role of the village in the New Guinea Highlands. The historian will analyse documents to reach his results; the social anthropologist—although he, too, makes considerable use of orally delivered evidence—can go to the community and examine it for himself. But the objectives are the same in both cases: to understand a society at work. Whether we call Huizinga's *The Waning of the Middle Ages* or Burckhardt's *The Civilization of the Renaissance* a contribution to history or to social anthropology is a matter of no consequence.

The historian goes to his material with certain general ideas about social structure (although these ideas may take a different shape as his work proceeds) which determine the pattern of his enquiries. "The historian", so Huizinga expresses the matter, "tries to discover some sense in the remains of a certain period of human history. To express this 'sense' he must organize historical phenomena according to the categories with which his *Weltanschauung*, his intellect, his culture, provide him."<sup>7</sup> These ideas often come to the historian from outside history; obviously, for example, Burckhardt's study of art determined the organization of *The Civilization of the Renaissance*. The historian, we might well maintain, ought to make more use than he ordinarily does of the patterns of organization discovered by the social anthropologist. Even Maitland was prepared to admit that "the traveller who has studied the uncorrupted savage can often tell the historian of mediaeval Europe what to look for".<sup>8</sup> The sociologist G. C. Homans in his *English Villagers of the Thirteenth Century* (1942) makes free use of historical techniques, but he draws attention to features of thirteenth century social organization which would have escaped the notice of a historian not soaked in the literature of anthropology. A training in social anthropology may come to be recognized as an essential pre-requisite for any historian who aspires to undertake cross-sectional studies.

Equally, however, a training in history is a pre-requisite for the social anthropologist. This is partly for technical reasons. Especially now that social anthropologists are studying literate societies where they are compelled to make use of documentary evidence, they fall into traps which the cunning of centuries has taught historians how to avoid.<sup>9</sup> But, as well, the social anthropologist has something to learn from the fact that even the "cross-section" historian conceives the society which forms his subject matter as something which is through-and-through temporal, which has roots in its past and points of growth and decay in

<sup>7</sup>J. Huizinga, "Historical Conceptualization" in *Varieties of History*, p. 292.

<sup>8</sup>*op. cit.*, p. 300.

<sup>9</sup>*cf.* L. Gottschalk, C. Kluckhohn, R. Angell, *The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology and Sociology*, Publications of the American Social Science Research Council, New York, 1949. A similar point can be made about historians of science, who are often quite unacquainted with the difficulties of documentary investigation. Compare S. E. Toulmin, "Crucial Experiments: Priestley and Lavoisier", *Journal of History of Ideas*, 1957, Vol. XVIII, No. 2.

it which lead towards the future.<sup>10</sup> Reacting against the imaginative "historical reconstructions" of earlier sociologists and the extravagances of extreme diffusionists, a good many social anthropologists have thought it their duty to look at society quite unhistorically, as if it were an abstract mechanical system. But deliberately to close one's eyes to historical evidence, as Malinowski advised the anthropologist to do, is to ignore something essential to a society: its power of learning from its past. (It is the mistake a psychiatrist would make if he were to pay attention only to the stress-situations in which his patient finds himself at the present moment.) Now that social anthropologists are so largely engaged in the study of societies which are rapidly developing, this lack of a historical sense is particularly limiting;<sup>11</sup> if the historian can learn from the social anthropologists how institutions function at a moment in time, the social anthropologist can learn from the historians that the functioning or disfunctioning of such institutions is a product not simply of the present condition of the society but also of circumstances it once endured or expects to endure in the future. It is from the bringing together of these two different kinds of training and experience—sociological and historical—that hope lies for the understanding of society.

So far, I have been discussing what I have called "cross-section" history, in its relationship to that branch of sociology for which I have used the name "social anthropology". But, of course, this is not the only type of history nor the only type of sociology. From a consideration of the type of history most like a type of sociology I shall now turn to consider two opposite extremes: generalised sociology and narrative history.<sup>12</sup> It will be observed that our original question "how is history related to sociology?" has turned out to present not a single problem but several problems. Evans-Pritchard "plays down" narrative history in order to identify history and social anthropology; Hancock defines history as narrative and is then able to distinguish it very sharply from "social science".<sup>13</sup> But to do justice to the issues involved we must recognise that history need not be narrative in form, and yet again, on the other side, that it is often essential to it that it should be so written. (If we like, we can of course say that cross-section histories are "not really history at all"; but certainly in so doing we shall be recommending a new usage rather than elucidating an old one.)

It is perfectly apparent that narrative history could not be absorbed into a generalised sociology; one has only to cast the merest glance at, say, *The Structure*

<sup>10</sup>Thus when it is alleged against Burckhardt's *The Civilization of the Renaissance*, as it is by W. K. Ferguson in *The Renaissance in Historical Thought*, Boston, 1948, that it is "too static, too sharply delineated in time and space", this is a charge the seriousness of which must be admitted, for all that Burckhardt was not writing a narrative history.

<sup>11</sup>cf. Max Gluckman, *An Analysis of the Sociological Theory of Bronislaw Malinowski*, Oxford, 1949.

<sup>12</sup>Of course, I do not pretend that the distinctions I am making are absolute. The narrative historian will often begin, or end, his story with a chapter of cross-section analysis; the cross-section historian may begin or end with a narrative. But such "pure types" as Huizinga's *The Waning of the Middle Ages* or Homans' *Thirteenth Century Villagers* will illustrate clearly enough what I mean by a cross-section history; as examples of "narrative histories" I would cite such works as Wedgwood's *Thirty Years War* or Runciman's *A History of the Crusades*. Similarly the writings of Talcott Parsons will serve as examples of pure generalised sociology; they stand at the opposite extreme from, say, Malinowski's study of the Trobriand Islanders or Lynd's of Middletown.

<sup>13</sup>See Ch. VIII in his *Country and Calling*, London, 1954.

of *Social Action* and *The History of the Crusades* to see that their authors are working in completely different genres, not only in the techniques they adopt but also in the objectives they set before themselves. The narrative historian, indeed, is far more like a practising psychiatrist than he is like a generalising sociologist. He wants to find out what produced certain changes in a complex system; as a principal clue to finding out what happened he scrutinises, but sceptically, what men thought had happened; in the process he shows us that, as Acton puts it, "common report and outward seeming are bad copies of the reality, as the initiated know it",<sup>14</sup> that what seemed to be of central significance is a mere epiphenomenon, and that some apparently slight incident transformed the whole picture; to succeed in his task he needs imagination, sympathy, artistic insight. But to make this comparison good, according to some historians, we should have to imagine a psychiatrist whose diagnosis is *never* a generalised one; for whom the diagnosis always takes the form of a simple story of what happened to the patient. To quote Huizinga again: "The term 'case' does not belong in history at all. It is the facts in psychology, jurisprudence, sociology, that are conceived of as 'cases', for the historian the facts will always be 'a series of events that happened at a given time'."<sup>15</sup>

Yet isn't there some exaggeration here? Huizinga would seem to be suggesting that the historian never generalises, whereas in fact almost every history contains generalisations. These fall into two classes. The first I shall call, for want of a better name, "historical generalisations proper"; they are generalisations about an historical period. Thus, for example, Pirenne's *Mediaeval Towns* contains such generalisations as "the Oriental merchants of the Frankish Empire were virtually engaged in the wholesale trade" (p. 20); "after the twelfth century, no heresy cropped up which did not immediately find some followers" (p. 234). Huizinga's own book, *The Waning of the Middle Ages*, is a tissue of such generalisations; a cross-section history, indeed, is unimaginable without them.

So if it be said that history knows nothing of "cases", a *caveat* must be entered—this is not true of cross-section histories, which contain, at least, generalisations about classes of historically definable events. Yet even this concession does not, on the face of it, go far enough. For a great many of the generalisations in history books are as wide in scope as sociology. Thus Pirenne tells us that "primitive though it may be, every stable society feels the need of providing its members with centres of assembly or meeting-places" (p. 57). Even narrative historians indulge in the same freedom to generalise: in Wedgwood's *Thirty Years War* we read, for example, that "periods of transition are always periods of mismanagement" (p. 19).

These generalisations, however, are detachable: if they were false, the value of the historical work in which they appear would be quite unaffected. They are rhetorical flourishes, rather than seriously considered judgments. They may well irritate the sociologist, for they are often false, or at best are merely taken for

<sup>14</sup>A *Lecture on the Study of History*, 1896, p. 4.

<sup>15</sup>Huizinga, "Historical Conceptualization".



granted. In a treatise on sociology, they would be unpardonable. But in a narrative history they can merely be set aside, for it is the story that matters.

This is a conclusion which some people would find shocking; no enquiry is worth-while, they would insist, unless it issues in general laws. Indeed, the entry of History into the university curriculum was at one time opposed—for example by John Caird, Principal of the University of Glasgow in 1899—on these very grounds: that “knowledge which has not . . . become in some measure illuminated and harmonized by the presence of law cannot, I suppose, be regarded as a fit instrument of the higher education”.<sup>16</sup>

Even those who do not condemn history outright sometimes excuse it on grounds not particularly grateful to the historian. Somebody, it is suggested, has to do the digging and the delving; history is the handmaid of sociology—or, in the language of our own time, its research assistant. This had been Hume’s view; it was Spencer’s; and it has more recently been restated in a somewhat more sophisticated form by the economic historian, Alexander Gerschenkron.<sup>17</sup> “Historical research”, he writes,

consists essentially in application to empirical material of various sets of empirically derived hypothetical generalisations and in testing the closeness of the resulting fit, in the hope that in this way certain uniformities, certain typical situations, and certain typical relationships among individual factors in these situations can be ascertained.

Quoting this passage, T. C. Cochrane goes on to say that “most social scientists would readily subscribe to the Gerschenkron definition”.

Perhaps they would, but certainly few *historians* would recognise themselves in this picture of their activities. They do not think of themselves as testing general social-science hypotheses; nor are they ordinarily directed in their choice of subject by its relevance to such a hypothesis. Sometimes, of course, the historian is consciously testing an “historical-hypothesis proper”; for example, he may be considering, in Namier’s manner, whether there were political parties of the modern British sort in the eighteenth century, or he may seek to show that the devastation wrought by the Thirty Years War in Germany was not as great as has ordinarily been supposed. But to ask the historian what general social science hypothesis his book was meant to test would be to display a complete insensitivity to the actual character of historical work.

Here again, however, it is necessary to make a distinction: what we ordinarily describe as a “history book” does not test a social science hypothesis, but *the method of historical research* may sometimes be employed for this purpose. Hancock distinguishes, with this in mind, between “historical economics” and “economic history”. Historical economics is rigidly enclosed within economic confines; it considers an historical situation, simply, as the exemplification of an economic theory; its historical material, for the most part, is statistical. For the economic historian, in contrast, economic changes are depicted as operating within, and as

<sup>16</sup>See F. J. Teggert, *Prolegomena to History*, University of California Publications in History, 1916, Vol. 4, No. 3, p. 155.

<sup>17</sup>As quoted by T. C. Cochrane in *Varieties of History*, p. 348.

played upon by, a non-economic context. "Ashton", says Hancock, writing of his *Industrial Revolution*,

had a question to ask: why, in a period of unprecedented population growth, did the wealth of England grow still faster? No historian innocent of economic theory could formulate and pursue this question fruitfully; but the pursuit of it led to other questions—where, for example, did the entrepreneurs come from?—which could not be answered without investigation of the social, educational and religious background.<sup>18</sup>

The historians' questions, in other words, can never be fully answered by the application of a principle deriving from some particular social science, because the situation the historian is exploring is never purely economic or social, or political.

At the same time, the social scientist may have to engage in historical research—may have to adopt the techniques and standpoint of an historian—in order to test his hypothesis; or he may pick out a particular thread from the historian's narrative for that same purpose. Ginsberg, indeed, goes so far as to say that "the sociologist of necessity derives his material from the data furnished by anthropology and history".<sup>19</sup> This is at first sight an extraordinary statement. For an inspection of articles and text-books in sociology will rapidly reveal that they contain very few references to history, and that such historical references as are made have exactly that casual, uninformed, detachable character we detected in the sociological generalisations of historians. Even when the sociologist is talking, in quite general terms, about some such topic as technology and its effects on social change, he will rarely refer, say, to historical works on the Industrial Revolution; I have discovered only one such entry in recent text-books: in—for let honour be given where honour is due—Kingsley Davis's *Society*.

How then does Ginsberg come to write—as late as 1932—that "in actual practice the relation between history and sociology is very close"? He must be thinking of such a sociologist as Weber: certainly Weber's work is permeated by history. But the interests of sociologists have shifted. Now they concentrate their attention either on such special questions as "the relation between family background and marital happiness" or "the influence of television on reading habits"—in which case the historian simply cannot supply the sort of material which the sociologist needs—or else they attempt the broadest possible characterisations of social structure. Then the broad range of societies studied by the anthropologist is more likely to provide the sociologist with relevant information than will the relatively unified and continuous social group which is the concern of the historian of Western civilisation. Thus, although one may still insist that the sociologist should look more closely at historical evidence when this evidence is relevant to his enquiries, one must admit that such occasions are, in recent sociological work, distinctly rare.

Let us now consider the matter from the other side. What can the narrative historian learn from sociology? This question breaks itself up into two parts:

<sup>18</sup>Hancock, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

<sup>19</sup>M. Ginsberg, "History and Sociology", 1932, reprinted in *On the Diversity of Morals*, Melbourne, 1956, p. 163.

(1) What could history learn from an ideal sociology, a sociology which had discovered interesting and applicable generalisations about social institutions?

(2) What can history learn from sociology as it has so far been written?

If there were sociological generalisations, these would certainly be at least as relevant to history as other generalisations; the first question, indeed, sinks into the broader one: do generalisations play an essential part in history? I have suggested that when generalisations appear conspicuously in an historical work, they are often rhetorical flourishes rather than ingredients essential to the historical work of which they form a part. Yet the historian professes in some sort to explain what happens. How can there be explanations without generalisations?

Consider a case from ordinary life. Somebody might say: "I cannot understand how the Board of Graduate Studies made that decision; can you explain how it happened?" Then the reply might come: "Well, Faber and Heinemann would certainly have opposed it, but they were away; Macmillan, as it happens, had been called to the telephone; Duckworth, Dent and Cassell were engaged in a private discussion of their own; no one else cared in the slightest, so when Nelson proposed it, it simply went through without anybody noticing what had happened." This is certainly an explanation, and a perfectly satisfactory one. But it does not consist in deducing the Board of Graduate Studies' decision from some scientific principle. There are generalisations involved, of course, but they are so trivial as to be almost tautologous. "When someone is away, he can't vote"; "when people are engaged in a private discussion, they don't notice what is happening", and so on. When we listen to the explanation, we do not, in any sense, mentally supply these generalizations—which no one, perhaps, has ever expressly formulated until now. The course of events as it is described to us is not in any conflict with familiar patterns of behaviour—and that is all we demand. If we challenge the explanation it will be on a point of fact: "Faber *wasn't* away." The description of the behaviour of individuals is what matters in the explanation, in the sense that there alone are we being told something we do not already know.

Compare a typical piece of narrative history, from Miss Wedgwood's *Thirty Years War*:

George William, the eldest and Calvinist son, had succeeded his Calvinist father at Christmas 1619. The Lutheran electress-mother wished to dethrone him in favour of her second Lutheran son and enlisted the help of John George of Saxony. The Young Elector, with half his subjects ready to revolt against him, appealed for help to the neighbouring King of Poland. His mother immediately arranged for her eldest daughter to marry, without her brother's consent, the King of Sweden, mortal enemy of the King of Poland (p. 105).

This is undoubtedly a "fuller explanation" of the bare statement that the Young Elector was annoyed with his mother.

Such a story might be criticised in either of two ways:

(1) Are any of the explicit statements actually false? Was William a Calvinist? Was his mother a Lutheran? The major energy of historians is devoted to answering this sort of question. They write papers on "The alleged



Calvinism of the Elector William"; if they convince their fellow historians, these results are freely incorporated in historical narratives as "established facts".

(2) Has the historian explained what happened? In asking this question we are not demanding a generalisation from which it could be deduced that, in the situation Miss Wedgwood has put before us, the Young Elector's mother would marry off her eldest daughter to the King of Poland—there is certainly no such generalisation. Yet one might say: "You haven't explained why the mother wished to dethrone her son; surely the fact that they belonged to different Protestant sects—the only relevant fact you mention—isn't a sufficient explanation." To which the historian can only retort by bidding us to look more closely at the conditions of the times; and this amounts to introducing the "historical-generalisation proper" that "Lutherans and Calvinists were at that time bitterly opposed to one another".

This brings out the fact that it is *always permissible in principle* to attack an explanation by questioning a generalisation implicit in it. Miss Wedgwood thinks, no doubt rightly, that the implicit generalisation is trite—otherwise she would tell her story differently; but there can be a difference of opinion in this matter. Indeed, there are in fact such differences, especially between different communities, or at different times in the life of a single community. The narrative historian has to work with the assumptions of his readers; for he cannot hold up his narrative in order to defend a disputed general thesis. No modern historian would write—not even if he were an orthodox Roman Catholic and believed in the reality of miraculous interventions—"His troops were outnumbered and weary; but he prayed to the Blessed Virgin; and the infidels were scattered before his army like grains of dust." At least, he might write in this way for a restricted pious audience, but if he hopes to convince a broader segment of his society that his is the correct story, he will have to proceed quite differently. He must so tell his story that it depends upon the minimum assumptions of his time, not upon the assumptions of some particular group in the community. Perhaps he could write: "But he and his troops fought with the enthusiasm of men convinced that Heaven was on their side, and the enemy fled before them." This, we might feel, will do quite well, for we ordinarily believe that enthusiasm can make up for defects in numbers. Or more accurately—and the difference in accuracy is very important—we believe *that in the special circumstances the historian has described* enthusiasm can have this effect.<sup>20</sup> Some later age may be quite dissatisfied with this sort of explanation and will demand a comparison of the diets enjoyed by the two armies.

If sociology were to establish generalisations then, undoubtedly, once they come to the trite, they would play a part in shaping narrative histories; just as Ashton uses the trite parts of economic theory—*e.g.* the doctrine that lower interest rates encourage capital expansion—in his story of the Industrial Revolution. This seems a strange doctrine I am propounding—that the historian has no use for generalisations unless they are trite—but it has more than once been recognised

<sup>20</sup>To take this point further would lead me deeper than at the moment I want to go into the nature of historical explanation.

by historians as the truth. "I am also very far from denying", wrote Maitland, "that every advance of biological science, *but more especially any popularization of its results*, will supply the historian and the political scientist with new thoughts."<sup>21</sup> Only "popularized" results, indeed, are of any use to the narrative historian; so sociology will first have to produce generalisations which are not trite, and then pass through the stage at which they come to seem trite, before it can be of any real use to the narrative historian.<sup>22</sup>

But there is another way, apart from providing a store of implicit generalisations, in which sociology could influence history; and in this respect, I should say, it has already done so. At this point, I have made the transition to my second question—about the *actual* influence of sociology on history. The sociologist Robert Merton writes that "the growing contributions of sociological theory to its sister disciplines lie more in the realm of general sociological orientations than in that of specific confirmed hypotheses".<sup>23</sup> Sociology, in particular, has led the historians to recognise that aspects of social life which at first sight seem to be quite disconnected can be stages in a single story. Maitland suggests, indeed, that it is the historians, not the sociologists, who have remembered "the greatest lesson that Auguste Comte taught . . . the inter-dependence of human affairs".<sup>24</sup> More specifically, historians have learnt from sociologists to explain social changes in terms of social movements, not legislative action; they have learnt that economic changes can profoundly affect society in what appear to be quite non-economic facets of its life, and that religious attitudes have their place in the story of industrial expansion. For many historians there was only one social institution—the state. To record its actions was to tell the story of civilisation. For Burckhardt, even, there were only three—religion, the state, and culture. If that now seems to us a gross over-simplification, we have sociologists to thank. The historian does not deduce his story—nor could he—from a sociological generalisation, but sociologists have taught him to tell his story differently. Herein, in its power of bringing to light unsuspected relationships between social institutions, lies the greatest importance of sociology to the narrative historian. Just because, as Hancock emphasised, history is never the story of, for example, economic development simply, but always of that development as something which took place within a particular set of social conditions, the historian should welcome any form of enquiry which brings to light the connexions between different forms of social life. But he need not fear that such an enquiry will supersede his own.

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<sup>21</sup>Maitland, *op. cit.*, p. 289. My italics.

<sup>22</sup>Thus, at the moment, some Freudian-type hypotheses are passing into the area of available generalisations, i.e. generalisations one need not specifically mention.

<sup>23</sup>R. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, Ill., 1949, p. 86.

<sup>24</sup>Maitland, *op. cit.*, p. 293.

# Australian Political Chronicle

## July-December 1957

### THE COMMONWEALTH

The months from July to December 1957 were crowded both with political and administrative events. Apart from the normal excitement of the Budget, two first-rate political upheavals occurred over defence policy and the Government's new banking legislation. In addition, considerable public attention was attracted by matters such as the review of Commonwealth departmental functions, the publication of the Report of the Committee on Australian Universities and the Government's proposals in connection with it, the decision in the uniform tax case, and the attack on Dr. Evatt's leadership of the Parliamentary Labor Party.

#### *Banking*

The Government had already announced in April that it would review the structure of the Commonwealth Bank and its relation to the trading banks. More details of the proposals were published in September, and the fourteen bills required to enact the proposed changes were introduced into the House of Representatives on 24 October by the Treasurer, Sir Arthur Fadden.

The bills, when they came, provided shocks all round. The Treasurer, and the Country Party in general, were known to oppose any changes which might weaken the Commonwealth Bank, and the final decision of the Government to proceed with changes in the banking structure was widely interpreted both as a defeat for Sir Arthur personally and as a sign of the relative insignificance to which the Country Party had been reduced in its alliance with the Liberal Party. However, the bill aroused acute misgivings among the N.S.W. Liberal members who had been the most active in pressing the viewpoint of the private banks concerning the separation of central banking functions from trading bank functions, and the relaxation of the special account system. It was soon evident that the Government's proposals, although they effected a separation and altered the special accounts procedure, were liable to lead not to a reduction but to a positive increase in the powers and functions of the Commonwealth Bank.

The fourteen bills introduced by the Treasurer on 24 October comprised four major measures: (a) the Reserve Bank Bill, whose main function was to separate central banking from other functions, and to rename the central bank; (b) the Commonwealth Banks Bill, which set up three banks—the Trading Bank, the Savings Bank and the Development Bank, all of them controlled by a Commonwealth Banking Corporation; (c) the Banking Bill, which replaced the special accounts by statutory reserve deposits, of which 25 per cent. could be withdrawn by the central bank at short notice, and an unspecified proportion after 45 days' notice; (d) the Banking (Transitional Provisions) Bill, designed to deal with any difficulties that might arise during the change-over. The ten other bills introduced at the same time were simply machinery measures arising out of the changes in the existing structure.

The debate was stormy from the outset. The Treasurer described this complex set of measures as a "landmark" in Australian banking; Dr. Evatt, in his attack on the bills, launched on 7 November, denounced them as a "sinister sellout". The debate revealed both Government and Opposition speakers taking curious postures. The Ministers who supported the bill found themselves arguing that the Commonwealth Bank could actually expand its trading activities; Opposition speakers were constrained to admit that certain aspects of the scheme would strengthen the Commonwealth Bank, and found it convenient to sidetrack the whole issue by attacking the private banks.

Misgivings on the Government side soon became apparent. The broad charter given to the Commonwealth Development Bank, and the increase in powers given to the central bank



by the removal of certain limitations in the special accounts system, were the particular targets for criticism. On 6 November a Liberal Party meeting saw an attack, led by Mr. Leslie Bury and Mr. W. C. Wentworth, on these two aspects of the scheme. On 14 November a Victorian Liberal backbencher, Mr. Stokes, also suggested amendments to curtail the powers of the development bank during his speech in the House.

The debate dragged on, until on 26 November the Government applied the guillotine. It was promptly accused of "Hitlerism". On the following day the bills went to the Senate, and the most melodramatic part of the entire story took place.

The three breakaway Labor Senators—Senator McManus and Senator Cole (Anti-Communist Labor) and Senator Byrne (Queensland Labor)—had announced that they would oppose the legislation, together with the 27 Labor Senators; this meant that the Senate would be dead-locked, and under these conditions its vote, according to the Standing Orders, constitutes a negative. For some months there had been doubts about the health of several Labor Senators who, however, were present in time for the debate, with one exception. The exception was Senator J. J. Arnold (N.S.W.) who was in a Newcastle hospital following a serious operation. The Government had refused to grant Senator Arnold a pair. So the day before the crucial vote, he was flown to Canberra in a wheel chair and admitted to the Canberra Community Hospital. On 27 November he was transferred to Parliament House, again in a wheel chair, in time for the vote. The Labor Party had decided not to permit any debate on the legislation; when the Government introduced the Reserve Bank Bill and the Commonwealth Banks Bill, both were defeated on a motion for the first reading. As soon as the vote was over Senator Arnold returned to hospital.

The tactics of the Government in refusing to grant a pair (which would have led to precisely the same result) led to considerable criticism both in the press and within the Government parties. This criticism became more emphatic when the Deputy Government Leader in the Senate, Senator Spooner, refused to agree to defer the reintroduction of the bills in view of Senator Arnold's illness. However, after a Cabinet meeting on 3 December, which coincided with the defeat of the remaining twelve bills in the Senate, the Government decided to defer the reintroduction of the bills until the first session of Parliament in 1958.

### ***Defence***

Following the return of the Minister for Defence, Sir Phillip McBride, from his American mission, it was announced on 25 July that the Government had decided not to order the Lockheed F104 supersonic fighter, and would order more Avon Sabre subsonic fighters from the Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation. The decision not to order the F104, whose virtues had been widely touted, was justified because its functions were too specialised and it required too elaborate a ground organisation for Australian conditions.

Criticism on this point, however, was mild compared to the storm that broke over the St. Mary's ammunition filling factory. Although there had been rumbles presaging the coming storm throughout the year, the first real thunder-clap broke when on 25 September Major-General S. F. Legge, formerly Master General of Ordnance, stated publicly in Melbourne that the St. Mary's project had been undertaken against the advice of the service chiefs and the heads of the Service departments. Mr. Menzies felt impelled to reply to this statement, and on 1 October he made a speech in the House denying Major-General Legge's statement. He admitted, nevertheless, that there had been a two-year delay in acting on the proposal to do something about an ammunition filling factory, and that this had been mainly the result of hesitation whether to evict the private firms who had been granted permissive occupancy of the wartime filling factory by the Chifley Government. The Opposition at this stage was not ready for an attack, but indicated that it would soon launch one. When it came, on 15 October, it was surprisingly weak and ineffective. The Government had clearly been prepared for something much worse, which suggested that there was a great deal that could have been said to embarrass it. Mr. Menzies went to the extraordinary length of quoting two confidential Cabinet documents to demonstrate beyond all doubt that the Chiefs of Staff had approved of

the scheme. He also made a stinging attack on the *Sydney Morning Herald*, which had carried on a long campaign of criticism of the Government's defence policy. The *Herald* was not slow to reply, and early in November it produced a withering series of articles demonstrating how signally the Government had failed to carry out the "crash" three-year programme for placing Australia on a "semi-war footing" which had been announced by Mr. Menzies early in 1951. On 12 November Senator McKenna, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate, quoted these articles, and on the following day gave notice that he would move for a Select Committee of the Senate to investigate the whole question of defence. The Government was able to circumvent this move by announcing on 15 November that a special committee, under the chairmanship of Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Morshead, had been set up to investigate defence organisation and recommend changes.

The sub-committee was set up to advise the Cabinet committee, headed by Mr. Menzies, whose establishment was announced on 20 September, its function being to conduct a comprehensive review of Commonwealth departmental functions. It was generally expected that out of this would emerge recommendations for the amalgamation of the departments of Supply and Defence Production, and steps towards unification of the administration, if not the actual organisation, of the three armed services. In the meantime, the Minister for Supply and Defence Production, Mr. Beale, had admitted (on 23 October) that there was some substance in the criticisms made of the St. Mary's project. His report was based on the adverse comments made by officials of the Treasury and the Audit Office who had been investigating the over-spending of £5,000,000 above the estimated cost of the project.

### Challenge to Dr. Evatt

After a long silence, critics of Dr. Evatt's leadership of the Parliamentary Labor Party burst into full throat in August. Two former Ministers—Mr. Chambers, M.P. for Adelaide, and Mr. Johnson, M.P. for Kalgoorlie, made sharp attacks on their Leader. The Federal Executive of the A.L.P., at a meeting in Canberra on 26 August, carried a unanimous vote of confidence in Dr. Evatt; it left Messrs. Chambers and Johnson to be dealt with by their State executives, but with a strong recommendation for severity. In the subsequent month, Mr. Chambers was expelled from the A.L.P. by his State executive (after he had indicated that he would not oppose the official Labor Party publicly); Mr. Johnson was deprived of his endorsement, which did not appear to worry him unduly as he already intended not to stand again.

### Short Notes

(1) On 23 August, the High Court unanimously upheld the uniform tax legislation, except for a four to three verdict against Section 221 (1), paragraph (a), of the Income Tax and Social Services Contribution Assessment Act 1936-56, which gives the Commonwealth priority in tax collection. As any State which levied income tax would thereby forfeit its right to Commonwealth reimbursements, no practical effect is to be expected.

(2) The Budget, introduced on 3 September, cut company tax by sixpence in the £1; increased allowances for dependants; increased the tax on aviation kerosene and diesel fuel; and provided for an estimated surplus of £38,000,000.

(3) The first conference of the Democratic Labor Party opened in Sydney on 25 August. Mr. Joshua, former M.P. for Ballarat, was elected Federal President. It adopted a platform of six planks distinguished only by their vagueness.

S.E.

## NEW SOUTH WALES

### The Parliamentary Session

Main business of the session was the Budget, presented by the Premier and Colonial Treasurer, Mr. Cahill, on 11 September.<sup>1</sup> Though providing for a small surplus, he foreshadowed

<sup>1</sup>References to the factual information on which this material is based may be found in *N.S.W. Parl. Debs.*, 5 Sept.-20 Nov. 1957, and *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 Aug.-20 Dec. 1957.



a record expenditure of £135.2 million, the principal increases being in the State's main social services—education and health. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Morton, claimed artful concealment of a much larger surplus and repeated earlier charges that N.S.W. was falling behind the other States.

Mr. Morton also criticised the Government's attitude to gambling, which he said tied State revenues "to the betting-ring, the 'one-armed bandit', and the lottery marble". Protestant churchmen supported his attitude when the Government introduced the Totalizator (Amendment) Bill to allow "jackpot" totes, and one went so far as to blame gambling for the current trade recession. However the Country Party, with one exception, supported the bill, and even Mr. Morton's own party was divided.

Comment on the Loan Estimates also followed the familiar pattern. While Mr. Cahill deplored the shortage of loan money and implored the Commonwealth for relief, Mr. Morton accused him of inefficiency and argued for the use of private capital under franchise.

No bills of major importance achieved the status of law, and of those which were debated only the Totalizator (Amendment) Bill and the Fluoridation of Public Water Supplies Bill aroused any great interest. Even so debates in the House were uniformly dull. A bill introduced late in the session, the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Bill, which proposes to allow variation of alimony payments according to the cost of living, may bring better debates in the next session.

### ***The Speaker***

In September the Speaker, Mr. Lamb, having clashed with Opposition members on his conduct of the House, publicly defended his position in a radio news session. He called their attacks mere political propaganda and alleged intimidation by members "with threatening gestures and bellowing voices, howling and roaring". Though some reports forecast disciplinary action by the Australian Labor Party the Premier defended Mr. Lamb against further Opposition criticism. When the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Morton, moved that Mr. Lamb, being unfit for his high office, should be "forthwith removed" from it, Mr. Cahill admitted his tendency to "lecture" members unduly, but defended his right to broadcast his views. This motion, like its predecessor, was defeated on party lines.

### ***The Administration***

July brought three major industrial disputes—in coal-mining, transport and education. At the Abedare West and Bellbird collieries miners undertook "stay-in" strikes to force Government placement of dismissed men. Two coalfields Labor M's.L.A., Mr. Booth (Kurri Kurri) and Mr. Crook (Cessnock), found themselves on platforms from which the Premier and the Government were denounced as lacking in Labor principles. On 4 July Brookvale bus depot mechanics struck for increased pay and gradually paralysed transport from the Manly-Warringah area of Sydney. The strike was settled by negotiation on 25 July. N.S.W. school teachers also contemplated direct action in July when their nine months old log of claims was rejected by the Public Service Board. When the Board made an "insulting" offer of small salary increases the N.S.W. Teachers' Federation held a protest meeting at the Town Hall which attracted more than 5,000 of Sydney's 8,000 teachers, and organised a delegation to Parliament House. The Premier, Mr. Cahill, said that the Government had no power to direct the P.S.B.

The appointment of Lieutenant-General E. W. Woodward, G.O.C. Eastern Command, as Governor of N.S.W. ended newspaper speculation over the position.<sup>2</sup> It continues the Labor Government's policy of native-born appointments.

On 2 August the Electoral Districts Commission presented its recommendations, which alter 57 of the State's 94 electorates. Most alterations are in the city, where four electorates will be reduced to two, Paddington-Waverley and Ashfield-Croydon. Two new electorates, Cronulla and Merrylands, will be created from parts of the old Sutherland, Fairfield and Blacktown electorates. The proposed changes appear to favour the A.L.P.

<sup>2</sup>See *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. III, No. 1, Nov. 1957, p. 100.



In mid-September a Manly shoe store proprietor sparked off a Poujadist revolt when he announced that he would open on Friday nights. After a crowd of over 2,000 travelled to Manly to visit his and other shops the movement spread to the city and as far afield as Parramatta and Caringbah. Despite visits from departmental inspectors and trade union officials shops reported a high level of business and the newspapers began to campaign for a return to night shopping. It was November before trade association indifference and conviction of the original offender killed the movement.

Working hours also roused a party revolt against the Minister for Labour and Industry, Mr. Maloney. In his efforts to control bakers who ignored the statutory starting hours, he proposed a series of stringent amendments to the Bread Industry Act, one of which empowered inspectors to force their way into suspected premises. The amendments were rejected by a Caucus sub-committee and the Minister was eventually forced to concede a relaxation of baking hours for a trial period.

### ***The State of the Parties***

The Liberal Party, already restless under Mr. Morton's leadership, almost foundered on the November Legislative Council elections. Practising pre-selection for the first time, the party hoped for five seats but needed every vote plus the Country Party surplus to elect the fifth candidate. When two members, Mr. Deane (Hawkesbury) and Mr. Padman (Albury), nominated an Independent Mr. Morton threatened them with expulsion. Some members resisted the move and Mr. Morton decided to make the vote a test of his leadership. However the defection of the Country Party surplus to the Independent, Mr. Joel, though it destroyed the chances of the fifth candidate, allowed the Liberal Party to avoid the issue.

The Legislative Council also disturbed Labor Party unity. At a by-election in September at least four Government votes were cast against the Labor candidate, controversial Federal Secretary of the A.W.U., Mr. T. Dougherty. In his maiden speech, Mr. Dougherty made a bitter attack on the Council and demanded its abolition in accordance with A.L.P. policy. Members, he said, were like children playing at Parliament and did nothing but "beat the air with their tongues". Though Government action is unlikely, Mr. Dougherty's campaign may lead to a strong move for a referendum at the party's State Conference in June.

The Country Party-Liberal alliance again showed signs of strain. When the Leader of the Country Party, Mr. Bruxner, moved that the Loan Estimates be reduced, he chose the electrification of the Sydney-Gosford rail line as an issue. The Liberal Party was forced to declare a free vote and two members whose electorates will benefit, Mr. Storey (Hornsby) and Mr. Jackson (Gosford), voted with the Government. Defection of five surplus Country Party voters in the Legislative Council elections and the party's running a candidate at Wagga also acerbated relations.

The Democratic Labor Party Secretary, Mr. Kane, announced a campaign to raise £10,000 annually by recruiting 1,000 subscribers of £10 each. Mr. Kane said that it was hoped to achieve a regular income without "dictation" by outside bodies. However the party received a major setback at Wagga, when its candidate came fourth in a field of seven and the executive split over the distribution of preferences. Its experience gives point to the comment by the State President of the Liberal Party, Mr. Cotton, that many D.L.P. members could find "a ready and happy home" with the Liberals.

### ***The Wagga By-Election***

An important by-election was precipitated by the death of the Minister for Agriculture, Mr. E. H. Graham, in November. Since Mr. Graham had held Wagga for the A.L.P. largely on his personal following, the four major parties all had hopes of winning the seat. The A.L.P., whose majority depends on four marginal seats, and the D.L.P., more strongly organised in Wagga than elsewhere, perhaps needed it most, but the Liberal and Country Parties were also vitally concerned. In the previous session they had been divided on several issues and their old quarrel over the "invasion" of country seats threatened to break into open conflict. Though they exchanged preferences candidates stressed the city ties of all parties but their own.

Both the A.L.P. and D.L.P. suffered from internal dissension. After complaining of "Grouper" domination and the selection of the late Minister's nephew as candidate, the President of the local A.L.P. branch, Ald. A. L. Cook, resigned from the party and stood as an Independent. The Secretary of the D.L.P., Mr. Kane, and its President, Mr. Manning, quarrelled over the party ticket on which the A.L.P. was again placed last. Later Mr. Manning and some other members of the executive resigned their positions.

With seven candidates in the field preferences were obviously crucial, and rumours of "deals" were frequent. The manager of the three Independents' shoe-string campaign, Mr. Miller, alleged that he had been offered bribes of from £250 to £400 for their preferences, and promised to reveal those responsible after the poll. When the whole three polled less than 400 votes neither Mr. Miller nor the candidates was available for comment.

Though the A.L.P. candidate, Mr. Graham, was easily defeated by his Liberal opponent, Mr. Fife, on D.L.P. and Country Party preferences, neither of the latter won enough primaries to be seriously considered. If the results force the Opposition to emulate the Federal concordat, and the D.L.P. continues to run interference, a divided Labor Party may well lose its present slender majority.

### **Local Government**

Loan expenditure was brought to a halt in October by the Minister for Local Government, Mr. Renshaw. In a public statement Mr. Renshaw said that council applications already received by his department exceeded the total N.S.W. allocation by £1.7 million. Councils had easily found lenders and he intended to appeal to the Loan Council for an increased allocation.

When Woollahra Council decided to resume Babworth House, the 64-roomed, five-acre residence of the late Sir Samuel Hordern in fashionable Darling Point, it began a lengthy dispute which ended only with a ministerial fiat. The Council wanted to sub-divide the site for flats in accordance with its town-planning scheme, but was opposed by Major H. Rubin, a wealthy Queensland grazier, who had offered it to St. Vincent's Hospital as part of a £300,000 endowment. For two months the parties engaged in a verbal war in which the Council appealed to its electorate and the Major, by newspaper cartoons and interviews, appealed to public opinion. Finally the Minister refused the Council permission to borrow for the project and it was forced to withdraw from the contest.

P.B.W.

## **VICTORIA**

The second half of 1957 saw the last days of the Bolte Government's political honeymoon.<sup>1</sup> All was calm and joyful in public. The Government presented 68 new bills to Parliament, which dutifully accepted 67 of them, together with another 48 introduced in the previous session. The Budget produced only the politest and most placid squabble. And the daily press continued to report the daily round with simple admiration.

But there was also a hint of things to come. The High Court raised doubts about the State's right to determine its own housekeeping allowance.<sup>2</sup> And the Country Party (so faithful in election courting days) refused to pay the Bread Bill. By the end of the year the Government was content to draw a tight lip and wait for the electoral showdown in May 1958.

### **Labor Leadership**

The penultimate session of the fortieth Parliament was a brief but dreary affair. Between 4 September and 5 December the Legislative Assembly sat for thirty days in all, but the Council could only manage seventeen. The press was provoked to read a little sermon on the virtue of hard work. And despite the Government's impressive tally of bills, few issues brightened the proceedings.

<sup>1</sup>References to the factual information on which this material is based may be found in the Melbourne *Herald* and the *Age*, 4 July-7 Dec. 1957, and *Vic. Parl. Debs.*, 1956-7.

<sup>2</sup>For the debate on the High Court Uniform Tax Case (No. 2) judgment see *Vic. P.D.*, 1956-7, pp. 2189-2241, 2332-64.

Some of the fire seemed to go out of the Australian Labor Party Opposition with the death of its leader John Cain. (Cain first entered Parliament in 1917, first became a Minister in 1924, first became Premier in 1943, and led later Labor Governments from 1945 till 1947, and from 1952 to 1955.) Cain remained the dextrous strategist till his death, and continued to dominate the proceedings of Parliament even as Opposition Leader, despite the growing sameness of party policies in State politics. He was succeeded as Leader by the member for Ascot Vale (Mr. A. E. Shepherd). Mr. C. P. Stoneham (Midlands) defeated Mr. V. J. Doube (Oakleigh) and Mr. D. Lovegrove (Carlton) to become Deputy Leader of the party.<sup>3</sup>

### **The Budget**

The Budget put a damper on the session right at the very beginning. The Premier and Treasurer (Mr. H. E. Bolte) reported a £4,315,000 deficit for 1956-7, and predicted a further £3,550,000 deficit for 1957-8, resulting from an increased expenditure of £7,444,000 spread thinly and evenly over all the State's financial responsibilities. The continued deficit (which will total £14 million or so at the end of the Government's three-year term) was due, Mr. Bolte said, largely to the Commonwealth's continued financial persecution of Victoria, under the "uniform" tax reimbursement formula. (Revenue was estimated to increase by £8,209,000, of which the increase in the Commonwealth's contribution through tax reimbursements amounted to £4,240,000.)

The Opposition, fortified by a minor Budget surplus during its last year in power, simultaneously deplored the Government's irresponsibility, condemned its failure to support the community's development and completely failed to suggest any useful ways of raising further revenue or extracting more from the Commonwealth. By the end of the debate no one seemed to be able to distinguish between financial vices and virtues.

Grievance Day (only the fourth which the House had enjoyed in eighteen years) produced a similar demonstration of effortless mediocrity. Only fourteen members spoke. Subjects covered included water supply, pasture improvement and housing, with a dissertation on bureaucratic verbosity and a demand for secretaries for M's.P. providing the light entertainment.

Further evidence of the low level of political temperatures in the State was provided by an abortive attempt to introduce late shopping in the city and suburbs during August. It ended in a scoreless draw.

### **Social Reforms**

The greater part of the Government's legislative programme was concerned with routine financial and administrative matters and local government affairs. But it did include some useful minor social reforms.

The Crimes (Amendment) Act was aimed at strengthening the Government's power to deal with drunken driving. It allowed doctors and analysts to submit certificates as evidence of blood tests and medical examinations in drunken driving cases. (Previously public hospitals and doctors in private practice had complained that they did not have the time to appear in court to give evidence after making an examination or taking a blood sample.) A full-time medical officer was later appointed to assist the police.

The Act also provided that no mention of the fact could be made in court when a person charged with drunken driving refused to submit to a blood alcohol test. (This clause was written into the Act as a result of pressure from a Government backbencher in the Upper House, Mr. C. H. Bridgford, who threatened to seek Labor support to force the Government's hand if necessary.) The clause has since been acclaimed by those who maintain that police-administered blood alcohol tests are an infringement of the individual's rights, and condemned by those who argue that the system is necessary to reduce road accidents, and that it has to be quietly coercive if it is to work effectively.

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<sup>3</sup>The only other development in party organisation came with the foundation of the Australian Republican Party, pledged to establish Australia's leadership in Asia and to convert Australia to a Republic, "with or without the Queen" (*Herald*, 10 July 1957).



The Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act prohibited the publication in court reporting of the names of the victims of alleged sex attacks in an attempt to protect them from the sadistic curiosity of society. It was supported by most social workers, but was attacked before the Statute Law Revision Committee by both the Newspaper Proprietors and the Australian Journalists Association. They claimed that the legislation was sinister because it sought to enforce by law something which the press had always done voluntarily.

The Marriage (Amendment) Act removed the existing restriction on divorce for desertion in cases involving insanity.

The Police Offences (Prostitution) Act introduced tighter definitions of, and harsher penalties for, soliciting and for living on the earnings of a prostitute. It was passed with the support of all parties, though no one seemed to believe it would do very much to reduce the incidence of prostitution.

Some of the Government's other social reforms (or innovations) did not enjoy the same calm progress. The Police Offences (Cruelty to Animals) Bill was a simple measure aimed at improving existing legislation which prohibited the abandonment of domestic pets. The Labor Leader in the Legislative Council (Mr. J. W. Galbally) tried to extend it to prohibit the trap shooting of live birds. Strong pressure from the Country Party forced a rather embarrassed Government to decline the amendment.

The Country Party provided a further demonstration of its eclecticism when it allowed three of its Council members the right to vote according to conscience, and thereby defeated the Government's Racing (Totalisators) Bill, which was designed to introduce the sophistication of a "jackpot" into Victorian gambling.

### ***Development and Conservation***

Another group of useful bills dealt with some current development and conservation projects.

The Tourist Act set up a State Tourist Authority to sponsor and develop the State's tourist attractions. The Dental Hospital Act authorised the University of Melbourne to issue government-guaranteed debentures to finance the construction of the new dental hospital which had been on the drawing board since before the last war. The King Street Bridge Act provided for the construction of a £3,600,000 cross-over at the south-west corner of Melbourne, which is hemmed in at present by both railway and river.

Several reforms, such as the Foot and Mouth Disease Eradication Fund Act and the Vermin and Noxious Weeds Act, contributed significantly to the improvement of agricultural productivity. However, the River Improvement and Land Drainage Bill finally lapsed after strong Country Party opposition to the manner in which the project was to be financed at the expense of the local landowner.<sup>4</sup>

### ***Unreformed Bread***

The Government's most important legislative act, the Bread Industry Bill, failed in the face of combined opposition from the Labor Party and the Country Party. The bill was an attempt to control the bread industry in the interests of consumers, by placing it under the authority of a board with strong consumer and government representation. The bill had passed the Assembly during the previous session. The Premier (Mr. H. E. Bolte) had flaunted it as the last of the Government's unfulfilled election promises. But it was defeated in the Upper House on three crucial clauses—one to include four consumer representatives on the proposed Bread Industry Committee, another making provision for compulsory deliveries to customers living within two miles of a bakehouse, and a third removing all existing restrictions on working hours. After the Country Party and the Opposition had amended it in the Council so as to give control over the industry to the industry itself, the Government announced that it would let the legislation lapse, and make a vital election issue of it in 1958. One State political correspondent attributed the defeat of the measure to the combined lobbying activities of the

<sup>4</sup>See *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. III, No. 1, Nov. 1957, p. 102.

master bakers and the baking unions.<sup>5</sup> In any case, it was a clear and final illustration of the political dominance of the minority Country Party. It also provided political theorists with a good example of countervailing power not exercised.

C.B.

## QUEENSLAND

### *The Election Campaign*

The first of the policy speeches was delivered on 1 July by Mr. G. F. R. Nicklin (Country Party) at Maroochydore, a seaside resort in his own electorate of Landsborough, where he gave the first part of the Liberal-Country Party policy. This was completed on the following night by Mr. K. J. Morris (Liberal) in Brisbane. Both declared that their parties were the only ones which could secure unity and effective government, and they promised acceleration of development and a guarantee of civil rights. Mr. J. E. Duggan (Australian Labor Party) in Brisbane on 4 July adopted the slogan "a fair go for all", and made extensive promises of legislative action. He declared that three weeks leave would be implemented as a necessary reform. Immediately he was attacked by Mr. Gair, who charged him with failing to promise immediate legislation, which the party had endeavoured to force upon him. The following day Mr. Duggan promised that if returned he would introduce the measure in the first session of Parliament. Mr. V. C. Gair (Queensland Labor Party) spent half his speech in Brisbane on 8 July in tracing the dispute which led to his defeat, promised an all out attack upon Communism, and assured his hearers of a continuance of the past developmental programme. All meetings were largely and enthusiastically attended. Both the Liberal-Country Party and Q.L.P. promised court supervision of union ballots.

Nominations closed on 12 July with a record total of 219 candidates, an increase of 55 over the previous record set in 1953. They comprised: Liberal-Country Party 73, A.L.P. 64, Q.L.P. 62, Independents 20. Four seats were uncontested, *viz.* Toowong (Liberal), Aubigny, Callide and Landsborough (all Country Party). Campaigning was very keen in all contested seats, especially where A.L.P. and Q.L.P. candidates were opposed, with the A.L.P. constantly charging its opponent with sectarianism and alleging direct interference by ministers of religion. Each of the Labor parties made extreme efforts to unseat its rival's leaders, Messrs. Gair and Walsh (Q.L.P.) in South Brisbane and Bundaberg, and Messrs. Duggan and Dittmer (A.L.P.) in Toowoomba and Mount Gravatt. After nominations had closed the Minister for Mines (Mr. G. Devries), Q.L.P. candidate for Gregory, died, and the poll was postponed to a date to be set by the incoming government.

A large contingent of speakers from other States and Canberra took part in the A.L.P. campaign, including Mr. A. Calwell, Mr. E. J. Ward, Mr. John Cain, Mr. Clyde Cameron, and Senators McKenna and Kennelly, enabling the A.L.P. to demonstrate its Australia-wide character. Some claims were made by its opponents that some of the lesser lights came to Queensland under pressure, *e.g.* the Sydney *Bulletin* asserted they were driven north by the threat "last across the border is a Grouper". When it was announced that Dr. Evatt was cutting short his overseas trip to take part in the Queensland election Mr. R. J. J. Bukowski (President of the Queensland Central Executive of the A.L.P.) declared that the Q.C.E. had not invited Dr. Evatt. An invitation was extended by Trades Hall leaders and Dr. Evatt addressed three meetings in Brisbane. Mr. Bukowski was unable to attend through illness. The campaign committee then sent Dr. Evatt to Bundaberg to join in the campaign against Mr. Walsh. After a few quiet meetings he collapsed with Asian flu. Among his first visitors was Mr. Walsh.

<sup>5</sup>See *Herald*, 2 Oct. 1957.

**The Election**

Polling figures for the 71 contested seats (including Gregory) were a record, 94.58 per cent of the voters enrolled in the contested districts. Votes were shared as follows:

	Valid Votes	L.P.	C.P.	Q.L.P.	A.L.P.	Others
Metropolitan ..	286,615	124,631	—	65,557	93,498	2,929
South-Eastern ..	253,695	29,703	96,961	55,225	60,815	10,991
Northern ..	108,219	9,807	24,934	27,483	32,065	13,930
Western ..	50,347	1,294	17,825	15,269	15,593	366
Totals ..	698,876	165,435	139,720	163,534	201,971	28,216
Per cent. ..		23.67	19.99	23.4	28.9	4.04

Thus the combined Liberal and Country Party totals were 43.66 per cent. of the valid votes polled, as against the combined Labor total of 52.3 per cent. Adjustment for uncontested seats brings the respective totals to 45 per cent. and 50.7 per cent. respectively, compared with the 1956 election figures of 46.26 and 50.54 respectively. Electorates where only one Labor candidate appeared usually showed gains by the Liberal or Country Party candidate, but where both Labor parties appeared, the Liberal or Country Party vote decreased, except in a very few instances. The A.L.P. lost both its Leader and Deputy Leader, but the Q.L.P. retained both. In Flinders Mr. F. M. Forde lost by one vote, but subsequently lodged a petition with the Elections Tribunal, alleging wrongful disallowance of some votes. The hearing was set down for 17 February 1958 before Mr. Justice Philp. In three electorates, Rockhampton, Keppel and Hinchinbrook, Independents prevented possible Liberal-Country Party gains.

The Q.L.P. lost fourteen seats, but its members returned included seven of the ten Cabinet members facing election. Those defeated were Messrs. H. Collins (Agriculture and Stock), W. Moore (Health and Home Affairs) and T. Moores (Transport). The A.L.P. lost six, but gained two from the Q.L.P. The Country Party gained eight seats and the Liberals ten, leaving the new party totals: Country Party 24, Liberal Party 18, A.L.P. 20, Q.L.P. 11, Independents 2. The two Independents re-elected were Messrs. T. Aikens (Mundingburra) who stands as a North Queensland Labor Party candidate, and A. Coburn (Burdekin). Of the twenty Independents, ten lost their deposits, with one, who promised to secure lumpless cheese, securing the record low total of nine votes.

**The Gregory Election**

This took place on 5 October. Fresh nominations were called and for a time it appeared that Mr. A. Watson (Australian Workers' Union Western District Secretary) would continue to be the A.L.P. candidate. The Q.C.E. was anxious for Mr. Duggan to stand so Mr. Watson withdrew in his favour. The Country Party and the Q.L.P. both nominated candidates, and the election was made a real trial of strength with leaders of all parties taking a very active part. Some comment was caused by the failure of Mr. Bukowski (State Secretary of the A.W.U. and President of the Q.C.E.) to appear in the campaign, the Q.L.P. alleging that he was so unpopular over the shearing dispute of 1955-6 that he was afraid to appear. Although in 1956 the Country Party candidate had polled only 1,516 votes against 2,847 for Mr. Devries, the new poll resulted:

W. Rae (C.P.) .. ..	2,075
J. E. Duggan (A.L.P.) .. ..	1,328
K. Smith (Q.L.P.) .. ..	955

**The New Government**

A Liberal-Country Party Government thus took office for the first time since 1932 and the second since 1915. Of the new Cabinet six members came from the Country Party and five from the Liberals. In each case the selection was made by exhaustive ballot among the parliamentary representatives of each party, acting separately. Portfolios were allocated as follows:

Premier and Chief Secretary .. ..	G. F. R. Nicklin (C.P.)
Deputy Premier and Labour and Industry .. ..	K. J. Morris (L.P.)



Education .. .. .	J. C. A. Pizzey (C.P.)
Attorney-General .. .. .	A. W. Munro (L.P.)
Treasurer and Housing .. .. .	T. A. Hiley (L.P.)
Development, Mines and Main Roads .. .. .	E. Evans (C.P.)
Public Lands and Irrigation .. .. .	A. G. Muller (C.P.)
Health and Home Affairs .. .. .	Dr. H. W. Noble (L.P.)
Agriculture and Stock .. .. .	O. O. Madsen (C.P.)
Public Works and Local Government .. .. .	J. A. Heading (C.P.)
Transport .. .. .	G. W. W. Chalk (L.P.)

Labour and Industry was promoted from fourth to second place and Education (formerly Public Instruction) from tenth to third place. Housing was transferred from Public Works to the Treasury, Local Government was given Cabinet rank, and a new portfolio of Development was created. Main Roads was taken from Transport. The old name of Secretary was abandoned in favour of the general term Minister. Two changes of special note were made. First, all Cabinet Ministers were required to surrender all directorships and positions with co-operative societies and public bodies. Secondly, on 7 October the Premier announced the appointment of a Cabinet secretariat under Mr. A. Fletcher, to keep Cabinet records.

During the session it was decided in future to refer to the Country-Liberal Government.

### **Other Parties in the House**

The A.L.P. became the official Opposition. It elected Mr. L. A. Wood as its Leader and Mr. E. G. Lloyd as his Deputy. Others chosen to occupy the front bench were Messrs. J. H. Mann (the former Speaker), J. J. Dufficy, J. Donald, F. D. Graham, J. Clark, and P. J. Hanlon (at 27 the youngest member in the House and the son of the former Premier, the late Mr. E. M. Hanlon). Mr. C. G. Jesson became Party Whip and Mr. J. Donald Parliamentary Secretary.

The Q.L.P. had a strong front bench, with eight ex-Cabinet Ministers, *viz.* Messrs. V. C. Gair, E. J. Walsh, L. F. Diplock, P. J. Hilton, A. Jones, C. G. McCathie, W. Power and T. A. Foley, the last mentioned having resigned from Cabinet after the Royal Commission into Land Leases in 1956<sup>1</sup>. Mr. L. F. Diplock became Parliamentary Secretary and Mr. H. R. Gardner Party Whip. The Q.L.P. sat on the Opposition cross benches.

### **The Parliamentary Session**

Expectations of a bitter session proved unfounded. The new Speaker (Mr. A. R. Fletcher, Country Party) announced he would insist upon proper decorum and observation of all forms and procedures, and on two occasions warned the House he would take action if these were not observed. He was strongly supported by the new Chairman of Committees (Mr. H. B. Taylor, Liberal). The A.L.P. front bench took an early policy decision not to use parliamentary time to engage in mud-slinging with the Q.L.P., which party remained very quiet particularly during the early part of the session. The debate on the Address-in-Reply showed a somewhat different attitude from those of recent years, including some examples on both sides of departure from strict party lines. Although few major bills were brought down, the House was kept busy with 28 bills and two appropriation bills through all stages, while four other bills were initiated to be dealt with in the remainder of the session beginning in March.

Among the more important bills were the following:

#### **(a) University of Queensland Acts Amendment Act (No. 2)**

which abolished the contentious Appeals Board provided in the amending Act passed by the Gair Government.<sup>2</sup> This was strongly opposed by the Q.L.P. and much cross-firing took place between A.L.P. and Q.L.P. speakers, the A.L.P. members disclaiming responsibility.

<sup>1</sup>*Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. III, No. 1, Nov. 1957, p. 105.

<sup>2</sup>*ibid.*

**(b) *The Profiteering Prevention Acts Amendment Bill***

The parent Act provided for a Queensland Prices Board with advisory and consultative functions. The Board comprised the Prices Commissioner as Chairman, a member of the Industrial Court, and the Director or an officer of the Bureau of Industry (or an officer of the Department of Labour and Industry) but it had not functioned since November 1950. The Amending Bill altered the membership to the Under Secretary of the Department of Labour and Industry (as Chairman), the Prices Commissioner and an officer of the Department of Agriculture and Stock. The Board's new functions were reports and recommendations to the Minister whether any goods should be controlled, decontrolled or recontrolled, reports or recommendations on matters referred to it by the Minister, and advice and consultation on any matter referred to it.

The Q.L.P. strongly opposed the measure as the beginning of an attack upon the whole system of price control, but the A.L.P. gave it qualified support, though a little suspicious of the ultimate intent.

**(c) *Land Acts Amendment Bill***

The Government announced it was contemplating a complete revision and consolidation of the Land Acts in Queensland. To survey the whole of the land laws the Government parties appointed a committee of eight Country Party members (Messrs. Sparkes, Beardmore, Ewan, Harrison, Hewitt, V. Jones, Watson and Loneragan) and one Liberal (Mr. Connolly). The committee included graziers, farmers, a stock and station agent, and a lawyer. Submissions would also be received from other sources.

The first instalment in the Government's programme was this bill which provided for the conversion of certain types of leasehold property to freehold, at the option of the landholder. Lands included were perpetual lease selections, perpetual lease prickly pear selections, and perpetual lease prickly pear development selections not exceeding 2,560 acres each. About 9,500 properties and six and three-quarter million acres were involved. The same option applied to perpetual town, country and suburban leases, about 14,500 holdings aggregating 39,000 acres being involved.

Both the A.L.P. and the Q.L.P. strongly opposed this bill, which ran counter to the cherished Labor principle of perpetual lease.

**(d) *Landlord and Tenant Acts Amendment Bill***

Properties leased for the first time after 1 December 1957 were exempted from the Act (*i.e.* were not subject among other things to rent control) and so were houses which had not been leased at any time during the three years prior to the same date. Rent on older houses, previously leased on February 1942 values, could now be leased upon 1 July 1948 values, the change to come into effect on 1 March 1958. Rentals in these instances can be raised by twenty per cent. without recourse to the Fair Rents Court, but Court approval has to be obtained to secure the full rental based on 1 July 1948 values.

Again the A.L.P. and the Q.L.P. combined to oppose the measure, the debate producing more heat than that on any other measure during the session.

**(e) *Commonwealth Aluminium Corporation Pty. Ltd. Agreement Bill***

This authorised the Premier to make an agreement with COMALCO for the development of the big bauxite deposits at Weipa in the Cape York Peninsula. State interests were thoroughly protected by the agreement. Concern was expressed outside the House on possible dangers to the aborigines, but the Presbyterian Church, which conducts a mission to aborigines at Weipa, expressed itself as satisfied with the precautions. Negotiations on labour conditions for workers on the field brought a breach between the A.W.U. and the Trades Hall unions, to be noticed later in this Chronicle.

### **Administrative Activities**

Public interest was aroused in two special fields:

#### **(a) The Licensing Commission and the Films Commission**

These bodies had attracted much adverse comment because of secret hearings and because of the lack of appeal from their decisions. The Attorney-General (Mr. A. W. Munro) announced on 9 September that the proceedings of the Licensing Commission would be open to the public for applications for and objections to the granting of new licences, show-cause hearings for cancellation, forfeiture or surrender of licences, opening of tenders for new hotels, and matters concerning improvement of service. In other matters the Commission at its discretion could go into camera. Some short open hearings did take place but on each occasion the Commission speedily went into camera. The Attorney-General defended its action, on the ground that matters under consideration related to the personal fitness of applicants for transfers of licences, and that in those matters the Commission was not bound by strict rules of evidence. Strong exception was taken to this second defence by some lawyers.

Considerable changes were made in the personnel of the two Commissions. A retired grazier was appointed to the Films Commission in place of Mr. M. G. Lyons, whose appointment had been ended when he stood as a Q.L.P. candidate. The Director of Local Government (Mr. J. A. Sewell) and the Solicitor-General (Mr. W. E. Ryan) were replaced on the Films Commission by Mr. W. G. Hamilton (a retired Solicitor-General) and Mr. T. E. L. Hill, an officer of the Department of Local Government. Mr. F. P. Byrne (Under Secretary to the Department of Justice) was withdrawn from his post as Chairman of the Licensing Commission, which is to be reconstituted by legislative enactment. A bill to amend the Liquor Acts has been initiated, but no details have yet been given. The Attorney-General explained the changes by insisting that heads of departments should be free to deal impartially with matters arising out of the work of the Commissions, and that the services of the Solicitor-General should be available at all times to all government instrumentalities.

#### **(b) State Development**

Immediately after the election the Deputy Premier (Mr. K. J. Morris) visited Victoria to consult with Mr. Bolte and with manufacturers. The decision was taken to sponsor an overseas tour by a number of Queensland business men to seek to encourage overseas investment, the delegation to be joined overseas by the Deputy Premier. Brisbane business men were invited to join in a Development Association. The support of the mayors of Toowoomba, Rockhampton, Townsville, Ipswich, Cairns, Maryborough, Mackay and Bundaberg was requested, in the formation of a State Development Association, with local branches in their cities. The mayors promised full support. A Five Year Development Plan was promised by the Government, the first stage to be in full operation by November 1958. Steps were taken to establish a sub-department of Development in Townsville. Negotiations on the Mt. Isa railway continued with the Federal Government. Promise was made of an exhaustive survey of the potential of central Queensland.

### **The Governor**

The Chief Justice and Deputy Governor (Mr. Justice A. J. Mansfield, who was later created Sir Alan Mansfield) continued to act as Governor during the illness of Sir John Lavarack, whose term expired at the end of September. During the election campaign Mr. Gair announced he had submitted a panel of names to Buckingham Palace for the selection of a new Governor. According to newspaper comment all were distinguished Australians. When the new Government took office two more names were added to the panel. On 11 November it was announced that the new Governor would be an English retired soldier, Colonel Sir Henry Abel Smith, K.C.V.O., D.S.O., who had married Lady May Cambridge, daughter of the Earl of Athlone and a first cousin once removed of the Queen.

The State Parliament legislated for a pension of £1,000 per annum for Sir John Lavarack, with a pension of £500 per annum to his wife, if she should outlive him, a step that was approved by all parties. Unfortunately Sir John died suddenly on 4 December.



**The Australian Labor Party**

The election was followed at first by much recrimination, and threats of further expulsions. Interest first centred upon the Torbanlea and Bundaberg branches. Prior to the election Mr. Barry Salter of the Torbanlea branch had been nominated to the Q.C.E. as Labor candidate for Bundaberg. Although the Post Office records showed that his papers had been delivered by registered post<sup>3</sup> the Q.C.E. was unable to find them and instead named Mr. W. Elson Green, a Brisbane barrister, as its candidate for Bundaberg. When Mr. Green was badly beaten by Mr. Walsh, the Q.C.E. alleged a lack of support by the Bundaberg branch, which retorted by threatening to move a vote of censure on Mr. Bukowski.

By now cooler heads in the party were beginning to fear that further punitive action might drive yet more support away from the A.L.P., and it was decided to soft-pedal on the purges and for the time being at least to concentrate upon rebuilding. This trend was assisted by the shock given by the defeat of Mr. Duggan in the Gregory poll. Some rumours arose from time to time of moves for reunion between the A.L.P. and the Q.L.P. but these were always denied by the party heads.

**The Trade Unions**

The uneasy partnership between the A.W.U. and the Trades Hall unions was becoming much more uneasy and much less a partnership. Mr. Bukowski declared in the *Worker*<sup>4</sup> that an organised move against the A.W.U. was impending from the Q.L.P. and the groupers. Attacks came from different quarters. Soon accusations of "body-snatching" were made both by the A.W.U. and the Trades Hall unions. The Federated Liquor Trades Union considered an approach to the Court to secure from the A.W.U. membership of all hotel and brewery employees north of Bundaberg. The Federated Textile Workers' Union is interested in drawing all Queensland textile workers away from the A.W.U. Actual disputes have broken out between the A.W.U. and the Boilermakers' Society, the Meat Industry Employees' Union, Building Workers' Union and the Waterside Workers' Union. In each case the A.W.U. declared that attempts were being made to take away from its members work they had done for many years.

An important clash came over the industrial conditions for workers on the bauxite field at Weipa, expected to employ thousands. The A.W.U. was invited to confer on conditions. Trades Hall unions thought Mr. Bukowski was not entitled to come to any agreement without the consent of other unions. Mr. J. Egerton (President of the Queensland Trades and Labour Council) said "We are sick and tired of having to fall into line with sub-standard working conditions accepted by the A.W.U.", a charge indignantly repudiated by Mr. Bukowski. Relations grew steadily more strained: the A.W.U. had failed to attend the Trade Union Congress which opened on 16 October. The dispute between the A.W.U. and the Waterside Workers' Federation over the right to stack wheat on the wharves proved to be the deciding issue and on 8 January 1958 the A.W.U. announced its withdrawal from the Trades and Labour Council.

**The Queensland Labor Party**

The party proceeded to build up a complete organisation. It had 150 branches spread throughout the State, which was divided into eleven zones, two in Brisbane and nine in the country. Regional conferences took place in North Brisbane, South Brisbane, Lowood, Rockhampton, Bundaberg, Barcaldine, Townsville, Cairns, Roma, Warwick and Miles. Then came the first State Conference, held at Brisbane on 22, 23 and 24 November, to consider the party's constitution and policy. The three weeks leave issue brought the following resolution, for inclusion in the constitution:<sup>5</sup>

Members of the Queensland Labor Party elected to State and Federal Parliaments or to Local Authorities shall, when in government, take any

<sup>3</sup>For Mr. Salter's story see *Courier-Mail*, 11 Aug. 1957.

<sup>4</sup>12 Aug. 1957.

<sup>5</sup>"As I See It" by E. J. Walsh, *Brisbane Telegraph*, 12 Dec. 1957.

action, legislative or administrative, required to carry into effect any decision of an annual general conference, a special conference, or the central council of the party, when such members in government consider it practical and advisable to do so, having regard to the welfare and good government of the State.

The complete constitution has not yet been made public.

The Q.L.P. prepared the way to contest the Federal election in 1958. It decided not to amalgamate with the Democratic Labor Party, but gave to the executive power to examine the constitution and policies of other parties "holding political principles similar to those of the Q.L.P." with a view to "association or liaison with such a party on matters of a Federal nature".

Later the party also decided to contest the Lord Mayoralty and as many seats as practicable in the Brisbane City Council elections in 1958.

### **The New State Movements**

In both central and northern Queensland the movement for the establishment of new states gathered some momentum. A conference took place at Charters Towers on 14 and 15 September, where the name Burdekin was chosen for a future new northern state and the collection of signatures for a petition was begun. Another conference at Rockhampton on 28 September began a petition for a new central state; it was expected the capital would be Biloela or Emerald. On 4 December six members representing central Queensland electorates presented petitions signed by 10,000 persons.

A.A.M.

## **SOUTH AUSTRALIA**

The third session of the thirty-fifth Parliament which ran from 25 June to 31 October has seen one or two stimulating and entertaining debates, and was climaxed by a near-deadlock between the House of Assembly and the Legislative Council.

### **Cellulose Australia Limited**

The session had hardly begun when the Premier, Sir Thomas Playford, brought down a bill to enable the Treasurer to take up additional shares in Cellulose Australia Limited.<sup>1</sup> This company, founded in 1938 to exploit by-products from forests in the south-east of South Australia, had been saved from liquidation by State government guarantees and underwriting. Eventually the Playford Government found itself the largest individual shareholder and upon the issue of additional capital it became entitled to take up approximately 23,000 additional shares in a now thriving and expanding company. Hence the bill.

Sir Thomas Playford in introducing the measure into the House of Assembly claimed that "the success of this company is an example of Government association with private industry in the establishment and operation of a profitable industry", and its expansion "an essential project from the point of view of maintaining our profitable forest undertaking". Certain of the Premier's more orthodox Liberal and Country League supporters, however, were unable to distinguish between Sir Thomas' brand of "government enterprise" and the horrors of socialism, particularly when he assured honourable members that the Government had no intention of selling its shares save in exceptional circumstances. Mr. Heaslip, for example, opposed the measure because it involved government investment in what was not a government function. His attitude "might have been different if the Bill had been introduced only for the purpose of enabling the Treasurer to take up his rights and dispose of his shares in this undertaking". Likewise Mr. Brookman considered that now that the industry was established it was a "good time for the Government to get out and not go on investing in what was simply a private business transaction". All this provided good opportunity for Opposition interjections and jibes, but had no real effect on the outcome. Safe in the support of the Labor Party the

<sup>1</sup>References to the factual information on which this material is based may be found in *S.A. Parl. Debs.*, 25 June-30 Oct. 1957, and the *News*, 8 Aug.-30 Sept. 1957.

Premier carried the measure through the House without a division. Even the Legislative Council was in a benevolent mood, although Mr. C. R. Cudmore forced a division on his amendment proposing that the Government should sell all its shares once it could do so without a loss. He felt that principles were being "waved in the wind" but as has happened so often before the die-hards in the Council were outvoted by the combined Labor-ministerial vote, and more of the Premier's "Government Enterprise" legislation had reached the Statute Book.

### **Long Service Leave**

The principal activity of Parliament has been to debate and pass an Act granting long service leave to employees. Prior to the introduction of the measure by the Premier on 6 August a great deal of speculation and manoeuvring had taken place and the Governor's speech had added fuel to it by hinting that the bill might not be introduced.

The Premier's measure, which provided for one week's long service leave in the eighth and in each subsequent year of a worker's continuous service, was strenuously opposed *in toto* by the Labor Opposition, following on the ruling given by the incoming President of the S.A. branch of the Australian Labor Party, Mr. R. E. Bannister (see Political Chronicle, January-June 1957). The Leader of the Opposition (Mr. M. O'Halloran) accordingly moved as an amendment that "this Bill be withdrawn and redrafted to provide for three months' long service leave after 10 years' continuous service".

The debate that followed was carried on against the background of the Wallaroo by-election and the debate within the Labor Party itself as to the tactics it ought to pursue in its opposition to the measure. At first the L.C.L. members attempted a conspiracy of silence, hoping to catch the Labor Party unprepared, but on the second day of the debate, after unfavourable press reactions and a not particularly successful meeting addressed by the Premier at Wallaroo, L.C.L. parliamentarians entered the debate with a will. Generally they reiterated the Premier's argument that the bill was the best compromise that was possible between labour and management and that the A.L.P. was being hypocritical and dishonest in its opposition. A fighting speech by Mr. Millhouse, the L.C.L. member for Mitcham, attacking the way in which A.L.P. "solidarity" on the measure had been obtained, drew plenty of interjections, and the second reading debate developed into a vigorous affair of charge ("we know that when the Premier speaks and cracks the whip there is a scuttle behind him") and countercharge ("Mr. Bannister, the master, has spoken"). At one stage the Speaker was even forced to order an honourable member to withdraw a remark.

The difficulties associated with drafting a measure containing such phrases as "continuous service", "worker" and "continuance of benefits during leave" became clear in Committee and the Government was forced to recommit several clauses. The only amendment of significance, however, was moved by Mr. Millhouse and took account of serious illness interrupting an employee's "continuous service". Labor continued its opposition to the bitter end, including a third reading debate, followed by a division which the Government won nineteen to thirteen with the help of the Independents.

In the Legislative Council Labor opposition rallied conservative support to the Government and with one or two amendments, all accepted by the House of Assembly<sup>2</sup>, the bill was passed without difficulty.

The passage of the bill provided a contrast with the debate on Cellulose Australia Limited in that it produced a clear-cut party division, the Government drawing on solid support from its backbenchers in both the Assembly and the Council while the Labor Party strenuously fought the bill at all stages.

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<sup>2</sup>The principal amendment permitted employers to offset the cost of granting long service leave by using funds provided by employers for retiring allowances, superannuation and similar benefits for employees.



### Rent Control

A return to the more normal political pattern occurred when the Premier renewed the annual struggle for the extension for another year of the Landlord and Tenant (Control of Rents) Act. As usual, the bill had an easy passage through the House of Assembly, only the members for Mitcham and Victoria (Mr. Harding), speaking against it. Although other L.C.L. members could raise little enthusiasm for the continuance of such "wartime controls" they comforted themselves with the reflection that the measure was only for one year. The Labor opposition on the other hand welcomed the bill, regretting only its temporary nature and its provision for an increase in rents from 33 per cent. to forty per cent. above the 1939 level. With such support the second reading of the bill passed on voices, and in Committee Government-Labor co-operation was carried even further when the Government acquiesced in accepting an amendment by the Labor member for Norwood (Mr. Dunstan), the effect of which was to make the law courts judges of tenant hardship in cases where landlords wished to sell or occupy their properties.

The real battle for the Act was joined in the Legislative Council. Led by that doughty opponent of the Premier's "socialist" measures, Mr. C. R. Cudmore, the Legislative Council has been growing more recalcitrant over the years when it comes to the question of prolonging rent control. On this occasion the tactics pursued by the opponents of the bill were to permit it to pass the second reading, but to emasculate it in Committee. Mr. Cudmore, assisted by Sir Arthur Rymill, was remarkably successful. The provisions for court decisions in cases of tenant hardship, for ensuring that a landlord's refusal to accept rent did not constitute a tenant's "failure to pay", and for the continuance of rent control despite a sale of the property—all were struck out. In each case the only support for the two Ministers in the Council came from the four members of the nominal Opposition.

Led by Sir Thomas Playford the House of Assembly rejected the amendments of the Legislative Council, which in turn insisted upon them, thereby precipitating a deadlock between the two Houses in the dying hours of the session. In accordance with the Deadlock Provisions of the S.A. Constitution both Houses appointed managers to see whether a compromise could be reached before Parliament adjourned. Should no compromise be found the Landlord and Tenant Act would expire on 31 December. After six and a quarter hours of argument and discussion in which, according to the Premier, "there was great difficulty in arriving at some agreement acceptable to both Houses", a compromise was reached and the Act saved for another year. The main features of the compromise were to empower the courts to consider the question of hardship where a *bona fide* declaration was made by the tenant and that a tenant entering into a six month lease for a house could not apply to the Housing Trust to vary the rent during that period.

### The Royal Adelaide Hospital

The most significant contribution to the debate on the Budget, overshadowing the Premier's annual complaints about uniform taxation and the Leader of the Opposition's criticisms of rises in water rates and tram fares, was that by the L.C.L. member for Onkaparinga (Mr. H. Shannon) who is also Chairman of the important Parliamentary Committee on Public Works. In a thoroughly prepared and well-documented speech Mr. Shannon pointed out that the Royal Adelaide Hospital, the principal teaching hospital for the University of Adelaide, was probably the most out-of-date general government hospital in the Commonwealth, and that as a result the medical school of the University had slipped in twenty years from being one of the finest in Australia to being at the bottom of the Australian tree. In short, the hospital "needs to be bulldozed out of existence and rebuilt".

Mr. Shannon was vigorously supported in his remarks by the Professor of Medicine at the University of Adelaide, Professor Robson, who declared that "the hospital was completely lacking in elementary teaching facilities", and by a B.M.A. spokesman. The *News* carried an editorial the following day castigating the Government for allowing such conditions to develop. Under such heavy attack Government policy on this matter has been to await the return of the Chief Secretary and Minister of Health, Sir Lyell McEwin, from overseas, where he has

been studying general hospital development. Consequently critics have been forced to wait until the next session of Parliament before launching a full-scale attack on the Government's alleged deficiencies in this respect.

### ***Expenditure Tax***

Also taking advantage of the Budget debate, Mr. Dunstan suggested that the Government should look into the possibilities of an Expenditure Tax as a source of revenue. He claimed that by such a tax "we will get to the capital appreciation that goes on and to the differentiation in expenditure and spending capacity between the present classes that is not caught up by income tax in any way at present". From the hostile interjections of the Premier and other L.C.L. members, however, it appears that such a tax would be unlikely to find favour with the present Government, despite all the laments about the State's inability to levy income tax.

### ***The Marriage Act Amendment Bill***

One of the surprises of the previous session of Parliament had been the Legislative Council's rejection of the Government's bill to increase the minimum marriage age from twelve and fourteen to sixteen and eighteen for women and men respectively. As one of the principal reasons for this rejection appeared to have been Councillors' objections to the indecent haste with which they had been expected to debate and pass the measure, the Government took good care that this time the bill should be introduced into the Legislative Council first and that Councillors should have ample time to digest and debate it. Despite one or two attempts to alter the minimum ages the bill passed both Houses after a particularly good debate in the Legislative Council.

### ***S.A. Road Tax***

It was announced on 30 September that by the unanimous decision of the High Court the S.A. road tax was unconstitutional, in that it discriminated against heavy interstate motor vehicles. The challenge to the S.A. legislation, which applied to all vehicles with an unladen weight of two and a half tons or more which were not registered in S.A. was brought by the Sydney hauliers, Edmund T. Lennon Pty. Ltd. and Pioneer Express Pty. Ltd. of Melbourne.

### ***The Wallaroo By-Election***

The by-election for the Assembly seat of Wallaroo, caused by the death of the L.C.L. member, Mr. L. Heath, was held on 31 August. The late Mr. Heath had won the seat at the 1956 general elections by a little over 200 votes after the distribution of an independent candidate's preferences. Thus the marginal nature of the seat when added to speculation as to the effects of the attack by Mr. Chambers on Dr. Evatt, the possibility of a Democratic Labor Party candidate entering the contest and the Government's small majority in the House of Assembly, created more than ordinary interest in the campaign and its result.

H. A. D. Dowling (L.C.L.)	..	2,613
L. C. Hughes (A.L.P.)	.. ..	3,386
Informal	.. .. .	68

In winning the seat Mr. Hughes converted a Liberal majority of 248 into a Labor majority of 773, persuading one voter in twelve to change his allegiance. A swing of these proportions, repeated in other marginal seats at a general election would result in the comfortable defeat of the Playford Government, which, after providing for a Speaker, now has only nineteen direct supporters in a House of 39.

In its vigorous campaign—a campaign helped by an able and well-known local candidate—the A.L.P. concentrated on local issues such as the failure of the Government to provide a fishing haven, poor water supplies and the lack of industrial development for Wallaroo. The result suggests a plan of action by which the party may soon end its long years in the wilderness.

### **Mr. Chambers' Expulsion from the A.L.P.**

Two matters of importance on a Federal level have arisen during the period under review. The first of these concerned the expulsion from the A.L.P. of the Labor member for the Federal electorate of Adelaide, Mr. Cyril Chambers.

In a statement to the *News* on 8 August, Mr. Chambers, who was Minister for Army in the Chifley Government, declared that "Dr. Evatt's repeated references to Catholic action and clerical fascism have only continued to insult a widening section of the Australian community. Only by a unified A.L.P. can we hope to regain the confidence of the electors. And the only hope of unifying the party is under some other leadership than Dr. Evatt's."

As a consequence of his statement, which was the first open attack on Dr. Evatt by a leading S.A. member of the party, Mr. Chambers was expelled from the A.L.P. by the State Council. No other prominent A.L.P. parliamentarian or member supported Mr. Chambers who, significantly, has not joined the D.L.P. but continued to sit as the Independent Labor member for Adelaide.

### **The Snowy Waters Agreement**

The other matter with Federal repercussions has been the clash between the Premier and the Federal Government over the Snowy Waters Agreement. Sir Thomas Playford has stated that "the South Australian Government's view is that any agreement that does not give this State its proper share of increased waters coming down the Murray is an infringement of the original Murray Waters Agreement".

The evasiveness of the Prime Minister at a series of conferences, together with the Premier of Victoria's statement, that S.A. will get none of the extra water diverted into the Murray, caused the Premier to threaten a writ against the Commonwealth to restrain it specifically from proceeding with the work of diverting the Tooma River. Such a writ would seem to have every chance of success, and, depending on the scope given to the "waters of the Murray" cast grave doubts on the constitutional validity of the Snowy Waters scheme under Section 99 of the Constitution. However, this section, which prevents the Commonwealth "by any law or regulation of trade, commerce or revenue", from giving preference to one State over another, is very much a two-edged weapon in S.A.'s case, and no writ so far has been issued.

R.L.R.

## **TASMANIA**

During the second half of 1957 Tasmanian politics were undisturbed by any major contentious issue, although the parliamentary session was occasionally enlivened by strong opposition to at least three important measures in the Government's legislative programme and by sharp differences between the two Houses which were resolved by Free Conferences, on the whole to the advantage of the Legislative Council. Public opinion remained quiescent and the Government was not made aware of any sharp criticism. The conviction was widespread that there would be little change while Cosgrove remained at the helm, directing the affairs of the State and steering the Labor Party between the shoals and the quicksands. The future of the Premier, now aged 73, was much discussed and, following the decision of the State Labor Conference last March that the next State Governor shall be an Australian, Cosgrove was often mentioned in private as the possible successor of Sir Ronald Cross, whose term of office expires in August 1958. Whatever his plans, Cosgrove has so far not shown his hand and continues to keep the general public, his political opponents, and perhaps even his nearest colleagues, all guessing.

### **The Political Parties**

Meantime the Government, assured of its majority of one in the House of Assembly, faced the parliamentary session with confidence. Its chief anxieties arose from pressure from within the party, and particularly from certain unions, the Australian Workers' Union and Australian



Railways Union, which called for the carrying out of decisions of the State Conference. The strongest demand was for the resumption of cost of living in Hobart during the June quarter. Cabinet, backed by Caucus, resisted the demand, promising once more to look into possible economies and also to bring in bills to control prices and rents. The situation became temporarily difficult when Dr. Turnbull, the Treasurer, declared, in one of his irresponsible statements, that he thought cost-of-living payments should be resumed, and this only two months after Caucus had unanimously decided that the State could not afford it. Angered by the rebuff the A.W.U. attacked on another line. Following the Australian Labor Party endorsements decided upon by the State executive for the next Federal Senate elections, it was argued that the executive had defied the ruling of the State Conference, made in 1956 and re-emphasised in 1957, that pre-selection of Labor candidates should be made by the Conference. The executive's answer was that no machinery had been devised to give effect to the ruling. The question is likely to lead to heated discussion at the next State Conference in March 1958. On yet another front, where the Government was desperately searching for economies, the A.R.U. attacked the Wayne Report, which had recommended that certain railway lines be closed. Despite some loose talk at the time of the A.L.P. debacle in Queensland these attacks within the party did little to disturb the confidence of the Government or to encourage the Opposition.

During this time the Liberal Party, condemned interminably to Opposition and weighed down by the Cosgrove myth of invincibility, was sustained by the hope that the Premier must soon retire. Without Cosgrove, it was argued, the Left wing would get control of the Labor Party and a large body of moderate swinging voters would change its allegiance. Yet active and resourceful in debate though some of the Liberals are, there has still to be worked out an imaginative legislative programme that will appeal to the electorate. As for the Democratic Labor Party, there are few signs that, since the debacle at the election of October 1956, it has made much inroad on the public mind.

### ***The Budget***

Parliament came together on 27 August and after thirty sitting days was adjourned on 28 November. The session, though not giving rise to acute controversy, was made interesting by the nature of certain Government bills and by the renewed activity within the legislative process of the Upper House.

The Treasurer delivered his Budget speech on 5 September and gave a comprehensive survey of the economic situation and the financial condition of the State. He remarked upon the general prosperity, the greater stability in prices, and the reappearance of unemployment. Tasmania's rate of natural increase was substantially above the Australian average and there had been an increasing inflow of migrants during the year. At the same time the retail price level in Hobart, and even more the level of house rents, was the highest of the capital cities. Though there had been a significant increase in the production of many commodities, the apple crop, due to adverse seasonal factors, was considerably below normal. There was also reduced activity in the building industry. The remarkable increase of hire-purchase finance, while it favoured certain industries, was placing a great strain on the loan market, and some control of hire-purchase agreements was necessary. During the financial year 1956-7 there was a deficit in the Consolidated Revenue Fund of £813,330. Revenue had fallen below what was anticipated, largely due to a sharp decline in lottery subscriptions. The State continued to be penalised for its expenditure on social services, because of the growing adverse adjustment on this account in the Special Grant. The Treasurer proposed to increase revenue by amending the Stamp Duties Act, making *inter alia* hire-purchase companies liable; by raising the rate of totalisator tax and the registration fees of bookmakers; and by increasing drivers' licences and motor vehicle fees. The Treasurer referred here to a separate proposal to introduce football pools to Tasmania. On the side of expenditure he anticipated increases due to the re-classification of the Tasmanian public service, the employment of more teachers to cope with the growing school population, and the salary needs of technical staff in the Public Works, Agricultural and Health Departments. Finally, because of the limited loan money available, and the necessity to use some of it to finance the deficit, the Treasurer forecast a curtailed public

works programme, affecting particularly the Hydro-Electric Commission and the Housing Department.

### ***The Legislative Programme***

The chief items in the Government's legislative programme, after the Appropriation Bill, were the Restrictive Practices Bill, the Racing and Gaming Bill, the Constitution Bill, the Hydro-Electric Commission Bill, the Fire Brigades Bill, the Prices Bill and Dentists Bill (introduced in the Legislative Council), and the Public Service Tribunal Bill. Three of these were thrown out by the Legislative Council, two were seriously amended and one was laid aside pending further investigation.

Much interest was shown in the Restrictive Practices Bill, sponsored and prepared by the Attorney-General, Mr. R. Fagan, who in introducing it claimed that ample evidence existed to show that price rings were operating against certain traders and contrary to the public interest. The bill was carried (fourteen-eleven) in the House of Assembly, Mr. R. C. Townley voting with the Government. Interest groups then began to work hard on the Legislative Council, which threw out the measure. Pressure was also exerted when the Racing and Gaming Bill was in preparation and was before the House. Bookmakers protested against an increase in licence fees and Racing Club representatives favoured any increase in revenue that might benefit them. But the greatest publicity centred around the Treasurer's proposal to license football pools. The Protestant Churches protested strongly, there was some press correspondence, and a small University student demonstration. The Opposition attacked the proposal, called for papers, and moved a vote of censure on the Minister, which was defeated. However, papers containing correspondence between the Treasurer and a Victorian sponsor were tabled, and revealed that the Under-Treasurer was opposed to the proposal, a fact of which Opposition members made great play. The bill was passed by the House of Assembly but was rejected by the Legislative Council. The Attorney-General's Constitution Bill was designed to restrict the powers of the Legislative Council in respect of financial legislation and the suspensory veto somewhat on the lines of the Parliament Act of 1911, but contained also the novel proposal that the Council should be elected and should retire at the end of six years as a body (and not two or three each year as at present). Despite Mr. Fagan's excellent introductory speech, Government members showed little interest in the debate, the Liberals opposed it, and the Council gave it short shrift.

The Hydro-Electric Commission Bill proposed an extension of power development from the Great Lake northward estimated to cost £27,350,000. It was carried against the Liberal Opposition, which called for a Joint Committee to investigate. The Council successfully amended the proposal to appoint as an Associate Commissioner a Treasury official on the ground that it would be tantamount to returning the Commission to government control. The Fire Brigade Bill, designed to transfer a greater proportion of the cost of maintenance from the government and municipalities to the insurance companies, was successfully amended by the Legislative Council. The Government introduced the Prices Bill in the Council, where it was defeated, and the Liberal Opposition in the Assembly questioned the Government about this novel practice. The Dentists Bill, which also came down from the Council, was carried and gave legal sanction to certain practices of dental mechanics. Another important measure, setting up one Public Service Tribunal (to replace the many tribunals) to settle salary claims for all public employees, was referred to a Select Committee for further investigation.

All this legislative activity accentuated once more the relations between the two Houses. The Legislative Council wrecked the Government's programme and when it insisted on its amendments in Free Conference it got its way as in the Hydro, the Fire Brigades and the Racing Bills. The three retiring members in May 1958 are three of the four Labor members in the Council. The Government is determined to hold these seats and the Liberals are likely to forsake their neutrality and to campaign openly for certain Independents.

Meantime a Select Committee of the House of Assembly has heard evidence on the subject of electoral reform, particularly from Mr. George Howatt, Fulbright Scholar from the University



of Pennsylvania. The Committee has recommended the retention of the Hare-Clark proportional representation system and the adoption of seven instead of six members for each of the five electorates. The old fear voiced by both parties that an increase would favour Independents seems to have been exorcised by Howatt's statistics.

W.A.T.

## WESTERN AUSTRALIA

The second session of the State's twenty-second Parliament was high-lighted by vigorous controversy about several contentious proposals submitted by the Hawke Labor Government. It was also enlivened by a surfeit of political manoeuvres in both Houses which illustrated the chronic disunity in the Liberal-Country Party Opposition.

### *Railways and Supply*

The session began with an ostentatious display of solidarity within the Opposition. The Opposition threatened to use its majority in the Legislative Council to block Supply, unless the Government guaranteed to reopen the unpayable outlying railway lines whose closure Parliament had authorised by resolutions at the end of the previous session. The resolutions had received the support of the Liberal Party in the Council, but had been strongly resisted by the Country Party with the support of the Farmers' Union and the Road Board Association. The ostensible reason given by the Liberal Party for its change of attitude in the new session was that the Government had gone ahead with the closures too quickly and had not provided satisfactory alternative transport arrangements. A motion to rescind the earlier resolution was rejected in the Assembly, but a similarly worded motion was passed in the Council, only one Liberal member voting with the Government to maintain his reputation for consistency. The tone of debate in the Council was hostile and reflected the views expounded at various Farmers' Union meetings that the Government's action in closing the lines "was the most arrogant step any government had ever put over the people". Country Party member Sir Charles Latham hoped that the Council would agree to the rescission "even if only to give the people outback a bit of heart". However, the Opposition was unwilling to risk an Assembly general election on the issue of country rail closures, and the threat to stop Supply turned out to be a damp squib. After much debate the Council passed the Supply Bill without dissent, having already been informed by the Premier that the Government had no intention of abandoning its rail closure policy. Thus ended the first assault on the Government led by the Liberal Party under its newly elected Leader Mr. Brand, who had succeeded Sir Ross McLarty on the latter's retirement. Thereafter whatever measure of unity had previously existed between the Liberal and Country Parties practically vanished overnight, as did the unity previously existing in the ranks of the Country Party.

### *Administrative Corruption*

The controversy over the future of the government railways drew the attention of the public to the State's greatest liability, and the question of railway administration was the most important administrative problem to be tackled by the Government during the remainder of the parliamentary session. Following a long and secret investigation both in Perth and London by a Royal Commissioner, Stipendiary Magistrate A. G. Smith, the public was suddenly shocked into realising that much of the trouble in railway affairs was allegedly due to maladministration at the highest level. In October one of the State's three Railway Commissioners, Mr. R. E. B. Lee, was summarily dismissed on the grounds of gross incompetence, and another Commissioner, Mr. C. W. Clarke, resigned but was arrested to face charges of corruption. It was alleged that Clarke had received regular payments from firms which obtained certain railway contracts. He was later acquitted by the Supreme Court. The Royal Commissioner described Commissioner Lee as "suspicious, petty-minded, vindictive and given to wild and extravagant statements". Mr. Smith's investigations had suggested maladministration by the entire Railway Commission,



and "such misconduct, misbehaviour and inefficiency on the part of the two assistant commissioners, that no self-respecting community should be required to tolerate them further". The Chief Commissioner subsequently announced his retirement on the grounds of ill health.

Soon after these startling disclosures had been released to the press, Parliament agreed to replace the three-man Commission by a single Commissioner. But the Opposition in the Legislative Council, acting at the instigation of the Country Party, refused to accept the Government's complementary proposal to encourage greater use of the railways by limiting the number of exemptions issued by the Transport Board for the carriage of goods by road. An amendment to the Transport Co-ordination Act would have forced farmers to use the railways, by drastically reducing the list of goods which they might carry to and from their properties.

### ***The Transport Trust***

The second important problem to receive parliamentary attention also concerned transport, and the associated debates and voting manoeuvres in the Legislative Council illustrated the extent to which the distrust between the Country Party and the Liberal Party had developed since the beginning of the session. With strong support from the Country Party the Government's proposal to establish a three-man Metropolitan Transport Trust to take over all metropolitan bus services was agreed to by the Legislative Council late in November. The Country Party in the Assembly had been represented on the Committee which investigated the proposal and interviewed representatives of the bus companies. This was too much for the Liberal Party and the *West Australian* newspaper, who described the move as the "Bus Grab" and bitterly accused the Country Party of compromising itself after losing its fight over rail closures; it had based much of its earlier argument on the need for economies in the Railway Department, but now seemed prepared to give the Government an open cheque to incur more losses on metropolitan transport. Country Party Legislative Councillors replied that the Liberals wanted to pose as opponents of a socialistic proposal whilst remaining confident that Country Party support would ensure the passage of the measure. Strangely, no statements made by the bus companies concerned were issued to the press, and the public remained ignorant of their views. When the appointments to the Transport Trust were made known it was noted that its Chairman was also the head of the major bus company concerned in the take-over.

The third of the contentious issues which brought a further disintegration in the Opposition was the proposal to extend the life of the Unfair Trading and Profit Control Legislation to permit the Commissioner to continue his investigations into trade malpractices and monopoly agreements adversely affecting consumers. This was supported by several Country Party members in the Legislative Council, thus horrifying the Liberals and prompting the editor of the *West Australian* to comment of the Country Party: "In the Council it has become (except where there is an obvious and direct threat to rural interests) a loosely knit band of political individualists" (4 December 1957). When Country Party members read this denunciation they no doubt cast their minds back a few months to July, when the Liberal Party announced that it would in future run its own Senate team at Federal elections; this was described at the time by Country Party Leader Mr. A. F. Watts as "a shabby deal" and the reasons given for it were described by the State Country Party President as "gobbledygook".

### ***Parliamentary Legislation***

During the July-December session, a total of 112 bills were introduced into the Parliament, and 25 did not receive the support of both Houses. Of the former, apart from those already mentioned, many were machinery measures of small moment, and of the latter many were hardy annuals promoted by Labor Governments which were automatically rejected by the Council—bills to widen the Council franchise, to introduce adult franchise into local government elections, to introduce a bank holiday on Saturdays, and to extend the range of business of the State Government Insurance Office. Other measures on which no decisions had been reached before Parliament rose for the Christmas recess were concerned with the suggestion to confer citizenship on all aboriginal natives in the State, to implement a Town Plan for the

Metropolitan Region and to create a Swan River Conservation Board. Important bills rejected by the Legislative Council, apart from those already discussed, were the monster Local Government Bill (681 clauses) which lapsed for the second successive session after the failure of a conference of managers; a bill to grant long service leave to employees in private industry—the Council and the Employers' Federation wanted three months leave after twenty years, the Government wanted it granted after ten years; a bill to continue land taxation on improved rural holdings; and a proposal to prohibit press reporting of lower court proceedings at which a person might be committed for trial. Amongst the successful measures promoted by the Hawke Labor Government and agreed to by Parliament were bills to build fifteen miles of new railway from Midland Junction to Welshpool and to construct marshalling yards at Welshpool; to prevent the black-marketing of potatoes; to continue the life of the Betting Control Board for a further three years; to raise the school leaving age in stages from fourteen years to fifteen years; to give government backing for private home-building loans; to introduce majority jury verdicts in criminal cases (except in those involving the death penalty); to allow women from 21 to 65 years of age to serve on juries; to introduce voluntary blood tests for alleged drunken drivers; to register used-car dealers; and to limit the hours of petrol retailing.

Apart from the problem of the railways, the subject which attracted most attention outside Parliament was the Perth City Council's scheme to build and equip a twenty acre Aquatic Centre on a section of the northern edge of King's Park. On a free vote before a crowded public gallery the bill was defeated in the Legislative Assembly by 29 votes to 14. Thirty members of the Assembly had signed a petition against the proposal before the bill was introduced by the Minister for Lands (seventeen Labor, six Country Party, five Liberal Party, and two Independent Liberals). Numerous public meetings had preceded the parliamentary debate at which the Council's plan was described as an attempt to "desecrate" the city's heritage of 1,000 acres of native bushland and as likely to be followed by requests from many sporting bodies for a share in the reserve; supporters of the proposal pointed to the need for an Olympic Pool to replace the decrepit Crawley Baths, and to the fact that much of the Park was inaccessible and most of it was already overrun with non-indigenous plant life.

Amongst other interesting political events of the period was the signing of a new coal contract with the Collie Mines which was to save the State Electricity Commission and the Railways Department about £500,000 a year, and the investigation by a parliamentary committee of the working of the Licensing Act. The Minister for Lands, Mr. E. K. Hoar, was appointed as the new Agent-General for W.A. in London, and Premier Hawke failed in his bid to obtain Federal approval for the export of large quantities of iron ore to Japan so as to be able to build up a big charcoal-iron ore industry in the south-west on the proceeds. There was also a recurrence of the public controversy between the Independent Liberal member for South Perth in the Assembly, Mr. W. Grayden, and the Commissioner for Native Affairs, Mr. S. G. Middleton, over the question of the treatment of natives in the Warburton Range area.

In contrast to the unhappy relationships between the two Opposition parties and the public recriminations which they involved, the Parliamentary Labor Party and the Labor Cabinet were models of cohesion and political amity. Apart from the time taken up by parliamentary proceedings, the Hawke Cabinet was able to set aside sufficient time for the very real burden of administration, and for constant negotiations with the Federal Government on the State's finances and the need for the State's rapid development. There was no spill-over into the State Parliament of the controversies in eastern Australia about the Federal leadership of the Labor Party, though the State executive of the party refused any future party endorsement to Mr. H. V. Johnson, M.H.R. for Kalgoorlie, in the Federal Parliament, in consequence of his public attacks on Dr. Evatt. The diminutive party branches of South Perth, Scarborough and Wembley-Floreat Park were expelled for failing to observe Federal Conference decisions, but new branches were soon substituted. The State's Labor executive did not take the new Democratic Labor Party very seriously. There was also a continuing amicability in the relations between the Parliamentary Caucus, the extra-parliamentary Labor Party and the Trades Hall.



# Review Article

## NEW APPROACHES TO WORLD POLITICS

Hard upon the heels of the neo-realists, whose analyses are as literary and philosophical as those of the idealists they overthrew, there are appearing in international studies at least two movements that tend to favour formal and even mathematical approaches. One movement has spread across from the military operations researchers. The other, generated from within the social sciences themselves, has easily joined up with operations research, by virtue of sharing with it certain formal techniques, of which the Theory of Games is perhaps most typical.

Both movements have so far found their expression in articles and technical papers. Dr. Morton A. Kaplan's *System and Process in International Politics*<sup>1</sup> is a new kind of book in this tradition. Using first certain technicalities developed in the sociology and psychology of systems, of groups, and of decision-making, then taking hints from some ingenious elaborations of game-theory, Dr. Kaplan has put together a semi-formal structure intended both to characterize six possible types of international system and to explain the several trends toward or away from equilibrium that he has supposed each would exhibit. With the aid of this structure, he also estimates and seeks to explain both the behaviour to be expected of decision-makers finding themselves in one or another situation, and also the changing effects of and upon two main types of internal political system as the international picture changes.

Clearly then, it is not a book for the general reader or the freshman, but for the final year honours man, and is above all required reading for the theorist. At appropriate points, the author illustrates lavishly from past and present international situations; but it would be obtuse of the critic to cavil at the historical judgments expressed in these illustrations even if, as is not the case, that were often called for. What the book requires is theoretical criticism, the more so because part of the way forward in the study of international relations from now on must be by the critical testing of theory, and because Dr. Kaplan is one of the very first to provide a theory general and detailed enough to be worth the testing.

The sociological parts read as sociology does, and those who, like the present reviewer, are biased against that discipline will find the writing there distasteful, and the argument sometimes frigid and abstract. But it may be of some interest that several of the anti-sociologists have come independently to theories that coincide in many places with Dr. Kaplan's, though expressed in different words and from a different point of view.

Chapter 1 defines certain technical terms, which need learning by the reader. The "essential rules" of a system specify its "characteristic behaviour"—e.g. in Chapter 2, the following rules characterize "balance of power", Kaplan's first-examined system:

1. Act to increase capabilities but negotiate rather than fight.
2. Fight rather than pass up an opportunity to increase capabilities.
3. Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential national actor.
4. Act to oppose any coalition or single actor which tends to assume a position of predominance with respect to the rest of the system.
5. Act to constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizing principles.
6. Permit defeated or constrained essential national actors to re-enter the system as acceptable role partners or act to bring some previously inessential actor within the essential actor classification. Treat all essential actors as acceptable role partners.

One cannot be quite sure of the theoretical work that these "essential rules" are supposed to perform. Later in the book Dr. Kaplan suggests that they might be regarded as "initial hypotheses—in the absence of systematic evidence which would be convincing". But this

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<sup>1</sup>Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957, pp. ix + 280. \$6.50.



leaves still unresolved the question whether "essential rules" are meant to describe the subject-matter of international relations, or to explain it. Since only two of the six types of system characterized by sets of "essential rules" have had historical instances, the sets of rules can hardly be descriptions, however sketchy, affording material for comparative study. If on the other hand the rules are meant to explain in some degree the behaviour of the type of system they characterize, then in this first set concerned with the balance-of-power types there is a mixing together of two levels of explanation, one presupposing the other. Rules 3, 5 and 6 cited above presuppose that a balance-of-power system already exists which the constituent actors wish to preserve; if rules 1, 2, and 4 were followed by national actors, even by actors quite ignorant of the possibility that any international system should exist, then, provided the state of the military art were suitable, a balance-of-power system should come into existence without anyone's necessarily intending or even noticing the event. Thus while 3, 5 and 6 could explain little more than postponement of the system's gradual decay, 1, 2, and 4 explain the much more surprising fact that a more-or-less equilibrating system of nations once existed and could well have done so without any nation's having fostered it. Moreover, in the sense that 3, 5 and 6 are rules or norms comprising an ethic of statecraft, 1, 2, and 4 are not "rules" at all, but maxims directed to the single aim of preserving national integrity. The theorist could use them to construct, from a minimum number of axioms, a model which would account for the essentials of balance-of-power behaviour amongst nations; then, supposing that some of the predictions derivable from the model did not square with the historical facts (or, in the case of systems which have not yet existed, with the kinds of situation that national actors might be expected to accept without modification) the theorist could formulate, in supplementary hypotheses, the rules—such as 3, 5, and 6—for a policy that would adjust the model to the historical facts, or to our expectations concerning future political behaviour. But this is a criticism rather of methodological style than of logic and substance.

Logically-analogous "essential rules" are said to characterize five other systems—(2) "loose bipolar" *e.g.* that which in general now prevails; (3) "tight bipolar" *viz.* the same, but consisting solely of two "hierarchically organized blocs", no grey areas, and no U.N.; (4) "universal" *viz.* roughly, World Federal Union; (5) "hierarchical" *i.e.* unitary world government; and (6) "unit veto" *i.e.* what is more often called the "deterrent" or "standoff" situation, where all possess "weapons of such a character that any actor is capable of destroying any other actor" (or coalition) "even though it cannot prevent its own destruction". The author does not intend an exhaustive list.

Chapter 3 classifies national actors as "directive" (roughly "dictatorial") or "non-directive", and "system-dominant" or "sub-system dominant". (Definitions: "the political system is dominant over its sub-systems to the extent that the essential rules of the political system act as parametric 'givens' for any single sub-system. A sub-system becomes dominant to the extent that the essential rules of the system cannot be treated as parametric givens for that sub-system." *N.b.* "the political system" here refers to the whole body-politic, and definitely not to the government, or the state apparatus, or the governing élite, all of which are apt to be classed as "sub-systems".) Spain is directive system-dominant, the Soviet and Nazi Germany directive sub-system-dominant by virtue of their Parties, the United Kingdom is non-directive sub-system-dominant since its government can change foreign policy with comparatively little reference to the electorate, and the U.S.A. is non-directive system-dominant since its governments are straitly confined in foreign affairs.

The reviewer feels that this four-ways classification is not subtle enough, and that it finds current application too readily. Dr. Kaplan, nevertheless, does something quite interesting with it. He considers what each type of actor would do under each of the six international systems with respect to each of five "ranges of choice"—"organizational focus" (who tells whom), "allocations of reward" (who gets what), "alignment preferences" (whom you stand with), "scope and direction of political activity" (what you stand for), and "adaptive quality" (*i.e.* rigid or flexible). This section amounts to a sustained attempt at predicting—or, in the appropriate cases, explaining—national behaviour in terms of national and international structure.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are concerned with processes and changes within systems and from one system to another, 4 and 5 in terms alleged to be "general for all kinds of social and political activity". In particular Chapter 4 (which discusses "regulation" as "the process by means of which a system attempts to maintain or preserve its identity over time as it adapts to changing conditions") comes close, in my view, to mythology—social systems are not persons, and cannot literally "attempt" anything. Chapter 5 concerns integrative and disintegrative processes in systems and develops nine "hypotheses" about the behaviour of decision-makers given the several structures of system and patterns of command or of communication. The critic who lacks sociological or psychological training is rather out of his depth with these. Some will appear platitudinous and others tinged with Western ideology. They seem attuned to preferences for permissive and not chain-of-command leadership, for world federation or union and not international conflict. More seriously, those derived from sociology and psychology do not fit very well with those few suggested by game-theory.

Once again, however, the author makes good use of his inventions. In Chapter 6 he applies the hypotheses to interpretation of his six systems. Here, those hypotheses concerned with conditions of communication instructed me more than did those derived from psychology (which have an extra appendix at the end of the book). Dr. Kaplan maintains for instance that the great tensions of the unit veto systems, in which communications between national or bloc actors will be minimal, are very likely to infect and disintegrate those actors' internal political systems. But surely the recognition that one's own and one's nation's existence depend upon keeping up in the scientific and technological race should be a great national unifier and a great incentive to work, especially when success brings so many incidental improvements in living standards. Post-Sputnik, we do not hear of a deeply divided United States.

A most rewarding study of the disintegrative process forms the second part of Chapter 6. Dr. Kaplan stresses the fact that in most international systems the number of effective Powers is small, and (pp. 126-30) that much hangs upon the question "how small?" I am sure that this is a master-clue to the problem of international relations, and explains much both of the subject matter's behaviour and of the subject's development or under-development. Perhaps the only major point Kaplan fails to mention concerns the instability of a balance-of-power system with *too many* national actors yet without, of course, enough for the system as a whole to impose "system-dominance" over the nations that comprise it. On the instabilities of "too few" he is very good. The chapter ends with illustrations of the integrative process from the history of NATO (positive) and of the Korean War (negative).

Chapter 7 and the sub-joined appendix deal with the theory of value, applied in Chapter 8, "The National Interest and Other Interests". But the most stimulating and ingenious section of the book consists of the next three chapters, on strategy. Chapter 9 is a students' introduction to the Theory of Games. Chapter 10 mentions some of its cruxes, especially those concerned with application, and leads up to two of them, The Prisoners' Dilemma and The Hangman's Paradox. The main feature of these Dr. Kaplan combines, in 10 and in the following chapter, and most ingeniously applies to a characteristic international situation. Suppose two Great Powers are in a recurring position such that (a) if, on each critical occasion, either successfully deceives the other—say, by a surprise attack—then the deceiver gains a maximum and the deceived loses a maximum, while (b) if both attempt simultaneously to deceive each other both suffer severely though not to the maximum, and (c) if each keeps faith with the other both suffer somewhat, though less than if both deceive. It would seem best if both could reach agreement to keep faith; but if the series of recurrences were expected to be finite, both would be likely at every recurrence to attempt deceit since, on the occurrence believed to be the last, successful deceit could escape subsequent punishment. If, on the other hand, the series of recurrences is not known to be finite, the threat of later retaliation ought to be more effective; but even so, as Dr. Kaplan demonstrates, a retaliatory strategy fixed and announced in advance with the intention of securing co-operation "will not give rise to co-operative solutions except by chance", and the series of games will probably turn into a cycle or, more likely, settle to an equilibrium of mutual deceit.



Game-theory is important here because it demonstrates that, given the competitive international order and the "rationality" of its national actors, a non-co-operative outcome is the likely one for such a predicament. There is no theoretical way past this conclusion: no more ultimate social science is awaiting discovery behind the findings of game-theory, though sociology and psychology have still ancillary tasks to perform alongside it. In the conclusion of the book (Chapter 12) Dr. Kaplan expresses the opinion that international politics is "so poorly developed that the construction of a precise deductive system would be more constrictive and misleading than enlightening at the present stage" and that game-theory "is not yet powerful enough . . . for situations as complex as those found in the international system". I think he is over-cautious. His own contributions exemplify the great explanatory power of the Theory of Games—great, since it can spin so much out of so few existential premises. This economy of hypothesis means that predicted results which make even a quite imperfect fit with the facts should be interpreted as, at worst, indications to press on along the same lines.

One suspects, however, that the Theory of Games is not used more boldly by social scientists on account of its frequently indeterministic character. It dispels the positivist chimaera of timeless social law, to an extent which sometimes Dr. Kaplan's terminology might conceal from some readers, as it did at first from the reviewer. For example, on pp. 173-4 he writes ". . . the concept of strategy implies that, given the movement of the first pawn, the game becomes completely determinate", meaning in the context no more than that *if* there should be a best strategy (as yet undiscovered) for chess, then from each lawful opening move there would spring a branching tree of moves whose every twig tip would represent the complete finish of a game. (Even given the interlock of Black's and White's strategies, and even if one player's strategy be pure, the game will not necessarily run a predetermined course from root to twig-tip, since the other's "strategy" may be whimsical—say, a decision to move every time in obedience to a randomizing device.) Again, page 177 (italics mine): "A proper mixed strategy is the strategy designated by the minimax criterion for games without saddlepoints because it *guarantees* the greatest minimum expected value for the players." One may fail to note that what is "guaranteed" is not any actual outcome nor (except in a series of very many replays) any actual balance of profit and loss, but a "greatest minimum *expected* value" (i.e. one's "best bet")—a value not independent of the valuer's personal preferences about "gambling".

Dr. Kaplan, of course, is more than master of all this. I have however underlined the dangers of deterministic association of words for a reason perhaps best displayed by reference to Kaplan's distinction between supergame and subgames. In the supergame of power politics the crucial choices are usually between playing alternative subgames (*e.g.* which alliance to contract, whether to make war or not), and each subgame has sub-subgames (*e.g.* how much to contribute to joint forces, whether to fight a battle or to retreat). Now—supposing that power-political games are usually one-shot affairs requiring mixed strategies—it will be by definition at least partly a matter of chance whether subgames, and *a fortiori* sub-subgames, get played at all. Therefore (to pick up the argument where the philosophers have left it) the sentence "Athens will win the sea fight tomorrow" may no more raise an issue of fact than does "the present King of France is bald"—there may be no sea fight tomorrow, no Athens tomorrow, no more war, no more sea. This rules out any traditional determinism quite conclusively.

Next, the Theory of Games presupposes some fixed rule for each particular game; so, as Dr. Kaplan suggests, the most prudent course may be to regard every game of power politics as bounded by no rule narrower than that imposed by the physical dimensions of the situation. But scientific innovation may from time to time alter the physical dimensions beyond all imagining; and some scientific innovation is unpredictable in principle. We therefore do not have a notion of the subgames' or supergame's most general rules a century hence. Advances in social theory cannot mitigate this ignorance—in fact they now demonstrate its necessity.

Most of Dr. Kaplan's theory is untouched by the above remarks which, indeed, passages of his Conclusion anticipate. In the Preface, however, where he discusses empirical testing of various parts of his theory, the suggestion that his hypotheses about decision-making might in



some cases be tested by a small-group experiment makes one suspect, despite his acknowledgment of differences from the international scale of situation, serious confusion between the insulated, averageable, and largely sub-rational behaviour of small groups in laboratories, and the uninsulated, once-for-all, and professionally-planned defence activities of modern nations. The latter features nevertheless are clearly enough understood in his proposals for testing the systemic parts of his theory. There, one might argue, the theory requires a little more elaboration concerning military and economic potential—fields in which the measurer has something pretty definite to work with. One or two indices suitable to this purpose might have been salvaged from that impressive inter-war failure, F. W. Richardson's *Generalized Foreign Politics*.

A last criticism is that more space could have been given to military technology, a subject that will increasingly affect international relations. Having said so much, I should now make it clear that this notice has concentrated quite unfairly upon the criticizable aspects of Dr. Kaplan's work, simply because it is in general so much more worthwhile than are most international systems. In the history of the subject, his book may come to mark the epoch at which we got beyond the prolegomena and began to develop a truly general theory.

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# Book Reviews

DOMINION OF THE NORTH: A HISTORY OF CANADA. By Donald Creighton\*. Revised ed. Macmillan, 1958. Pp. ix + 619. 41/6 A.

This is the best history of Canada yet written, a substantial volume based on careful research which, in this revised edition, carries the narrative down to the period of the Korean War. Professor Creighton writes with gusto, as readers of his great biography of John A. Macdonald will know. He uses too many adjectives, and indulges in what may be regarded as poetic licence, but the skilled craftsman, the painstaking scholar, is always paramount. It might be difficult to prove from documentary evidence that Francois de Laval, that austere mystic and ascetic, who was first bishop of the colony of New France, "slept, by choice, between thin blankets well filled with fleas", but such dramatized tit-bits reflect the informed historian who is also a "popular" scribbler, who conceals his ignorance behind artistic adornment.

About a quarter of the book is devoted to the so-called "heroic age" of French missions, exploration and the westward movement of the beaver trade, concluding with the climax of Anglo-French conflict in the Seven Years' War. Thence follows the story of the American Revolution and its aftermath: the creation of a land of two nationalities. The well-worn theme—the evolution of responsible government—is dealt with succinctly and shrewdly; the account of the making of a "Transcontinental Dominion" between 1850 and 1873, with its close analysis of economic, military and political issues is, perhaps, the best chapter in the book. Of course, all roads lead to nationhood, but Creighton, as a doughty opponent of the "Whig Interpretation" of Canadian history, refuses to interpret the protracted and intricate development towards political independence within the narrow and familiar rut of a struggle for freedom against British obduracy. After all, whether they like to admit it or not, there was a time when Canadians had to depend for existence on the weight and bargaining power of British diplomacy. Even as a Dominion it was inevitable that Canada should remain for long in the frustrating position of a midget on a stage dominated by two great powers, and no one was naïve enough in those days to suggest she was playing the part of interpreter.

Sometimes British governments did place Anglo-American understanding ahead of Canadian "rights"; British statesmen were not prepared to press Canadian claims to the verge of war; but in retrospect Creighton's analysis of Anglo-American diplomacy makes it quite clear that Canada had far more to lose from a just war than from an unjust treaty. Canadians, like the first Prime Minister John A. Macdonald, might curse the timidity or stupidity of British diplomats, but Macdonald himself knew full well that if Canada were left to her own resources the chances of survival would be thin indeed.

Ultimately, of course, the political independence of Canada depended on the strength of the democratic tradition in the United States. If the United States had ever embarked on an imperialist crusade under a Senatorial slogan of Manifest Destiny, then Canadian independence might have "paid the piper"; similarly, if Canada had tried to throw her weight about, had attempted in short, to play a rôle that cut across American interests, she might have invited drastic interference. Any form of benevolent supervision can be irritating. Playing second-fiddle to a great, however considerate, Power has its drawbacks, as Creighton has repeatedly emphasized; on the other hand, it gave Canada an enviable security.

It is fair to say that, today, Canada's attitude towards the outside world is dominated by two things, *One*, her proximity to the United States, and, *Two*, the racial (or, if you prefer it, the cultural) divisions within the country—chiefly French and English. These are the decisive facts of Canadian history. In the interests of national unity, Canadian policy has been such as would have the widest, and at the same time, the least disruptive appeal to a heterogeneous nation, of which the Anglo-Saxon proportion is only about fifty per cent. As

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\*Chairman of the Department of History, University of Toronto.

in 1919 (with the League of Nations), because of her racial divergencies, and because of her proximity to a sensitive Great Neighbour, Canadian politicians, in particular Mackenzie King, found it simpler and safer to propound foreign policy in terms of universal security, namely, through the United Nations, or through NATO, rather than put their energies primarily within a British Commonwealth association.

In other words, UNO and NATO have saved Canada from a painful dilemma, *viz.*, on the one hand, moving into closer partnership with Britain and the other members of the Commonwealth; or, on the other, allowing herself to become more closely tied to the United States—resigning herself, it might be said, to a total dependence on the power and decisions of another government. For the old role of balancing herself as an intermediary between two great powers of apparently equal strength had gone by the end of the second world war. British power had steadily diminished; that of the United States had enormously increased. Hence, fearful of the growing dependence on Washington, still sensitive to London in a curious adolescent way, and at the same time fearful of having to take responsibility for independent action, Canadian governments sought refuge on the international stage, where there was prestige, if not influence, to be won, with a minimum of responsibility.

Apart from certain limited and reluctantly accepted obligations, the emphasis of Canadian policy has been on *Peace*, and *not* the enforcement of peace. High above the hurly-burly of power politics, Liberal Cabinet Ministers for example, at the time of Suez, could fling down their moral thunderbolts in the cause of a peaceable and stable world. Yet, one may doubt whether the Government were seriously interested in the use of force through UNO. After all, as the Archbishop of York said at the time: "There is a big and important distinction between moral sentiments and moral judgments." If one makes a moral judgment, one must be prepared to back it up, and if Canada wishes to strengthen her influence in the Councils of the world, she may, in the future, have to support pious exhortations by deeds, even to the extent of paying for some form of national military service.

In his concluding chapter, "Modern Canada in a Great-Power World", Creighton discusses not only the fantastic post-war economic developments, but the growth of the arts, letters and sciences as additional evidence of growing national maturity. It is an impressive summary, but unhappily it veers both from licensed poesy and good history, *e.g.* ". . . the long procession of English lecturers, which had paraded so confidently through Canada in the 1920's and 1930's, had dwindled away to occasional appearances of not very impressive celebrities, including a few bores or boors". Such judgments, whatever their worth, suggest pique, and, in any event, are a little ungracious, if not boorish. Again, one wonders whether the statement that "Canadian novels were beginning to outsell American and British novels three or four times over" should, if true (which I doubt), be accounted to Canadian taste or Canadian nationalism.

Canada's is the problem of a nation rich in material things; the élite of Canada are business men, a condition which affects academic standards, political standards and cultural standards. Mr. Morley Callaghan, one of the ablest of the few professional writers in Canada, recently described, with a nice irony, the terms on which the writer might be accepted in his community: "He lives in a society dedicated to the business man. He has to have friends, and his neighbours are usually all business men who feel slightly uneasy when communicating with him. . . . If they invite him in for a drink they have to go to great pains to make sure that the other guest is 'intellectual'. . . . If he is a well-known writer—I mean if his name is well known—he gradually learns that he has the social status of an associate professor, and from then on his increasing social success depends on the well-known names around town he can drop lightly. Of course, if the writer gets his name in the papers from time to time, he can easily assume this democratic virtue of success; and if he can keep up the act long enough he will finally win for himself the respect of his community as a successful business man."

Canada will need, not more skyscrapers, but more ivory towers to fulfil her destiny as a great country, and, it might be added, more individuals of Professor Creighton's creative powers to fill them.

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GERALD S. GRAHAM



MOSCOW AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA. By John H. Kautsky. Published jointly by John Wiley and Sons, New York (Chapman and Hall, London) and Technology Press of M.I.T. Pp. xii + 220. No price given.

At first sight one is inclined to be dubious of a book on this subject by an author who has never "observed Indian Communist activities at first hand" nor even had any assistance worth acknowledging from Indians Right, Left or centre. As one reads, one is impressed by the painstaking detail of the analysis, based practically entirely on intra- or inter-party documents. Yet at the end one is left with a sense of opportunities missed, and missed by reason of a self-denying ordinance rather than of necessity. For wartime Japan or iron-curtained China, the methods of a Gorer or a Rostow may be the only feasible ones; but this does not apply to India, and it may be suggested that the rigorous restraint of Kautsky's approach, however scientific in intent and indeed to a considerable degree in spirit, perhaps gives less understanding than a wider if less precise survey.

Kautsky would probably reply that this objection is implicitly anticipated in his opening pages: the book is not a history of the C.P.I. as such, and much that would be necessary to that history is irrelevant to the narrower theme of how the strategy of the party evolved; a theme which is then as it were widened by extrapolation to explain how changes in Communist strategy are put over throughout the world. But without this local analysis, how can we be sure that the C.P.I. is indeed a fair model? Are we not discounting in advance possible significant variables? At one important point at least the argument breaks down into admitted guess-work, in discussing Ranadive's "Leftist" inner-party dictatorship (pp. 68-77), and here a more naturalistic analysis might have been useful. Ranadive after all was an academic, and not a bad one, before he was a Communist, and the clue to much that perplexes Kautsky might be simply that he was (relatively) honest and (absolutely) inept. At least, in the context of country and period, such an interpretation ought to be considered. And indeed, in passages that carry much more conviction (pp. 59-60, 116-17), Kautsky does resort to analysis of a concrete social situation—the Telangana rising and the "violent neo-Maoism" of the Andhra leadership.

At times there are distinct ambiguities in the argument, and at times the evidence seems rather strained, as in the deduction that the use of the word "camp" (camp of reaction and so on) indicates the influence of a particular speech of Zhdanov's (p. 37 n.); a usage surely not confined to Communists nor even to this century. On the whole however the book is closely argued, and inconsistencies are not such as seriously to invalidate the general thesis. The style, though not brilliant, successfully resists contamination from the dreary documents it paraphrases, and occasionally is mildly epigrammatic—*e.g.* "no reason, except the negligible one of Marxist theory, why exploiters too should not be mobilised" (p. 191) or the definition of C.P.'s in under-developed countries as "intellectuals seeking a popular base where they could find it" (p. 11)—and not only in these countries; members of the C.P.G.B., in unpublished lighter moments, have referred to the party as "the driving-belt between the intelligentsia and the lumpenproletariat".

Although there are often revealing lights on tactics, *e.g.* in the remarks on the peace front (p. 193), the core of the book is not so much the vicissitudes of the C.P.I. as the elucidation of the three strategies of world Communism—Left, Right, and neo-Maoist. "The essential and unique characteristic of the neo-Maoist strategy is its direct appeal 'from below', that is, not through bourgeois parties, to sections of the bourgeoisie. . . . The party of the proletariat is to unite all classes, regardless of their class interests, provided they are opposed to imperialism, meaning the United States. In short, the class struggle has been replaced by the cold war" (p. 12). Kautsky notes that this appeal even includes "progressive" feudal landlords (pp. 12, 91), a matter which may well be of great significance in the Middle East.

Much of this strategic analysis seems impeccable, and on the whole one feels that Kautsky makes out his case, with perhaps a little exaggeration and rigidity: thus on his own showing Moscow signally failed to direct the C.P.I. at times, and his evidence is now and then difficult to square with his views on the monolithic character of Communist strategy—as indeed shows through his arguments for this uniformity (pp. 194-9). But the book as a whole deserves careful

study. All the same, one closes it with some feeling that if the author had widened his terms of reference to include some solid Marxist analysis of his type-specimen—the Communist Party of India—one would feel more assured that the broader conclusions were fully validated. It is surely not unreasonable to expect such analysis from a Kautsky!

Canberra

O. H. K. SPATE

BUREAUCRACY IN NEW ZEALAND. Edited by R. S. Milne. New Zealand Institute of Public Administration. Wellington and London, Oxford University Press, 1957. Pp. 137. £1 stg.

Discourse about bureaucracy is peculiarly subject to confusion. Every attempt at clarification or illustration is to be encouraged but a cold eye should be cast at contributions which ignore the difficulties. What sort of welcome should we give to this volume, the latest in a growing series of publications of the papers of the annual conventions of the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration?

Apart from Professor Milne the contributors include two public servants, two lawyers and a politician (the then Attorney-General). Milne's paper is very important, and the others are more nearly important than they might have been expected (or, perhaps, intended) to be. A member of the Public Service Commission, Mr. Frederick Baker, drawing on his experience in the somewhat peculiar context of the Rehabilitation Board and Department, asks what factors determine the degrees and occasions of influence by the permanent head as an adviser to the Minister. The Minister, J. R. Marshall, matches this with a talk on ministerial responsibility in which we are told a little about particular New Zealand modulations of the operation of this doctrine. One of the lawyers, D. J. Riddiford, gives "A Citizen's Point of View", but this is an untidy paper, the weakest in the volume and mainly irrelevant to the rest. The second lawyer, R. B. Cooke, presents a much more distinguished piece of work. This is an assessment of the changing attitudes of New Zealand and English courts to the review of administrative powers and tribunals. Cooke's paper makes a useful summary of some case-law between 1929 and 1946 and since, but he does not look at tribunals and the administrative process in their own right and he places far too much importance on judicial opinion as against the actual substance of legislation. Surely the lesson of *Willett v. Minister of Agriculture* is that even the most original and determined judicial efforts in the British or New Zealand systems cannot in the end withstand legislation which has deliberately set out to remove the possibility of judicial review? Must we then not look to the reform of tribunals and processes themselves; neither Robson (as far as a supreme administrative tribunal is concerned) nor Hewart but Franks is the thing?

The final paper is given by the second civil servant, Mr. P. B. Marshall, on professional ethics and administrative discretion. In the light of contemporary American discussion of public service ethics (Monypenny), objective responsibility (Friedrich) and the public interest (Appleby) this is obviously something that ought to be talked about by officials of Marshall's wisdom and experience in such highly discretionary functions as licensing in the Department of Industries and Commerce. Appleby would approve of most of what Marshall says, for example about the "political" nature of the work of top officials, all the more, perhaps, because it is obvious from the way in which Marshall lightly dismisses problems like the clash of sectional and public interests ("wearing out the carpet", he says, is not an effective tactic) that he is not generally aware of the United States literature on the subject.

P. B. Marshall has thought it all out for himself, then, and so apparently have J. R. Marshall and Baker. One is not always convinced that this is wholly a good thing: the discussion of the public interest is one instance of this; some knowledge of what has been done about role conceptions in bureaucracy would improve the treatment of the problem of the reconciliation of professional and public service codes of ethics; and much of this book, concerned as it is with the status of official influence in decision-making, would be clarified by some reference to theories of advice. The very importance of the topics raised tends to make one a little impatient of a weakness in theoretical equipment which drives one back, once again,



to American work. But at its best the result is an intriguing combination of shrewd observation with a revealing series of myths, silences and rhapsodies. Baker's enumeration of the occasions when the permanent head must defend Minister and policy is a useful corrective—all the more striking in a context of cabinet government—of L. D. White's theory of the politician as the defender. Baker is similarly illuminating about the variation of types, and not just of the importance, of issues as a factor in the permanent head-Minister nexus. Of course any serving public servant is going to limit the number of secrets he gives away and is going to claim an unlikely degree of harmony in administrative relations or of wisdom in ministerial interventions; it is disingenuous of Baker to pretend that this might not apply to a public service commissioner also. Retirement, one gathers, alters this. But there are revelations here, at any rate of conventions that need empirical testing: the different implications of what Baker (pp. 43-4) and J. R. Marshall (pp. 61-2) have to say about the sacred Australasian practice of direct personal approach to Ministers by citizens on individual cases is one instance of this; the concept of the public interest is another.

It is clear from these contributions that it is in organisational procedures that the key to the reform of discretion lies: Norton Long and his colleagues would receive ample support from this book. This takes us to its most important part. Professor Milne has not merely done a first class job of editing. His own paper is a notable contribution to the literature of administrative discretion. His definition of the theme which he thinks ought to be discussed is pretty clear: it is the exercise of discretion by civil servants, and he notes the incomparably greater significance for a study of New Zealand bureaucracy of central government as against local government or business organisation. Sometimes Milne seems on the point of leaving this definition and talking instead about general criticisms of the public service. Mainly, however, his argument is that the thing to talk about is discretion and so to explain its causes and its problems. This tends to become a defence: it is, it ought to be. He is far from those schools of thought about administrative responsibility which would expunge discretion by attacking its roots. The question he asks is what might be done about the inevitable concomitants of discretion, but there is also the question of why discretion goes wrong: can we just ignore Parkinson; or, to take another example, if we have administrative discretion do we therefore have to have contact men also? Milne is aware of contact men and of the 1950 Herbert report about intermediaries in the United Kingdom but he does not use the material provided in the report to ask questions about the pathology of discretion. This is a pity, for that report suggests a most useful framework for enquiry.

It is clear from Milne's paper that there is also the problem of whether one should talk about bureaucracy as the result of discretion or, on the contrary, of attempts to minimise it. Weber, after all, set up a model of regulated behaviour. Milne sees that there must be some qualification of discretion. He does not show that this means that one must discuss either Weberian bureaucracy or the problem of designing checks which do not vitiate the profits expected of discretion. The points system, for example, is not a check but an abolition of discretion; grievances are pushed into the fields of policy (about the points) or execution; perhaps Milne does not give sufficient attention to a differentiation of types of discretion, though he refers to Leys, one of the key writers on this matter. To search for non-destructive checks is to think about public interest concepts (as Milne and some of his contributors do) and about the definition and publication of rules for administrative processes. The importance of such rules is implied here and there but what Milne talks about are policy rules. He sees that there are severe problems about their development and publication, but procedural rules are different and free from these difficulties. Milne perceives but does not work out this distinction.

Milne is mainly concerned with administrative discretion in the operation of economic controls. The other contributors do not deal very happily with the problem of interest pressures on administration in this field. Milne himself points out very acutely the potential role of pressure by big firms in a situation like New Zealand's where big firms are few; he also refers to Redford's *Administration of National Economic Control*. It would be very interesting to see him exploit Chapter IX of that classical study in a comparison of American and New Zealand experience.



One other reference to American literature can now be made. Milne sees that the problem of checking discretion in economic regulation is created by its variety of objectives and the impossibility of precisely weighting them. It was Herbert Simon's realisation of precisely these two obstacles to a maximising of rationality in decision-making that provoked his introduction to the second edition of *Administrative Behaviour*, composed presumably at much the same time as Milne's paper. Administration becomes a matter of bounded rationality, or, if you like, common sense. Simon might wish to escape from this by laboratory experiments, others (one hopes not Milne) by a replacement of discretion by points, priorities and other doubtful devices. The one would seem to destroy the possibility of studying anything important; the other would seem to destroy the administrative role itself. The real question is how the common sense of the administrator's behaviour can make good rather than bad sense to his Minister, himself and his public whatever that might be. This is a pretty delicate matter generally and peculiarly so in some fields, including economic regulation, which, as Milne splendidly says, is about brutal matters such as who gets what. It is certainly a legitimate topic to discuss under the heading of bureaucracy. Our verdict must be a warm welcome for a book which includes this provocative essay by Professor Milne. It is a brilliant introduction to a most enjoyable work.

Brisbane

B. B. SCHAFER

SOURCES OF AUSTRALIAN HISTORY. Selected and edited by M. Clark. Oxford University Press, 1957. 12/9.

Professor Clark has probably done more than any other scholar to destroy the myth that Australia has no history. Yet he is one of the least insular professional historians in Australia. Most of his colleagues, if set to compile this book, would have shied away from documents and produced instead short vignettes saying in a dozen pages of self conscious flippancy all that need be said of this unhistoric land. But Clark is not scornful of the parish pump or vainly nostalgic about some "period". From material at hand, his enquiring mind makes richness.

Australian history is purveyed in various forms. From written remnants of events themselves and reminiscences of participants, it rises to scholarly works of synthesis and interpretation, and then descends through textbooks to those less reputable places where the wreckage of yesterday's knowledge mixes with propaganda and fiction. In every form, it is incomplete and selective, and like all other history, its quality can be no better than its source. Since Clark is too fastidious to take stale sips from muddied streams, he must be forgiven if he offers fresh water only by the bucketful. Those who are not dominated by distaste for "parochial" documents will find refreshment in his latest collection. Six hundred pages chastely bound at 12/9 is a bargain to librarians and their committees harassed by high prices and cheap paper backs. Now that Clark has joined the popular blue ribbon series, it is too much to hope that more Australian articles and reviews of Australian books will appear in overseas journals?

As in his earlier volumes, Clark shrewdly sticks to printed sources, although this is not the reason for his immodest disclaimer that the work is not "scholarship or a textbook for students doing academic history". Selections from manuscripts may sometimes appear more erudite or original, but not even Clark's austere discipline could arrange them with the strict relevance of this collection. So we are guided through six stages of European men in Australia; of the unrevealed last, like Rita Hayworth's version of the seven veils dance, the less said the better. All except the discoverers have their scraps of verse to prove that poets can be more concise than politicians, and even the discoverers are given a veneer of blessed culture by the monk Cosmas. Otherwise, the documents tell their own earthy human tale. Somehow at least a corner of the curtain is lifted on every important act. But Clark is no mere scene shifter. He adds his own astringent commentary, full of laconic phrases that taunt and mystify, yet clearly show the subject is not closed.

Adelaide

DOUGLAS PIKE

WILLIAM MORRIS HUGHES: HIS LIFE AND TIMES. By W. Farmer Whyte. Sydney, Angus and Robertson, 1957. Pp. viii + 557. 50/- A.

There are three groups of people from whom we may expect books about political history: the politicians, the journalists and the academics. The three are more sharply distinguished in Australia than elsewhere, for few among either the politicians or the journalists have had sufficient academic training to affect the type of work which they produce. If there is one thing on which the academics and the journalists agree, it is that the politicians are not likely themselves to write balanced and comprehensive accounts of their own work and certainly W. M. Hughes's three volumes of reminiscences make no such claim. It must be said that Mr. Whyte's biography is not a great contribution from the journalistic side. It lacks the perception shown in some much shorter ventures in political history by Federal parliamentary journalists, such as Denning's *Caucus Crisis* and even Whittington's *The House Will Divide*, though its sheer factual content is, of course, much greater. However, despite its faults, Whyte's life of Hughes must take second place to Evatt's *Australian Labour Leader* among lives of twentieth century Australians.

Let no one begrudge Mr. Whyte his due. This is a serious study of Hughes's political career up to the time of his forced resignation as Prime Minister in 1923. It shows as full a knowledge of the parliamentary history of the Commonwealth to that point as any other writer has so far revealed in print, with the exception of Professor Sawyer's recently published handbook which serves quite different purposes. This is an achievement for which we should be grateful. He who reads thus far will obtain a coherent account of the politics of the time although, quite properly, an incomplete one.

It is less likely that the reader will feel that he has gained much understanding of Hughes himself, though there are plenty of anecdotes in confirmation of the legendary temperament. Other reviewers have questioned much of Whyte's account of Hughes's early life, which appears to be based on the subject's own lively recollections. For the same reason, a query must be placed against some later sections which break new ground, such as those on the Peace negotiations. However, until the narrative reaches 1923 hope remains alive that a revealing picture of the man will emerge before the book ends.

Unfortunately, this hope, together with any others relating to the section after Hughes ceased to be Prime Minister, is unfulfilled. The closing chapters, purporting to cover the last 29 years of his life, are thoroughly bad. It is not so much that they are too few and too short as that their pages are squandered on all manner of irrelevancies to the exclusion of material which not only could have been valuable for its own sake, but might have helped produce that impression of Hughes as man and politician which never emerges clearly. Is it conceivable that Mr. Whyte does not know that between 1941 and 1943 Hughes replaced Menzies as leader of the United Australia Party? Surely not; yet is it easier to suppose that he considered this less worthy of mention than the number of casualties in the air raids on Darwin or the circumstances of the death of J. B. Chifley? Hughes's part in bringing about the defeat of the Bruce-Page Government in 1929 is mentioned briefly, but the fact that Hughes contested the subsequent election at the head of the short-lived Australian Party is not. And how can a parliamentary journalist who witnessed the period of the Scullin Government describe the Mungana affair as "a rather unsavoury episode connected with the construction of a railway"? "Connected" indeed, but how tenuously!

Apparently by the time his account reached 1923 the author had tired of his work or considered that in all important respects it was accomplished, and hurried on to the end. This was a mistake, for the impression of a discursive and formless narrative, which is often held at bay during the earlier part of the book, is confirmed beyond doubt by the concluding section.

The obvious comparison which comes to mind is with *Australian Labour Leader*, a work in the academic tradition. On most counts, Evatt's book is vastly superior to Mr. Whyte's. His range of sources was much wider and he used them with greater method and precision. There is nothing in Mr. Whyte's book comparable to Evatt's careful and even laborious prefatory list of "problems" which he wished to illuminate. This was an inelegant way to begin a

biography and is certainly not to be regarded as a canon to be followed. The damaging charge against Mr. Whyte is that he had nothing comparable to it in his head either. It is just this sort of conceptual stiffening which his book required to hold it together. Without it, not only the facts but the standards of judgment and relevancy are the transient ones of the period immediately under discussion. The great danger of the journalist-turned-historian is that he will not appreciate the need for some framework of purpose to take the place of the cement of topicality on which he has become accustomed to rely.

However, in case this should appear to be a plea for a "closed shop" for academics in political biography, it should be remembered that the essential purpose of biography is the evocation of a personality, and that Evatt was no more successful in recreating a credible Holman than Mr. Whyte has been in re-creating a credible Hughes. The definitive life of Hughes, it has been said, remains to be written. So, for that matter, does a really satisfying biography of any Australian of this century.

Canberra

D. W. RAWSON

**A SQUATTER WENT TO SEA: the Story of Sir William Macleay's New Guinea Expedition (1875) and His Life in Sydney.** By David S. Macmillan. Sydney, Currawong Publishing Co., 1957. 27/- A.

When William Macleay left Sydney in the *Chevert* in May 1875 bound for New Guinea he had modest hopes of increasing the store of scientific knowledge. The great crowd that faredwelled him saw the expedition in another light. Sydney was in the midst of an irrational fever of interest in New Guinea and at a public meeting only a week before the great riches of the island had been extolled and a unanimous motion pressing for British annexation had been passed. Sydney expected Macleay to return with some of these riches so when in October he returned with nothing but specimens in bottles his expedition was dubbed a failure.

Mr. Macmillan's study of this expedition and of the man who led it is an admirable one. It is based on some of Macleay's diaries and the *Chevert's* log book, but it is no mere collection of extracts. It places the expedition in its historical setting, provides a picture of Sydney in the 1870's, recounts the actual voyage and examines the controversy that it aroused. But more than this its bold and imaginative style makes it a pleasure to read. As the author suspects there are some doubtful interpretations and some errors. For instance, Sydney's New Guinea fever owed more to Moresby's reports and Carnarvon's interest than to mere "rumours and travellers' tales", and Port Moresby was not named by Captain Moresby "for himself" but after his father, Admiral Fairfax Moresby. But these are very minor matters and in no way detract from the book's worth.

The expedition itself met with many difficulties which were bound to be experienced by travellers to New Guinea in 1875. The uncharted seas and hidden reefs placed a great strain on the ship's officers, New Guinea's rivers proved difficult to penetrate, and fever took its toll. Macleay had hoped to penetrate inland by going up the Fly River but as the south-east monsoon prevented an approach being made, he had to content himself with work at Katau River, west of the Fly, and at Yule Island in the east. Fever forced the expedition to withdraw and further plans to reach the Fly had to be scrapped.

These modest achievements pleased no one. Sydney had expected much more, while the missionaries, like McFarlane, saw Macleay as the vanguard of the settlers they wished to keep out as long as possible. On both sides Macleay was assailed, for doing too much and for doing too little.

Mr. Macmillan shows clearly how Macleay's actions were misinterpreted and one must agree with his general conclusion that the expedition was not a failure. Within Macleay's limited intentions, it certainly was not. But further, his reports of New Guinea, coupled with those of other observers at first hand, breathed an air of reality into the New Guinea agitation and helped to kill Australia's first interest in New Guinea as an island of boundless riches ripe for exploitation and crying out for white settlers. In itself this was a valuable achievement.

The book is instructive in an entertaining way and has some excellent illustrations.

Sydney

J. A. MILES



THE AUSTRALIAN TRADING BANKS. By H. W. Arndt. Melbourne, F. W. Cheshire, 1957. Pp. vi + 216. 17/6.

The past two decades have been years of crisis and great changes for Australia's banking system. Perhaps developments have been too hectic and indeterminate to have encouraged much in the way of analysis, or even description. Professor Arndt's *The Australian Trading Banks* undertakes both analysis and description and in so doing has earned pride of place as a pioneering study, in short perspective, of what has "emerged from the changes".

About half the book is mainly descriptive of the composition of the banks, their deposits and advances, the money supply, securities and, in generous detail, foreign business and policy. The graphs and statistical lists are valuable but why amidst the other up-to-date material are we given a simple, easy-to-get but three years old table of branches and agencies?

The banking companies will find little comfort in this book. An unsympathetic spotlight is turned on their alleged shortcomings whilst the Commonwealth Bank emerges with practically all the garlands. As early as Chapter I an author's attitudinal hint is dropped when the banks are charged with setting up subsidiary nominee companies—"whose activities are hidden from the public gaze"—specifically to handle "hot money". This claim would have been more convincing if Professor Arndt had revealed how he drew a line of demarcation between "hot money" and funds held for genuine investment.

The chapter on Foreign Exchange might well be taken as a standard of research and lucid writing to be striven after by others. One would, nevertheless, have liked a little more detail on the 1929-31 revaluation crises. Open differences no longer occur on exchange matters between the Commonwealth Bank and the banking companies and an assessment of the actions of the Bank of New South Wales at that time—often said to be meritorious—would have been welcome.

Undoubtedly the most stimulating sections of the book are those dealing with Capital and Income and Monetary Policy. In these there is so much of value and interest that more space might well have been given to them. Here we are brought face to face with the practical problems of reconciling the various aspects of the Commonwealth Bank's charter. Professor Arndt believes that the maintenance of full employment has not been a major task compared with the difficulties of currency stabilization and the safeguarding of the balance of payments. The resistance of the banking companies to central bank action is, he implies, typified by their alleged refusal to adhere to an L.G.S. ratio of 25 per cent. during the 1954 boom. Points which other writers might in due course be expected to make, when giving other points of view, will include mention of over-emphasis on trading bank restrictions to the exclusion of limitations on other inflationary elements such as government spending. Added to the Special Account figure the banks found an L.G.S. average ratio of 25 per cent. a little unrealistic so far as business needs were concerned. Professor Arndt does however very directly point the finger at governments who "find it politically impossible—or should one say lack the political courage—to adopt the necessary measures of budget policy or direct economic control".

In the general context of liquidity it seems a little inadequate to highlight the satisfactory figure maintained by the Commonwealth Trading Bank without also mentioning the transfer of long-term loans to the Savings Bank for which it received securities, just prior to the boom years.

Another topic touched on only sufficiently to whet the appetite is that of the possibility of establishing an Australian short-term money market. With so much emphasis on the bluntness of the central bank's weapons the book could well have contained a section devoted to possible means of getting a little more subtlety and finesse into the implementation of monetary policy. Bank advances are shown to have a diminishing influence in the economy and the reasons for this are clearly given. In recent years, says Professor Arndt, "the trading banks have been shorn of all authority over monetary policy. All their former monetary policy functions, as well as those which before 1941 were performed by the monetary standard, are now formally vested in the Commonwealth Bank, which in the last resort, is subject to the higher authority of the Commonwealth Government, and indirectly to Parliament and the

electorate. The trading banks are reduced to the role of trading enterprises providing banking services under the close control and supervision of the central bank". A logical sequence to his analysis of why and how this has happened would have been an examination of the rapid growth of hire purchase and other "fringe" banking services which have taken up part of the demand unfulfilled by banks operating under strong restrictions on advances and interest rates.

There is an interesting sidelight on the internal difficulties which unused overdraft limits present in the administration of restrictive advance policies but a positive alternative has apparently not presented itself strongly. One suspects that the banks themselves would not be averse to a method of lending which would bring their commitments and actual advances closer together.

In the administration of Special Accounts—the main central bank weapon—the central bank is claimed to have had a difficult time with the banking companies. "They have fought every extension of the powers of the central bank with tenacity and it is doubtful whether they are all, even yet, reconciled to the very notion of central banking." This point, even if valid at the time of writing, could hardly be sustained today when the banks' recommendations for legislative reform include a central bank call-up to statutory reserve account of up to 100 per cent.

In a book of this kind one cannot but wonder why Professor Arndt drops his academic approach every so often for little "asides" which appear to help not at all and which at times remind one more of the political pamphleteer than of the economist. That however should not affect our respect for the immense worth of the work. This is almost a unique book and no student of Australian finance can afford not to know it well.

*Sydney*

R. B. PROWSE

THE HIGHER PUBLIC SERVICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA. By Howard A. Scarrow. Duke University Commonwealth Studies Centre, Durham, N.C. \$3.50.

Very little has so far been written of the Morants and Sadlers of Australia. Australian politicians have not been generous with public compliments to them as were Joseph Chamberlain and Lloyd George and even Herbert Morrison in the old country. The press, with rare exceptions, either ignores them or complains of the growing power of bureaucracy. Dr. Scarrow's slender volume is therefore welcome as the first attempt to study the subject objectively.

After a brief introduction about Australian federalism, political parties and the Commonwealth Public Service Board, the book goes on to deal with the "machinery governing the composition of the higher public service". The classification system of the Commonwealth public service, the various methods of recruitment and the promotion process, are all examined under this heading. The third chapter traces the growth in numbers as well as functions of the higher public service. The main theme of this chapter is the increase of assistant secretaryships, with definite differentiation in functions in the major departments, particularly after the acceptance by the Commonwealth government of Keynesian and Beveridgian doctrines and the growth of the foreign service after the second world war. The composition of the higher public service is then examined, first with regard to recruitment sources and then as to age levels and state of origin. The periods before and after 1939 are analysed separately to bring out the striking differences in composition in the latter period, owing to the influence of "lateral" and graduate recruitment and the war. The author speculates on the possibility of the increasing importance of graduate recruitment—analyses and evaluates it. He would attribute its success to the use of graduates as specialists in appropriate jobs. The concluding chapter sums up the various factors that make the higher public servant in the Commonwealth very influential, namely short Parliaments with shorter sessions, and short lived ministries with frequent changes of portfolios.

Careful accumulation, selection and handling of material have helped in developing the main theme clearly in such a short space. The main conclusions on the changing composition and increasing influence of the top bureaucracy are well supported by the evidence. The book



deserves careful study by all students of public administration in Australia for the light it throws on the subject and even more for the starting point it offers for further research.

It is not, however, entirely free from the triple temptations of all pioneering work, namely the tendency to lengthy introductory sections, to make easy ephemeral comparisons, and to touch on too many points without going deeply enough into many of them. That seventy pages out of 160 are devoted to introductory material is really a charge sheet against earlier publishers and research workers, or rather the lack of them. This part of the book could have been compressed considerably if the background material on public service classification and arbitration were more widely known. In fact however the nature of the Commonwealth public service classification, its basis in specific job values, and its narrow salary ranges are for the first time well explained in the book.

There are a number of points on which the reviewer would join issue—though many of them are not directly important to the conclusions of the book. An implied assumption that the Australian classification system corresponds to the American is highly questionable. While the American administrators were prepared till recently to go to the logical conclusion of the principle of specific job valuation, their Australian counterparts were less sure of it and the principle itself only attained a certain immortality because of the arbitration process. The term "lateral recruitment" is rather loosely used without indicating the level at which it is made and the special skills represented. More caution and precision are required in this respect, since the recruitment of the engineer and the doctor at the base grade appropriate to the degree holder is dubbed "lateral" in Australia, obviously on the specious plea that the bulk of clerical recruitment is at a lower salary level. A careful breakdown of the figures of "lateral" recruitment into different groups would have served to avoid this confusion. Dr. Scarrow again concludes not without some good evidence that graduates owe their quick progress to their specialist training rather than to general ability. This however makes no allowance for the smokescreen of official attitudes. The British Treasury takes pride in the fact that its best permanent secretaries were prizewinners in the classics, while the Australian pragmatist would rather represent his man of general ability as a specialist in whatever position he happened to occupy. Both are poses and equally misleading.

The reviewer would take a more serious view of some important sins of omission. There is little about the social background of the higher public service, mainly because research material on the subject has only recently begun to accumulate. The author has failed to take full note of the extent to which the McLachlan Royal Commission Report of 1920 and consequent legislation helped permanent heads in the Commonwealth public service to assume their present high stature. The importance of the Commonwealth legislation of 1922-4 becomes evident through a comparison with State services, particularly that of New South Wales where the Public Service Board still guards its powers over the permanent heads jealously, and where the Board's spokesmen feel that the McLachlan Report set in motion an un-Australian practice while the New South Wales Mason Allard report of 1918 consolidated the Australian tradition. The section dealing with political neutrality in the last chapter gets the picture out of focus since the facts are presented without the proper background. In this chapter again, some case studies of the nature of the influence of permanent heads on their Ministers would have been a valuable addition. It is said that in spite of Mr. Menzies's attack on the political activities of the head of the External Affairs Department, Dr. Burton, early in 1949, the subsequent Menzies Government, through its External Affairs Minister, Mr. Spender, was considerably influenced by Burton's advice on such issues as Indonesian independence and recognition of Red China. Such instances are worth closer investigation. Lastly there is this question on Australian political psychology—why are Australian politicians so slow to compliment their advisers in public in comparison with their British counterparts?

Let us, however, be thankful for what the book tells us. So far as it goes it is a most valuable contribution.



THE POLITICS OF ENGLISH DISSENT. By Raymond G. Cowherd. New York, New York University Press, 1956. Pp. 167 (text); notes and bibliography to p. 242. \$5.

In this study, Professor Cowherd's field is very much more restricted, and his approach very much less critical, than the title suggests. His broad aim, as he says in his preface, is to identify the moral and social ingredients of the Whig and Liberal parties in the political tumult of the 1830's, and to study the contributions of the Evangelical revival and the Dissenting sects to the liberal and humanitarian reform of the time. But in fact, he gives us only a very restricted study of the role played by dissenting and evangelical religious groups in the various reform movements in England between 1815 and 1845, told skilfully and in considerable detail, but with no attempt to tackle the more critical issues, large or small.

Thus Professor Cowherd gives us chapters on the Dissenters' role in fighting against slavery, child labour, the corn laws, religious tests and church taxes, and for popular education, parliamentary reform, and religious liberty; all of which they treated as intensely religious issues. But Professor Cowherd, for all his readability, writes too much as though he were simply a humble chronicler who had been there himself, caught up in the May meetings at London, seeing all of the trees, and not much of the wood. He gives us potted biographies of the various leaders and their religious background, details of the connexions between various preachers, Parliamentarians, and businessmen (all of them well-known and none of them startling), the temporal sequence of protests and petitions, rallies and organisations. He does succeed in showing, of course, that the influence of religion was extremely important, but never does he ask the obvious question: just where was it important, in what respects was it decisive? For Professor Cowherd, of course, recognises that the Dissenters were also industrialists, bankers and merchants, fighting a landed aristocracy and church. But the crucial problem of weighing the relative importance of their economic background and their religious convictions Professor Cowherd eschews entirely. Yet that, it seems to me, would be the main reason for studying in detail the politics of English Dissent.

This complete reluctance to tackle the critical issues involved reveals itself in smaller matters as well. Thus Professor Cowherd never examines properly the basis of his distinction between Wesleyan humanitarianism and Dissenting liberalism. He never attempts even to characterise, let alone analyse, the other main element in his religious struggle, the Church of England, whose unprecedented change during that period must be understood before we can seriously discuss the influence of religion on English politics. He leaves all too sketchy the relationships between Quakers, Presbyterians, Baptists, and Unitarians, whom he treats as far too homogeneous, and obscures the tensions between radical dissenters and their milder brethren.

In short, Professor Cowherd writes readably of everything which can merely be retold, and eschews anything that needs critical examination or placing in a broader framework. At best, his book may become a convenient chronicle for the undergraduate, giving him a fair number of facts, but no food for thought.

*Singapore*

EUGENE KAMENKA

### THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON

The University of Chicago and the University of Virginia are sponsoring the publication of a new and complete edition of the papers of James Madison. The editors will appreciate information about the location of letters by or to James Madison or his wife, especially letters in private possession or among uncalendared manuscripts in the collections of public or private institutions. Please address The Papers of James Madison, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago 37, Illinois.



# Book Notes

The following new editions of two classic works have been received:

THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICS AT THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III. By Sir Lewis Namier. Second edition, London, Macmillan, 1957. Pp. xvii + 514. £A3/12/-.  
SATOW'S GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE. Edited by Sir Nevile Bland. Fourth edition, London, Longmans, Green, 1957. Pp. xviii + 510. £A4/15/9.

The following publications may be drawn to the attention of readers of the Journal:  
GUIDE TO RESOURCES FOR COMMONWEALTH STUDIES. By A. R. Hewitt. London, published for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, by the Athlone Press, 1957. Pp. viii + 219. 21/- stg.

This admirable guide is designed to help advanced research students, especially from overseas, to locate the materials available for the study of British Commonwealth affairs in the British national collections, and in the libraries of universities, colleges, government departments, and learned institutions and societies in London, Oxford and Cambridge. It also includes information about facilities for Commonwealth study in British universities generally. The compiler is Secretary and Librarian to the Institute of Commonwealth Studies.

DIRECTORY OF SOCIAL SERVICES, QUEENSLAND. Compiled by the Social Work Staff of the Faculty of Education, University of Queensland. Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 1958. 15/- A.

This is the first comprehensive directory of the health and welfare facilities of Queensland covering 400 agencies under the headings: Statutory Departments, Child and Youth Services, Family and Adult Welfare, Health, Migration, Recreation, Service and Ex-Servicemen.

APSA NEWS: Bulletin of the Australian Political Studies Association. Vol. 3, No. 1, March 1958. Edited by Henry Mayer, Department of Government, University of Sydney.

This mimeographed periodical appears two or three times a year. It contains short articles on developments in the teaching and study of political science especially in Australia, "news briefs" on academic developments, new books and journals, and political events, and occasional supplements summarising the progress of research work.

An indication of the spread of interest in the Journal is provided by the receipt of several monographs published by the Research Institute for Humanistic Studies, Kyoto University, Japan. These publications include:

L'ENCYCLOPEDIE (1751-1780): A Corporate Study under the direction of Takeo Kuwabara. Tokyo, Institute for Humanistic Science, 1954. Pp. 37.

ROUSSEAU: A Corporate Study. Edited by Takeo Kuwabara. Tokyo, Institute of Humanistic Science, 1950. Pp. 498.

ZINBUN. Number 1, 1957. The first issue of a social science periodical containing articles on the collaborators of *L'Encyclopedie* and on the distribution of Rorschach responses.

## Books Received (to be reviewed)

Stephen B. Baxter: *The Development of the Treasury (1660-1702)*. London, Longmans, Green, 1957.

Hight and Straubel (eds.): *A History of Canterbury (N.Z.)*. Volume I: to 1854. Christchurch, Canterbury Centennial Association with Whitcombe and Tombs Ltd., 1957.

George Nadel: *Australia's Colonial Culture*. Melbourne, Cheshire, 1957.